Mossad/CIA/MI6/MI6/Five Eyes Security Agency Alliance Above The Law

Mossad/CIA/MI6/MI6/FiveEyesSecurityAgencyAllianceAboveTheLaw

Five Eyes

 https://privacyinternational.org/learn/five-eyes

Secret agreements allow secretive intelligence agencies in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the USA to Spy on the World

The Five Eyes brings the UK, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand into the world’s most complete and comprehensive intelligence alliance

Despite the fact that the alliance is known throughout the world and its existence is subject of endless debates, the real knowledge of how the Five Eyes works is still clouded by the security measures that involves almost everything related to the Five Eyes.

 https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/the-five-eyes-the-intelligence-alliance-of-the-anglosphere/

The Five Eyes (FVEY) is widely regarded as the world’s most significant intelligence alliance. The origins of it can be traced back to the context of the Second World War and by its necessity of sharing vital information mainly between Britain and the United States so both countries could enhance their close war effort.

For more than 70 years, the once-secret post-war alliance of the five English-speaking nations has been an infrastructure of surveillance with a global reach and ageing is not a problem for the FVEY, which remains one of the most complex and far-reaching intelligence and espionage alliances in our history. Former Mossad chief threatened ICC ...

Revealed: Israeli spy chief 'threatened ...

Differential focus image that centres Yossi Cohen among a crowd of suited men

Yossi Cohen during a reception held at the Israeli foreign ministry in Jerusalem, in May 2018. 

According to two sources, there were even suspicions among senior ICC officials that Israel had cultivated sources within the court’s prosecution division, known as the office of the prosecutor. Another later recalled that although the Mossad “didn’t leave its signature”, it was an assumption the agency was behind some of the activity officials had been made aware of.

Only a small group of senior figures at the ICC, however, were informed that the director of the Mossad had personally approached the chief prosecutor.

A career spy, Cohen enjoys a reputation in Israel’s intelligence community as an effective recruiter of foreign agents. He was a loyal and powerful ally of the prime minister at the time, having been appointed as director of the Mossad by Netanyahu in 2016 after working for several years at his side as his national security adviser.

As the head of the national security council between 2013 and 2016, Cohen oversaw the body that, according to multiple sources, began to coordinate a multiagency effort against the ICC once Bensouda opened the preliminary inquiry in 2015.

Cohen’s first interaction with Bensouda appears to have taken place at the Munich security conference in 2017, when the Mossad director introduced himself to the prosecutor in a brief exchange. After this encounter, Cohen subsequently “ambushed” Bensouda in a bizarre episode

Netanyahu and Cohen

Cohen (right) was appointed as director of the Mossad by Netanyahu in 2016 after working for several years as his national security adviser.

ICC prosecutor requests arrest warrants for Netanyahu, Gallant and three Hamas leaders – video

ICC prosecutor requests arrest warrants for Netanyahu, Gallant and three Hamas leaders 

Three of those sources were familiar with Bensouda’s formal disclosures to the ICC about the matter. They said she revealed Cohen had put pressure on her on several occasions not to proceed with a criminal investigation in the ICC’s Palestine case.

Revealed: Israeli spy chief 'threatened' ICC prosecutor over war crimes  inquiry | Israel | The Guardian

Mossad/CIA/MI6/MI6/Five Eyes Security Agency Alliance Above The Law to Be Able To Commit Murder With Impunity

The former head of the Mossad, Israel's foreign intelligence agency, allegedly threatened a chief prosecutor of the international criminal court in a series of secret meetings in which he tried to pressure her into abandoning a war crimes investigation,

the Guardian can reveal..

The former head of the Mossad, Israel’s foreign intelligence agency, allegedly threatened a chief prosecutor of the international criminal court in a series of secret meetings in which he tried to pressure her into abandoning a war crimes investigation, the Guardian can reveal.

Yossi Cohen’s covert contacts with the ICC’s then prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, took place in the years leading up to her decision to open a formal investigation into alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in occupied Palestinian territories.

Fatou Bensouda stands next to various national flags at a lectern that features the UN logo.

The ICC case dates back to 2015, when Fatou Bensouda decided to open a preliminary examination into the situation in Palestine. Photograph: Pacific Press Media Production Corp/Alamy

In the Mossad’s efforts to influence Bensouda, Israel received support from an unlikely ally: Joseph Kabila, the former president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, who played a supporting role in the plot.

Bensouda shaking hands with a bearded Joseph Kabila

Bensouda with Joseph Kabila in New York. Sources claim the then DRC leader played an important supporting role in the Mossad’s plot against the ICC’s chief prosecutor. Photograph: ICC

Bensouda was in New York in 2018 on an official visit, and was meeting Kabila, then the president of the DRC, at his hotel. The pair had met several times before in relation to the ICC’s ongoing investigation into alleged crimes committed in his country.

The meeting, however, appears to have been a setup. At a certain point, after Bensouda’s staff were asked to leave the room, Cohen entered, according to three sources familiar with the meeting. The surprise appearance, they said, caused alarm to Bensouda and a group of ICC officials travelling with her.

 

Who Murdered Thomas Graham Allwood and Why?

https://awn.bz/WhoMurderedThomasAllwood.html

Thomas Graham Allwood was murdered in Broxburn Scotland, on the 21st June, 2012 after telling friends the day before of threats on his life 

The world still morns and reflects on the murder of INL News and AWN News Investigative Journalist, poet, film and TV producer... Thomas Graham Allwood  was only 56 years old..... who was murdered because he dared to expose the truth about many wrongful illegal activities being carried out by the rich, well-connected and powerful

The below independent witness's sworn testimony of the next door neighbour to John Montgomery's House, where Thomas Graham Allwood was invited that night to visit after being at the pub,....  was completely ignored by the jury and the court. This undisputable evidence proves that Thomas Graham Allwood was king hit against the lounge room wall, at around 3.15 am...  everything went silent... then Thomas Graham Allwood  was obviously carried out quietly while unconscious .... with the door not slamming for the first time for years ....  then Thomas Graham Allwood  was stabbed in the street while unconscious ..... then left in the street to bleed to death... ..

Whereas Kyle Montgomery, who was a diagnosed chronic schizophrenic. completely made up the story to the court that the fight and stabbing broke out at around 1 am in the morning, and that Thomas Graham Allwood was armed with an Iron Bar .... and he accidently stabbed Thomas Graham Allwood with a single six inch wound to his heart, being the only spot a person cab be stabbed and die form such stab wound....

( a Russian Police Officer was stabbed 35 times and did not die from his stab wounds) .....

Thomas Graham Allwood was a well built man and a trained security guard, who could easily handle the small statured paralytic drunk Kyle Montgomery without any iron bar...

However if Thomas Graham Allwood had an iron bar, which is doubtful, .... as there would be nowhere to obtain an iron bar. at 1 to 3 am in the morning in a quiet small residential place such as Broxburn.... there is no possible way that Kyle Montgomery, who would have been paralytic drunk, after drinking vodka for the last 12 plus hours, could have been able to achieve a one single six inch stab wound into Thomas Graham Allwood's body ..., in the only place that could kill a person, with one stab wound.....

( two experts were interviewed by the INLTVNews Investigation Team ..

One a doctor,

and

Second, a trained professional hitman trained to silently kill a person for the UK Government ...

They both stated that to be able to kill a person with one single stab wound, one has to have an intimate knowledge of the human body, have the right type of long sharp pointed knife, not a serrated  bread knife that Kyle Montgomery says he used to stab Thomas Graham Allwood with ...know where exactly to stab the person, and know how to extract the knife to cause maximum damage ... and be well in control of their senses and movements ... not paralytic drunk)..

....if Thomas Graham Allwood was armed with an iron bar, then he would have easily knocked the knife out o Kyle Montgomery's hand, and then completely overpowered the small statured paralytic drunk Kyle Montgomery ... at best Kyle Montgomery may have landed a few superficial wounds on Thomas Graham Allwood, before the iron bar was used to knock the knife out of Kyle Montgomery's hand...

... thus in the circumstances, there is simply no way that Thomas Graham Allwood ended up with just one deep six inch stab wound to the heart, with no other superficial wounds on his body... as evidenced by the forensic witness at the trial.. .....

plus all this was meant to have taken place at around 1am in the morning, according to Kyle Montgomery and his father John Montgomery... ..... yet the next door neighbours said the drinking, shouting and arguing went on till 3.15 am in the morning.. which all ended with an eventual massive bang on their bedroom wall at 3.15 am in the morning, with the bang so hard they thought that their thin plaster bedroom wall was going to cave in... it seems that their is no reasonable doubt that Thomas Graham Allwood was given a massively hard king hit against John Montgomery's lounge room wall, which was also their bedroom wall at 3.15 in the morning, with it likely that his girl friend  Margaret Sheddon, who was a trained nurse, had given Thomas Graham Allwood some heavy sedative drugs when she gave him his heart pills,... so by the time he was king hit Thomas Graham Allwood  was well on the way to being heavily sedated..

.... this further proves the whole story as stated by Kyle Montgomery at his trial was a completely fabricated story.... which was implanted in his mind... so he could be the fall guy for the hired hit man acting under instructions of the Mossad/CIA/MI5/MI6/CIA/Five Eyes, ,,,, who was hired to kill Thomas Graham Allwood  form nay reasons, which included that Thomas Graham Allwood was involved in exposing serious corruption int her UK Government, the UK Police and Legal system, along with issued a £100 million pound damages claim and a criminal contempt application against the then UK Prime Minister David Cameron, and the UK Chancellor, George Osborne, who are not well-connected powerful Red Lodge high ranking Scottish Rite Freemasons, along with the UK Border Agency, the UK Home Office, and UK Treasury Solicitors named as respondents in these High Court of London Proceedings.. which included a criminal contempt application for the respondents to be put in prison for their involvement in a most serious criminal conspiracy to pervert the course of justice, by all conspiring to create a false fraudulent UK Border Agency document and having their Treasury Solicitors present it to Master Page at the High Court of Justice in London, attached to a letter demanding that, on the basis such false fraudulent UK Border Agency Document, that Master Page completely strike out strike Thomas Graham Allwood's and others High Court Claim for £100 million in damages against  the then UK Prime Minister David Cameron, and the UK Chancellor, George Osborne, who are not well-connected powerful Red Lodge high ranking Scottish Rite Freemasons, along with the UK Border Agency, the UK Home Office, and UK Treasury Solicitors  ...for illegally and wrongfully arresting very talented USA Character Comedian Ronnie Prouty at  London's Heathrow Airport, then illegally and wrongfully holding him in custody for 48 hours, and then sending him back to Los Angeles in handcuffs using his own return ticket back to Loas Angeles...48 hours later... to stop him continue hos journey to Edinburgh, where he was staying for five days to help free of charge with the filming of the Pilot of the Fringe Shows Have Talent TV Show, , then returning back to Los Angeles..... Rupert Murdoch  and his all powerful Rothschild silent partners in their News Corp LLC wanted the UK Border Agency to in any way possible to stop the the Pilot of the Fringe Shows Have Talent TV Show, which was being produced by the INLTVNews Group and Thomas Graham Allwood , because this would give their competitors, the INLTVNews Media, TV, Film and Publishing Group and Thomas Graham Allwood, creditability in the media, TV and filming world, and  help make them financially successful with their proposed float of the stock exchange.

Below if a copy of part of the unsigned and no UK Border Agency officers named....  Fraudulent False UK Border Agency Document  presented to Master Page at the High Court on London, by the UK Treasury Solicitors, on behalf of the then UK Prime Minister David Cameron, the then UK Chancellor George Osborne, the UK Home Office and the UK Border Agency with a false made up statement that falsely implies was made by Ronnie Prouty to two unnamed UK Border Agency  Officers ... which was never made by Ronne Prouty... well knowing that such document was fraudulent and false ....  as a basis to convince the Red Lodge High Ranking Scottish Rite Freemason Master Price, to completely strike out without any court hearing, Thomas Graham Allwood's and Others claim for £100, million pounds damages, which cost £3,00 pounds in court fees to file, without talking into consideration legal preparation costs, for the wrongful and illegal arrest of Character Comedian, Ronnie Prouty on the 14th May 2011 at London's Heathrow Airport, which was for the wrongful purpose, to commercially sabotage the filming of the Fringe Shows Have Talent TV Pilot in Edinburgh planned for filming in May 2011

 

Fraudluent_UKBorderAgencyDocument_FalseStatmentByUKBordergencyConcerningRonnieprouty_falsleydated-14-05-2011

thomas allwood

INLTVWorld News Top Investigative Journalist Thomas Graham Allwood was found lying dead as a result of a violent stabbing in the Pyothall Road Broxburn 

INLTVWorld News Top Investigative Journalist Thomas Graham Allwood held both UK and Australian Passports, having been born in Scotland, but lived a lot of his life in Australia with his World War II Hero Father, Thomas Allwood, who worked for both the British and Australian Air Forces, was found lying dead as a result of a violent stabbing in the Pyothall Road Broxburn . 

 World War II Hero, Thomas Allwood, was ordered by the UK Government at the end of World War II, to act in his capacity of a flight engineer, on hundreds of clandestine flights from Heathrow Airport in London, delivering to the Rothschilds in Switzerland, billions of pounds of gold bars stacked on wooden pallets and wrapped in Black Plastic, with no security guards present, so there no witnesses, other than a couple of RAAF Staff, who were sworn to secrecy.

This billions of pounds in gold bars as the repayment of Britain's War Finance Debt owed to the Rothschild Family, who financed the military purchases to  all sides of World War II.

INLTVWorldNews Top Investigative Journalist, Thomas Graham Allwood ,was found by members of the public lying across Pyothall Road in Broxburn, Scotland at about 04:45 on Thursday 21st June 2012, having been violently stabbed to death by a very professional hitman. Thomas Graham Allwood died from a one six inch knife wound to his heart, after been drugged and then violently king hit to make him unconscious, at a nearby house in Broxburn, where he was lured to visit by a Mossad/MI5/MI6/CIA/Five Eyes Security Agency Alliance Asset. Thomas Graham Allwood's  body was carried to the street, where he was stabbed while unconscious, then left to bleed to death in Pyothall Road in Broxburn, Scotland.  An in-depth INLTVWorldNews Investigation Report in the background of the murder and how the murder happened, and why the murder happened, showing beyond any reasonable doubt that the Mossad/MI5/MI6/CIA/Five Eyes Security Agency Alliance were involved in the planned murder of  INLTVWorldNews Top Investigative Journalist, Thomas Graham Allwood, was handed to the Head of Scotland's Procurat0r Fiscal, which is Scotland's equivalent the Director of Public Prosecutions  (DPP) in other Western Countries,.

This  in-depth INLTVWorldNews Investigation Report in the background of the murder and how the murder happened, and why the murder happened, demanded a personal meeting with the Head of Scotland's Procurat0r Fiscal, to discuss the reinvestigation of the murder of Thomas Graham Allwood, a further examination of the body, and am injunction freeze of the planned cremation of the body of Thomas Graham Allwood, until a full reexamination of his body was completed. However, the Head of Scotland's Procurat0r Fiscal ordered the immediate cremation of the body of Thomas Graham Allwood, refused any meeting to discuss the most serious facts and issues set out in the INLTVWorldNews 300 in-depth Investigation Report into the murder of  Thomas Graham Allwood, and wrote a short one sentence letter to the INLTVWorldNews stating... "Scotland's Police and Procurat0r Fiscal have done an excellent job investigating the murder of INLTVWorldNews Top Investigative Journalist, Thomas Graham Allwood, and file in now completely closed, thus no meeting to discuss this matter will be provided with the INLTVWorld News Group, and no further correspondence with be entered into the murder of Thomas  Graham Allwood

Community's shock over man's death

A COMMUNITY have spoken of their shock after a man was found dead in their street. 

Mossad/CIA/MI6/MI6/Five Eyes Security Agency Alliance

Eugenics before 1945 (inltv.co.uk)

'I'm a Zionist,' says Biden, calls for peace efforts in Gaza

'I'm a Zionist,' says Biden, calls for peace efforts in Gaza

President Joe Biden has reiterated that he is a Zionist and said Israel must take advantage of an opportunity to have peace and security for Israelis and Palestinians.

"You need not be a Jew to be a Zionist. I'm a Zionist. Where there's no Israel, there's not a Jew in the world to be safe," Biden said on an appearance on "Late Night With Seth Meyers" on NBC late Monday.

CIA Agent stated that ..We designed mRNA To Kill.."

According to the agent and leaked top-secret documents, the COVID pandemic was a psyop, run by the CIA to frogmarch humanity towards a total surveillance state.

And COVID mRNA vaccines were not developed during Operation Warp Speed, but were ready and waiting for deployment for at least 10 years prior to the pandemic!

Revealed: Israeli spy chief ‘threatened’ ICC prosecutor over war crimes inquiry

Mossad director Yossi Cohen personally involved in secret plot to pressure Fatou Bensouda to drop Palestine investigation, sources say

  • Spying, hacking and intimidation: Israel’s nine-year ‘war’ on the ICC exposed
  • The former head of the Mossad, Israel’s foreign intelligence agency, allegedly threatened a chief prosecutor of the international criminal court in a series of secret meetings in which he tried to pressure her into abandoning a war crimes investigation, the Guardian can reveal.

    Yossi Cohen’s covert contacts with the ICC’s then prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, took place in the years leading up to her decision to open a formal investigation into alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in occupied Palestinian territories.

     

    That investigation, launched in 2021, culminated last week when Bensouda’s successor, Karim Khan, announced that he was seeking an arrest warrant for the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, over the country’s conduct in its war in Gaza.

    The prosecutor’s decision to apply to the ICC’s pre-trial chamber for arrest warrants for Netanyahu and his defence minister, Yoav Gallant, alongside three Hamas leaders, is an outcome Israel’s military and political establishment has long feared.

    Netanyahu and Cohen
    Cohen (right) was appointed as director of the Mossad by Netanyahu in 2016 after working for several years as his national security adviser. 

    Cohen’s personal involvement in the operation against the ICC took place when he was the director of the Mossad. His activities were authorised at a high level and justified on the basis the court posed a threat of prosecutions against military personnel, according to a senior Israeli official.

     

    Another Israeli source briefed on the operation against Bensouda said the Mossad’s objective was to compromise the prosecutor or enlist her as someone who would cooperate with Israel’s demands.

    A third source familiar with the operation said Cohen was acting as Netanyahu’s “unofficial messenger”.

    Cohen, who was one of Netanyahu’s closest allies at the time and is emerging as a political force in his own right in Israel, personally led the Mossad’s involvement in an almost decade-long campaign by the country to undermine the court.

    Four sources confirmed that Bensouda had briefed a small group of senior ICC officials about Cohen’s attempts to sway her, amid concerns about the increasingly persistent and threatening nature of his behaviour.

    5:17
     
    ICC prosecutor requests arrest warrants for Netanyahu, Gallant and three Hamas leaders – video

    Three of those sources were familiar with Bensouda’s formal disclosures to the ICC about the matter. They said she revealed Cohen had put pressure on her on several occasions not to proceed with a criminal investigation in the ICC’s Palestine case.

     

    According to accounts shared with ICC officials, he is alleged to have told her: “You should help us and let us take care of you. You don’t want to be getting into things that could compromise your security or that of your family.”

    One individual briefed on Cohen’s activities said he had used “despicable tactics” against Bensouda as part of an ultimately unsuccessful effort to intimidate and influence her. They likened his behaviour to “stalking”.

    The Mossad also took a keen interest in Bensouda’s family members and obtained transcripts of secret recordings of her husband, according to two sources with direct knowledge of the situation. Israeli officials then attempted to use the material to discredit the prosecutor.

    The revelations about Cohen’s operation form part of a forthcoming investigation by the Guardian, the Israeli-Palestinian publication +972 Magazine and the Hebrew-language outlet Local Call, revealing how multiple Israel intelligence agencies ran a covert “war” against the ICC for almost a decade.

    Contacted by the Guardian, a spokesperson for Israel’s prime minister’s office said: “The questions forwarded to us are replete with many false and unfounded allegations meant to hurt the state of Israel.” Cohen did not respond to a request for comment. Bensouda declined to comment.

    Fatou Bensouda stands next to various national flags at a lectern that features the UN logo.
    The ICC case dates back to 2015, when Fatou Bensouda decided to open a preliminary examination into the situation in Palestine. 

    In the Mossad’s efforts to influence Bensouda, Israel received support from an unlikely ally: Joseph Kabila, the former president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, who played a supporting role in the plot.

     

    Revelations about the Mossad’s efforts to influence Bensouda come as the current chief prosecutor, Khan, warned in recent days that he would not hesitate to prosecute “attempts to impede, intimidate or improperly influence” ICC officials.

    According to legal experts and former ICC officials, efforts by the Mossad to threaten or put pressure on Bensouda could amount to offences against the administration of justice under article 70 of the Rome statute, the treaty that established the court.

    A spokesperson for the ICC would not say whether Khan had reviewed his predecessor’s disclosures about her contacts with Cohen, but said Khan had never met or spoken to the head of the Mossad.

    While the spokesperson declined to comment on specific allegations, they said Khan’s office had been subjected to “several forms of threats and communications that could be viewed as attempts to unduly influence its activities”.

    Bensouda sparks ire of Israel

    Khan’s decision to seek arrest warrants against Netanyahu and Gallant last week marked the first time the court had taken action against leaders of a country closely allied with the US and Europe. Their alleged crimes – which include directing attacks on civilians and using starvation as a method of warfare – relate to the eight-month war in Gaza.

    The ICC case, however, dates back to 2015, when Bensouda decided to open a preliminary examination into the situation in Palestine. Short of a full investigation, her inquiry was tasked with making an initial assessment of allegations of crimes by individuals in Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

    Bensouda’s decision sparked the ire of Israel, which feared its citizens could be prosecuted for their involvement in operations in Palestinian territories. Israel had long been open about its opposition to the ICC, refusing to recognise its authority. Israeli ministers intensified their attacks on the court and even vowed to try to dismantle it.

    Soon after commencing the preliminary examination, Bensouda and her senior prosecutors began to receive warnings that Israeli intelligence was taking a close interest in their work.

    Differential focus image that centres Yossi Cohen among a crowd of suited men
    Yossi Cohen during a reception held at the Israeli foreign ministry in Jerusalem, in May 2018. 

    According to two sources, there were even suspicions among senior ICC officials that Israel had cultivated sources within the court’s prosecution division, known as the office of the prosecutor. Another later recalled that although the Mossad “didn’t leave its signature”, it was an assumption the agency was behind some of the activity officials had been made aware of.

     

    Only a small group of senior figures at the ICC, however, were informed that the director of the Mossad had personally approached the chief prosecutor.

    A career spy, Cohen enjoys a reputation in Israel’s intelligence community as an effective recruiter of foreign agents. He was a loyal and powerful ally of the prime minister at the time, having been appointed as director of the Mossad by Netanyahu in 2016 after working for several years at his side as his national security adviser.

    As the head of the national security council between 2013 and 2016, Cohen oversaw the body that, according to multiple sources, began to coordinate a multiagency effort against the ICC once Bensouda opened the preliminary inquiry in 2015.

    Cohen’s first interaction with Bensouda appears to have taken place at the Munich security conference in 2017, when the Mossad director introduced himself to the prosecutor in a brief exchange. After this encounter, Cohen subsequently “ambushed” Bensouda in a bizarre episode in a Manhattan hotel suite, according to multiple sources familiar with the incident.

    Bensouda shaking hands with a bearded Joseph Kabila
    Bensouda with Joseph Kabila in New York. Sources claim the then DRC leader played an important supporting role in the Mossad’s plot against the ICC’s chief prosecutor. Photograph: ICC

    Bensouda was in New York in 2018 on an official visit, and was meeting Kabila, then the president of the DRC, at his hotel. The pair had met several times before in relation to the ICC’s ongoing investigation into alleged crimes committed in his country.

    The meeting, however, appears to have been a setup. At a certain point, after Bensouda’s staff were asked to leave the room, Cohen entered, according to three sources familiar with the meeting. The surprise appearance, they said, caused alarm to Bensouda and a group of ICC officials travelling with her.

    Why Kabila helped Cohen is unclear, but ties between the two men were revealed in 2022 by the Israeli publication TheMarker, which reported on a series of secretive trips the Mossad director made to the DRC throughout 2019.

    According to the publication, Cohen’s trips, during which he sought Kabila’s advice “on an issue of interest to Israel”, and which were almost certainly approved by Netanyahu, were highly unusual and had astonished senior figures within the intelligence community.

     

    Reporting on the DRC meetings in 2022, the Israeli broadcaster Kan 11 said Cohen’s trips related to an “extremely controversial plan” and cited official sources who described it as “one of Israel’s most sensitive secrets”.

    Multiple sources have confirmed to the Guardian the trips were partly related to the ICC operation, and Kabila, who left office in January 2019, played an important supporting role in the Mossad’s plot against Bensouda. Kabila did not respond to a request for comment.

    ‘Threats and manipulation’

    After the surprise meeting with Kabila and Bensouda in New York, Cohen repeatedly phoned the chief prosecutor and sought meetings with her, three sources recalled. According to two people familiar with the situation, at one stage Bensouda asked Cohen how he had obtained her phone number, to which he replied: “Did you forget what I do for a living?”

    Initially, the sources explained, the intelligence chief “tried to build a relationship” with the prosecutor and played “good cop” in an attempt to charm her. The initial objective, they said, appeared to have been to enlist Bensouda into cooperating with Israel.

    Over time, however, the tone of Cohen’s contact changed and he began to use a range of tactics, including “threats and manipulation”, an individual briefed on the meetings said. This prompted Bensouda to inform a small group of senior ICC officials about his behaviour.

    In December 2019, the prosecutor announced that she had grounds to open a full criminal investigation into allegations of war crimes in Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem. However, she held off launching it, deciding first to request a ruling from the ICC’s pre-trial chamber to confirm the court did indeed have jurisdiction over Palestine.

    Demonstrators carry banners outside the ICC
    Protesters gather outside the ICC to call for the court to prosecute Israel for war crimes.

    Multiple sources said it was at this stage, as the judges considered the case, that Cohen escalated his attempts to persuade Bensouda not to pursue a full investigation in the event the judges gave her the green light.

     

    Between late 2019 and early 2021, the sources said, there were at least three encounters between Cohen and Bensouda, all initiated by the spy chief. His behaviour is said to have become increasingly concerning to ICC officials.

    A source familiar with Bensouda’s accounts of the final two meetings with Cohen said he had raised questions about her security, and that of her family, in a manner that led her to believe he was threatening her.

    On one occasion, Cohen is said to have shown Bensouda copies of photographs of her husband, which were taken covertly when the couple were visiting London. On another, according to sources, Cohen suggested to the prosecutor that a decision to open a full investigation would be detrimental to her career.

    Four sources familiar with the situation said it was around the same time that Bensouda and other ICC officials discovered that information was circulating among diplomatic channels relating to her husband, who worked as an international affairs consultant.

    Between 2019 and 2020, the Mossad had been actively seeking compromising information on the prosecutor and took an interest in her family members.

    In February 2021, it was confirmed that the ICC had jurisdiction in occupied Palestinian territories. Photograph: Peter Dejong/AP

    The spy agency obtained a cache of material, including transcripts of an apparent sting operation against her husband.

     

    It is unclear who conducted the operation, or precisely what he is alleged to have said in the recordings. One possibility is that he had been targeted by the intelligence agency or by private actors of another country that wanted leverage over the ICC. Another possibility is the information was fabricated.

    Once in the possession of Israel, however, the material was used by its diplomats in an unsuccessful attempt to undermine the chief prosecutor. But according to multiple sources, Israel failed to convince its allies of the significance of the material.

    Three sources briefed on the information shared by Israel at a diplomatic level described the efforts as part of an unsuccessful “smear campaign” against Bensouda. “They went after Fatou,” one source said, but it had “no impact” on the prosecutor’s work.

    Trump and Netanyahu shake hands
    Trump and Netanyahu. The Trump administration imposed visa restrictions and sanctions on Bensouda in 2019-20. 

    The diplomatic efforts were part of a coordinated effort by the governments of Netanyahu and Donald Trump in the US to place public and private pressure on the prosecutor and her staff.

    Between 2019 and 2020, in an unprecedented decision, the Trump administration imposed visa restrictions and sanctions on the chief prosecutor. The move was in retaliation to Bensouda’s pursuit of a separate investigation into war crimes in Afghanistan, allegedly committed by the Taliban and both Afghan and US military personnel.

    However, Mike Pompeo, then US secretary of state, linked the sanctions package to the Palestine case. “It’s clear the ICC is only putting Israel in [its] crosshairs for nakedly political purposes,” he said.

    Months later, he accused Bensouda, without citing any evidence, of having “engaged in corrupt acts for her personal benefit”.

    The US sanctions were rescinded after President Joe Biden entered the White House.

    In February 2021, the ICC’s pre-trial chamber issued a ruling confirming the ICC had jurisdiction in occupied Palestinian territories. The following month, Bensouda announced the opening of the criminal investigation.

    “In the end, our central concern must be for the victims of crimes, both Palestinian and Israeli, arising from the long cycle of violence and insecurity that has caused deep suffering and despair on all sides,” she said at the time.

    Bensouda completed her nine-year term at the ICC three months later, leaving it to her successor, Khan, to take up the investigation. It was only after the Hamas attacks on Israel on 7 October and the ensuing war on Gaza that the ICC’s investigation gained renewed urgency, culminating in last week’s request for arrest warrants.

    It was the conclusion Israel’s political, military and intelligence establishment had feared. “The fact they chose the head of Mossad to be the prime minister’s unofficial messenger to [Bensouda] was to intimidate, by definition,” said a source briefed on Cohen’s operation. “It failed.”

     

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      UK government challenged over ICC inquiry into Israel’s conduct

     

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 https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/may/28/israeli-spy-chief-icc-prosecutor-war-crimes-inquiry#:~:text=The%20former%20head%20of%20the,investigation%2C%20the%20Guardian%20can%20reveal.The former head of the Mossad, Israel's foreign intelligence agency, allegedly threatened a chief prosecutor of the international criminal court in a series of secret meetings in which he tried to pressure her into abandoning a war crimes investigation, the Guardian can reveal

COHEN WAS NETANYAHU'S 'UNOFFICIAL MESSENGER' TO BENSOUDA

Former Mossad chief threatened ICC prosecutor over probe into Israel, report claims

The Guardian charges that Yossi Cohen ‘stalked’ and ‘intimidated’ former ICC chief prosecutor Fatou Bensouda between 2017 and 2021, hinted he’d incriminate her husband

 https://www.timesofisrael.com/former-mossad-chief-threatened-icc-prosecutor-over-probe-into-israel-report-claims/

Ex-Mossad chief Yossi Cohen (left) at the Kirya base in Tel Aviv, January 16, 2023 (Tomer Neuberg/Flash90); Then-International Criminal Court Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda speaks during an interview with The Associated Press in The Hague, Netherlands, June 14, 2021. (Peter Dejong/AP Photo)

Ex-Mossad chief Yossi Cohen (left) at the Kirya base in Tel Aviv, January 16, 2023 (Tomer Neuberg/Flash90); Then-International Criminal Court Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda speaks during an interview with The Associated Press in The Hague, Netherlands, June 14, 2021. 

Former Mossad chief Yossi Cohen allegedly engaged in “threats and intimidation” in an attempt to stop former International Criminal Court chief prosecutor Fatou Bensouda from opening a war crimes investigation into Israel, according to a report published by The Guardian on Tuesday.

Citing a slew of unnamed Israeli and ICC officials, the report claimed Cohen, who led the Mossad in 2016-2021, had frequent and increasingly threatening communications with Bensouda between 2017 and 2021 that amounted to “stalking,” in which he tried to persuade her not to investigate Israel.

Three unnamed Israeli sources familiar with the matter told The Guardian that Cohen was allegedly approved “at a high level” to act as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s “unofficial messenger” and that the objective was to compromise Bensouda or get her to comply with Israel’s demands.

The Guardian said the allegations come from part of a forthcoming investigation by the Guardian, the Israeli-Palestinian publication +972 Magazine and the Hebrew-language outlet Local Call, revealing how multiple Israel intelligence agencies ran a covert “war” against the ICC for almost a decade.

The report placed Cohen’s and Bensouda’s first meeting in 2017 when the former Mossad chief introduced himself to the then-prosecutor at a security conference in Munich

The next meeting, the report continued, came in 2018 when Cohen allegedly teamed up with the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s then-president Joseph Kabila to ambush Bensouda in a hotel room in New York.

According to the report, Bensouda was meant to meet with Kabila but found herself in a surprise meeting with Cohen after her staff was told to leave the room, which sources said left her “alarmed.”

ICC Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda at the International Criminal Court in The Hague, Netherlands, January 28, 2016.

Three unnamed sources told The Guardian that after the surprise meeting, Cohen repeatedly called Bensouda on her phone and sought meetings with her, asking her “Did you forget what I do for a living?” when she inquired how he got her number.

The sources said Cohen initially “played good cop,” trying to build a relationship with Bensouda, but eventually resorted to “threats and manipulation” when that did not work.

They added that after Bensouda announced in 2019 that she was ready to open an investigation into Israel, she and Cohen had three meetings until she left her role in 2021.

 

Former Mossad chief Yossi Cohen at a Jerusalem Post Conference on October 12, 2021

Cohen allegedly initiated all three meetings, two of which led Bensouda to believe he was threatening her and her family after he showed her covert photos of her husband and told her an investigation would be detrimental to her career.

An unspecified number of unnamed ICC officials claimed they were told that Cohen had said to Bensouda, “You should help us and let us take care of you. You don’t want to be getting into things that could compromise your security or that of your family.”

The report claimed Israel then launched a smear campaign against Bensouda that was allegedly coordinated with then-US president Donald Trump, who imposed visa restrictions and sanctions on her. President Joe Biden canceled the sanctions when he took office in 2021.

 

Then-president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Joseph Kabila sits in a garden at his ranch on December 10, 2018 in Kinshasa. (John WESSELS / AFP)

Responding to a request for comment, the Prime Minister’s Office told The Guardian, “The questions forwarded to us are replete with many false and unfounded allegations meant to hurt the State of Israel.”

The publication added that Cohen did not respond to a request for comment and that Bensouda declined to comment.

Bensouda announced in December 2019 that her office had grounds to open an investigation into Israeli actions in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem but that she was seeking a ruling on whether the ICC had jurisdiction.

In the report she published at the time, she accused Israel of at least three disproportionate attacks, willfully killing and injuring civilians, and intentionally attacking Red Cross personnel and institutions during Operation Protective Edge in Gaza in 2014.

In the same report, she accused Hamas and other terrorist organizations of a string of charges including intentionally attacking Israeli civilians, using Palestinian civilians as human shields, and torture and inhumane treatment.

At the time of her announcement, Bensouda was accused of bias against Israel. Israeli observers noted the significance of the timing of the investigation’s span: On June 12, 2014, Hamas terrorists kidnapped and murdered three Israeli teenagers in the Gush Etzion area of the West Bank. Bensouda’s investigation was set to focus on events beginning only from the following day.

More than a year later, in February, 2021, the pre-trial chamber ruled that “Palestine” was enough of a state to fall under the ICC’s jurisdiction, and Bensouda began her investigation before stepping down that same month and being replaced with the current chief prosecutor, Karim Khan.

“The fact they chose the head of Mossad to be the prime minister’s unofficial messenger to [Bensouda] was to intimidate, by definition,” one of the unnamed sources told the Guardian. “It failed.”

International Criminal Court Prosecutor Karim Khan looks on during an interview with AFP at the Cour d’Honneur of the Palais Royal in Paris on February 7, 2024. (Dimitar DILKOFF / AFP)

Khan did not close the investigation, but it largely lost prominence until the Israel-Hamas war broke out on October 7 with Hamas’s unprecedented onslaught on southern Israel in which terrorists murdered some 1,200 people and seized 252 hostages.

Over more than seven months of the war, Khan investigated both Hamas’s actions during the attack and Israeli actions throughout its ground invasion in the Gaza Strip.

Last week, Khan announced that following his investigation, he was seeking arrest warrants for three Hamas leaders as well as Netanyahu and Defense Minister Gallant. The warrants for the latter two, he said, were being sought on charges of starvation as a method of warfare, willfully causing great suffering or cruel treatment, willfully killing, intentional attacks against civilians, extermination, and persecution.

Khan has never commented directly on Cohen’s alleged behavior toward Bensouda but has recently said that he would “not hesitate to prosecute attempts to impede, intimidate or improperly influence” ICC officials.

Five Eyes

 https://privacyinternational.org/learn/five-eyes

Secret agreements allow secretive intelligence agencies in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the USA to Spy on the World

In 1946, an alliance was formed between five anglophone countries and their security agencies:  the US (NSA), the UK (GCHQ), Australia (ASD), Canada (CSEC) and New Zealand (GCSB) comprising of a series of bilateral agreements on surveillance and intelligence-sharing. Though these arrangements are commonly referred to as the United Kingdom-United States Communication Intelligence Act (UKUSA) agreement, the documents underpinning the Five Eyes alliance are numerous, intricate, and secret

Pursuant to these arrangements, each of the Five Eyes states conducts interception, collection, acquisition, analysis and decryption activities, sharing all intelligence information obtained with the others by default.

Information on the Five Eyes alliance has emerged piecemeal since its birth. We now know that Five Eyes have integrated programmes, integrated staff, integrated bases, and integrated analysis.

Intelligence-sharing agreements have now expanded beyond the Five Eyes to include other states: 

9 Eyes: the Five Eyes, with the addition of Denmark, France, the Netherlands and Norway;
14 Eyes: the 9 Eyes, with the addition of Germany, Belgium, Italy, Spain and Sweden;
41 Eyes: all of the above, with the addition of the allied coalition in Afghanistan;
Tier B countries with which the Five Eyes have “focused cooperation” on computer network exploitation, including Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungry, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherland, Norway, Poland, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey;

What is the problem

The Five Eyes intelligence-sharing arrangements are shrouded in secrecy, allowing for arbitrary or unlawful intrusions on the right to privacy which circumvent domestic legal restrictions on state surveillance. There is no domestic legislation governing intelligence-sharing, meaning that many of these arrangements lack legal basis and therefore democratic legitimacy. The “third party rule”, often included in intelligence-sharing agreements, forbids the disclosure of inter-agency information to third parties, ousting the possibility of oversight.

Some of the bilateral agreements falling under the UKUSA umbrella reveal the outsourcing of surveillance activities to corporations without limiting their access to classified information, contributing to the privatisation of espionage. This raises questions about the delegation of governmental functions to private actors that remain unanswered.

What is the solution

What PI is doing

Five Eyes

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Five_Eyes

The Five Eyes (FVEY) is an Anglosphere intelligence alliance comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States.[1] These countries are parties to the multilateral UK-USA Agreement, a treaty for joint cooperation in signals intelligence.[2][3][4] Informally, Five Eyes can refer to the group of intelligence agencies of these countries.

The origins of the FVEY can be traced to informal secret meetings during World War II between British and American code-breakers, before the US formally entered the war.[5] The alliance was formalized in the post-war era, specifically through the UKUSA Agreement in 1946. As the Cold War deepened, the intelligence sharing arrangement became formalised under the ECHELON surveillance system in the 1960s.[6] This was developed by the FVEY to monitor the communications of the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc; it is now used to monitor communications worldwide.[7][8] The FVEY expanded their surveillance capabilities during the course of the "war on terror", with much emphasis placed on monitoring the World Wide Web. The alliance has grown into a robust global surveillance mechanism, adapting to new challenges such as international terrorism, cyber threats, and regional conflicts.

The alliance's activities, often shrouded in secrecy, have occasionally come under scrutiny for their implications on privacy and civil liberties, sparking debates and legal challenges. In the late 1990s, the existence of ECHELON was disclosed to the public, triggering a debate in the European Parliament and, to a lesser extent, the United States Congress and British Parliament. Former NSA contractor Edward Snowden described the Five Eyes as a "supra-national intelligence organisation that does not answer to the known laws of its own countries".[9] 2010s global surveillance disclosures revealed FVEY had been spying on one another's citizens and sharing the collected information with each other, although the FVEY nations maintain this was done legally. It has been claimed FVEY nations have been sharing intelligence to circumvent domestic laws, but only one court case in Canada has found any FVEY nation breaking domestic laws when sharing intelligence with a FVEYs partner.[10][11]

Five Eyes is among the most comprehensive espionage alliances.[12] Since processed intelligence is gathered from multiple sources, the intelligence shared is not restricted to signals intelligence (SIGINT) and often involves defence intelligence as well as human intelligence (HUMINT) and geospatial intelligence (GEOINT). Five Eyes remains a critical element in the intelligence and security landscape of each member country, providing a strategic advantage in understanding and responding to global events.

Organisations

The following table provides an overview of most of the FVEY agencies involved in such forms of data sharing.[2]

Australia

Australian Secret Intelligence Service ASIS Human intelligence
Australian Secret Intelligence Service ASIS Human intelligence
Australian Signals Directorate ASD Signal intelligence
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation ASIO Security intelligence
Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation AGO Geo intelligence
Defence Intelligence Organisation DIO Defence intelligence

Canada

Canadian Forces Intelligence Command CFINTCOM Defence intelligence, geo intelligence, human intelligence
Communications Security Establishment CSE Signal intelligence
Canadian Security Intelligence Service CSIS Human intelligence, security intelligence
Royal Canadian Mounted Police RCMP Security intelligence

New Zealand

Directorate of Defence Intelligence and Security DDIS Defence intelligence
Government Communications Security Bureau GCSB Signal intelligence
New Zealand Security Intelligence Service NZSIS Human intelligence, security intelligence
       

 

United Kingdom

Defence Intelligence DI Defence intelligence
Government Communications Headquarters GCHQ Signal intelligence
Security Service MI5 Security intelligence
Secret Intelligence Service MI6, SIS Human intelligence

United States

Central Intelligence Agency CIA Human intelligence
Defense Intelligence Agency DIA Defense intelligence
Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI Security intelligence
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency NGA Geo intelligence
National Security Agency NSA Signal intelligence

 

History

Origins (1941–1950s)

The earliest origins of the Five Eyes alliance are secret meetings between British and US code-breakers at the British code-breaking establishment at Bletchley Park in February 1941 (before the US entry into the war).[13] A February 1941 entry in the diary of Alastair Denniston, head of Bletchley Park, reading "The Ys are coming!" ("Ys" referring to "Yanks") is the first record, followed by "Ys arrive" on 10 February. The British and US agencies shared extremely confidential information, including the British breaking of the German Enigma code, and the US breaking of the Japanese Purple code. From then key figures travelled back and forth across the Atlantic, including Denniston and code-breaking expert Alan Turing. The practical relationship established for wartime signals intelligence developed into a formal signed agreement at the start of the post-war Cold War.[14]

The formal Five Eyes alliance can be traced back to the Atlantic Charter, which was issued in August 1941 to lay out the Allied goals for the post-war world. On 17 May 1943, the British–US Communication Intelligence Agreement, also known as the BRUSA Agreement, was signed by the UK and US governments to facilitate co-operation between the US War Department and the British Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS). On 5 March 1946, the secret treaty was formalized as the UKUSA Agreement, which forms the basis for all signal intelligence cooperation between the NSA and GCHQ to this day.[15][16]

In 1948, the treaty was extended to include Canada, followed by Norway (1952), Denmark (1954), West Germany (1955), Australia (1956), and New Zealand (1956).[16] These countries participated in the alliance as "third parties". By 1955, the formal status of the remaining Five Eyes countries was officially acknowledged in a newer version of the UKUSA Agreement that contained the following statement:

At this time only Canada, Australia and New Zealand will be regarded as UKUSA-collaborating Commonwealth countries.[16]

The "Five Eyes" term has its origins as a shorthand for a "AUS/CAN/NZ/UK/US EYES ONLY" (AUSCANNZUKUSreleasability caveat.[17]

Cold War[edit]

During the Cold War (generally accepted to be approximately the period 1947–1991), GCHQ and the NSA shared intelligence on the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and several eastern European countries (known as Exotics).[18] Over the course of several decades, the ECHELON surveillance network was developed to monitor the military and diplomatic communications of the Soviet Union and its Eastern Bloc allies.[19]

During the Vietnam War, Australian and New Zealand operators in the Asia-Pacific region worked directly to support the United States, while GCHQ operators stationed in British Hong Kong were tasked with monitoring North Vietnamese air defence networks.[20][21] During the Falklands War, the British received intelligence data from its FVEY allies such as Australia, as well as from third parties such as Norway and France.[22][23][24] In the aftermath of the Gulf War, a technician of the ASIS was used by SIS to bug Kuwaiti government offices.[23]

In the 1950s, SIS and the CIA jointly orchestrated the overthrow of Iran's Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh.[25][26][27][28] In the 1960s, SIS and the CIA jointly orchestrated the assassination of the Congolese independence leader Patrice Lumumba.[29][30][31] In the 1970s, the ASIS and the CIA jointly orchestrated the overthrow of Chile's President Salvador Allende.[32][33][34][35] Also in the 1970s, a senior officer (Ian George Peacock) in the counterespionage unit of Australia's ASIO stole and sold highly classified intelligence documents shared with Australia to the Russians for at least five years. Peacock held the title of supervisor-E (espionage) and had top-secret security clearance. He retired from the ASIO in 1983 and died in 2006.[36] During the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989SIS and the CIA took part in Operation Yellowbird to rescue dissidents from the Chinese regime.[37]

ECHELON network disclosures (1972–2000)

By the end of the 20th century, the ECHELON surveillance network had evolved into a global system capable of sweeping up massive amounts of private and commercial communications, including telephone callsfaxemail and other data traffic. This was done through the interception of communication bearers such as satellite transmission and public switched telephone networks.[38]

The Five Eyes has two types of information collection methods: the PRISM program and the Upstream collection system. The PRISM program gathers user information from technology firms such as GoogleApple and Microsoft, while the Upstream system gathers information directly from the communications of civilians via fiber cables and infrastructure as data flows past.[39] The program's first disclosure to the public came in 1972 when a former NSA communications analyst reported to Ramparts magazine that the NSA had developed technology that "could crack all Soviet codes".[40] In 1988, Duncan Campbell revealed in the New Statesman the existence of ECHELON, an extension of the UKUSA Agreement on global signals intelligence [Sigint]. The story, 'Somebody's listening,' detailed how the eavesdropping operations were not only being employed in the interests of 'national security,' but were regularly abused for corporate espionage in the service of US business interests. The piece passed largely unnoticed outside of journalism circles.[41] In 1996, a detailed description of ECHELON was provided by New Zealand journalist Nicky Hager in a book titled Secret Power – New Zealand's Role in the International Spy Network', which was cited by the European Parliament in a 1998 report titled "An Appraisal of the Technology of Political Control" (PE 168.184).[42] On 16 March 2000, the Parliament called for a resolution on the Five Eyes and their ECHELON surveillance network, which, if passed, would have called for the "complete dismantling of ECHELON".[43]

Three months later, the Temporary Committee on ECHELON was set up by the European Parliament to investigate the ECHELON surveillance network. However, according to a number of European politicians such as Esko Seppänen of Finland, these investigations were hindered by the European Commission.[44]

In the United States, congressional legislators warned that the ECHELON system could be used to monitor US citizens.[45] On 14 May 2001, the US government cancelled all meetings with the Temporary Committee on ECHELON.[46]

According to a BBC report in May 2001, "the US Government still refuses to admit that Echelon even exists."[19]

War on Terror (since 2001)

In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the surveillance capabilities of the Five Eyes were greatly increased as part of the global war on terror.

During the run-up to the Iraq War, the communications of UN weapons inspector Hans Blix were monitored by the Five Eyes.[47][48] The office of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was bugged by British agents.[49][50] An NSA memo detailed plans of the Five Eyes to boost eavesdropping on UN delegations of six countries as part of a "dirty tricks" campaign to apply pressure on these six countries to vote in favour of using force against Iraq.[49][51][52]

SIS and the CIA forged a surveillance partnership with Libya's ruler Muammar Gaddafi to spy on Libyan dissidents in the West, in exchange for permission to use Libya as a base for extraordinary renditions.[53][54][55][56][57]

As of 2010, the Five Eyes also have access to SIPRNet, the US government's classified version of the Internet.[58]

In 2013, documents leaked by the former NSA contractor Edward Snowden revealed the existence of numerous surveillance programs jointly operated by the Five Eyes. The following list includes several notable examples reported in the media:

  • PRISM – Operated by the NSA together with GCHQ and the ASD[59][60]
  • XKeyscore – Operated by the NSA with contributions from the ASD and the GCSB[61]
  • Tempora – Operated by GCHQ with contributions from the NSA[62][63]
  • MUSCULAR – Operated by GCHQ and the NSA[64]
  • STATEROOM – Operated by the ASD, CIA, CSE, GCHQ, and NSA[65]

In March 2014, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ordered Australia to stop spying on East Timor. This marks the first such restrictions imposed on a member of the FVEY.[66]

In November 2020, the Five Eyes alliance criticised China's rules which disqualified elected legislators in Hong Kong.[67]

Competition with China (since 2018)

On 1 December 2018, Meng Wanzhou, a Huawei executive, was arrested by Canadian authorities at Vancouver International Airport, in order to face charges of fraud and conspiracy in the United States.[68] China responded by arresting two Canadian nationals. According to the South China Morning Post this conflict was seen by analysts as the beginning of a direct clash between the CCPs leadership of China and members of the Five Eyes alliance.[69] In the months that followed, the United States placed restrictions on technology exchanges with China.[70] Following prompting by parliamentarians in Australia and by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, the UK Government announced it would reduce the presence of Huawei technology in its 5G network to zero.[71][72] The newspaper reported that these events were seen by Beijing as political warfare "waged with the world’s oldest intelligence alliance, the Five Eyes."[73]

In mid-April 2021, the New Zealand Foreign Minister Nanaia Mahuta issued a statement that New Zealand would not let the Five Eyes alliance dictate its bilateral relationship with China and that New Zealand was uncomfortable with expanding the remit of the intelligence grouping. In response, the Australian Government expressed concern that Wellington was undermining collective efforts to combat what it regarded as Chinese aggression.[74][75] Mahuta's remarks were echoed by New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern who claimed that while New Zealand was still committed to the Five Eyes alliance, it would not use the network as its first point for communicating on non-security matters. While The Telegraph's defence editor Con Coughlin and British Conservative Member of Parliament Bob Seely criticised New Zealand for undermining the Five Eyes' efforts to put a united front against Beijing, the Chinese Global Times praised New Zealand for putting its own national interests over the Five Eyes.[76][77][78]

In late April 2021, the Global Times reported that employees of companies and organisations considered to be "at-risk" of foreign infiltration travelling to the Five Eyes countries would be monitored by the Chinese Ministry of State Security. These employees will be required to report their travel destinations, agendas, and meetings with foreign personnel to Chinese authorities. Other security measures include undergoing "pre-departure spying education" and leave their electronic devices at home and bring new ones abroad. These measures came at a time of heightened tensions between China and the Five Eyes countries.[79][80]

In mid-December 2021, the United States Secretary of State Antony Blinken along with the Foreign Ministers of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom issued a joint statement criticising the exclusion of opposition candidates, the Hong Kong national security law, and urging China to respect human rights and freedoms in Hong Kong in accordance with the Sino-British Joint Declaration.[81][82] In response, the Chinese Government claimed the Hong Kong elections were fair and criticised the Five Eyes for interfering in Hong Kong's domestic affairs.[83][84]

2023 meeting

In October 2023, the first known public meeting[85] of the Five Eyes leaders occurred at Stanford University's Hoover Institution,[86] CaliforniaUSA. They had been meeting in private at nearby Palo Alto. Present were:

Matters covered in public statements included:

Domestic espionage sharing controversy

The Five Eyes alliance is sort of an artifact of the post World War II era where the Anglophone countries are the major powers banded together to sort of co-operate and share the costs of intelligence gathering infrastructure. ... The result of this was over decades and decades some sort of a supra-national intelligence organisation that doesn't answer to the laws of its own countries. —Edward Snowden[9]

One of the core principles is that members do not spy on other governments in the alliance. US Director of National Intelligence Admiral Dennis C. Blair said in 2013: "We do not spy on each other. We just ask."[88]

In recent years, documents of the FVEY have shown that they are intentionally spying on one another's citizens and sharing the collected information with each other, although the FVEYs countries claim that all intelligence sharing was done legally, according to the domestic law of the respective nations.[10][89][90][11][91] Shami Chakrabarti, the director of the advocacy group Liberty, claimed that the FVEY alliance increases the ability of member states to "subcontract their dirty work" to each other.[92] The former NSA contractor Edward Snowden described the FVEY as a "supra-national intelligence organisation that doesn't answer to the laws of its own countries". While many claims of illegal intelligence sharing among FVEY nations have been made, only once has any FVEY intelligence agency been shown to have broken the law with intelligence sharing in Canada.[9]

As a result of Snowden's disclosures, the FVEY alliance has become the subject of a growing amount of controversy in parts of the world:

  • Canada: In late 2013, Canadian federal judge Richard Mosley strongly rebuked the CSIS for outsourcing its surveillance of Canadians to overseas partner agencies. A 51-page court ruling asserts that the CSIS and other Canadian federal agencies have been illegally enlisting FVEY allies in global surveillance dragnets, while keeping domestic federal courts in the dark.[93][94][95]
  • New Zealand: In 2014, the NZSIS and the GCSB of New Zealand were asked by the New Zealand Parliament to clarify if they had received any monetary contributions from members of the FVEY alliance. Both agencies withheld relevant information and refused to disclose any possible monetary contributions from the FVEY.[96] David Cunliffe, leader of the Labour Party, asserted that the public is entitled to be informed.[96]
  • European Union: In early 2014, the European Parliament's Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs released a draft report which confirmed that the intelligence agencies of New Zealand and Canada have cooperated with the NSA under the Five Eyes programme and may have been actively sharing the personal data of EU citizens. The EU report did not investigate if any international or domestic US laws were broken by the US and did not claim that any FVEY nation was illegally conducting intelligence collection on the EU. The NSA maintains that any intelligence collection done on the EU was in accordance with domestic US law and international law. So far, no court case has found the NSA broke any laws while spying on the EU.[97][98]
  • United Kingdom: In 2013, the British Parliament's Intelligence and Security Committee conducted an investigation and concluded that the GCHQ had broken no domestic British laws in its intelligence sharing operations with the NSA. According the investigation "It has been alleged that GCHQ circumvented UK law by using the NSA’s PRISM programme to access the content of private communications. From the evidence we have seen, we have concluded that this is unfounded. We have reviewed the reports that GCHQ produced on the basis of intelligence sought from the US, and we are satisfied that they conformed with GCHQ’s statutory duties. The legal authority for this is contained in the Intelligence Services Act 1994. Further, in each case where GCHQ sought information from the US, a warrant for interception, signed by a Minister, was already in place, in accordance with the legal safeguards contained in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000."[99]
  • United States: So far, no court case has been brought against any US intelligence community member claiming that they went around US domestic law to have foreign countries spy on US citizens and give that intelligence to the US. However, this may change as attention is paid to the anticipated public releases regarding Operation Lobos 1Operation Trojan Shield and Project Habitance. These operations received information from foreign government's for spying on U.S. citizens. Operation Trojan Shield is the only operation confirmed to have been initialized by the FBI, but required the Australian government to execute the operation as it wasn't legal in the United States. 17 U.S. citizens have been charged in U.S. federal court between 2021 and 2024, but none of the cases as of April 2024 had proceeded past the initial pretrial stages.

Other international cooperatives

Beginning with its founding by the United States and United Kingdom in 1946, the alliance expanded twice, inducting Canada in 1948 and Australia and New Zealand in 1956, establishing the Five Eyes as it remains to this day.[100][101] Further, there are nations termed "Third Party Partners" that share their intelligence with the Five Eyes despite not being formal members. While the Five Eyes is rooted in a particular agreement with specific operations amongst the five nations, similar sharing agreements have been set up independently and for specific purposes; for example, according to Edward Snowden, the NSA has a "massive body" called the Foreign Affairs Directorate dedicated to partnering with foreign countries beyond the alliance.[102]

Six Eyes (proposed)

Several countries have been prospective members of the Five Eyes. Israel,[103] SingaporeSouth Korea,[104] and Japan have or continue to collaborate with the alliance, though none are formally members.[105] According to French news magazine L'Obs, in 2009, the United States propositioned France to join the treaty and form a subsequent "Six Eyes" alliance. French President at the time Nicolas Sarkozy required that France have the same status as the other members, including the signing of a "no-spy agreement". This proposal was approved by the director of the NSA, but rejected by the director of the CIA and by President Barack Obama, resulting in a refusal from France.[106]

In 2013 it was reported that Germany was interested in joining the Five Eyes alliance.[107][108] At that time, several members of the United States Congress, including Tim Ryan and Charles Dent, were pushing for Germany's entrance to the Five Eyes alliance.[109]

Five Eyes Plus

Since 2018, through an initiative sometimes termed "Five Eyes Plus 3", Five Eyes formed associations with FranceGermany and Japan to introduce an information-sharing framework to counter threats arising from foreign activities of China as well as Russia.[110][111] Five Eyes plus France, Japan and South Korea share information about North Korea's military activities including ballistic missiles, in an arrangement sometimes dubbed "Five Eyes Plus".[112]

Nine Eyes

The Nine Eyes is a different arrangement that consists of the same members of Five Eyes working with Denmark, France, the Netherlands and Norway.[100][101]

Fourteen Eyes

A map of the Fourteen Eyes countries

According to a document leaked by Edward Snowden, there is another working agreement among 14 nations officially known as SIGINT Seniors Europe, or "SSEUR".[113] These "14 Eyes" consist of the same members of Nine Eyes plus Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden.[100][101]

Further intelligence sharing collaborations

As spelled out by Privacy International, there are a number of issue-specific intelligence agreements that include some or all the above nations and numerous others, such as:[114][115]

  • An area specific sharing amongst the 41 nations that formed the allied coalition in Afghanistan;
  • A shared effort of the Five Eyes nations in "focused cooperation" on computer network exploitation with Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey;
  • Club of Berne: 17 members including primarily European States; the US is not a member;
  • Maximator: an intelligence alliance between Denmark, Germany, France, the Netherlands and Sweden
  • The Counterterrorist Group: a wider membership than the 17 European states that make up the Club of Berne, and includes the US;
  • NATO Special Committee: made up of the heads of the security services of NATO's 32 member countries
  • Virtual Global Taskforce - 14 Member country law enforcement agencies intelligence and law enforcement group who operate together to stop online child sex abuse. Australia, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Columbia, Switzerland, Netherlands, Italy, South Korea, Canada, New Zealand, U.A.E., Philippines, United States.
 

References

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Further reading

External links

The Five Eyes brings the UK, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand into the world’s most complete and comprehensive intelligence alliance

 https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/the-five-eyes-the-intelligence-alliance-of-the-anglosphere/

Despite the fact that the alliance is known throughout the world and its existence is subject of endless debates, the real knowledge of how the Five Eyes works is still clouded by the security measures that involves almost everything related to the Five Eyes.

The Five Eyes brings the UK, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand into the world’s most complete and comprehensive intelligence alliance.

For more than 70 years, the once-secret post-war alliance of the five English-speaking nations has been an infrastructure of surveillance with a global reach and ageing is not a problem for the FVEY, which remains one of the most complex and far-reaching intelligence and espionage alliances in our history.

The Five Eyes (FVEY) is widely regarded as the world’s most significant intelligence alliance. The origins of it can be traced back to the context of the Second World War and by its necessity of sharing vital information mainly between Britain and the United States so both countries could enhance their close war effort.

The Five Eyes was formally founded in the aftermath of the Second World War, through the multilateral agreement for co-operation in signals intelligence (SIGINT), known as the UKUSA Agreement, on 5 March 1946.

Initially, compromising only the UK and the United States, it expanded to also include Canada in 1948 and Australia and New Zealand in 1956, all of these last three English-speaking countries, members of the Commonwealth of Nations and with similar political systems when compared to Britain. Thereby, the ‘Five Eyes’ term was created from the lengthy ‘AUS/CAN/NZ/UK/ Eyes Only’ classification level that included the ‘eyes’ that could have access to high profile papers and information.

The secretiveness of the alliance is so severe that the treaty that created it was not in the knowledge of Gough Whitlam, then Prime Minister of Australia, as late as 1973 and it did not come to the public attention until 2005. Only in June 2010, the full text of the UKUSA Agreement was released by the British and American governments and for the first time officially recognised.

It’s worth mentioning the importance of the UKUSA Agreement and the subsequent Five Eyes for the Special Relationship. It helped to forge the basis for a stronger co-operation between the UK and the United States in the Cold War period fostering mutual trust and deepening the links between the two countries. In other words, the Agreement consolidated the Special Relationship between Britain and the United States.

The co-operation was crucial for both countries during the Cold War, for Britain, an example was the Five Eyes role in providing complementary intelligence for tracking Soviet submarines with ballistic missiles in the North Atlantic and the North Sea, and for the United States, it relied on long-established British listening posts in territories that were part of Britain’s empire for signals of intelligence, especially in the Middle East.

Few documents are accessible to the public, but with the ones that have been officially realised it is possible to know the primary extent of the Agreement.

 

For more than 70 years, the once-secret post-war alliance of the five English-speaking nations has been an infrastructure of surveillance with a global reach and ageing is not a problem for the FVEY, which remains one of the most complex and far-reaching intelligence and espionage alliances in our history.

Despite the fact that the alliance is known throughout the world and its existence is subject of endless debates, the real knowledge of how the Five Eyes works is still clouded by the security measures that involves almost everything related to the Five Eyes.

The secretiveness of the alliance is so severe that the treaty that created it was not in the knowledge of Gough Whitlam, then Prime Minister of Australia, as late as 1973 and it did not come to the public attention until 2005. Only in June 2010, the full text of the UKUSA Agreement was released by the British and American governments and for the first time officially recognised.

It’s worth mentioning the importance of the UKUSA Agreement and the subsequent Five Eyes for the Special Relationship. It helped to forge the basis for a stronger co-operation between the UK and the United States in the Cold War period fostering mutual trust and deepening the links between the two countries. In other words, the Agreement consolidated the Special Relationship between Britain and the United States.

The co-operation was crucial for both countries during the Cold War, for Britain, an example was the Five Eyes role in providing complementary intelligence for tracking Soviet submarines with ballistic missiles in the North Atlantic and the North Sea, and for the United States, it relied on long-established British listening posts in territories that were part of Britain’s empire for signals of intelligence, especially in the Middle East.

Few documents are accessible to the public, but with the ones that have been officially realised it is possible to know the primary extent of the Agreement.

According to the original declassified treaty of 1946, ‘the parties agree to the exchange of the products of the following operations relating to foreign communications: collection of traffic, acquisition of communication documents and equipment, traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, decryption and translation, acquisition of information regarding communication organisations, practices, procedures, and equipment’. This shows the initial scope of the treaty and its ambitions.

Furthermore, it is known that each member of the alliance is responsible for intelligence gathering and analysis over specific regions of the world. Britain monitors Europe, Western Russia, Middle East and Hong Kong. Meanwhile, the United States also oversees the Middle East plus China, Russia, Africa and the Caribbean. Australia is responsible for South and East Asia and New Zealand for the South Pacific and Southeast Asia. Canada monitors the interior of Russia and China and parts of Latin America. In spite of this division, they work mainly together, and the ‘final product’ generally is a result of more than one of its members; helping each other is an essential part of this agreement.

For more than 70 years, the once-secret post-war alliance of the five English-speaking nations has been an infrastructure of surveillance with a global reach and ageing is not a problem for the FVEY, which remains one of the most complex and far-reaching intelligence and espionage alliances in our history.

Despite the fact that the alliance is known throughout the world and its existence is subject of endless debates, the real knowledge of how the Five Eyes works is still clouded by the security measures that involves almost everything related to the Five Eyes.

The secretiveness of the alliance is so severe that the treaty that created it was not in the knowledge of Gough Whitlam, then Prime Minister of Australia, as late as 1973 and it did not come to the public attention until 2005. Only in June 2010, the full text of the UKUSA Agreement was released by the British and American governments and for the first time officially recognised.

It’s worth mentioning the importance of the UKUSA Agreement and the subsequent Five Eyes for the Special Relationship. It helped to forge the basis for a stronger co-operation between the UK and the United States in the Cold War period fostering mutual trust and deepening the links between the two countries. In other words, the Agreement consolidated the Special Relationship between Britain and the United States.

The co-operation was crucial for both countries during the Cold War, for Britain, an example was the Five Eyes role in providing complementary intelligence for tracking Soviet submarines with ballistic missiles in the North Atlantic and the North Sea, and for the United States, it relied on long-established British listening posts in territories that were part of Britain’s empire for signals of intelligence, especially in the Middle East.

Few documents are accessible to the public, but with the ones that have been officially realised it is possible to know the primary extent of the Agreement.

According to the original declassified treaty of 1946, ‘the parties agree to the exchange of the products of the following operations relating to foreign communications: collection of traffic, acquisition of communication documents and equipment, traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, decryption and translation, acquisition of information regarding communication organisations, practices, procedures, and equipment’. This shows the initial scope of the treaty and its ambitions.

Furthermore, it is known that each member of the alliance is responsible for intelligence gathering and analysis over specific regions of the world. Britain monitors Europe, Western Russia, Middle East and Hong Kong. Meanwhile, the United States also oversees the Middle East plus China, Russia, Africa and the Caribbean. Australia is responsible for South and East Asia and New Zealand for the South Pacific and Southeast Asia. Canada monitors the interior of Russia and China and parts of Latin America. In spite of this division, they work mainly together, and the ‘final product’ generally is a result of more than one of its members; helping each other is an essential part of this agreement.

 

 

The Five Eyes brings the UK, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand into the world’s most complete and comprehensive intelligence alliance.

The Five Eyes (FVEY) is widely regarded as the world’s most significant intelligence alliance. The origins of it can be traced back to the context of the Second World War and by its necessity of sharing vital information mainly between Britain and the United States so both countries could enhance their close war effort.

The Five Eyes was formally founded in the aftermath of the Second World War, through the multilateral agreement for co-operation in signals intelligence (SIGINT), known as the UKUSA Agreement, on 5 March 1946.

Initially, compromising only the UK and the United States, it expanded to also include Canada in 1948 and Australia and New Zealand in 1956, all of these last three English-speaking countries, members of the Commonwealth of Nations and with similar political systems when compared to Britain. Thereby, the ‘Five Eyes’ term was created from the lengthy ‘AUS/CAN/NZ/UK/ Eyes Only’ classification level that included the ‘eyes’ that could have access to high profile papers and information.

For more than 70 years, the once-secret post-war alliance of the five English-speaking nations has been an infrastructure of surveillance with a global reach and ageing is not a problem for the FVEY, which remains one of the most complex and far-reaching intelligence and espionage alliances in our history.

Despite the fact that the alliance is known throughout the world and its existence is subject of endless debates, the real knowledge of how the Five Eyes works is still clouded by the security measures that involves almost everything related to the Five Eyes.

The secretiveness of the alliance is so severe that the treaty that created it was not in the knowledge of Gough Whitlam, then Prime Minister of Australia, as late as 1973 and it did not come to the public attention until 2005. Only in June 2010, the full text of the UKUSA Agreement was released by the British and American governments and for the first time officially recognised.

It’s worth mentioning the importance of the UKUSA Agreement and the subsequent Five Eyes for the Special Relationship. It helped to forge the basis for a stronger co-operation between the UK and the United States in the Cold War period fostering mutual trust and deepening the links between the two countries. In other words, the Agreement consolidated the Special Relationship between Britain and the United States.

The co-operation was crucial for both countries during the Cold War, for Britain, an example was the Five Eyes role in providing complementary intelligence for tracking Soviet submarines with ballistic missiles in the North Atlantic and the North Sea, and for the United States, it relied on long-established British listening posts in territories that were part of Britain’s empire for signals of intelligence, especially in the Middle East.

Few documents are accessible to the public, but with the ones that have been officially realised it is possible to know the primary extent of the Agreement.

According to the original declassified treaty of 1946, ‘the parties agree to the exchange of the products of the following operations relating to foreign  communications: collection of traffic, acquisition of  communication documents and equipment, traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, decryption and translation, acquisition of information regarding  communication organisations, practices, procedures, and equipment’. This shows the initial scope of the treaty and its ambitions.

Furthermore, it is known that each member of the alliance is responsible for intelligence gathering and analysis over specific regions of the world. Britain monitors Europe, Western Russia, Middle East and Hong Kong. Meanwhile, the United States also oversees the Middle East plus China, Russia, Africa and the Caribbean. Australia is responsible for South and East Asia and New Zealand for the South Pacific and Southeast Asia. Canada monitors the interior of Russia and China and parts of Latin America. In spite of this division, they work mainly together, and the ‘final product’ generally is a result of more than one of its members; helping each other is an essential part of this agreement.

Nevertheless, the regional division does not imply that the parties are bounded to direct its efforts only to those regions, this means that while Britain is ‘responsible’ for some areas, it has not the obligation to just monitor those parts of the world.

The current role of the Five Eyes has many ramifications, such as the ‘maritime domain’ where the alliance monitors shipping traffic passing through strategic maritime areas and the ‘aerospace domain’ which covers ballistic missile tests, foreign satellite deployments and the military activities of relevant air forces.

Terrorist organisations and weapons business deals made by ‘problematic regimes’ are also within the scope of the Five Eyes; these two, in particular, are growing source of worries for all the five members and the intelligence co-operation between them is essential to keep their governments updated with the most recent information. This aids the process of policy-making, for the data collected and analysed by the alliance may turn out to be vital for more than a time of crises but also for the daily basis of government; notably, these daily efforts consist in tracking and identifying possible sources of terrorism and other non-conventional threats.

Such complex agreement would never exist if not by the convergent aspects of all the five members. They share common principles, such the liberal democratic values, similar or complementary national interests and cultures. Beyond that, since the Second World War Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United States share same threats to their national security be them conventional or not.

All these characteristics unify their efforts and foster mutual trust, indispensable to the Five Eyes. Within the context of mutual trust, the five partners seem not to target each other; nevertheless, there are no means of ensuring that spying on each other does not happen.

In addition, the Five Eyes works with various ‘Third Party’ countries, the co-operation with Denmark, France, Norway and the Netherlands receives the name of ‘Nine Eyes’, and there is the ‘Fourteen Eyes’ which consists of the previously mentioned Nine Eyes plus Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden. However, the official name of the Fourteen Eyes is SIGINT Seniors Europe (SSEUR), and its primary objective is to coordinate the exchange of military signals amongst its members.

It is also worth to mention that many countries mentioned above already have other intelligence co-operation links, especially through NATO Special Committee which gathers the heads of the security services of its parties.

So, after more than 70 years, the Five Eyes is widely regarded as the ‘gold standard’ of intelligence alliances. Its scope grows accordingly with the new technologies and the following evolving security concerns arising from those new technologies, thereby, the Eyes have in mind that the digital world cannot be underestimated; the opponents of the UK and the United States recognise that as well, as the number of cyber attacks grows unceasingly.

Therefore, the Five Eyes is an enormous asset to keep the citizens of the ‘English-Speaking World’ safer and is the result of decades of relationship cemented on trust and confidence amongst its members.

By uniting services from Britain, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand it is possible to affirm that its potential is almost limitless and meets no parallel.

Research Article

Getting the Better of the Bargain: Technical Intelligence, Arms Sales, and Anglo-Israeli Relations 1967–1974

Pages 531-553 | Published online: 17 Sep 2021
 
 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592296.2021.1961489
 

ABSTRACT

This analysis explores the nature of Anglo-Israeli intelligence relations between 1967 and 1974, focusing in particular on how the legacy of the British mandate in Palestine, the influence of senior British diplomats, as well as wider commercial interests shaped attempts by intelligence officials on both sides to move this relationship beyond the purely functional. Whilst Israel looked to barter access to recently captured Soviet equipment for greater collaboration with the British in weapons development and arms sales, London demurred. Despite the urging of some in Whitehall, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office limited any collaboration to functional exchanges and kept them firmly in the shadows. The aftermath of the October 1973 war revealed the price paid by Britain. With Israel now dependent on Washington for the bulk

of its military equipment, London’s ability to exercise any influence over Tel Aviv in reaching an accommodation with its Arab neighbours diminished greatly.

 

Reciprocity has defined some of the closest intelligence relationships between democratic states. Not only are such relationships functional in terms of the intelligence shared and distributed but equally, shared norms, values, and even cultures that allow more junior partners to benefit exponentially inform them for the most part. They are so much more than utilitarian arrangements and, as such, have a durability, indeed longevity, which can and does survive periodic friction when political masters fall out.Footnote1 It has often been noted, for example, that intelligence liaison and co-operation between Britain and the United States has allowed London to exercise influence in Washington’s corridors of power that its otherwise diminished status as a global Power would have denied.Footnote2 Equally, the ‘Five Eyes’ alliance, an Anglophone intelligence consortium pooling the signals and electronic capabilities of Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States is perhaps the most notable example of an intelligence alliance built on shared cultural and political norms as well as common security interests.Footnote3

By contrast, intelligence relationships between democratic states, at best defined as transactional, receive less attention. Such relationships, whilst beneficial to the actors involved, receive definition more obviously and regularly by cost–benefit analyses and the desire of those involved to ensure that benefits accruing from the intelligence given will not be less than that of the information sought, whether in the short or medium turn. Wider competing commercial or strategic hard power interests that limit the extent and intensity of co-operation can shape them, too. Equally, such arrangements are not without more abstract values, say historical experience, which can shape the nature of the interaction. This is particularly so where the legacy of violence between the actors in another era continues to exercise a pull on the memory and emotions of key decision-makers. It is often this legacy that limits intelligence sharing to the purely transactional, the grip of the ‘hand of history’ on the shoulder of the actors involved being too firm to easily shake off. This moves the debate over intelligence sharing and liaison beyond a ‘form of subcontracted intelligence collection based on barter’.Footnote4

One such relationship is Anglo-Israeli intelligence. Until the 1980s, historians of Anglo-Israeli relations regarded bilateral ties between London and Tel Aviv as, at best, cool. Powerful factors decided the nature of the relationship: the bloody legacy of Britain’s mandate, competing interests over the future of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and a British perception, held strongly by Foreign Office officials noted for their pro-Arab sympathies, that arms sales to Israel should not damage their perceived regional status quo and Britain’s increasingly beleaguered place in it.Footnote5 Despite a brief Cold War–driven flirtation in the early 1950s that Israel might offer Britain use of its military bases in any future conflict with the Soviet Union, the two states’ interests across the region remained far apart. Until the 1956 Suez crisis, such was the depth of suspicion between London and Tel Aviv that Britain drew up contingency plans for attacking Israel should the Israelis threaten to destabilise Jordan. It was one of the major British preoccupations in putting together the invasion of Egypt in that year.Footnote6

This raises the issue of the extent to which negative views of Israel held by many in the Foreign Office influenced Anglo-Israeli ties in other spheres, including intelligence liaison and exchange. Some files from the 1960s and 1970s relating to intelligence exchanges – particularly in the realm of electronic warfare and cyber technologies – remain closed to public scrutiny, as do similar files in Israeli archives. Those released by The National Archives in London suggest a picture, whilst partial, as rather mixed.Footnote7 In the immediate aftermath of the June 1967 war, British officials in the Directorate of Scientific and Technical Intelligence [DSTI], a subsidiary of the Defence Intelligence Staff [DIS], believed a closer association with a Power that had fought against and defeated foes equipped largely with Soviet bloc weaponry was in the British national interest. With admiration for Israel’s military achievements pronounced across much of Whitehall, Israeli officials, too, were keen for an exchange of technical intelligence on weapons design as well as future collaboration on research and development.Footnote8

However, wider concerns across government, not least relating to Anglo-Arab relations and a belief that such collaboration might upset once again a regional order still recovering from the effects of the June 1967 war, saw the renamed Foreign and Commonwealth Office [FCO] continuing to exercise a policy of highly selective engagement.Footnote9 For some in the field of defence intelligence, this was not only a missed intelligence opportunity but also a squandered commercial one. More broadly, it diminished Britain’s ability to exercise political leverage on Tel Aviv that now looked to consolidate its newfound regional gains. The price paid by London came six years later. In the immediate aftermath of the October 1973 war, the intelligence emperor, Britain, had few clothes and very little with which to barter with an Israel by now firmly dependent upon the United States for its military and security well-being.

Until the Suez crisis, the view holds that intelligence liaison and sharing between Britain and Israel was limited. Some attributed this to the legacy of empire. Sir John Sinclair, head of MI6 – or ‘C’ – between 1952 and 1956, resisted the establishment of formal intelligence liaison precisely because his ‘prejudices born from the brutality of the Palestinian era were unassailable’.Footnote10 Indeed, soon after the establishment of Israel in 1948, the first MI6 officer sent to Tel Aviv incognito, Nigel Clive, had his cover blown soon after his arrival: he was quickly withdrawn. A series of MI6 officers, some of them women, went to Israel having been ‘declared’ to their hosts throughout the 1950s.Footnote11

The immediate run up to the Suez crisis saw some of this antipathy dissipate. Foreign Office officials largely opted to maintain clear diplomatic water from their Israeli counterparts, but a maverick group of senior MI6 officers led by George Young, deputy director for Middle East operations, saw closer ties with the Israeli secret intelligence service, Mossad, as part of a wider regional strategy to unseat President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt. Sinclair, it seems, failed to exercise effective control over Young, who admitted to ignoring his superior’s orders on the ‘working level’.Footnote12 Young established firm relations with Isser Harel, his Israeli counterpart, but it remains unclear if this intelligence relationship had any direct bearing on military plans surrounding the Anglo-French invasion of the Suez Canal zone, Operation Musketeer, on 31 October 1956. Britain’s intelligence appreciation of Israeli military capabilities certainly left London in no doubt that the Israel Defence Forces [IDF] would rout Egyptian forces in Sinai. This assessment by Britain’s Joint Intelligence Committee [JIC], however, found basis largely on careful analysis of open-source information, rather than any direct intelligence liaison with the IDF as to their actual military proficiency.Footnote13

It was not until Sinclair resigned in the aftermath of the Suez invasion and replaced by Sir Dick White that liaison with Israeli intelligence was put on a firmer footing.Footnote14 The siren-like call of Arab nationalism threatened both British and Israeli interests across the Middle East, not least in the Arabian Peninsula where, from 1957 onwards, Britain looked to construct a new edifice, the Federation of South Arabia, which would protect its military base in Aden. Equally, local conditions allowed the Egyptians to exploit anti-colonial sentiment, the appeal that Nasser carried across the airwaves via cheaply made transistor radios that amplified the seductive appeal of Arab nationalism across the Middle East.

Most in the Foreign Office wanted to work with, rather than against, Nasser and Arab nationalism and felt the failure to do so undermined British power and influence in the region.Footnote15 Indeed, White regarded those mainly on the right wing of the governing Conservative Party, advocating a continued British presence in Aden and South Arabia, as being ‘motivated by a nostalgia for lost causes’ who wished to exact revenge against Nasser for the humiliation of Suez.Footnote16 Equally, Foreign Office pro-Arab bias had long shaped the scope and scale of British arms sales to Israel. In 1953 despite a previous agreement to do so, London vacillated over the sale of 30 Centurion tanks to Tel Aviv, using the Israeli retaliatory action against the West Bank village of Kibya as the pretext for rejecting the request. The underlying reason, however, was London’s treaty obligations to Amman: why supply British tanks for possible use against British troops. A similar request made by Shimon Peres, director general of Israel’s Defence Ministry, was also turned down; London again cited concerns about upsetting the military balance vis-á-vis Jordan, although Israel’s main military threat remained Egypt.Footnote17 Only in 1958 – following the overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq – did Britain relent in its arms policy to Israel and release the Centurion tanks. Even then, the Foreign Office ultimately decided the scale and scope of these sales, contingent on Israel’s relations with Jordan and Tel Aviv remaining discreet about the scope and scale of its tank purchases from Britain.Footnote18

The case of Anglo-Israeli co-operation on ‘Operation Mango’ – a series of covert supply drops by the Israeli Air Force to Royalist tribesman in north Yemen fighting the Egyptian-backed government with the help of a British-led mercenary organisation – is a case in point. Even here, however, the British were semi-detached. The operation, for London at least, was largely a private initiative that used former British Special Forces as the link to Mossad. MI6 undoubtedly remained in the loop about what was being planned – one British mercenary, Colonel David Smiley, reported intermittently to MI6 – but it was an arrangement that appeared to suit all concerned. London saw benefits in turning a ‘blind eye’ to an operation it felt protected British interests in Aden; Israel equally saw gains in bleeding an Egyptian army in Yemen that by 1965 saw 60,000 of its troops bogged down fighting an unwinnable war.Footnote19

Useful intelligence emerged, too. Some British mercenaries reported on the performance of Soviet-built Egyptian aircraft to both London and Tel Aviv, whilst soil samples from villages subjected to chemical weapons attack – mainly bombs containing mustard, chlorine, or phosgene gas – went to the Israelis for analysis. The impact of the mercenary operation on Egypt’s later combat performance in the June 1967 war remains difficult to gauge, although according to Moshe Dayan, a former Israeli chief of staff, the collapse of the Egyptian army in Sinai was in no small measure due to the erosion of its combat capabilities in the mountains of Yemen.Footnote20

The battering Egypt’s army endured in Yemen largely informed British intelligence analysis of the likely outcome of the conflict two years before its outbreak. In March 1965, charged with assessing all-source intelligence on given targets and distributing this to the relevant consumers across Whitehall, the JIC issued a detailed report that looked at the military balance between Israel and its Arab neighbours. The report has since been subject to a detailed historical analysis, which whilst noting several inaccuracies – not least in terms of Israel’s force structure and the tendency of the report to underplay efficiency and quality in determining combat power – it nonetheless validated the core finding of the document: in any war, the Jewish state would emerge triumphant. Israel, the report argued, was able to realise its total combat power more quickly and bring it to bear more effectively than any combination of the surrounding Arab states.

The JIC assessment derived from collecting, collating, and analysing – three stages of the traditional intelligence cycle – open-source intelligence material in reaching its conclusions. The errors in assessing relative force strengths aside, the report’s accuracy highlighted an enduring truth about intelligence:

In order correctly to assess the probable course of action by the assessment’s subject, one is not compelled to first penetrate decision-making circles, not to employ elite spies, not to develop extraordinary means of collection … . It is apparently sufficient for intelligence services to be properly familiar with the strength and security perception of their subject and to intelligently analyze parameters of time, space and geography.Footnote21

 

This above narrative, however, exposes a wider truth: all too often, the understanding of the Anglo-Israeli intelligence relationship remains limited to a cursory understanding of ties between MI6 and Mossad. In light of their respective standing at the forefront of the intelligence world, this is perhaps understandable. In London’s case at least, strategic appreciations of Israel, its capabilities, and the extent to which British foreign and defence interests could best be realised through closer ties with Israel, particularly in the collaborative realm of technical intelligence, was always a bureaucratic balance. In this case between, on one hand, the all source analysis produced by the JIC and, in particular the DIS, and on the other, the concerns of the Foreign Office always sensitive to Britain’s ties with the Arab states.

The study of technical intelligence remains something of a ‘Cinderella’ within the ever-expanding realm of intelligence studies. Moreover, those studies of academic note that have appeared focus primarily on the Cold War.Footnote22 By contrast, little of is relatively known of how the exchange of technical intelligence informed relationships beyond the established alliance structures of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation [NATO] and the Warsaw Pact. In the case of Britain, this should come as little surprise. The sharing of sensitive technical data, materials, and technology with Israel, let alone its public disclosure, remains a delicate matter for the British. Only in 2006, for example, revelations showed that in 1958 Britain had allowed 25 tons of surplus heavy water, purchased from Norsk Hydro in Norway, sold back to the Norwegians, knowing that the final destination would be Israel. Some sought clear ‘safeguards’ from Israel over its intended use of heavy water, a vital component producing plutonium from spent fuel and essential for developing a nuclear weapon. The Foreign Office, however, felt it unreasonable to demand such safeguards as this was a Norwegian transaction and responsibility rested with Oslo to demand appropriate guarantees as to its final use.Footnote23

Still, by 1962, Britain concluded that Israel had an active nuclear weapons programme based on the amount of heavy water acquired by Israel, photographs of the Dimona reactor taken covertly by the British military attaché in Tel Aviv, and the likely role of so many French technicians present in the Negev. Some even suspected that Tel Aviv might have acquired nuclear secrets from pro-Israel sympathisers working at the British Atomic Weapons Research Establishment at Aldermaston. There certainly were precedents for such suspicions. In 1950, just two years after the founding of Israel, the Security Service, more popularly known as MI5, uncovered Cyril Wybrow, a British Jew working in the War Office’s Joint Intelligence Bureau, who had been passing classified information to the Israelis. He suffered immediate dismissal rather than prosecution, suggesting that the information divulged was relatively low grade.Footnote24

Suspicions of dual loyalties lingered, however. MI5 interviewed several British Jews over their alleged connexions to Israel. One such figure was Nyman Levin, just eased out of his role as head of the nuclear weapons programme in early January 1965 when he died of a heart attack. It was widely believed that he was under investigation by MI5, although British authorities have never released the files relevant to his case with no case proved of collusion with Israel.Footnote25 Still, such episodes created a wider climate of concern across Whitehall over how far to extend the hand of co-operation, if not collaboration, with Israel in matters related to technical intelligence and selling military equipment. What is readily apparent in this debate, however, is the clear divisions between what might be called the scientific and military professionals, who saw ties with Israel as not only desirable but necessary, and senior civil servants, notably in the FCO, who remained decidedly wary. These divisions played out across Whitehall in the aftermath of the June 1967 war.

There is no doubt that admiration for Israel’s victory in 1967 was widespread. The British Ministry of Defence [MoD] took a particular interest – and delight – in what they learnt of the performance of the Centurion tanks Britain sold to Israel over the previous decade. Equally, with 55,000 British troops stationed in West Germany – the British Army of the Rhine [BAOR] – officials in London were anxious to glean any information they could regarding Soviet weaponry and, believing these to reflect largely Soviet military doctrine, the tactics and strategies used by the Egyptian army. Above all else, the British wanted access to technical intelligence, a task falling the DSTI, responsible for designing and evaluating new weapons systems as well as developing effective counter measures against existing Soviet bloc weaponry and equipment. The Israelis knew they had material leverage that they could exploit. If Britain – and other NATO countries – wanted access to captured Soviet bloc equipment, Israeli knowledge was barter material for closer co-operation both in terms of access to particular items of British kit as well as research and development. What was to become apparent on the British side was that whilst the DSTI was responsive to such ‘trading’, other government departments, notably the FCO, remained more circumspect over exactly how far Britain could, or should jump, into a ‘technical bed’ with the Israelis.

Even before the June 1967 war, improving Anglo-Israeli ties had seen arms sales move beyond the purchase of just tanks. In the mid-1960s, the Israeli navy purchased three former Royal Navy submarines, including HMS Totem, renamed INS Dakar – Swordfish. The British used Totem for covert signals intelligence gathering in the Arctic circle off the Soviet coast. Refitted in Portsmouth with a conning tower that allowed for the underwater insertion of Special Forces, Dakar was lost on 24 January 1968 east of Crete with all crew on its final approach to Haifa.Footnote26 Whilst a tragic loss, this episode demonstrated nonetheless Israel’s continued interest in acquiring British weapons systems and technical intelligence. In so doing, the Israelis were prepared to trade technical intelligence for access to British weapons technology. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the realm of armoured warfare.

The IDF had already made an opening gambit to the British regarding tank design. In early 1968, the director of Armoured Warfare Research at Bovington, Bayley Pike, visited Israel and held a series of meetings with Major-General Israel Tal, widely regarded as the ‘Don’ of Israel’s armoured Corps. Tal expressed his desire to co-operate with the British on any technical matters related to the performance of IDF Centurion tanks during the war, not least the performance of their main armament, the 105 mm gun. In return, Tal asked permission to allow Israeli experts to probe officials at Bovington on issues related to innovations in armoured warfare that could be of use to the IDF. In particular, Israel hoped to purchase the next generation of British tank, the Chieftain, and two had already reached Israel to allow their suitability for desert warfare to be assessed.Footnote27

This was part of a wider Israeli effort to gain access not just to British equipment but to Britain’s research and development facilities, in effect trading technical intelligence for technical know-how with joint Anglo-Israeli teams to engage in collaborative evaluation on a range of military equipment. A joint party of military and civilian experts from Britain visited Israel between 27 January and 2 February 1968 at Tel Aviv’s instigation to lay the groundwork for how both sides might best profit from analysis of the copious amount of Soviet equipment captured. The delegation expressed cautious optimism about reaching suitable arrangements, although it was by no means uniform across the British service representatives. The army in particular remained keen to extract more information regarding IDF tactics used against Egypt, but the Israelis proved reluctant to divulge such information without exacting something of similar value from the British. In particular, Israel hoped that with their greater weapons development capabilities and test ranges, Britain could be of use in helping fast track Israel’s research and development programmes.Footnote28

One name that began to figure prominently in this proposed exchange of information and wider research and development was Professor Efraim Katchalsky, chief scientist of the Israeli MoD and, later, under the surname Katzir, the fourth president of Israel between 1973 and 1978. Katchalsky hoped to place the exchange of technical intelligence with Britain on a more formal footing that would cover the exchange of information related to non-conventional weapons development, notably biological and chemical weapons.Footnote29 Already a noted scientist, he received access to one of Britain’s most sensitive military research facilities, Porton Down, although admission to more sensitive on-site areas of military research and development in chemical and biological weapons was necessarily restricted. Still, by offering London access to captured Soviet chemical warfare equipment, the Israelis hoped London might sign an ‘Information Exchange Agreement’ allowing Israel to develop what Katchalsky termed ‘defensive measures’. Such trading arose elsewhere: Israel offered British officials access to captured Soviet Styx anti-ship missiles – the Royal Navy was keen to learn of their guidance systems; in return, Israel asked for information in the field of Electronic Counter Measures.Footnote30

There were clearly advantages for both sides, and there is no doubt that the DSTI team visiting Israel remained keen to explore what they regarded as propitious grounds for future collaboration. The Israelis were prepared for captured equipment to be sent to Britain where it could be subjected to extensive field trials in the presence of Anglo-Israeli teams. This included ‘certain chemical warfare items’, the Soviet T55 tank, as well as captured radios, mines, tank ammunition, anti-tank missiles, and air-to-air missiles as well as detailed examination of captured papers, handbooks, and the serial numbers of various weapons systems. The study of intelligence often overlooks the latter, but examination of serial numbers allows trained analysts to build up a picture of weapons production and development whilst also giving some indication of the likely size of an opponent’s military formations. The hope was for parallel trials in Israel. The matter went to the JIC. Whilst noting the possible advantages, the FCO voiced serious concerns and baulked at signing any formal memorandum on the exchange of technical intelligence. Already sensitive to the – unfounded – allegations that London had colluded with Washington in helping Israel crush so completely three Arab states, the FCO Eastern Department raised objections to any collaboration with Israel over research and development into chemical weapons.Footnote31 One official cited ‘political difficulties vis a vis the Arabs if it ever became known’ that Britain had entered into any such agreement with Israel on such matters. Another, with reference to the wider eddies of the Cold War, noted ‘Communist propaganda would have a field day’.Footnote32 The envisaged political difficulties of allowing Israel access to British research and development facilities was such that the FCO looked to refer the matter through the JIC to the Cabinet for ministerial consideration.

The FCO attitude towards closer ties with Israel was shared by the foreign secretary, George Brown, who would resign from office soon after. Something of a maverick, his personal animus towards Prime Minister Harold Wilson reflected their respective positions on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Whereas Wilson possessed sympathy for the Jewish state, Brown actively sought a reconciliation with Cairo and believed that unless Britain took a firm stance in support of Amman, Jordan was likely to succumb to more seemingly ascendant radical forces across the Arab world. It was a view shared by the head of the FCO Eastern Department, William Morris, who believed, ‘Britain’s material interests in the Arab world much more important than those in Israel’.Footnote33 Because the value of intelligence is often hard to measure in purely material terms, decision-making circles can dilute its value when wider considerations are at play. Morris’ comments were certainly of a piece with how far Britain was prepared to go in transferring sensitive technologies to Israel. Whilst Tel Aviv demonstrated consistent interest in acquiring British and Canadian civilian nuclear technology in the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, London and Ottawa ‘refrained from establishing close nuclear ties with Israel … primarily because of concern that they would upset their relations with Arab states’.Footnote34

Still, despite growing FCO unease, the DSTI team still hoped a memorandum of sorts could be drawn up that related solely to evaluating captured Soviet weapons and equipment, which the IDF General Staff now tried to link to a more grandiose arrangement: access to wider British weapons development programmes. London met this condition with consternation and indeed, also towards some officials in Israeli military intelligence who felt that their patient, incremental approach that built trust with their British counterparts best served the exchange of technical intelligence. British officials rejected these new conditions, and the Israelis backtracked on their insistence. It led the JIC, however, to note, ‘information about captured equipment is finite and we shall stand firm on the refusal to barter it with undertakings of more lasting significance’.Footnote35

By spring 1968, the British had become more circumspect in offering detailed appreciations of military equipment in which Israel had a clear interest. In early April, the Israeli military attaché at London, Brigadier General Zvi Zamir – soon to become director general of Mossad – handed the DIS a list of items of particular interest to the IDF. These ranged from ‘spoofers’ to disrupt early warning radar, on-line tele-printers, ground surveillance radar, mortar locating radar through to various proximity fuses, and laser-range finders being developed for the new generation of Chieftain tanks, technology that, at the time, Britain was seen to have a comparative advantage. The British frowned on using an intelligence channel to pass on this request, telling Zamir that they regarded this appeal as a commercial transaction not an exchange of technical intelligence. Procedurally, the British were right, but an element of bureaucratic obfuscation was at play here. Pushing the Israeli request through commercial channels limited the quid pro quo involved in intelligence exchanges, forcing the DIS to keep Israel at arms-length. Perhaps sensing the real reason for the British insistence on adhering to accepted procedure, Zamir equally insisted that such requests be handled through intelligence channels, claiming that as officials from the DSTI had been given access to captured Soviet equipment, Israel had the ‘moral right to do so’.Footnote36

In the field of technical evaluation, sympathy for Israel’s position came at the highest level of the DIS. Its director-general, Air Chief Marshal Sir Alfred Earle, believed that if British 105 mm tank ammunition supplied to the Israelis proved in anyway deficient in penetrating the armour of Soviet-supplied Egyptian tanks, this information should, as a matter of course, be shared with the Israelis. When approached by Zamir, Earle agreed that the exchange of research and development information between Israel and Britain should be comprehensive, ‘including the practical operational applications resulting from the evaluation of data thus acquired’.Footnote37

Personal relations between the DSTI and Israelis had in fact developed from the formal to the outright friendly. The British officials knew that the technical data that they could extrapolate from access to an array of captured Soviet equipment was unprecedented. Until this point, such technical intelligence had been piecemeal and largely dependent on the British Commanders-in-Chief Mission to the Soviet Forces in Germany based out of East Berlin. Moreover, despite clear divisions over when, not if, to extract a price from the British, the Israelis remained open to entertaining requests regarding access to a range of Soviet equipment. The FCO, however, was keen to remind the DIS of official government policy. On 15 May 1968, a memorandum went to the MoD reminding DSTI staff that the JIC would evaluate requests for exchanges of intelligence and research and development.

All this is set against a background that the Israelis have in their possession large quantities of captured Soviet equipment, in which our own technical intelligence departments have a considerable interest. Our objective therefore is to co-operate with the Israelis so far as valuable information is made available to us, but without getting a one-sided bargain, contravening either our arms sales or release of military information policies, or engaging in wide ranging exchanges in sensitive fields which might seriously damage our relations with Arab states if they became known, and lead to renewed charges of a special relationship between our armed forces and those of Israel.Footnote38

 

But there were attempts at nurturing a closer relationship of sorts. Keen to extract as much as possible from the reservoir of Eastern bloc equipment, the British now agreed to send to Israel H.W Pout, the assistant chief scientific officer projects of the DSTI. An expert on guided weapon radar control systems, Pout was given clear instructions on what he could and could not discuss with the Israelis. He was under strict FCO instructions to ‘exclude from consideration nuclear matters and biological and chemical warfare’. The accompanying FCO instructions to the Pout mission noted that whilst exchange of conventional equipment could come on a case-by-case basis, Britain would not engage in any exchanges on ‘nuclear matters’ that might contribute towards developing Israeli technology in this field.Footnote39 Meanwhile, discussion on biological and chemical warfare was to remain, as much as possible, theoretical in nature, making clear to the Israelis that ‘there would be no question of collaboration with us contributing to the development by Israel of an offensive (B&C warfare) capacity’.Footnote40

Between 16 and 23 June 1968, Pout toured Israel’s main scientific and technical sites that either directly or indirectly dealt with weapons research and development. There is little doubt that Israel rolled out the proverbial red carpet. Escorted by Katchalsky, Pout met scientists, technicians, and senior MoD officials at the Weizman Institute, the Armament Development Authority, the Israeli Institute for Biological Research, the Office of the Chief Scientist, as well as Hebrew University in Tel Aviv. What he saw and heard impressed him, not just in terms of technical achievements of such a young country but the vigour and sheer energy witnessed all around him. His subsequent report to London was not only glowing in its praise but also made important policy recommendations that, if accepted, would have shifted the relationship with Israel beyond a purely functional exchange of technical intelligence based on national interests alone:

The constant threat from without, combined with the indefensible boundaries of the 1949 armistice have given the country generally, and the Armed forces, an unequalled sense of urgency, purpose, and unity. One is conscious of this at all time travelling about Israel and talking to the people, whether highly placed or the man in the street. After the Britain of 1968, a visit to Israel is a tonic.

 

He then added:

To base our sales policy on weapons of defence only would be tantamount to condemning Israel to defeat: even now, Israeli planning must be based on the brief, annihilating attack, although military advances are no longer a necessary part of the plan.Footnote41

 

Sentiment aside, hard economic calculations also played a part in his report. Israel’s technological feat in developing the Gabriel anti-ship missile system impressed him, even more so when he discovered that research and development costs for the whole system was £4 million. His own estimate of the total costs for developing a system of equal complexity in Britain would have been £50 million and nearer £150 million in America. Such technological prowess moved Pout to recommend, ‘There would be considerable advantage in bringing our establishments and industry into closer contact with development groups dedicated to economy and value for money’. A memorandum of understanding would define the type and scale of collaboration between British and Israeli scientists, perhaps including Electronic Counter Measures, tank design, anti-tank weapons, warhead design, propellants, and, controversially given his brief, chemical and biological weapons focusing on ‘incapacitating agents’ with Israel developing the ability to use chemical weapons to deter those of Egypt in attacking Israeli towns. Several Israeli scientists he met made the same point: ‘Gas used in Yemen was a mixture of mustard and V agent’, and Israel had to respond. Whilst detecting an element of hysteria, Pout noted, ‘In their position I would be bound to agree that the IDF must have an attack capability as a deterrent’.Footnote42

One curious element in Pout’s report was an apparent unease expressed by some Israeli scientists over the nature of ties to Washington. Whilst recognising that American generosity had been essential to their survival, ‘The Israelis regard themselves as essentially European in in character’ and that ‘charity is not the basis for the firm economic development of a nation’. This interpretation of Israel’s behaviour perhaps confused sentiment with the hardheaded pragmatism of decision-makers in Tel Aviv; whilst Israel was trying to link access to Soviet weaponry to greater collaboration with Britain in research and development, it was using the same leverage to draw a commitment from Washington on future arms sales. Facing the mainly Soviet armed and supplied North Vietnamese army in Southeast Asia, the United States was desperate for technical intelligence on Soviet weaponry, surface-to-air missiles, and their guidance systems being a particular priority. In August 1967, evaluation teams from the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] and the American Defence Intelligence Agency [DIA] – collectively known as ‘Project MEXPO’ – acquired access by the IDF to what one report called ‘low priority items’. It was clear to American intelligence officials, however, that the Israelis were ‘holding out’ to await the results of parallel discussions on the result of weapons sales to Tel Aviv.Footnote43

In remains unknown is whether the DIS ever knew about these evaluation teams; Washington wanted to keep their activities on a need-to-know basis. Israel eventually softened its stance towards the MEXPO by January 1968, granting the CIA and DIA access to all the captured Soviet equipment requested. It remains unclear, however, if a reciprocal deal emerged at this stage for the purchase of the desired items of American equipment.Footnote44 Given that the Pout mission occurred after Project MEXPO concluded, Israel was still hedging its bets. Still, if Pout’s assessment of his hosts Europhilia intended to endear the JIC and FCO towards a warmer embrace of Israel, it failed. Whilst Pout was still in Israel, the MoD, under the guidance of the JIC, deemed research and development too sensitive to warrant further collaboration with Israel: communications equipment and guided weapons topped the list. The reason given had little to do with security and everything to do with commercial gain. ‘It is not considered any useful purpose would be served by providing detailed information [to the Israelis] since the firms concerned [in Britain] would be unwilling to deal with Israel and thus jeopardise more lucrative Arab markets’.Footnote45

Equally, the FCO believed that the seemingly ad hoc Israeli approach in approaching various departments across Whitehall was deliberate. Across the vast machinery of government, there was suspicion amongst some officials that Israel hoped to either exploit any gaps in policy co-ordination, gain access to information withheld by one department, or get the better of any deal. This was a particular concern when it came to discussing chemical and biological weapons as well as nuclear ‘matters’. As one official opined:

One of the considerations which we have been concerned to emphasise from the start has been the necessity of close coordination [across Whitehall] to ensure that the exchange [of information with the Israelis] is a fair one. Given the piecemeal way in which the Israelis tend to approach different institutions and departments, this consideration will require to be borne firmly in mind.Footnote46

 

In the end, Pout’s enthusiastic support for greater research and development collaboration with Israel fell afoul of the FCO, the JIC effectively doing its bidding in preventing closer ties between the DSTI and its Israeli counterparts. Technical exchanges of information continued over the next year; Britain after all had agreed to sell its Chieftain tank, more powerful than the Centurion, to the IDF. Now preliminary discussions occurred over the possible sale of 60 Royal Air Force [RAF] Hunter fighter aircraft as well as up to 50 Harrier ground attack jump jets, an aircraft of radical design and technology that was only just entering front-line service with the RAF. Harrier’s ability to take off from makeshift airfields or even become airborne through vertical take-off capability was particularly appealing to the Israelis. Operating from relatively few runways – which as the IAF had demonstrated in 1967 could be vulnerable to a devastating first strike – the Harrier offered flexibility and survivability although it was designed as primarily as a ground attack aircraft rather than a fighter.Footnote47

Again, however, fears that such a sale might jeopardise arms sales to the wider Arab world and place British arms manufacturers at a competitive disadvantage if faced with an Arab boycott proved decisive. On the eve of a visit by the former Israeli chief of staff and now deputy defence minister, Lieutenant General Zvi Tzur, to London in February 1969, a briefing note spelling out de facto British arms sales policy effectively stymied any hope that the Israeli delegation may have entertained of concluding a deal. It is worth quoting at length:

From the professional point of view, there is a great interest in the way that in which the Israelis are dealing with their defence problems and the benefits from arms sales and, to a lesser extent, the exchanges of information cannot be disregarded. But in their context, our defence relations with Israel are of little importance compared to those with other states in the Near East. Israel has no defence facilities which we need and her enemies are not our enemies and some indeed are our friends. Closer defence links with Israel would be so easy to achieve and so welcome to her compared with the exasperation we [the UK] often find in trying to work with the Arabs, or even Iranians and Turks. Nevertheless, it is clear where our interests lie, and probably our responsibilities too: when we have to make a choice we cannot choose Israel. Our defence relations with Israel must be limited to achieving a balance which is clearly reasonable compared with our relations with other countries and especially the Arabs. Some visits by senior officers to Israel, some training of Israelis in this country, some co-operation in search and rescue between Israeli forces and the RAF in Cyprus: to go beyond this would be to seem to take sides in the controversy between Israel and the Arabs.Footnote48

 

Any Israeli illusions about where British interests lay were soon disabused. Not only did hopes of purchasing the Harrier prove a chimera, so did any hopes of purchasing the Chieftain tank. This deal collapsed by 1969. The British now claimed the sale of Chieftains would upset the military balance in the Middle East, whilst the Israelis suspected that fears over the potential impact on Britain’s trading relations with the wider Arab world remained the real cause. The subsequent sale of Chieftains to the Libyan government would suggest greater weight to the latter interpretation. The FCO preferred to hide behind adherence to a policy that only allowed the sale of ‘defensive’ equipment to Israel whilst doing nothing that might undermine peace efforts led by Swedish diplomat, Gunnar Jarring, under the auspices of the United Nations.Footnote49 Even application of this stricture was selective: the Chieftain, with its heavy armour and massive 120 mm main gun, had after all constituted a defensive weapon system. It seems the defensive needs of Libya were more pressing than Israel’s despite the fact, on British insistence, that Tel Aviv maintained a studied silence regarding the purchase of the Chieftain lest it rankle policy-makers in Washington.Footnote50 The most surprising element perhaps was that a Labour government led by Wilson, a premier otherwise known for his sympathy towards Israel, confirmed the Libyan sale. By 1970, Tel Aviv could look, but only occasionally touch, what London was prepared to offer.

A growing estrangement that began to mark Anglo-Israeli relations under Wilson’s Labour government continued apace after 1970 with the election of a new Conservative administration under Edward Heath. At a time when Britain’s well-being was increasingly dependent on Arab oil – the discovery of North Sea reserves had yet to come on stream – and London anxious to support a resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict that addressed the issue of Palestinian refugees, British policy looked to balance between continued support for Israel’s existence and support for Palestinian self-determination. The new foreign secretary, Alec Douglas Home, articulated this publicly during the so-called ‘Harrogate speech’, given to a meeting of Yorkshire Conservative Party members on 31 October 1970. At that moment when there was no formal recognition of Israel by any group of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, the speech was met with disdain in Tel Aviv, which sensed the continued influence of Foreign Office ‘Arabists’ behind Home’s words. The Scottish Labour MP and Zionist activist, Maurice Miller, provided a more pithy summation, noting, ‘Britain needs oil more than Jaffa oranges and it looks like this is the kind of thinking that will dominate the [Conservative] cabinet’.Footnote51

The exchange of intelligence continued, albeit on a limited basis, although there were exceptions where exigencies demanded as events in Jordan now proved. Faced with the growing militancy of armed Palestinian factions, notably the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, that threatened the Hashemite dynasty in Jordan, King Hussein unleashed his army against their redoubts in and around the capital Amman in September 1970. The MI6 station chief in Amman, Jon ‘Bill’ Speares, before the events later known as ‘Black September’, established a secure radio link with the Jordanian monarch. It now served as a conduit to pass IDF intelligence assessments to the Jordanians, a key source of information once Syrian forces looked to intervene on the side of the Palestinians.Footnote52

Still, London remained suspicious that Israel might seek to take advantage of the crisis and seize Jordanian territory that abutted the Golan Heights. Even so, and despite Jordanian requests for British – and American – airstrikes against Syrian forces, London demurred. Ultimately, Jordanian Armed Forces proved their worth, turning the tide against the Palestinian guerrillas and Syrian forces, thereby securing the monarchy. But the episode raised serious questions for London and Tel Aviv. The British might well have seen the survival of the monarch as a key strategic interest but lacked the military wherewithal, let alone the political will, to match words with deeds. In Israel, the debate amongst the leadership increasingly centred on whether to strengthen Hussein’s hand or allow Jordan effectively to become Palestine. The intelligence passed to the king via Speares demonstrated Tel Aviv’s preference for the regional status quo. The view, however, that ‘Jordan is Palestine’ retained an appeal that continues to resonate amongst some elements of Israel’s political right to this day.Footnote53

Elsewhere, arranging military exchange visits occurred albeit on an ad hoc basis. In November 1971, for example, the IAF hosted a team of RAF officers over four days at the Ramat David air base. With both air forces now equipped with the American-built F4 Phantom fighter-bomber, the RAF were keen to learn from the tactical experience of the Israeli crews who had flown the aircraft against Soviet-equipped Egyptian forces in the recent War of Attrition and, in particular, how they had countered the surface-to-air [SAM] missile sites. These weapons equipped Warsaw Pact forces across Central Europe and, given its frontline role in West Germany, the RAF was keen to glean any information that could help counter this threat if the Cold War turned hot. IAF professionalism impressed the RAF officers involved, an admiration that convinced them of the need for further exchanges, a key recommendation of the post-visit report. It was not to be. By the time the October 1973 ‘Yom Kippur’ war broke out, military exchanges between Israel and Britain were negligible, restricted to the work of their respective military attachés.Footnote54

In the October 1973 war, Israel again captured vast amounts of Soviet-supplied weapons and equipment from Syria and Egypt, much of it replacing the losses both had incurred following the 1967 hostilities. Much of this equipment had yet to enter frontline service with Warsaw Pact forces. The technical intelligence as well as the tactical and operational knowledge gained by the IDF in overcoming two armies equipped with this latest Soviet weaponry – the Sagger anti-tank missiles and Soviet SAM missiles – was self-evident to any Western intelligence professional.

Anticipating that the warmth in relations between the DSTI and their Israeli counterparts could be rekindled, ministers in the Heath government hoped that Israel would grant British technical experts access to some of the captured loot. The British defence secretary, Peter Carrington, was particularly vexed about the apparent success of Soviet SAM missiles downing Israel’s F4 Phantoms. The effectiveness of Egyptian infantry in using the Sagger anti-tank wire-guided missiles to knock out so many Israeli tanks, including Centurions, in the first days of the war also struck Heath. The prime minister now queried Carrington if the BAOR struck the right balance between its armour and infantry units.Footnote55

The DIS director-general, Admiral Sir Louis Le Bailly, asked the British military attaché in Tel Aviv to see if, in the war’s immediate aftermath, the Israelis would now co-operate in the ‘mutual exploitation of Soviet equipment’.Footnote56 But the limited returns of co-operating with the British on technical intelligence after June 1967 and, more presciently, London’s arms embargo imposed on all sides in the conflict – including a moratorium on the use of British and Cypriot bases by United States Air Force planes flying resupply missions to Tel Aviv – were fresh in the Israeli collective memory. Moreover, Britain also imposed restrictions on American high altitude reconnaissance flights operating from British bases during the war, insisting that Tel Aviv should not acquire any imagery intelligence resulting from these operations.Footnote57 British perfidy proven saw access denied. Also dashed were hopes that some crumbs of technical comfort might come from the Americans. Still smarting from Heath’s decision to deny the use of British airbases, Washington was in no mood to do London’s bidding with the Israelis.Footnote58

Moreover, with Israel increasingly dependent on American manufactured arms and equipment, London had no leverage that it could realistically use in the realm of research and development to gain access, an area that marked a clear Israeli need for co-operation and collaboration in the aftermath of June 1967 war. As the newly formed ‘Middle East War Aftermath Intelligence Coordinating Committee’ in Whitehall reported in November 1973, the British were now set to miss ‘potentially the greatest source of intelligence on Soviet equipment and tactical doctrine ever presented to the Western world’. Not only were the DIS prevented from touching, they could not even look.Footnote59 The role reversal was striking, marking a decisive shift in the power relationship between the Israeli supplicant and the British supplier and where London’s voice now counted for very much less.

Perhaps the most damning account of British policy resides in the published memoirs of former Labour foreign secretary, David Owen. Condemning both Heath and Home for refusing to allow the supply of tank shells for the British-made Centurion tanks crucial to Israel’s war effort, he opined, ‘It showed not just Arab influence within the Foreign Office but a total lack of principle in standing by one’s commitments … . British influence with Israel never recovered, for perfectly understandable reasons. It was a craven act which had everything to do with the threat of being cut off from Arab oil and for which I had nothing but contempt’.Footnote60 Relations did not improve nine years after the Yom Kippur war by disclosures that Israel continued to sell military equipment to Argentina both during and after the 1982 Falklands War. The argument put forward by Tel Aviv that such military exports were crucial to its balance of payments echoed the very arguments used by Whitehall in weighing the value of arms sales to the Arab Middle East.Footnote61 Not until the visit to Israel in 1986 by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher did intelligence relations return to anything like that warm, albeit brief, transactional glow experienced in the immediate aftermath of the June 1967 war.Footnote62

Today, the Anglo-Israeli intelligence relationship is probably as close as it has ever been and across a range of activities, from counter-terrorism to efforts to disrupt Iran’s regional ambitions, including in the nuclear realm.Footnote63 Moreover, wars in Afghanistan and Iraq saw British Armed Forces buy Israeli military equipment, notably the Heron ‘Watchkeeper’ drone and Popeye missile system, to plug gaps in capability that would otherwise have limited British military operations. Equally, when first deployed in Afghanistan in 2002, the British army drew heavily on Israeli expertise, mainly from IDF operations in southern Lebanon, in how to deal with threats from suicide bombers and Improvised Explosive Devices.Footnote64 Elsewhere, the Government Communications Headquarters [GCHQ], alongside the United States National Security Agency [NSA], has shared information with their Israeli counterpart, Unit 8200 – also referred to as Israel’s Intelligence Signals National Unit – presumably on shared targets of interest across the Middle East, notably Iran and its nuclear programme.Footnote65 If such a thing as a golden age of Anglo-Israeli intelligence and defence co-operation exists, it is probably occurring now.Footnote66

Israel, however, remains an intelligence target for both the United States and Britain. In January 2016, the release of material by Edward Snowden on Wikileaks revealed that GCHQ and the NSA had co-operated for over a decade on ‘Operation Anarchist’, allowing both agencies to hack into the video feeds of IAF aircraft and drones on operational flights. For Israel, it was a major security breach; for the British and American crypto-analysts, it was a real coup, allowing the gathering of real-time information on IDF military operations and, most important, offering a priceless forewarning of any Israeli intent to launch pre-emptive strikes designed to degrade Iran’s nuclear programme.Footnote67 It is a salutary reminder that the path of Anglo-Israeli relations, not least in the realm of intelligence sharing, has rarely been smooth.Footnote68

Competing regional interests have often led to estrangement, with the shared antipathies towards Cairo in the 1960s producing a brief period of co-operation as both London and Tel Aviv looked to clip Nasser’s wings. But commercial gain and London’s determination to protect existing interests and develop others across the Arab Middle East saw British and Israeli interests quickly diverge by 1970. In this process, the FCO often exercised the greatest influence across Whitehall and, in particular, the JIC. By contrast, professional interest as well as admiration for Israel’s victory in June 1967 saw the MoD and DSTI adopt a more benign attitude towards Israel’s military needs. In the hierarchy of power, however, the DIS was always the poor relation in influencing policy, unable to compete with the FCO – and likely MI6 – in drafting JIC assessments. In most matters relating to the Middle East, ministers usually deferred to their trained diplomats.

To be sure, certain areas always remained beyond the pale in the realm of technical intelligence sharing with Israel. Collaboration over nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare remained taboo, despite the best efforts of the Pout report to elicit some change in JIC attitudes. One could ask if an opportunity for greater defence collaboration was lost, pushing Tel Aviv towards Washington and denying crucial political leverage to London in the wider Arab-Israeli conflict. Perhaps the trajectory of Israel’s military ties to the United States had already been set with the sale of Hawk missiles under the Kennedy Administration and soon after with the deal to supply Israel with Skyhawk jets. The access given to Project MEXPO that pre-dated the Pout visit also underscored that shift.

Still, the Anglo-Israeli intelligence relationship highlights a wider truth. Whilst the idea of democratic peace largely negates violent conflict between states defined by open government, the competing interests of Israel and Britain across the Middle East made for an uneasy relationship. Israel’s perception of its existential needs ran counter to a Britain seeking to shore up an ailing economy. Of course, British influence across the region was in decline, its moment in the Middle East as described by the historian, Elizabeth Monroe, long passed. Britain tried to punch above its weight but, by 1967, its interests were undoubtedly rooted in commercial advantage rather than strategic assets gained. The aftermath of the October 1973 war was testament to this fact. British intelligence and, in particular, the DIS, admired Israel’s military achievements and saw the value in sharing technical intelligence aimed at bolstering the British Armed Forces. But the competing interests identified above could never be reconciled. A shared cultural tradition, the very essence of the ‘Five Eyes’ alliance, was conspicuous by its absence. Moreover, if a reciprocity of sorts defined Anglo-Israeli intelligence relations between 1967 and 1974, it was defined by ‘the reciprocity of barter’, a reciprocity still to emerge fully from the shadows of the Palestine mandate. To paraphrase Lord Palmerston’s famous quip, not all democratic states in an intelligence relationship become close friends. Rather, they become nodding acquaintances who, more often than not, come together by the shared pursuit of short-term interests.Footnote69

 

Acknowledgments

I remain grateful for the comments and insights on earlier drafts of this article provided by Dr Alan Craig, Ambassador Efraim Halevy, Professor Rory Miller, Professor Tore Petersen, and Professor Yigal Sheffy.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Clive Jones

Clive Jones is Professor of Regional Security (Middle East) at Durham University and Visiting Research Professor in the Department of Historical and Classical Studies, NTNU, Trondheim. His publications include The Clandestine Lives of Colonel David Smiley: Code Name ‘Grin’ (2019); with Yoel Guzansky, Fraternal Enemies: Israel and the Gulf Monarchies (2020); with Tore T. Petersen, eds., Israel’s Clandestine Diplomacies (2013); and Britain and the Yemen Civil War, 1962-65 (2010).

Notes

1 Richard J. Aldrich, “Allied Codebreakers Co-operate but not Always,” Guardian, June 24, 2010.

2 Idem., “British Intelligence and the Anglo-American “Special Relationship”, during the Cold War,” Review of International Studies 53, no. 2 (1998): 331-51. See also Bradley F. Smith, “The Road to the Anglo-American Intelligence Partnership,” American Intelligence Journal 16, no. 2-3 (1995): 59-62; Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, The Ties that Bind: Intelligence Cooperation between the UK/USA Countries (London, 1985).

3 J. Vitor Tossini, “The Five Eyes – The Intelligence Alliance of the Anglosphere,” UK Defence Journal (14 November 2017), https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/the-five-eyes-the-intelligence-alliance-of-the-anglosphere/.

4 Jennifer E. Sims, “Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals, and Details,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 19, no. 2 (2006): 195-217.

5 See for example Moshe Gat, Britain and the Conflict in the Middle East, 1964-1967: The Coming of the Six-Day War (Westport, CT, 2003).

6 Zach Levey, “Britain and Israel, 1950-1967: The Strategic Dimension,” in Britain and the Middle East: From Imperial Power to Junior Partner, ed. Zach Levey and Elie Podeh (Brighton, 2008), 91.

7 In researching this article, the author applied for the release of the following documents relating to Anglo-Israeli intelligence liaison under the UK Freedom of Information Act: “Israel’s nuclear capabilities,” CAB [Cabinet Records, The National Archives, Kew] 163/263; “Working party on Israel JulySeptember1974,” CAB190/75; “Cyber System Exchanges and the Value of British Intelligence Liaison with Israel,” CAB 163/158; “Israel: Electronic Warfare Capability,” DEFE [Ministry of Defence Records, The National Archives, Kew] 61/6. These requests were all denied.

8 Israeli military intelligence and the use of deception both before and during the June 1967 war particularly impressed the Defence Intelligence Staff of the Ministry of Defence. See “Secret. The Arab-Israeli War June 1967,” July 1968, DEFE 63/19; Alston to Moberly, “Intelligence Exchanges with Israel,” 5 March 1968, WO [War Office Records, The National Archives, Kew] 337/8.

9 See Moore [Ministry of Defence] briefing note to Brenchley, 15 May 1968, WO 337/8.

10 Tom Bower, The Perfect English Spy (NY, 1995), 239-40.

11 One female MI6 officer posted as head of station to Tel Aviv in the late 1950s included the wonderfully named Betsy Dumbell. Private information.

12 Scott Lucas and Alistair Moray, “The Hidden “alliance”: The CIA and MI6 before and after Suez,” Intelligence and National Security 15, no. 2 (2000): 101, 106.

13 “Likely Israeli Course of Action and Scale of Attack with Arab states in the Near Future,” 9 November 1955, JIC 55(68), CAB 158/22.

14 Bower, Perfect English Spy, 240.

15 Christopher Gandy, “A Mission to Yemen: August 1963-January 1963,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 28, no. 2 (1998): 247-74.

16 Bower, Perfect English Spy, 246.

17 Zach Levey, “Anglo-Israeli Strategic Relations, 1952-56,” Middle Eastern Studies 31, no. 4 (1995): 779-80.

18 By 1969, Britain had supplied Israel with 500 Centurions with a commitment to sell a further 200: “Visit of General Zur, Israeli Assistant Minister of Defence, Annexure “B”,” 5 February 1969, DEFE 31/34.

19 Clive Jones, The Clandestine Lives of Colonel David Smiley: Code Name ‘Grin’ (Edinburgh, 2019), 286-316.

20 Duff Hart Davis, The War that Never Was (London, 2011), 328-29.

21 Yigal Sheffy, “Assessing the Assessors: The JIC assessment and the test of time,” in Exploring Intelligence Archives, eds. R. Gerald Hughes, Peter Jackson, and Len Scott (Abingdon, 2008), 239.

22 See for example, Paul Maddrell, Spying on Science: Western Intelligence in a Divided Germany 1945-61 (Oxford, 2006); Huw Dylan, Defence Intelligence and the Cold War: The British Joint Intelligence Bureau 1945-64 (Oxford, 2014).

23 See the documents, all held by the National Archives: www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/israelbomb.pdf.

24 Ben Macintyre, “Spy Fed Secrets to the Israelis,” Times, September 24, 2019). Cf. John Ferris, Behind the Enigma: The Authorised History of GCHQ: Britain’s Secret Cyber-Intelligence Agency (London, 2020), 454. The Joint Intelligence Bureau became the Defence Intelligence Staff in 1964.

25 For a full account of the Levin case, see Avner Cohen and Meirion Jones, “The sudden death of UK’s nuke chief, suspected of spying for Israel’s A-bomb program,” Ha’aretz (24 September 2016). https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium.MAGAZINE-did-u-k-nuclear-chief-nyman-levin-spy-for-israel-1.5441273.

26 “Confidential Covering Secret: Visit of General Zur, Israeli Assistant Minister of Defence, Annexure “A”, Naval Items,” 5 February 1969, DEFE 31/34. On the clandestine history of HMS Totem, see Richard J. Aldrich, GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain’s Most Secret Intelligence Agency (London, 2010), 264-65.

27 Alston to Moberly, “Subject. Intelligence Exchanges with Israel,” 5 March 1968, WO 337/8. On the sorry story of Anglo-Israeli development of the Chieftain tank, see Simon C. Smith, “Centurions and Chieftains: Tank Sales and British policy towards Israel in the aftermath of the Six-Day War,” Contemporary British History 28, no. 2(2014): 219-39; Saul Bronfeld, ““The Chieftain Tank Affair”: Realpolitik, Perfidy, and the Genesis of the Merkava,” Contemporary British History 29, no. 3 (2015): 380-400.

28 Alston to Moberly “Secret: Exchange of Military Intelligence with Israel,” 23 February 1968, WO 337/8.

29 “Secret: UK Eyes Only. Secretary of State [for Defence]. Collaboration with Israel,” nd, WO 337/8.

30 Alston to Moberly “Secret: Exchange of Military Intelligence with Israel,” 23 February 1968, WO 337/8.

31 Arieh J. Kochavi, “George Brown and British Policy in the Middle East following the 1967 war,” Middle East Journal 70, no. 1 (2016): 95.

32 Mallet holograph notes, “Secret Exchange of Military Intelligence with Israel, 8 March 1968, WO 337/8.

33 Kochavi, “George Brown,” 96.

34 Or Rabinowitz, “‘When Pigs Fly’: Britain, Canada, and Nuclear Exports to Israel, 1958-1974”, Diplomacy & Statecraft 30, no. 4 (2019): 708.

35 “Secret: UK Eyes Only. Collaboration with Israel,” nd, WO337/8.

36 Nelson to Greenhill [Foreign Office], “UK Eyes Only. Israel,” 16 April 1968, WO 337/8.

37 Haskell to Greenhill, “Exchange of Research and Development Information with the Israelis,” 18 April 1968, WO 337/8.

38 Moore to Brenchley and Arbuthnott [Foreign Office], 15 May 1968, WO 337/8.

39 Moore to Brenchley “Secret: Briefing note,” 20 May 1968 FCO [Foreign and Commonwealth Office Records, The National Archives, Kew] 17/578.

40 Moore to Brenchley and Arbuthnott, 20 May 1968, WO 337/8.

41 “UK Eyes Only: Report on a Visit to Israel 16-23 June 1968 by H.W. Pout, Assistant Chief Scientific Adviser (Projects) MoD,” 8 July 1968, Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 Documents relating to Israeli-American technical intelligence liaison can be accessed at the National Security Archive [NSA] online hosted by George Washington University. NSA [document number unclear] “Secret: Memorandum for the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Subject – On-Site Evaluation of the Operational and Technical Information Resulting from the Arab-Israeli War (C),” 5 September 1967: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=4361583-Document-27-Project-MEXPO-Exploitation-of-Soviet; NSA [document number unclear] “Secret: Memorandum for the Director, Joint Staff. Subject – Soviet SA 2 Equipment,” 14 November 1967: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=4361584-Document-28-Project-MEXPO-Exploitation-of-SA-2.

44 NSA, SNFD-27, 041/CO-2B, “Secret: Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense. Subject: Exploitation of Material in the Middle East (U),” 8 January 1968: https://nsarchive. gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=4361585-Document-29-Project-MEXPO-Update-Memorandum-from.

45 Tallboys [head, DS.13] to Gammon [Ministry of Technology], “Collaboration with Israel,” 20 June 1968, WO 337/8.

46 “Rand D Exchanges with Israel,” nd, FCO 17/578.

47 “Visit of General Zur [sic] Israeli Assistant Minister of Defence,” Appendix 1 to Annexure ‘c’, 6 February 1969, DEFE 31/34.

48 “Covering Secret: Visit of General Zur [sic] Israeli Assistant Minister of Defence,” 5 February 1969, Ibid.

49 “Secret. Record of Meeting Between Secretary of State for Defence & H.E. Mrs Golda Meir,” 13 June 1969, “Record of Conversation between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Deputy Prime Minister of Israel Held at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on Monday 12 May 1969,” both Ibid.

50 “Prime Minister: Sale of Chieftains to Israel,” 29 January 1969, “UK Eyes Only. Minute for the Prime Minister,” 3 February 1969, both Ibid.

51 See Louis Heren, “Israel rejection of Sir Alec’s plans is based on misreading,” Times, November 2, 1970.

52 See Nigel Ashton, King Hussein of Jordan: A Political Life (London, 2008), 151-52.

53 Ibid., 154, highlights the comments of General Mordechai Gur who, in his capacity as chief of Israel’s Northern Command, noted the two options before Israel. Whether Israel would indeed have ever recognised the fiat of the Palestinians over Jordan remains a matter of conjecture.

54 “UK Eyes Only. Central Tactics and Trials Organisation (RAF). Report on A Visit by CTTO to the Israeli Air Force, November 1971,” December 1971, DEFE 56/31.

55 Carrington (MO27/2) to Chief of the Air Staff, 18 October 1973, Heath to Carrington, 29 October 1973, both DEFE 31/145.

56 “Signal 291800,” Le Bailly to Barrett [defence attaché, Tel Aviv], 29 October 1973, Ibid.

57 See the detailed account in Aldrich, GCHQ, 277.

58 “Signal 081930,” Cromer to Le Bailly, 8 November 1973, DEFE 31/145.

59 “Terms of Reference for the Middle East War Aftermath Intelligence Coordinating Committee,” 14 November 1973, D-DIS 25/2/2, Ibid.

60 David Owen, Time to Declare (London, 1991), 209.

61 Azriel Bermant, “A Chronicle of Failure Foretold: The UK, Israel and Arms Sales to Argentina in the Era of the Falkland War,” International History Review 41, no. 2 (2019): 237-56.

62 Azriel Bermant, Margaret Thatcher and the Middle East (Cambridge, 2016), 142-155, has an excellent account.

63 Christopher Hope, “We foiled Iranian nuclear weapons bid, says spy chief,” Daily Telegraph, July 13, 2012. See also Seth Frantzman, “How Israeli military tech (and doctrine) will make the UK better at fighting the hybrid war of the future,” Fathom Journal, January, 2021. https://fathomjournal.org/how-israel-military-tech-and-doctrine-will-make-the-uk-better-at-fighting-the-hybrid-warfare-of-the-future/.

64 “David Cameron’s speech to the Knesset in Israel” (12 March 2014). https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/david-camerons-speech-to-the-knesset-in-israel. Private Information disclosed to the author.

65 “Visit Précis. Sir Iain Lobban, KCMG, CB, Director, Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ, 30 April 2013-1 May 2013)”: https://cryptome.wikileaks.org/2014/04/nsa-gchq-lobban-visit.pdf. See also Aldrich, GCHQ, 550-51.

66 See for example, the interview with Neil Wigan, the British ambassador, Israel, in Fathom, January, 2021. Fathom – UK-Israel 2021 | An interview with UK Ambassador to Israel Neil Wigan (fathomjournal.org). See also “UK-Israel Relations after Brexit: Cyber Security,” British Israel Communications and Research Centre, April, 2018. http://www.bicom.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/cyber-security-UK-Israel-relations-after-Brexit.pdf.

67 Ronen Bergman, “US, UK, Spied on Israel’s Drone and Missile Programmes,” Yediot Aharanot, January 31, 2016; Jacques Follorou, “Britain Has Spent Years Spying on Israel’s Leaders,” Le Monde, December 7, 2016; Gili Cohen, “UK, US Spy Program Hacked into Video Feeds on Israeli Drones, Fighter Jets,” Ha’aretz, January 29, 2016.

68 One report claimed that GCHQ believed Israel to be ‘a true threat’ to the stability of the Middle East. See “UK Intelligence called Israel “True Threat” to Middle East,” Ha’aretz, December 8, 2016.

69 The late writer, John le Carré, captured the bitter legacy of the mandate on Anglo-Israeli intelligence relations in fiction. In his novel, The Little Drummer Girl, he constructs a tense discussion between the lead Israeli intelligence officer, Kurtz, and Commander Picton of British intelligence, who had served with the colonial police in Palestine. He views collaboration with the Israeli in helping to track down a skilled Palestinian bomb maker with barely concealed contempt. See John le Carré, The Little Drummer Girl (London, 2018).