: computers

Click Here for the best range of Amazon Computers


With INL News Corporation's Website Tonight Website Builder For Dummies It Is So Easy And Cheap To Own You Own Domain Name for as low as $5 And Build Your Own Website for As Low As $2 a week

Click Here for INL News Amazon Best Seller Books


INLNewsLimitedCorporateLogo : computers

Click Here for the best range of Amazon Computers



Click Here for INL News Amazon Best Seller Books


Amazon Electronics - Portable Projectors

Click Here for INL News Amazon Best Seller Books

INLTV Uncensored News Logo

INLTV Uncensored News 

INLTV is Easy To Find Hard To Leave

CIA History
The Central Intelligence Agency
 The Central Intelligence Agency A Documentary History
Scott C. Monje Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Monje, Scott C.
"MI6 kept quiet about 'criminality' of agent with ‘licence to kill’ | MI6 | The Guardian"

MI6 kept quiet about ‘criminality’ of agent with ‘licence to kill

UK foreign secretary not told about behaviour of ‘high risk agent’ when asked to re-authorise special status

Dan Sabbagh Defence and security editor
Tue 15 Dec 2020 

MI6 failed to make clear to the foreign secretary that a “high risk agent” operating overseas had probably engaged in “serious criminality” until it was pointed out by an independent regulator last year.

The spy agency was asking the minister – either Dominic Raab or his predecessor, Jeremy Hunt – to renew authorisation of the agent’s activities despite the apparent criminality without being “expressly clear” as to what had happened.

Six months previously the agent, likely to be an undercover informant, had been sent some “red lines” by MI6. The agent was told if they were breached, it would “result in the termination” of the informant’s relationship with the spy agency.

But when renewal of the agent’s authorisation was sought from the foreign secretary, MI6 “did not make expressly clear” that the “‘red lines’ had probably been crossed” – until the ambiguity was noted by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner (Ipco).

Many details are withheld from the account, which is highlighted in 2019 annual report of the Commissioner, and it is not clear if approval was ultimately granted by the minister. All the report said was that MI6 responded to the concern about its authorisation request “by updating” the Foreign Office.

Human rights campaigners said disclosure and others in the report suggested that MI6’s agent running was in disarray. “While our intelligence agencies do a vital job, this report rings alarm bells in its account of agents run amok,” said Dan Dolan, the deputy director of Reprieve.

The spy agency had been seeking to authorise the agent’s activities under section 7 of the Intelligence Services Act, dubbed the “licence to kill”. It allows British agents operating abroad to break any law without fear of prosecution in the UK if they have the written permission of the foreign secretary of the day.

Ipco also criticised MI6 for the way it handles informants in the UK, although it runs only a few agents at home. Although it was satisfied that MI6 manages “all agent cases appropriately” there were questions about its handling of paperwork, including “inconsistent written evidence of oversight”.

Ministers are seeking to introduce a related law – the covert human intelligence sources (Chis) bill – which would allow MI5 and police informants working in the UK to commit crimes in pursuit of obtaining intelligence on terrorists or other serious criminals.

Reprieve said that the disclosures in the Ipco annual report demonstrated that the government “urgently needs to get a grip on unchecked lawbreaking by agents”. But, Dolan said, ministers are “rushing through legislation which places no clear limits on the crimes they can commit”.

MI6 also told the regulator it had been forced to suspend cooperation for a time with another country after joint anti-terror operations had led to individuals being subject to “unacceptable treatment” while in detention there.

However, since then, MI6 has restarted working with that country, saying further safeguards have been introduced.

Ministers were also asked by spy agencies or the military to approve two cases involving “a serious risk of torture” plus seven cases involving “serious risk of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment” and a further 21 were there was a lack of due arrest or detention process. But the report does not record what was decided in these cases.


EXCLUSIVE: Man who runs MI6 SOHR admits to RT he last visited Syria 15 years ago

The director of the UK MI6  Observatory for Human Rights, Rami Abdulrahman © Mohammed Abbas / Reuters
The UK-MI6 Observatory for Human Rights has been feeding news about the Syrian war to many media outlets, claiming to have a wide network of contacts on the ground. RT caught up with its director to find out how trustworthy those sources are.
Recently RT went to investigate what makes SOHR so popular with the mainstream media. Journalist and prankster Nimrod Kamer, who volunteered to help find out the answer, travelled to the Midlands to see the headquarters of the Observatory and speak to its director.
Kamer had no luck catching Rami Abdulrahman at home, however. Calling him on the phone, he found out the man went out to a shop. The director of the Observatory sounded very distressed on the phone, talking about the dangers of meeting up for daytime interviews because “they are trying to kill me.”

Soon after RT found out that TRAITOR Abdulrahman was headed to Kazakhstan, although no further details were clear. But tracing the steps of the Syrian opposition was a big help. They got together for a conference in one of the Kazakh capital’s lavish spots. The head of the SOHR also attended the conference, and, after a bit of wrangling, agreed to answer a couple of questions from RT.
“We are under attack simply because we tell the truth what’s going on in Syria. Apparently nobody wants to hear the truth,” Abdulrahman told RT’s Ilya Petrenko.
The organization claims to have a wide network of contacts in the region who feed their information to the head office, where it is processed and then posted on the SOHR website, Facebook and Twitter accounts.
RT asked Abdulrahman whether he personally knows “hundreds of people,” as he himself puts it, working in Syria for SOHR, and whether he can really trust all of them.
“I know all of the activists working for the SOHR,” he replied.
When RT wondered when the last time Abdulrahman actually went to Syria was, he said it was 15 years ago.
“But I know some of the Observatory activists through common friends. This organization only takes new members following a six-month trial period and the candidate has to be familiar to someone from the organization or to a reliable outside contact,” he said.

Since the start of its anti-terror campaign in Syria, Russia has got in SOHR reports, which were quickly picked up by major Western media outlets. One of the latest wires from the Observatory, alleging that “Russian warplanes killed 30 civilians in Homs including women and children,” made headlines worldwide on October 1.
Interestingly enough, the same wire published on the Arabic version of the SOHR website on the same date did not mention any Russian warplanes. It said: “27 civilians dead in airstrikes by Assad regime air forces.


MI6: Richard Moore named as new head of Secret Intelligence Service

  • Published

The next chief of the Secret Intelligence Service, otherwise known as MI6, has been named as Richard Moore.

Mr Moore is currently political director at the Foreign Office and a former ambassador to Turkey. He will take over as MI6 chief in the autumn.

He succeeds Sir Alex Younger, who has been in the post for almost six years.

Mr Moore was praised as "an excellent choice" and "calm, engaging, thoughtful and courageous" by a former MI6 chief.

MI6 is the UK's foreign intelligence service and is responsible for gathering intelligence outside the UK.

It says its three core aims are stopping terrorism, disrupting the activity of hostile states, and giving the UK a cyber advantage.


Its counterpart intelligence agency, MI5, is responsible for protecting the UK, its citizens and interests at home and overseas against threats to national security.

Libya-born Mr Moore joined MI6 in 1987 and later held director roles there. He has also been deputy national security adviser in the Cabinet Office.

During his career he has been posted to Vietnam, Turkey, Pakistan and Malaysia.


According to his biography online, he is married with two children and his interests include golf, hiking, scuba diving, Turkish carpets and porcelain, and visiting historical sites. He speaks fluent Turkish and sometimes tweets in it.

'Vital role'

"I am pleased and honoured to be asked to return to lead my service," said Mr Moore.

"SIS plays a vital role - with MI5 and GCHQ - in keeping the British people safe and promoting UK interests overseas.


"I look forward to continuing that work alongside the brave and dedicated team at SIS."

Presentational grey line
Analysis box by Gordon Corera, security correspondent

The job of "C" involves balancing what goes on inside the confines of MI6 with the outside world.

Internally, a chief needs to make sure MI6 is able to keep producing intelligence from agents.

This requires complex decisions about risk and resources, but also making sure the secret service keeps up with technology - the interconnected data-driven world is challenging traditional spying because it makes it harder to keep secrets and work undercover.

But a chief also needs to navigate the wider world, sometimes acting as a secret diplomat maintaining alliances which deliver intelligence co-operation and occasionally running back-channel contacts with sensitive countries.

A chief also needs to navigate Whitehall. There was a time when they would have little contact with the prime minister but that has changed as relations have got closer - too close, many felt, in the run up to the Iraq War.


Richard Moore's CV - which includes operational time in MI6 at the start of his career, then as an ambassador and finally in the corridors of power - is likely what helped secure him the job.

Presentational grey line

John Sawers, who served as MI6 boss for five years until 2014, said Mr Moore "has the perfect blend of experience - running intelligence operations and holding senior positions in diplomacy and policy formation".

"He knows how intelligence is produced and how it is best used to protect our national security."

The headquarters of MI6 (The Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) at Vauxhall Cross, LondonIMAGE SOURCE,PA MEDIA
Image caption,
MI6 has its headquarters in Vauxhall, London

Mr Sawers added: "I have known Richard for many years. He is calm, engaging, thoughtful and courageous - all qualities that will be essential for the demanding role of chief of MI6, especially during these challenging times."

Outgoing MI6 chief Sir Alex said: "Richard is a highly accomplished intelligence officer and we look forward to welcoming him back to the service."

Alex Younger gave a wide ranging speech to St Andrews UniversityIMAGE SOURCE,GETTY IMAGES
Image caption,
Outgoing chief Alex Younger joined the SIS in 1991

Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab appointed Mr Moore with the agreement of the prime minister.

"He returns to SIS with tremendous experience and will oversee the work of a group of men and women whose tireless efforts are rarely seen in public, but which are critical for the security and prosperity of the UK," he said.

"I pay tribute to Sir Alex Younger for everything he has done during his time leading the Secret Intelligence Service.

"He has carefully and effectively guided the service during a time of increased and more diverse threats."

Sir Alex took up the role of SIS chief - known as "C" - in 2014.

Public speeches by the head of MI6 are rare. In 2018, Sir Alex spoke at the University of St Andrews, where he studied as an undergraduate.

In the speech, he raised questions over Chinese technology companies being involved in the UK's communications infrastructure.

He also said Russia should not underestimate the UK's capabilities.


● (Left) John Wyman, escorted by a Special Branchman, leaving Dublin’s Special Court after he was charged under the Official Secrets Act



IN DECEMBER 1972, the extent of the British Intelligence spy network in Ireland and their infiltration of the Garda Síochána was dramatically exposed by the arrest of John Wyman and Patrick Crinnion.

Wyman (alias “Douglas Smythe” and also known as “Michael Teviott”), a member of MI6, the Secret Intelligence Service, was an important cog in the well-oiled machine of British Intelligence in Ireland.

During the 1960s, especially following the beginning of the most recent phase of the struggle, Wyman’s network expanded. He recruited a number of gardaí and Special Branch officers as agents, the most important being Garda Detective Sergeant Patrlck Crinnion.

Crinnion joined the Garda in 1955. He was transferred to Dublin Castle in 1961 and in 1969 was appointed private secretary to the then Head of the Special Branch, Chief Superintendent John P. Fleming, and moved to Garda HQ in the Phoenix Park to control the intelligence section known as C3.

Crinnion was a particularly valuable spy and was ideally placed to supply the British with intelligence on the IRA, the Republican Movement and gardaí. In return for large sums of money, he supplied Wyman with photostat copies of files and information relating to republicans and republican sympathisers.

MI6 spies Wyman & Crinnion


Also in the Wyman network were the Littlejohn brothers.

Keith and Kenneth Littlejohn, two English criminals on the run in Ireland in 1969, made contact with British Intelligence and offered to work for them in return for an amnesty. Their offer was accepted and they were put in contact with “Douglas Smythe” (Wyman) in Dublin.

The Littlejohns' orders were to infiltrate the Republican Movement, kill republican leaders, and carry out operations in the 26 Counties in an effort to discredit the IRA and to force the Fianna Fáil government to crack down on the Movement. They were responsible for numerous bombings and robberies in the 26 Counties which prompted the Minister for Justice, Des O’Malley, to promise tougher action against the IRA.

In November 1972, O’Malley introduced the draconian Offences Against the State (Amendment) Bill before the Dublin parliament and in the early hours of 2 December, as the Bill was being debated in Leinster House, British Intelligence agents exploded bombs in Dublin, killing two people and seriously injuring 127 others. Within hours, the Bill was passed by a large majority.


On 20 December, the Littlejohns were arrested in London. The following day, Wyman and Crinnion were arrested in Dublin and charged with stealing state secrets.

The reason for the arrest of Wyman and Crinnion is clear: the Fianna Fáil government knew full well that the British agents provocateur, having failed to lay the blame for the Dublin bombs at the door of the IRA, would now resort to political assassination.

After the loss of their two key operatives, the British decided to sacrifice the Littlejohns in exchange for the return of Wyman and Crinnion.

In February, both were tried in camera and sentenced to three months. As they had already been held for that time, both were released and immediately flown to London. The following month, the deal was completed when the Littlejohn brothers were sent to Dublin to stand trial.

MI6 agents John Wyman and Patrick Crinnion were arrested in Dublin on 21 December 1972, 43 years ago this week.

The MI6 Wyman spy network in Dublin | An Phoblacht

An Phoblacht
44 Parnell Sq. Dublin 1, Ireland

 The Central Intelligence Agency : a documentary history / Scott C. Monje p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
 ISBN 978-0-313-35028-3 (alk. paper)
1. United States. Central Intelligence Agency—History.
2. United States. Central Intelligence Agency—History—
I. Title JK468.I6 M63 2008 327.1273009—dc22 2008010075 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright C 2008 by Scott C. Monje
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2008010075 ISBN: 978-0-313-35028-3
First published in 2008 Greenwood Press, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881
An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc.
Printed in the United States of America The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48-1984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Contents Preface vii Introduction: A Secret Organization in a Free and Open Society xi Timeline: Selected Events in the History of the Central Intelligence Agency
1. The Charter 1
2. The Korean War 21
3. Cuba 29
4. Political Assassinations and Illicit Drug Tests 49
5. At Headquarters in the 1960s:  A Brief Note 77
6. Counterintelligence: The Spies among Us 81
7. The Search for Foreign Instigators: Operation Chaos and the Intelligence Evaluation Committee 91
8. ‘‘CIA’s Domestic Activities’’: The Management Advisory Group 111
9. Assistance to Police and Other Agencies 129
10. Chile 143
11. Watergate 153
12. The ‘‘Family Jewels’’ 173
13. The List of Delicate Matters 191
14. Nicaragua, with a Side Trip to Iran 207
15. 9/11 257
16.The Global War on Terrorism 283
17. Iraq, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction 309
18.  The Iran National Intelligence Estimate 371
19. Concluding Remarks 393
Appendix A: Leaders of the United States Intelligence Community 405
Appendix B: Agencies of the United States Intelligence Community 407
 Appendix C: Some Common Acronyms 409 Selected Bibliography 411 Index
 Not so long ago, writing a documentary history of the Central Intelligence Agency would have been a futile endeavor. There were simply not enough documents available to be worth the effort. Histories and analyses—valuable as they are—have been compelled to rely heavily on self-serving leaks, faded memories of participants, or speculation. The situation is still far from ideal, yet the change has been tremendous. Eagerly or reluctantly, the CIA and other agencies have released a flood of information on the history of American intelli gence. The end of the Cold War and the active use of the Freedom of Informa tion Act by historians and civil libertarians contributed to this. Symbolic of the change was the declassification in 2007 of the ‘‘Family Jew els’’ file—the result of an internal CIA effort in 1973 to discover whether it had been violating its own charter—after thirty-four years. Although it may sound oxymoronic, this was surely the most famous set of secret documents in the agency’s history. Many gaps remain, of course. More documents remain hidden than have come to light. Many of those that have been revealed, including the ‘‘Family Jewels,’’ contain more than a few holes inasmuch as selected words, phrases, and pages have been deleted prior to release. Yet, a process has begun. The time has come to take a first, tentative step at putting some of these docu ments together in a more or less cohesive narrative. Any book on such a vast topic, even if it seems to be overly long, necessarily involves choices. In this case, some of those choices have been made for us. The CIA decides which records it will release to the public and which it will not. Clearly, the documentary record is not complete, although it is now probably fuller than that of any intelligence agency in history that was not attached to a defeated and occupied country. We cannot know all of the ways in which the record is skewed because, well, that would be giving away secrets. We do know, of course, that the CIA will be reluctant to reveal current operations, so releases are biased in favor of the past. (On the other hand, certain political leaders of both parties occasionally reveal selective portions of current secret evidence to bolster their positions. On occa sion, some in the CIA may do something similar, especially when they decide that the revelations already occurring are not only selective but inaccurate or designed to blame the agency for policy failures.) Obviously, certain weapons systems cannot be discussed. Documents pertaining to the design of nuclear weapons or formulas for nerve gas will not be released, at least not intention ally, and that is fine. The divulgence of intelligence sources and methods or of the names of certain CIA employees is prohibited by law. In a sense, this is unfortunate—the definition of ‘‘methods,’’ in particular, is elastic and can be stretched to cover many things—but we will probably have to live with it.
1 Pre sumably, a number of things have been kept secret because they are embarrass ing or politically damaging, even though that is expressly prohibited as a criterion. Many of these are, no doubt, categorized as sources and methods. We are also aware of another bias. The CIA is more reluctant to open its operational records, so the evidentiary base is skewed toward the analytical. In other words, the agency is generally more willing to discuss what it thought others were doing in the past than to disclose what it was doing. When it does release operational records, and it does on occasion, they are usually connected to an operation that is already fairly well known. This can be interesting, too, but it is clearly incomplete. It is possible that all the past operations are known and therefore the bias is specious, but this is not very likely. In this book we shall try to give a sampling of document excerpts from throughout the CIA’s history that will be necessarily incomplete even in relation to the documents that are now publicly available. Some periods will be more heavily represented and others less so. We will not cover some of the most fa mous operations, such as Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), and the Bay of Pigs (1961), which have been thoroughly handled elsewhere. An unfortunate lacuna will be a lack of space devoted to the Soviet Union, which was the major focus of CIA attention for most of the agency’s existence. Perhaps, someday, that can be the subject of another book. An effort has been made to incorporate both analytical and operational reports as well as critical internal reviews. Several chapters rely heavily on the ‘‘Family Jewels’’ collection, which focuses primarily on activities of the late 1960s and early 1970s that could be considered domestic in nature. On occasion, documents from other agencies, such as the National Security Council, will be offered when they discuss the CIA, include CIA representatives, or contribute to understanding a given situation.
Chapters dealing with more recent events, for which fewer internal documents are available, make use of the declassified reports of Congressional oversight committees and official investigative com missions examining CIA and intelligence-related activities.
The chapter dealing with the Iraq War examines both the intelligence and the way it was used by the administration in its argument in support of war. The background for the estimate on Iran’s nuclear program released in December 2007 is provided through open testimony on Iran before the Senate Select Committee on Intelli gence. With luck, this book will contribute to an understanding of the CIA and what it does, and of the dilemmas associated with any secret organization in a free society. Like all researchers in this field, I owe an enormous debt of gratitude to the National Security Archive at George Washington University, which is
 responsible for making available most of the formerly classified documents pre sented here.
2 Other documents are available through two important programs of the Federation of American Scientists (the Intelligence Resource Program and the Project on Government Secrecy),
3 the general news media and various departments and agencies of the U.S. government, including the CIA itself.
4 I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Mary Curry of the National Secu rity Archive and to Margaret M. Wood of the Law Library of Congress for help in finding resources and in explaining things. I extend my appreciation to Sandy Towers of Greenwood Press for her consistent enthusiasm and encour agement.
I especially thank my wife, Audrey, and our daughter, Patricia, for their patience and understanding through the many months as I huddled over the computer and grumbled.
1. On the flexibility of the concept of ‘‘methods’’ as a reason for classifying things, and also for the reasons that some publicly known facts may be subject to classification, see Joseph Weisberg, ‘‘The CIA’s Open Secrets,’’ New York Times (27 August 2007).
Weis berg was formerly with the CIA Directorate of Operations.
2. See nsarchiv.
It was an unusual event for an academic meeting, one marked by a certain degree of irony. On 21 June 2007, Gen. Michael V. Hayden, Director of the Cen tral Intelligence Agency, addressed the annual conference of the Society for His torians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR). As a professional association, SHAFR had long championed ready access to historical government documents, whereas the CIA was the very embodiment of government secrecy. Yet Hayden—who had earned a master’s degree in history at Duquesne University in 1969—noted that he both respected and enjoyed the historian’s task. He allowed that the CIA had a social contract with the American people to explain to them, to the best of its ability, the things that it did on their behalf. In doing so, he also boasted of his agency’s openness: ‘‘No other intelligence agency in the world rivals our record on declassification.’’1 Over the years, he noted, the CIA had reviewed and released some 31 million pages of previously classified documents, and it continued to receive 3,000 new requests each year for declas sifications under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) of 1967. The very nature of intelligence activities, however, creates problems in this regard. For a democratic society to hold its government accountable, it must know what the government is doing. This should be all the more important with regard to vital issues such as national security, which concerns questions of war and peace, life and death. Yet the very nature of intelligence activity requires that it remain secret. The CIA’s charter, the National Security Act of 1947, makes the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for ‘‘protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.’’ Thus, ‘‘a se cret organization serving an open and free society,’’ as Hayden put it, faces a perpetual dilemma. It must ‘‘wrestle constantly with the twin imperatives of essential openness and essential secrecy.’’ We must balance our responsibility to the public, and to history, to explain our actions and their impact, with our obligation to protect sources, methods, and ongoing intelligence relationships. These are not simple, cut-and-dried issues. They spark vigorous internal debates that ultimately require informed, yet subjective, judgments. We have those debates and make those judgments knowing that mis takes can jeopardize American security, and, in some cases, place lives at risk. An intelligence organization that fails to protect those who work with it—foreign intel services and individuals—will eventually see sources dry up and cooperation di minish. So, as you can see, this is an existential question for us. Hayden was correct, of course; the dilemma of a secret organization in an open society is a very real one. Real as the predicament may be, however, it also provides endless opportunities and temptations for abuse. The public must sim ply accept that the CIA will review the appropriate documents, make the proper determination regarding what can and cannot be revealed, and then fol low that determination fully and without distortion. This may be problematic when the information proves embarrassing to the agency, its director, or the pres ident of the United States—even when the law forbids such considerations— or when revelations threaten to complicate diplomatic relations with other countries. Despite the enormous number of documents released by the CIA in recent years, the agency’s history of declassification has been more uneven than Hay den implied. While the agency had just released some 31 million pages, it had reportedly reviewed and declined to release about 70 million others.2 These pre sumably included some of the most sensitive and, therefore, most interesting. Moreover, most documents that are released are first ‘‘redacted.’’ That is to say, they are edited and left with gaping holes, usually without any indication of what information was removed or why. In some cases, it is clearly the name of an individual or a foreign intelligence service. In others, whole paragraphs or entire pages may simply fail to appear. Hayden himself personifies the irony here. In his speech to the SHAFR con ference, he noted: ‘‘Of course, we cannot tell the American people everything we do to protect them without damaging our ability to protect them. When it comes to secret intelligence, public sovereignty and oversight reside in the Con gress.’’ The careful reader will note that he never specifically said that the Con gress is told either, although he clearly meant to leave his audience with that impression. Sometimes, consulting Congress has meant informing the two rank ing members of the intelligence committee of each house and then telling them that the matter is secret; they cannot effectively act upon the information or even discuss it with their colleagues or staffs. That takes much of the meaning out of ‘‘consultation.’’ Before coming to the CIA, Hayden had been the director of the National Se curity Agency, where he initiated the warrantless wiretapping of communica tions between the United States and foreign countries following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (‘‘9/11’’). Most members of Congress learned of this program in late 2005, four years after it began. They discovered only in April 2007 that legal questions surrounding an earlier version of the program had nearly provoked the resignation of the attorney general, the deputy attor ney general, and the director of the FBI in 2004. The week after Hayden’s speech at the SHAFR conference, the Senate Judiciary Committee found it nec essary to issue subpoenas to the White House in its years-long effort to learn xii Introduction the details of the program and the reasoning behind it. (The subpoenas were ignored.) Even Congress, the repository of ‘‘public sovereignty and oversight,’’ is not guaranteed timely and effective access to information. The early beginnings of the CIA’s declassification program came in the 1970s, when the agency released some of the analytic records of its World War II pred ecessor, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Operational records of the OSS followed in the early 1980s. With this precedent in mind, the agency established its own voluntary Historical Review Program in 1985, as part of a deal with Congress exempting CIA operational records from FOIA requests. The agency’s various subdivisions, however, were reluctant to cooperate with the program, and its initial releases consisted not of documents but of previously classified internal histories written by the agency’s own staff historians.3 The heyday of CIA declassification came in the 1990s, in the immediate after math of the Cold War’s end. Director of Central Intelligence (later, Secretary of Defense) Robert M. Gates convened the Task Force on Greater CIA Openness, which in December 1991 recommended that the agency declassify and release certain historical documents that had been withheld from the public. Although the CIA’s initial reaction was to classify the task force’s recommendations as se cret, it soon repented, published the recommendation, and began releasing documents. Notable was the publication of CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, for a conference commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of that event.4 The Center for the Study of Intelligence, which had been established in 1974, was expanded at this time. Then, President Bill Clinton, on 17 April 1995, signed Executive Order 12958, ‘‘Classified National Security Information,’’ which called on all government agencies to declassify historical records automatically if they were more than twenty-five years old. This was radical new thinking for the government in gen eral, and especially for the CIA. But, as is so often the case, it came with some substantial qualifications. The main point, paragraph (a) in this instance, was followed by a lengthy list of exceptions in paragraph (b), several of which had direct and significant implications for the CIA. While all of them were under standable, and probably even necessary, they meant that significant gaps in the published record would remain. In part, the executive order reads: Sec. 3.4. Automatic Declassification. (a) Subject to paragraph (b), below, within 5 years from the date of this order, all classified information contained in records that (1) are more than 25 years old, and (2) have been determined to have permanent historical value under title 44, United States Code, shall be automatically declassified whether or not the records have been reviewed. Subsequently, all classified information in such records shall be automatically declassified no longer than 25 years from the date of its original classification, except as provided in paragraph (b), below. (b) An agency head may exempt from automatic declassification under para graph (a), above, specific information, the release of which should be expected to: (1) reveal the identity of a confidential human source, or reveal informa tion about the application of an intelligence source or method, or reveal the identity of a human intelligence source when the unauthorized Introduction xiii disclosure of that source would clearly and demonstrably damage the national security interests of the United States; (2) reveal information that would assist in the development or use of weapons of mass destruction; (3) reveal information that would impair U.S. cryptologic systems or activities; (4) reveal information that would impair the application of state of the art technology within a U.S. weapon system; (5) reveal actual U.S. military war plans that remain in effect; (6) reveal information that would seriously and demonstrably impair rela tions between the United States and a foreign government, or seriously and demonstrably undermine ongoing diplomatic activities of the United States; (7) reveal information that would clearly and demonstrably impair the current ability of United States Government officials to protect the President, Vice President, and other officials for whom protection serv ices, in the interest of national security, are authorized; (8) reveal information that would seriously and demonstrably impair cur rent national security emergency preparedness; or (9) violate a statute, treaty, or international agreement. While some information was excluded from automatic declassification, it was still subject to a process of systematic declassification review to determine whether declassification might be permissible in individual cases. There was also the mandatory review of items specifically requested under FOIA. (Manda tory review, of course, does not mean mandatory declassification and release.) It is noteworthy that the lengthy executive order also specified the following among the limitations on the government’s ability to classify information: Sec. 1.8. Classification Prohibitions and Limitations. (a) In no case shall information be classified in order to: (1) conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error; (2) prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency; (3) restrain competition; or (4) prevent or delay the release of information that does not require protection in the interest of national security. The initial enthusiasm for declassification at the CIA, such as it existed, faded quickly. Through the early and mid-1990s, successive directors pledged to declassify and release the documentary record of eleven major covert operations in France and Italy (1940s–1950s), North Korea (1950s), Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), Indonesia (1958), Tibet (1950s–1960s), the Congo (1960s), the Dominican Republic (1960s), Laos (1960s), and Cuba (1960s). Yet only documents related to Guatemala and the Bay of Pigs operation in Cuba were released officially, while Iran documents were leaked unofficially. In mid-1998, it was announced that, while a declassification program would continue, budgetary limitations would not permit the review and declassification of documents for the remaining cov ert operations.5 At the same time, while the Department of State and the Department of Energy were aggressively releasing documents, the CIA and the Department of Defense were openly resisting pressure to broaden their declassification xiv Introduction programs.6 At no time did the agency promise to release information about any operation whose existence was not already known to the public. Indeed, when records were released, they concerned operations (such as Guatemala and the Bay of Pigs) on which wide-reaching details were already available through leaks, Congressional investigations, or previous FOIA releases.7 The official mood regarding openness began to shift during the Clinton administration, in 1998–1999, owing to concerns that the Department of Energy had inadvertently released some documents related to the design of nuclear weapons. This concern was then made salient by accusations of possible espio nage by Wen Ho Lee, a U.S. government scientist at the Los Alamos National Laboratory who occasionally visited the People’s Republic of China.8 In October 1998, Congress passed the Kyl-Lott Amendment (officially titled ‘‘Protection against Inadvertent Release of Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data’’), permitting the Energy Department to remove sensitive weapons-related mate rial from public repositories. Under this program, 5,508 pages of documents were reclassified and removed from public shelves.9 Quite aside from the issue of arms-related information, however, by 1999 the CIA was increasingly less cooperative in turning over papers for publication in the State Department’s regular documentary series Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS). That autumn the CIA, the Justice Department, the Defense Department, and the three military services complained that State was releasing material in which they had ‘‘equity’’ (by virtue of the interdepartmental nature of the intelligence process) without their permission. These agencies, although lacking any specific Congressional authorization, then began reviewing released documents and withdrawing them from public shelves. The process of reclassification apparently accelerated under the administra tion of President George W. Bush and in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. In October 2001, the process was formalized in a secret memo randum of understanding (MOU) signed by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) and the CIA. The MOU was made public in 2006. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION AND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY The purpose of this Memorandum of Understanding is to establish standard procedures to handle instances where classified or sensitive information containing possible Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) equities may have been inadvertently or improperly released. The goal should be to protect CIA equities while resolving the issue as expeditiously as possible in a way that will not draw unnecessary pub lic attention to the steps taken to correct the problem. It is in the interests of both the CIA and the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) to avoid the kind of public notice and researcher complaints that may arise from removing from the open shelves for extended periods of time records that had been publicly available. 1. When NARA is notified by CIA or another agency, or otherwise becomes aware that CIA documents containing classified or sensitive information, or other government agency documents containing sensitive or classified CIA equities may have been inadvertently or improperly released in records that were reviewed for declassification by NARA or another agency and made available to the public, NARA will notify CIA immediately and hold those Introduction xv records off the open shelf for a period of 30 days following CIA receipt of notification to give CIA an opportunity to investigate the extent of the problem. 2. CIA will attempt to resolve the exposure within 30 days after it receives no tification from NARA. If CIA informs NARA that it cannot resolve the issue within 30 days, NARA and the CIA will agree upon a date by which the CIA will resolve the exposure. 3. If CIA has not resolved its concerns by the agreed upon date, NARA can require an explanation of the CIA’s inability to resolve the issue within the agreed upon time limit. NARA can further require an update on CIA’s pro gress monthly until resolution is reached. If a final determination is not reached within six months, NARA will withdraw the documents in question and return the rest of the files to the open shelves. CIA may review such documents that are returned to the open shelves, for additional with drawals, on a box-by-box basis. 4. If after examining the records, CIA finds that there has been no improper release of classified or still sensitive information, CIA will promptly inform NARA that the records can be returned to the open shelf. 5. If CIA finds that information containing classified or still sensitive CIA equi ties has been improperly released, CIA will tab these documents. The tabs will include the justification for continued classification or withholding. 6. NARA will withhold the tabbed documents in accordance with the justifica tion cited on the tab. The place markers inserted for withheld documents will not contain any reference to CIA removal of the documents or any rea son for the withholding of the documents. The common generic descriptor ‘‘intelligence document’’ shall also not be used. 7. NARA will not attribute to CIA any part of the review or the withholding of documents from this exposed collection. Researcher requests for withheld documents shall be accepted for processing by NARA and researchers shall not be directed to CIA for response. NARA will contact CIA regarding such requests, and will act as a surrogate for CIA in dealing with requestors of these withheld documents. 8. When examining documents at NARA, whether for declassification pur poses or investigation of an inadvertent release, CIA personnel will follow NARA requirements for the handling of archival records and will take care to preserve the integrity of the records. 9. NARA staff will provide training for CIA personnel and contractors in NARA requirements and procedures for the handling and preservation of archival documents. 10. NARA will inform CIA immediately if CIA personnel or contractors are mishandling or rearranging archival records. CIA will take prompt action to correct such problems including, if NARA deems necessary, requiring personnel to take refresher training in handling and preserving archival records. 11. NARA will inform CIA immediately if NARA personnel or contractors have mishandled classified information. NARA will take prompt action to correct such problems including, if CIA deems necessary, requiring personnel or contractors to take refresher training in handling classified information. This Memorandum of Understanding is subject to amendment by agreement of both parties. In August 2001, the Bush administration initiated a review of the 1995 execu tive order mandating automatic declassification, although the newly revised xvi Introduction order was not issued until 25 March 2003.10 A great deal of the document— perhaps a surprising amount, given the administration’s reported penchant for secrecy—remained unchanged, including all the prohibitions listed in section 1.8 against classifying embarrassing information. One change was delaying the dead line for clearing the backlog of classified material to the end of 2006. (It already had been delayed from 2000 to 2003 by Executive Order 13142 of 1999.) The release of documents by the tens of millions did, in fact, commence at the end of 2006.11 Another key difference pertained to the issue of reclassification. The Clin ton document said, ‘‘Information may not be reclassified after it has been declas sified and released to the public under proper authority.’’ The new version said: Information may be reclassified after declassification and release to the public under proper authority only in accordance with the following conditions: (1) the reclassification action is taken under the personal authority of the agency head or deputy agency head, who determines in writing that the reclassification of the information is necessary in the interest of the national security; (2) the information may be reasonably recovered; and (3) the reclassification action is reported promptly to the Director of the Infor mation Security Oversight Office. The revised executive order reconfirmed the role of the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP) in the declassification process. Nonethe less, it granted the director of central intelligence the authority and responsibility to protect information regarding sources and methods by vetoing ISCAP deci sions in those areas. In addition, the revised order gives certain officials the right, in an emergency, to ‘‘share’’ classified information with unauthorized individu als without that information then being considered declassified. According to NARA, this is to permit unhindered cooperation with state and local authorities in the context of homeland security.12 Interestingly, all the powers of classifica tion and declassification granted to the president in the original order are also explicitly extended to the vice president in the revised order, no doubt reflecting the unusually prominent policy role of Vice President Dick Cheney. Between 2001 and 2006, the CIA and five other agencies reclassified some 9,500 documents (totaling more than 55,500 pages) that had already been made available to the public. At least eight of the documents had already been pub lished, either in print or on microfiche, as part of the State Department’s FRUS series.13 The clandestine reclassification project went unnoticed until December 2005, when Matthew Aid, a visiting fellow at the National Security Archive (a nongov ernmental research center at George Washington University) found that docu ments he had already used were no longer available in collections of NARA, the official government archives. Researchers familiar with the documents deemed some of them mundane, while others were conceivably embarrassing to the agency. Still available on the public shelves, however, were various man uals explaining how to engage in sabotage or assemble explosives as well as technical documents regarding chemical and biological weapons.14 The revela tion by Aid prompted a review of the declassification standards by NARA’s Interagency Security Oversight Office (ISOO).15 Introduction xvii THE ‘‘FAMILY JEWELS’’ With that background, many were surprised by the announcement at the June 2007 SHAFR conference that the CIA was releasing the ‘‘Family Jewels’’ in response to a FOIA request made by the National Security Archive fifteen years earlier. The ‘‘Family Jewels’’ file was easily the most famous and most sought after collection of secret documents in U.S. intelligence history, even though many of its secrets had long been public knowledge. The 693-page collection had been assembled in the era of Vietnam and Watergate, and it eventually triggered the era of the Congressional intelligence investigations. The order to collect the documents was given on 9 May 1973 by James R. Schlesinger during the seventeen weeks he served as DCI before being named secretary of defense.16 It came in response to a newspaper report about the trial of Daniel Ellsberg, which revealed that a former CIA operative, E. Howard Hunt, had burglarized the office of Ellsberg’s psychiatrist with CIA equipment on behalf of the Nixon White House. David Robarge, chief historian at the CIA, believes that William Colby himself contributed to misconceptions about the nature of the documents with exagger ated descriptions in his memoirs.17 If the gravity of the misdeeds was in fact exaggerated, and people may differ on that, that raises another potential ques tion. Did the exaggeration—in some minds, glorification—of the CIA’s past mis deeds contribute to public and official acceptance of later, larger-scale misdeeds as merely more of the same? The test of this, however, has been compromised. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 bequeathed such an atmosphere of menace that the public call has been for even more direct action, for the unleashing of the CIA. Controversies focused not on unauthorized or illegal deeds, but on deeds incom petently or insufficiently done. Indeed, whereas in the 1970s Congress was out raged to discover that the CIA had engaged in assassination plots, after 9/11 Congress derided the agency for not having sought authority to assassinate Usama bin Ladin or, barring that, for not ‘‘taking advantage of ambiguities’’ in the authorization it did receive to do it anyhow. The CIA Office of Inspector Gen eral found itself explaining to Congress that ‘‘CIA managers refused to take advantage of ambiguities’’ and that ‘‘this position was reasonable and correct.’’18 Now, at least, the public can see firsthand what is in the ‘‘Family Jewels,’’ or almost. Like many declassified documents, this collection has been heavily redacted. In this case, the entire first document, approximately two and a half pages, has been redacted. Not even a title appears. Well, not completely blanked out: Each page has been marked ‘‘Secret: Eyes Only,’’ and on each page this designation has been crossed out in ink because, after all, the document has been ‘‘declassified.’’ Likewise, page 260 of the file consists of a letter to Schlesinger, dated 29 May 1973, from House Armed Services Committee chairman F. Edward Hebert. It reads: Dear Mr. Schlesinger: Attached is correspondence from [—about half a line deleted—] which is for warded for information and whatever action might be appropriate. With best regards. Sincerely, /signed/ F. Edw. Hebert Chairman xviii Introduction What follows, pages 261–265 of the file, is completely blank. Yet this docu ment, too, is presumably listed as having been released in redacted form. One further question comes to many minds: Why did the CIA choose to release the package at this time, thirty-four years after it was assembled and fif teen years after the National Security Archive submitted its FOIA request? The reason could be related to the fact that the automatic declassification program that President Clinton put in place in 1995 finally came into effect at the end of 2006, although the agency has rejected the declassification of tens of millions of pages of other documents and is, generally speaking, within its legal rights to do so. Some commentators have called the release of the ‘‘Family Jewels’’ a dis traction, an effort to draw attention to the controversies of past decades at a time when the CIA and other intelligence agencies are accused of engaging in similar activities again, on a far larger scale. It was noted that the agency had still not released the results of its internal review of intelligence failures related to the terrorist attacks of 2001, which had been completed in 2005, even in an unclassified summary or redacted form. As a result, in the following month, July 2007, Congress mandated the release of a declassified summary of that report, and the CIA complied in August. THE FUNCTION OF INTELLIGENCE The purpose of intelligence, simply put, is to provide necessary information to government decision makers. Since much information can be gathered by con ventional means, ranging from diplomacy to journalism, the focus of intelli gence activities is usually on information related to national security that other governments are trying to conceal. It is then integrated with information from open sources to create a more complete picture of the capabilities and intentions of foreign governments or other entities, such as revolutionary movements or terrorist organizations. The information passes through a set of steps identified as the intelligence cycle.19 The normal procession is planning and direction, collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination. Planning and direction take account of policy mak ers’ information requirements, given a particular set of threats, concerns, or objectives. Collection is the gathering of information, whether by means of clan destine agents, electronic eavesdropping, satellite photography, or the careful perusal of public sources. Naturally, different means may be more or less appropriate to a given task. Satellite photos will reveal a great deal about mis sile silos or large-scale troop movements but very little about the intentions of political leaders or the actions of small groups of terrorists. For the latter, spies and informers inside the target organization (‘‘human intelligence’’) are more useful. During the Cold War, U.S. intelligence tended to rely most heavily on the technical means, leaving a notable gap in human intelligence capabilities in the post–Cold War environment. Once gathered, the bits of information must be processed. Film must be developed, intercepted messages must be translated, and codes must be deci phered. Next, the processed information must be analyzed. Expert analysts examine the disparate bits of information, calculate the value and reliability of the sources, try to distinguish the relevant (‘‘signals’’) from the distractions (‘‘noise’’), see how the relevant parts fit together, and attempt to decipher Introduction xix whether there is a hidden message and, if so, what it is.20 Finally, the result is disseminated to policy makers, who, many analysts insist, too often simply ignore it or ‘‘cherry-pick’’ the parts they like to support their preferred policies. In addition to revealing ‘‘secrets,’’ of course, intelligence agencies are also expected to resolve ‘‘mysteries.’’ A secret is information that others are trying to keep from you. The task is to find out what they already know. Mysteries are questions to which there are no real answers: What will a given dictator decide to do when he finally makes up his mind? Will a certain government fall? How will a particular leader react to a range of likely or unlikely events? Will an insur gency grow stronger or weaker with time? No one really knows; no amount of wiretapping or satellite photos will disclose the truth. This task calls for a some what different set of analytical talents, using both public and clandestine infor mation and relying heavily on the analysis of trends and the laws of probability. Error may be introduced at any stage of the intelligence cycle. Even the rela tively straightforward opening stage of laying out the goals rarely seems to hap pen in a clear, concise, and useful manner. The key point to remember is that intelligence always deals with uncertainties. This is more obvious in cases involving mysteries, but it is also true of secrets. Much evidence is ambiguous and subject to multiple interpretations. True signals are often indistinguishable from noise until after the fact. Thus, the preconceived notions or preferences of analysts may easily shape the interpretation that emerges. The way an analyst ‘‘connects the dots,’’ to use a phrase much in vogue these days, may in fact tell us more about the analyst than about the dots. Human intelligence is the most valuable resource when analysts are trying to determine the intentions of a for eign leader, but sometimes sources are mistaken, vague, unreliable, self interested, or downright deceitful; and sometimes they are truthful and accurate but unconvincing. Perhaps the best that can be said of the intelligence task is that trying is likely to produce better results than not trying. As noted earlier, the main purpose of intelligence agencies is to provide infor mation to decision makers, but that is not all that intelligence agencies do. Although the role was not spelled out in its founding legislation, the CIA, early in its existence, assumed the task of running covert operations, or ‘‘special activ ities.’’ Imbued with a spirit of gung-ho enthusiasm for fighting the Cold War and equipped with a network of clandestine agents stationed around the world, the CIA was the place to go when government leaders decided they needed an option ‘‘between doing nothing and sending in the Marines.’’
The agency involved itself in the postwar electoral politics of Italy and France in order to prevent a Commu nist victory and then went on to organize and support a series of attempted coups, revolutions, civil wars, insurgencies, and counterinsurgencies.21 Calculating a realistic balance of successes and failures among covert opera tions is difficult to do given the veil of secrecy that still obscures so much of the history.
It is customary for agency officials to claim that everyone knows about their failures but no one knows about their successes, because these remain se cret. It appears that it is, in fact, a history replete with failure, possibly because presidents who do not really understand the nature of covert operations turn to the CIA for a miracle when everything else has failed. Impossible tasks are unlikely to fare well. Even known successes have sometimes proved counter productive in the long run, including the successful overthrow of the Mossa degh government in Iran in 1953 (contributing to animosity toward the xx Introduction ‘‘American shah’’ and the Islamic revolution of 1979), the successful overthrow of the Arbenz government in Guatemala in 1954 (which contributed to decades of civil war in that country and stoked anti-Americanism throughout Latin America), or the successful arming of anti-Soviet Islamic militants in Afghani stan in the 1980s (which contributed to the rise of the Taliban and al-Qa’ida). When political leaders initiated covert action, only to see it fail spectacularly, they often avoided responsibility afterward by allowing the CIA to be depicted as a ‘‘rogue agency’’ operating on its own.
It is worth noting that the CIA is only one piece of the overall United States Intelligence Community (IC). Moreover, it is far from the largest agency in terms of budget or personnel. Most intelligence agencies, and an estimated 80 percent of the overall intelligence budget, are subordinated to the Department of Defense, and of all the departments of the executive branch, that department has generated the most resistance to institutional reform. In all, sixteen agencies are considered members of the IC, the oldest being the Office of Naval Intelli gence (ONI, 1882) and the youngest being the Coast Guard Intelligence and Criminal Investigations Program (CGICIP, 2001). The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was separated from the IC in 1981 to avoid risking the improper mixing of intelligence and law enforcement functions, only to be read mitted in 2006 to deal with the growing overlap among drug-trafficking, revolu tionary, and terrorist organizations. (See Appendix B for a list of IC members.) The CIA is perhaps the most comprehensive member of the community, in terms of its range of interests, intelligence collection, and analysis. The CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) are experienced in conducting all-source analysis. On the other hand, the three largest agencies in terms of budget and personnel—the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), all part of the Pentagon—are highly specialized. The NSA is concerned with signals intelligence (SIGINT), the exploitation of foreign communications for intelli gence and counterintelligence purposes. The NRO deals with satellite reconnais sance. Spy satellites were once considered so controversial that the mere existence of the NRO was officially acknowledged only in 1992, more than thirty years after its establishment in 1961. Also making use of satellites, the NGA concerns itself with imagery and mapping. Beyond the official IC, there are offices that primarily keep track of the community’s intelligence products in search of information relevant to their parent organizations’ concerns, such as the Office of Intelligence, Security, and Emergency Response within the Depart ment of Transportation. Prior to 2004, the CIA had an especially central role in the community; the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was both the administrative leader of the CIA and the nominal leader of the IC as a whole. In a commonly used corporate analogy, the DCI was both the chief executive officer of the CIA and the chair man of the board of the IC. This meant that he (or, theoretically, she) was expected to coordinate intelligence functions across agencies, but the position was given little real authority outside the CIA itself. Introduction xxi One way in which the DCI could perform an interagency role was through the National Intelligence Council (NIC), an entity formed in 1973 and subordi nated directly to the office of the DCI. The NIC brought together representatives of all intelligence agencies to produce consensus-based assessments known as National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs). An unclassified summary of an NIE released in July 2007 gives an idea of how the system is supposed to operate. The Estimate, Terrorist Threats to the US Homeland, followed the standard process for producing National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), including a thorough review of sourcing, in-depth Community coordination, the use of alternative analysis, and review by outside experts. Starting in October 2006, the NIC organized a series of roundtables with IC experts to scope out terms of reference (TOR) for the Estimate. Drafters from throughout the Community contributed to the draft. In May, a draft was submitted to the IC officers in advance of a series of coordination meetings that spanned several days. The National Clandestine Service, FBI, and other IC collection officers reviewed the text for the reliability and proper use of sourcing. As part of the normal coordination process, analysts had the opportunity—and were encouraged— to register ‘‘dissents’’ and provide alternative analysis. Reactions by the two outside experts who read the final product were highlighted in the text. The National Intelli gence Board, composed of the heads of the 16 IC agencies and chaired by the ODNI, reviewed and approved the Estimate on 21 June. As with other NIEs, it is being dis tributed to senior Administration officials and Members of Congress. Just how many NIEs go through so complete a process—and how many of them have eight or nine months available to do so—is difficult to say. The DCI’s coordinating function, however, extended little beyond the production of these occasional joint estimates. After the terrorist attacks of 2001, the Intelligence Community was blamed for not predicting the incident, and a bipartisan board was established to con duct a thorough investigation. Officially called the National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks upon the United States—but almost universally referred to as the 9/11 Commission—it proposed changes in the structure of the IC.22 Prior to the attacks, the community had failed to put together disparate bits of relevant information that might have become meaningful clues in juxtaposition. Thus, the recommendations focused on the lack of real coordination and intelligence sharing among the various entities of the Intelligence Community, especially the ‘‘firewall’’ between foreign intelligence and domestic law enforcement. Con gress, responding with customary hyperbole, passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004, instituting the largest reorgan ization of the intelligence community since its creation in 1947. That achieve ment was all the more notable when one considers that between 1989 and 2001, no fewer than six independent commissions and three government reviews had attempted to address the need for intelligence reform, without results.23 The task of increasing coordination and information sharing is a difficult one, given the variety of agency mandates, interests, procedures, competencies, cul tures, mythologies, and incompatible computer systems. The key to this reform was the creation of a new focal point, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).24 The former Director of Central Intelligence was downgraded to Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (DCIA). The idea was to create a new and stronger ‘‘intelligence czar.’’ Although the DNI may have been new, after the xxii Introduction customary bureaucratic infighting and legislative wrangling—which uncustoma rily pitted a bipartisan group of senators against the more skeptical House Repub licans—one could question how much stronger the new position really was. The DNI replaced the DCI as the president’s principal intelligence adviser. The NIC was transferred to the Office of the DNI (ODNI), as was the recently formed analytic, interagency National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC; not to be confused with the CIA’s more operationally oriented Counterterrorist Center, CTC, which retained responsibility for disrupting terrorist activities). The DNI now had responsibility for coordinating, guiding, and focusing the community as a whole without the biases that might derive from being attached to one of the community members. The new leader was also granted official budgetary authority over the country’s civilian intelligence program, although—at the in sistence of House Republicans—he was limited to participating with the secre tary of defense in drawing up the budget for military intelligence programs. On paper, the DNI also has authority to shift funds and personnel among agencies. Nevertheless, the new office lacked the clout of an agency leader; the DNI was, in other words, a bureaucrat without a bureaucracy (despite the fact that the ODNI staff quickly grew to 1,500). Congressional responsibilities for intelli gence and intelligence-budget matters remained totally unreformed and highly fragmented, which also complicates life at the ODNI. Despite proposals for an open and unified intelligence budget, the community’s budget remained secret and hidden in multiple ‘‘black accounts’’ throughout the government. The pecu liar combination of extensive responsibilities with relatively few and vaguely defined powers actually made it difficult to fill the new leadership position; sev eral potential candidates turned down the offer. Exercising authority over Defense Department agencies proved particularly difficult, especially while they were under the strong-willed leadership of Don ald Rumsfeld (2001–2006). The CIA was granted communitywide responsibility for the management of overseas human intelligence (HUMINT), but then the Defense Intelligence Agency created its own Defense HUMINT Management Office in 2005, the year after the reform law was enacted. Despite the coordinat ing role of ODNI, the DIA took on new intelligence management responsibilities among the military intelligence agencies.25 In April 2007, Mike McConnell, already the second person to hold the posi tion of DNI, responded to a question as to whether the Intelligence Community had finally found the proper organizational structure. We don’t have it right yet. The part of the debate earlier was to create a depart ment of intelligence, and that was not warmly embraced in some circles, I would say. So now, as DNI, I’m responsible for basically two things if you just sort of reduce it to the bottom line: the budget for the 16 components of the community and ensuring that no one breaks the law. Now, 15 of those agencies work for another Cabinet official, so I would submit that’s a challenge. If you’re going to dictate someone else’s budget in another department and worry about compliance with the law and the regulations where you don’t have direct line management responsibility, you cannot hire or fire, it puts you in a challenging management condition.26 As important as improved coordination and information sharing may be, however, there are limits to what can be accomplished through reorganization. Introduction xxiii A more efficient structure will not make up for the lack of a human source inside a targeted government or organization. Furthermore, institutional changes designed to offset one problem may very well exacerbate another. Like the National Security Act of 1947, which created the CIA, the IRTPA focused on a particular array of problems highlighted by a given set of recent events. Whether or not the act adequately resolves those problems, other issues— unhighlighted and therefore unaddressed—may cause different problems in the future. For instance, the emphasis placed on coordination, guidance, and focus would seem to promise a homogenized intelligence product without regard for the different, and even competing, needs of various intelligence users. Focusing on the priorities imposed by political leaders might mean overlooking clues to other, unexpected events, which would seem to be the very definition of intelli gence failure. Finally, increased centralization and control raise the prospect of ‘‘groupthink,’’ an aspect of group dynamics whereby unorthodox, innovative, and other dissident ideas are suppressed by formal or informal pressures to conform to the group consensus.27 In the past, the Intelligence Community has always prided itself on a sloppy and cantankerous process that gave rise to a variety of views, interpretations, and explanations, as well as dissents. As Thomas Fingar, deputy director of national intelligence for analysis, put it: ‘‘The basic idea is to avoid a premature rush to an artificial consensus. ... The interesting thing is not when analysts agree. It’s when they disagree.’’28 Political leaders, on the other hand, chafe at the caveats and ambiguities that sometimes seem to predict everything and nothing. They generally prefer a single, consensus-based, ‘‘correct’’ answer— even when no one can possibly know what the ‘‘correct’’ answer is. The debate over which approach is superior will be with us for some time.
The CIA is subdivided into four directorates. This basic structure has been fairly stable since it was innovated by DCI Walter Bedell Smith in the early 1950s. It is functional and not inherently complicated, but over the years there have been so many nominal reorganizations and name changes that keeping track of whether one is discussing the same directorate over time or a series of different directorates can be highly taxing. One formality that we shall forgo in this discussion is the shift to ‘‘Direc torates.’’ At one time they were called ‘‘Deputy Directorates’’ because they usu ally were—until the most recent reform, led by the agency’s Deputy Directors. Thereafter, the divisions were called ‘‘Directorates,’’ although the division heads were still called ‘‘Deputy Directors.’’ Here, the term ‘‘Directorate’’ will be used throughout. The essential but routine administrative issues are handled by the Directorate of Support (DS), which deals with human resources, financial and logistical operations, and other housekeeping matters. Originally, the DS was called the Directorate of Administration, but the name was changed to Directorate of Sup port in 1955, then to Directorate of Management and Services in 1973, and then back to Directorate of Administration in 1974. DCI George Tenet abolished the Directorate of Administration, although its component parts lived on, and DCI Porter Goss reconstituted it as the Directorate of Support. xxiv Introduction The branch that stations officers around the world, collects and disseminates foreign intelligence, and conducts ‘‘special activities’’ (covert operations) is cur rently called the National Clandestine Service (NCS). It began life as the Direc torate of Operations, but by the time its first Deputy Director assumed his post, it had taken on a more euphemistic name, Directorate of Plans. In 1973, its name was changed back to the Directorate of Operations, and it remained such until it was given its current designation in 2005. It is led by the Director of the National Clandestine Service (before 2004, by the Deputy Director for Opera tions, and so forth). In addition to the CIA’s clandestine operations, under the 2004 reform the Director of the NCS has overall management responsibility for human intelligence (HUMINT) operations throughout the intelligence commu nity. This includes the development of common standards for all aspects of clandestine human intelligence operations, ‘‘including human-enabled technical operations,’’ and the ‘‘integration, coordination, de-confliction, and evaluation of clandestine HUMINT operations.’’29 Those readers who wish to be correct should note that full-time CIA employees are not called ‘‘agents.’’ American officials in the employ of the National Clandestine Service (or, previously, the Directorate of Operations, etc.) are called ‘‘case officers.’’ Individuals, usually foreign nationals, whom the case officers recruit, are called ‘‘agents.’’ Individu als who are sources of information are ‘‘assets.’’ Case officers are assigned over seas to a ‘‘station’’ or a ‘‘base.’’ A base is subordinate to a station, whether or not it is located near one. Thus, a Chief of Station (COS) ranks higher than a Chief of Base (COB). The Directorate of Intelligence (DI) is the analytical branch, generating com prehensive ‘‘all-source’’ intelligence assessments, combining clandestine and open sources of information. It concerns itself with both functional and regional issues, and its output includes quickly produced responses to recent events, long-term research studies, and projections of future trends. As such, it is the branch of the CIA that interacts most with the intelligence users situated in other parts of the government, and it is expected to learn their specific intelli gence requirements so that intelligence products can be kept relevant. It has almost always been called the Directorate of Intelligence, except between 1977 and 1982, when it was the National Foreign Assessment Center. Its leader is the Director of Intelligence, formerly the Deputy Director for Intelligence (or Direc tor of the National Foreign Assessment Center). The key employees of the Di rectorate of Intelligence are called ‘‘analysts.’’ The final major branch is the Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T), which was formed as the Directorate of Research in 1962 but took its current name the following year. It supports the National Clandestine Service and the Directorate of Intelligence with scientific, engineering, and technical solutions to intelligence problems, devising ways to gain access to information, support clandestine operations, and so forth. The Director of (formerly, Deputy Director for) Science and Technology is the senior scientific and technical adviser to the DCIA. It also maintains the capacity to gather outside experts in many fields on short notice in case of fast-breaking needs. As an innovation in response to the changing business environment, DS&T founded In-Q-Tel in 1999. In-Q-Tel is a nonprofit venture-capital firm intended to keep the Intelligence Community in contact with innovators of emerging technologies in the private sector and to give financial support to promising Introduction xxv projects. As an independent legal entity, it has a board of directors drawn from among former cabinet secretaries, military and intelligence officials, and figures from business and finance.
The DS&T office that deals directly with it is the In Q-Tel Interface Center. NOTES
1. All Hayden quotes are from ‘‘General Hayden’s Remarks at SHAFR Conference’’ (21 June 2007), hayden-remarks-at-shafr-conference.html.
2. Scott Shane, ‘‘Secrets to Be Declassified under New Rule at Age 25,’’ New York Times (21 December 2006).
3. J. Kenneth McDonald, ‘‘Commentary on ‘History Declassified,’ ‘‘ Diplomatic History 18:4 (Fall 1994): 627–34. McDonald was, at the time, chief historian of the CIA. Examples of declassified internal histories are Arthur B. Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government, to 1950 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990); Ludwell Lee Montague, General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence, October 1950–February 1953 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State Univer sity Press, 1992). A rare earlier example was Thomas F. Troy, Donovan and the CIA: A His tory of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency (Frederick, MD: Aletheia Books, 1981). The Darling book had been written in 1953. The Troy book had been published internally in 1975 with two copies printed.
4. McDonald, ‘‘Commentary;’’ Zachary Karabell and Timothy Naftali, ‘‘History Declassified: The Perils and Promise of CIA Documents,’’ Diplomatic History 18:4 (Fall 1994): 615–26; Mary S. McAuliffe, ed., CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1992).
5. ‘‘Editorial: The Price of History,’’ New York Times (19 July 1998).
6. Matthew M. Aid, ‘‘Declassification in Reverse: The U.S. Intelligence Community’s Secret Historical Document Reclassification Program,’’ The National Security Archive (21 February 2006), nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB179/index.htm.
7. Karabell and Naftali, op. cit.; Anna Kasten Nelson, ‘‘History with Holes: The CIA Reveals Its Past,’’ Diplomatic History 22:3 (Summer 1998): 503–8.
8. Dan Stober and Ian Hoffman, A Convenient Spy: Wen Ho Lee and the Politics of Nu clear Espionage (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001).
9. Aid, ‘‘Declassification in Reverse.’’
10. Executive Order 13292: ‘‘Further Amendment to Executive Order 12958, As Amended, Classified National Security Information.’’ See also ‘‘Revisions to Executive Order 12958 on Classified National Security Information,’’ isoo/speeches-and-articles/article-revised-eo-12958.html. The August 2001 date is from Frank Rich, ‘‘When the Vice President Does It, That Means It’s Not Illegal,’’ New York Times (1 July 2007).
11. Shane, ‘‘Secrets to Be Declassified,’’ notes that the archives did not have adequate staff to handle all the records that would be released.
12. ‘‘Revisions to Executive Order 12958.’’
13. Aid, ‘‘Declassification in Reverse.’’
14. Aid, ‘‘Declassification in Reverse’’; Scott Shane, ‘‘U.S. Reclassifies Many Docu ments in Secret Review,’’ New York Times (21 February 2006).
15. ‘‘Secret Understanding between National Archives and CIA Exposes Framework for Surreptitious Reclassification Program,’’ The National Security Archive (19 April 2006), nsarchiv/news/20060419/index.htm. The ISOO, once part of the Office of Management and Budget, now part of NARA, oversees the handling of clas sified documents. It gained public attention when the Office of the Vice President refused to cooperate with it (over the course of four years) and then proposed to abolish it (as xxvi Introduction part of a new revision of Executive Order 12958) when the ISOO director insisted that the vice president comply with the executive order. See Mark Silva, ‘‘Cheney Keeps Clas sification Activity Secret,’’ Chicago Tribune (27 May 2006); Scott Shane, ‘‘Agency Is Target in Cheney Fight on Secrecy Data,’’ New York Times (22 June 2007); and Rep. Henry A. Waxman’s letter to Vice President Dick Cheney (21 June 2007), gov/documents/20070621093952.pdf.
16. Brief tenure was common in the Watergate era. At the Department of Defense, Schlesinger was following the four-month term of Elliott Richardson, who then served six months as attorney general before he was dismissed for refusing to fire the special prosecutor investigating Watergate.
17. David Robarge, ‘‘Perspective on the Jewels from the C.I.A.’s Chief Historian,’’ available on a New York Times blog, ‘‘Examining the Archives: The CIA’s ‘Family Jew els,’ ‘‘ the-cias-chief-historian/#more-28. The memoir in question is William Colby, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978).
18. See ‘‘OIG Report on CIA Accountability With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks’’ in the chapter ‘‘9/11.’’
19. Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 3rd ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2006); Loch K. Johnson, America’s Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Walter Laqueur, The Uses and Limits of Intelligence (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1993).
20. For a seminal study of how ‘‘noise’’ can crowd out ‘‘signals’’ (even when the sig nals appear obvious in retrospect), see Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and De cision (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962). 21. See, for example, John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chi cago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006); and Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA (New York: Doubleday, 2007).
22. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004). Unusually readable, and covering an unusually salient topic, the report quickly became a bestseller.
23. Helen Fessenden, ‘‘The Limits of Intelligence Reform,’’ Foreign Affairs 84:6 (Novem ber/December 2005).
24. Mike McConnell, ‘‘Overhauling Intelligence,’’ Foreign Affairs 86:4 (July/August 2007). 25. See ‘‘Defense Intelligence Agency,’’ in An Overview of the United States Intelligence Community (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2007).
26. ‘‘Remarks and Q&A by the Director of National Intelligence, Mr. Mike McConnell, 2007 Excellence in Government Conference, Washington, D.C., April 4, 2007,’’ http://
27. Irving L. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Political Decisions and Fiascoes, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982). In an effort to counter this risk, the Intelligence Community has experimented with ‘‘devil’s advocate’’ and alternative analyses. McConnell, ‘‘Overhauling Intelligence.’’
29. Overview of the United States Intelligence Community.
Timeline: Selected Events in the History of the Central Intelligence Agency
11 JULY 1941 President Franklin D. Roosevelt creates the Office of the Coordinator of Informa tion (COI) and appoints attorney William J. ‘‘Wild Bill’’ Donovan to the position. The COI is to collect and analyze information that bears on the national security, issue publications, and facilitate the securing of information.
13 JUNE 1942 President Roosevelt reorganizes the Office of the COI as the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and places it under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The OSS is to collect and analyze strategic information and perform ‘‘special services’’ as may be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Donovan is appointed as Director of Strategic Services.
18 NOVEMBER 1944 Donovan recommends that the president create a permanent civilian intelligence agency after World War II. 1
OCTOBER 1945 With the war over, President Harry S. Truman dissolves the OSS and transfers its assets to the State and War departments.
22 JANUARY 1946 President Truman establishes the National Intelligence Authority (NIA)— consisting of the secretaries of State, War, and the Navy and a presidential representative—to plan, develop, and coordinate intelligence activities. He also establishes the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), with a Director of Central Intelligence and a staff of officers on loan from the War, Navy, State, and Justice departments. The creation of a permanent intelligence agency is to be part of the planned ‘‘unification’’ of the military, which is still under debate.
26 JULY 1947 Congress approves military unification with the passage of the National Security Act of 1947. The Act establishes the Department of Defense (merging the War and Navy departments), the National Security Council, and a new permanent civilian intelligence body, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
18 SEPTEMBER 1947 The National Security Act comes into effect, and the CIA opens for business. The Director of Central Intelligence becomes the head of the new agency.
22 MARCH 1948 The CIA Office of Special Operations is established to conduct espionage and counterespionage. This office will later be merged into the Directorate of Plans. SPRING 1948 The CIA pays subsidies to the Christian Democratic Party of Italy to assist it in its electoral campaign against the Communist Party of Italy.
18 JUNE 1948 The National Security Council issues a secret directive, NSC 10/2, that authorizes the CIA to undertake ‘‘covert operations’’ to counter similar activities engaged in by the Soviet Union. These activities are to be conducted in accordance with U.S. foreign policy and military goals.
1 SEPTEMBER 1948 The CIA Office of Policy Coordination is established under Frank Wisner to con duct psychological operations. Its responsibilities will soon expand to include sab otage and economic warfare. This office will later be merged into the Directorate of Plans.
16 NOVEMBER 1948 Wisner arranges to use Marshall Plan money to bolster non-Communist labor unions in Italy and France.
 20 JUNE 1949 Congress passes the Central Intelligence Agency Act, formally spelling out the agency’s authority, responsibilities, and special privileges, including exemptions from civil service rules and normal budgetary and accounting requirements. The CIA may also conceal information regarding is organization, functions, and personnel.
5 SEPTEMBER 1949 In the CIA’s first penetration of the Soviet Union, the agency parachutes members of the Supreme Council for the Liberation of Ukraine into the Carpathian Moun tains of western Ukraine. Soviet forces mop up the Ukrainian insurgency by 1953. OCTOBER 1949 In coordination with British intelligence, the CIA begins infiltrating anti-Commu nist rebels into Albania. Nearly all are immediately killed or captured. It later emerged that Communist agents had infiltrated the Albanian emigr e community and training camps, and the British liaison, Kim Philby, was secretly passing in formation to the Soviet Union.
1 DECEMBER 1950 An administrative reorganization creates the positions of Deputy Director for Administration and Deputy Director for Operations (changed to Deputy Director for Plans on 4 January 1951). 8 DECEMBER 1951 The CIA initiates a program to monitor all mail passing through New York City to and from the Soviet Union. Beginning in 1955, this mail is opened.
1 JANUARY 1952 An administrative reorganization creates the position of Deputy Director for Intelligence. 13 APRIL 1953 DCI Allen Dulles approves a proposal to develop biological and chemical materi als.
The program, called MKULTRA, leads to drug experiments on unsuspecting individuals. 19 AUGUST 1953 A coup d’ etat instigated by the CIA overthrows the government of Prime Minister Muhammad Mossadeq in Iran, leading to the restoration of the Shah.
27 NOVEMBER 1953 Dr. Frank Olson, a civilian scientist in the employ of the U.S. Army, commits sui cide. The act is attributed to his role as an unwitting subject in the CIA drug pro gram MKULTRA.
27 JUNE 1954 President Jacobo Arbenz is forced form office in Guatemala, despite the failure of a CIA-instigated coup d’ etat led by Carlos Castillo Armas. As a result of pressure from the United States, Castillo Armas becomes president on 1 September.
23 NOVEMBER 1954 President Dwight Eisenhower approves a plan to develop the U-2 spy plane, which is to fly at altitudes undetectable by the Soviet Union. 14 JANUARY 1955 Montana Senator Mike Mansfield introduces a resolution to establish a joint Con gressional oversight committee to monitor the CIA. The measure fails in the face of opposition from the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Eisenhower administration.
3 FEBRUARY 1955 The Deputy Director for Administration becomes the Deputy Director for Support. 4 JULY 1956 The first U-2 overflight of the Soviet Union is conducted. SPRING 1957 The CIA begins offering training and support to anti-Chinese guerrillas in Tibet. The agency will later establish a training center for the Tibetan operation in the Rocky Mountains in Colorado. Although not very effective, the operation contin ues into the early 1970s, when President Richard Nixon ends it as part of the pol icy of improving relations with China. 22 SEPTEMBER 1957 The National Security Council approves a covert operation to overthrow the gov ernment of President Sukarno in Indonesia by supporting rebel forces.
4 OCTOBER 1957 The Soviet Union unexpectedly launches Sputnik, the first artificial space satellite. A presidential commission later concludes that the Soviets must be building inter continental missiles at a rapid pace, giving rise to fears of a ‘‘missile gap.’’
19 APRIL 1958 CIA pilots begin engaging directly in combat operations in Indonesia, bombing and strafing government positions in support of armed dissidents. 19 MAY 1958 DCI Dulles orders the Indonesian operation ended after the U.S. ambassador and the commander of Pacific forces declare it a transparent failure.
DECEMBER 1959 Vang Pao, an ethnic Hmong military leader in Laos, tells the CIA that, if he had the weapons, he could raise an army of 10,000 Hmong to fight the pro-Communist Pathet Lao movement in the country’s escalating civil war. Arms begin arriving in January 1961.
17 MARCH 1960 President Eisenhower approves plans to recruit and train Cuban emigr es for an invasion of Cuba.
1 MAY 1960 A CIA U-2 spy plane flown by Francis Gary Powers is shot down over the Soviet Union. A U.S.-Soviet summit meeting scheduled for 16 May is canceled. U-2 flights over Soviet territory are ended and are to be replaced by surveillance satellites.
AUGUST 1960 The National Security Council authorizes the assassination of Premier Patrice Lumumba of the Congo and Prime Minister Fidel Castro of Cuba. 12 AUGUST 1960 Colonel Oleg Penkovsky of Soviet military intelligence (GRU), a ‘‘walk-in’’ in formant, offers the CIA highly useful information about Soviet missile technology and intelligence operations. Penkovsky’s activities are discovered by Soviet authorities on 12 October 1962, and he is executed on 16 May 1963.
 18 AUGUST 1960 The first CIA surveillance satellite is launched in the CORONA program. It is to photograph the Soviet Union in search of missiles.
17 APRIL 1961 Cuban exiles recruited and trained by the CIA invade Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. They are defeated by the Cuban army within three days.
30 MAY 1961 President Rafael Leonidas Trujillo of the Dominican Republic is assassinated by rebels who had, for a time, been encouraged by the CIA.
20 SEPTEMBER 1961 The CIA begins moving into its new headquarters in Langley, Virginia.
NOVEMBER 1961 President John F. Kennedy initiates Operation Mongoose to destabilize Cuba. Being distrustful of the CIA after the Bay of Pigs failure, he places the project under his brother, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy.
28 NOVEMBER 1961 The CIA headquarters building in Langley, Virginia, is completed.
15 DECEMBER 1961 Soviet intelligence officer Anatoliy Golitsyn defects and offers sensitive informa tion on Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence matters. 19 FEBRUARY 1962 An administrative reorganization creates the position of Deputy Director for Research.
7 MARCH 1962 Under pressure from Attorney General Kennedy, DCI John A. McCone orders the phones of journalists Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott to be monitored in order to identify who was leaking information to them.
14 OCTOBER 1962 A CIA U-2 reports the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba. Five days later, Pres ident Kennedy announces a quarantine of the island, setting off the Cuban Missile Crisis. In the following days, the world comes close to nuclear war.
5 AUGUST 1963 The Deputy Director for Research becomes the Deputy Director for Science and Technology.
1 NOVEMBER 1963 South Vietnamese army officers overthrow and assassinate Premier Ngo Dinh Diem. The CIA denies responsibility for the coup, but it was aware of the planning and opted not to interfere.
4 FEBRUARY 1964 Yuriy Nosenko, an operative of the KGB, defects to a CIA representative in Ge neva, Switzerland, claiming to have information on President Kennedy’s assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald. Suspicions regarding his authenticity lead to years of incar ceration and interrogation in CIA facilities in the United States. Anatoliy Golitsyn encourages suspicion of him. 1965 The CIA-guided Hmong operation in Laos grows into the largest paramilitary operation in the agency’s history. In addition to fighting Pathet Lao and North Vi etnamese forces in Laos, much activity is directed against Viet Cong supply routes running through Laos from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. The operation con tinues until June 1974, when it is ended as a consequence of peace accords.
FEBRUARY 1967 Ramparts magazine reports that the CIA has covertly funded the overseas pro grams of the National Student Association since 1952, raising questions of xxxiv Timeline academic freedom as well as inappropriate domestic activity by the CIA. The Kat zenbach Committee later recommends a ban on any direct or indirect funding of American educational or private voluntary organizations, which the CIA accepts.
15 AUGUST 1967 Prodded by President Lyndon B. Johnson, the CIA launches MHCHAOS to inves tigate possible foreign connections behind U.S. antiwar and civil rights activists. The program continues until 1973.
SUMMER 1968 The CIA issues ‘‘Restless Youth,’’ a study of student dissidents around the world, at the behest of National Security Adviser Walter Rostow. A limited number of copies include a chapter on the American organization Students for a Democratic Society (SDS).
31 MARCH 1970 FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover severs the bureau’s liaison with the CIA because of his annoyance at the handling of a missing-person case involving a Czech-born history professor in Colorado.
14 JULY 1970 The Huston Plan, devised by White House aide Tom Charles Huston, authorizes intelligence agencies to use ‘‘clearly illegal’’ investigative techniques in domestic operations. The plan is revoked thirteen days later.
15 SEPTEMBER 1970 President Nixon authorizes the CIA to prevent the inauguration of Salvador Allende as president of Chile. Allende has already won the election.
22 OCTOBER 1970 A botched kidnapping attempt results in the death of General Ren e Schneider, commander of the Chilean army. Chilean politicians rally around Allende. 19
NOVEMBER 1970 FBI Director Hoover announces that the Black Panther Party is supported by inter national terrorists. The CIA finds no evidence in either FBI or CIA files to support such an assertion but is not in a position to say so publicly.
DECEMBER 1970 President Richard M. Nixon forms the Intelligence Evaluation Committee, an interagency group assigned to investigate the foreign roots of internal dissent. It is led by Assistant Attorney General for Internal Security Robert Mardian. The CIA is represented on the committee, but most members are unaware of the CIA’s ongoing MHCHAOS.
7 JULY 1971 Presidential adviser John Ehrlichman telephones Deputy Director of Central Intel ligence Robert Cushman and instructs him that White House ‘‘security consul tant’’ and former CIA officer E. Howard Hunt will be making requests of the agency. The agency is to cooperate with Hunt without asking questions. JULY–AUGUST 1971 Hunt requests that the CIA provide him with disguises, alias identification, cam eras, and a psychological profile of Daniel Ellsberg, who is suspected of releasing the Pentagon Papers to the press. The CIA complies until the end of the summer, when agency managers deem the requests excessive.
3 SEPTEMBER 1971 Hunt breaks into the office of Dr. Louis Fielding, Daniel Ellsberg’s psychiatrist.
17 JUNE 1972 Police arrest five men at the National Democratic Committee headquarters in the Watergate complex in Washington. Among them is James McCord, a former CIA employee, and four Cuban Americans with past ties to the CIA, one of whom is carrying a false passport issued to E. Howard Hunt.
23 JUNE 1972 Presidential Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman presses DCI Richard Helms and Deputy DCI (DDCI) Vernon Walters to intervene with the FBI to limit part of its investigation related to the Watergate break-in. They are to say that further inves tigation will interfere with CIA operations in Mexico. (The later discovery of a re cording of Nixon instructing Haldeman to do this will result in his resignation as president in 1974.)
27 JUNE 1972 DDCI Walters refuses White House Counsel John Dean’s request to have the CIA pay the bail and salaries of the Watergate burglars because it would falsely impli cate the agency in the break-in.
6 JULY 1972 DDCI Walters informs acting FBI director L. Patrick Gray that his inquiries indi cate there is no CIA operation in Mexico, despite what was said the previous month, and he will no longer claim that there is.
JULY 1972 James McCord sends the first of six letters to Richard Helms and other CIA offi cials implying that the White House is pressing him to implicate the CIA in the Watergate affair. xxxvi Timeline
20 NOVEMBER 1972 Once reelected, despite the CIA’s failure to cooperate on the Watergate affair, Nixon dismisses Richard Helms as Director of Central Intelligence.
2 FEBRUARY 1973 James Schlesinger becomes Director of Central Intelligence. He has instructions from President Nixon to shake up the agency. 1 MARCH 1973 The Deputy Director for Plans becomes the Deputy Director for Operations. 22 MARCH 1973 The Deputy Director for Support becomes the Deputy Director for Management and Services.
9 MAY 1973 After learning from newspaper reports that E. Howard Hunt had burglarized a psychiatrist’s office with CIA-supplied equipment, DCI Schlesinger issues a mem orandum instructing all CIA employees to inform him of any past activities that might transgress the agency’s charter. The responses to his memo are collected in a file dubbed the ‘‘Family Jewels.’’
10 MAY 1973 Schlesinger is nominated to be Secretary of Defense. He steps down as DCI on 2 July.
4 SEPTEMBER 1973 William E. Colby becomes Director of Central Intelligence after a period in which Vernon Walters has served as acting director.
11 SEPTEMBER 1973 General Augusto Pinochet overthrows the government of Chile in a violent coup d’ etat. President Allende dies in the process, apparently by suicide. Many assume the CIA is responsible.
5 AUGUST 1974 The House Judiciary Committee releases the ‘‘smoking gun’’ tape, revealing Presi dent Nixon’s instructions to have the CIA intervene in the FBI’s investigation of Watergate.
9 AUGUST 1974 Richard Nixon resigns from the presidency to avoid impeachment. Gerald R. Ford becomes president.
19 AUGUST 1974 The Deputy Director for Management and Services becomes the Deputy Director for Administration.
17 DECEMBER 1974 DCI Colby informs James J. Angleton that he is relieving him of responsibilities as Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff. Angleton resigns from the agency effective 31 December. 22 DECEMBER 1974 Seymour Hersh reports in The New York Times on a ‘‘huge CIA operation’’ against antiwar forces and other dissidents in the United States.
30 DECEMBER 1974 Congress approves the Hughes-Ryan Act, requiring covert operations to have a written ‘‘finding,’’ signed by the president, that the operation is in the interest of national security. 4 JANUARY 1975 President Ford creates the President’s Commission on CIA Activities within the United States, led by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller (the Rockefeller Commis sion), to investigate the allegations of domestic surveillance. Some observers later dismiss it as a whitewash.
27 JANUARY 1975 Abandoning a tradition of benign neglect regarding its oversight of intelligence matters, the Senate establishes the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmen tal Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, led by Senator Frank Church (the Church Committee), to investigate allegations of past illegal activities of the CIA and other agencies. The committee conducts 800 interviews, twenty one public hearings, and 250 executive hearings. Its findings, completed in May 1976, fill fourteen volumes and are called the most comprehensive public review of intelligence activities in history.
19 FEBRUARY 1975 Following the Senate’s lead, the House establishes the House Select Intelligence Committee with a similar mandate. Its initial chairman, Lucien Nedzi, resigned from the committee on
June 12, 1975, after other Democrats discovered that he had known of the ‘‘Family Jewels’’ file since 1973 (having been informed by Colby). He was replaced by Otis Pike. The Pike Committee develops a less cooper ative relationship with the agency than the Church Committee. DCI Colby describes the committee as ‘‘totally biased and a disservice to our nation’’ and pri vately calls Pike a ‘‘jackass.’’ Its report is not officially released to the public, but it is leaked to The Village Voice.
MAY 1975 Several retired CIA officials form the Association of Retired Intelligence Officers (after 1978, the Association of Former Intelligence Officers; after 2006, the Associa tion For Intelligence Officers) with the intention of improving the agency’s image through public education.
8 JULY 1975 Nine weeks after the fall of Saigon and in the midst of Congressional investiga tions of CIA activities, President Ford signs a finding authorizing CIA support to two liberation movements in Angola against a third movement, which has con nections to the Soviet Union and Cuba. 20 NOVEMBER 1975 The Church Committee issues its most famous interim report, Alleged Assassina tion Plots Involving Foreign Leaders. 23 DECEMBER 1975 Richard Welch, Chief of Station in Athens, Greece, is assassinated after his iden tity and address are revealed in anti-CIA publications. As a consequence, a law is passed in 1982 making it a crime to disclose the identity of CIA officers.
19 DECEMBER 1975/27
JANUARY 1976 The Senate and then the House approve the Clark Amendment, requiring the ter mination of all funding for covert operations in Angola.
30 JANUARY 1976 President Ford dismisses Colby as Director of Central Intelligence, in large part for being too forthcoming to the Church Committee. The new DCI is future presi dent George H. W. Bush.
18 FEBRUARY 1976 President Ford issues Executive Order 11905, ‘‘United States Foreign Intelligence Activities,’’ to clarify the authority and responsibilities of the Intelligence Commu nity. It includes the following explicit prohibition: ‘‘No employee of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, political assassination.’’
6 MAY 1976 DCI Bush, under political pressure from conservative Republicans challenging President Ford’s renomination, creates a panel of outside experts to reevaluate the CIA’s assessment of Soviet strategic capabilities and objectives. Team B lambastes the CIA as na€ıve and paints a picture of a growing and aggressive Soviet military threat. The Team B assessment lays the foundation for Reagan administration pol icies in the 1980s. An internal CIA review in 1989, with more evidence available, concludes that the CIA had actually overestimated Soviet capabilities somewhat and that the Team B assessment was wildly exaggerated.
19 MAY 1976 The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is formed as a permanent oversight committee. Previous oversight responsibilities had been handled by subcommit tees of the Armed Forces and Appropriations Committees.
14 JULY 1977 The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence is formed. The formation of the House committee was delayed owing to controversies over the leaking of the Pike Committee report. 11 OCTOBER 1977 The Deputy Director for Intelligence becomes the Director of the National Foreign Assessment Center. 25 OCTOBER 1978 The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) establishes a special court and procedures for authorizing electronic surveillance within the United States for for eign intelligence purposes.
14 OCTOBER 1980 The Intelligence Accountability Act amends the 1974 Hughes-Ryan Act by reduc ing the number of Congressional committees that must be informed of covert actions from eight to two (the two new intelligence committees).
4 DECEMBER 1981 President Ronald Reagan replaces Ford’s Executive Order 11905 with Executive Order 12333, ‘‘United States Intelligence Activities.’’ The prohibition against assassination is strengthened by extending it to nonemployees of the government and by dropping the modifier ‘‘political.’’ It states: ‘‘No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination.’’
4 JANUARY 1982 The Director of the National Foreign Assessment Center reverts to the previous title, Deputy Director for Intelligence. 16 MARCH 1982 William Buckley, CIA Chief of Station in Beirut, Lebanon, is kidnapped by Islam ist militants. He is later tortured and killed.
23 JUNE 1982 President Reagan signs the Intelligence Identities Protection Act as an amendment to the National Security Act of 1947. The new law makes it a crime for someone authorized to know the identity of a covert intelligence officer to divulge that xl Timeline identity to someone not so authorized. In part, this is a delayed response to the assassination of Richard Welch in 1975 and to disclosures made by disgruntled former CIA employees such as Philip Agee.
8 DECEMBER 1982 The first Boland Amendment prohibits the use of government funds for the pur pose of overthrowing the Nicaraguan government. The Reagan administration claims the CIA’s support of the Contras is intended to disrupt arms traffic from Nicaragua to El Salvador, not to overthrow the Nicaraguan government.
12 OCTOBER 1984 The second Boland Amendment prohibits the Department of Defense, the CIA, or ‘‘any other agency or entity involved in intelligence activities’’ from providing military or paramilitary aid to the Nicaraguan Contras for the period from Octo ber 1984 to December 1985.
15 OCTOBER 1984 President Reagan signs the Central Intelligence Agency Information Act, exempt ing the CIA from some of the search and review requirements of the Freedom of Information Act.
27 MARCH 1985 President Reagan signs National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 166, ‘‘U.S. Policy, Programs, and Strategy in Afghanistan,’’ supporting the goal of military victory for the mostly Islamist mujahedeen. Although the United States has been funneling aid through Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) since 1979, it now increases assistance. The CIA takes a more direct role in arming, training, and supporting the guerrillas. Some of the Afghan guerrillas—and some of their supporters and allies from other Muslim countries—would later become mem bers of the Taliban and al-Qa’ida.
23 AUGUST 1985 President Reagan approves the sale by Israel of U.S.-made weapons to Iran in the hope of facilitating the release of hostages in Lebanon.
5 DECEMBER 1985 President Reagan authorizes direct sales of weapons to Iran.
1 FEBRUARY 1986 DCI William Casey establishes the Counterterrorist Center. Its first head is Duane Clarridge, who earlier was responsible for paramilitary operations in Nicaragua.
5 OCTOBER 1986 Nicaragua shoots down a CIA-chartered aircraft in the process of supplying Con tra guerrilla forces. The sole survivor, Eugene Hasenfus, is captured.
 3 NOVEMBER 1986 An Islamist newspaper in Lebanon reports that the Reagan administration sought to trade arms for hostages.
25 NOVEMBER 1986 Attorney General Edwin Meese III confirms that arms were traded to Iran to secure the release of hostages in Lebanon and that part of the proceeds were diverted to supply the Contras in Nicaragua in defiance of the Boland Amendment.
1 DECEMBER 1986 The President’s Special Review Board, consisting of John Tower, Edmund Muskie, and Brent Scowcroft (the Tower Commission), is established to investi gate the Iran-Contra affair and to recommend modifications in the national secu rity policy process.
19 DECEMBER 1986 Lawrence Walsh is appointed Independent Counsel to investigate any criminal activities by the White House, the CIA, or other federal entities in connection with the Iran-Contra affair. The investigation continues for six and a half years.
7 JANUARY 1987 Congress authorizes a joint House and Senate investigation into the Iran-Contra affair.
9 NOVEMBER 1989 Demonstrators tear down the Berlin Wall, symbolizing the end of the Cold War, as East European Communist regimes collapse.
30 NOVEMBER 1989 President George H. W. Bush signs a bill giving the CIA a ‘‘statutory’’ inspector general to be appointed by the president rather than the Director of Central Intelligence.
MARCH 1991 The CIA’s New Headquarters Building, attached to the Original Headquarters Building, is completed and occupied.
25 DECEMBER 1991 Mikhail Gorbachev resigns as president of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, symbolizing the collapse of the Soviet regime, which for all intents and purposes has already ceased to exist. With the Cold War over, the CIA’s budget and staffing are reduced by more than one-fifth over the next decade. xlii Timeline
24 DECEMBER 1992 President George H. W. Bush issues pardons to former Secretary of Defense Cas par Weinberger, former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Elliott Abrams, former National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane, and former CIA officials Duane Clarridge (Chief, Western Hemisphere Division), Alan Fiers (Chief, Central America Task Force), and Clair George (Deputy Director for Oper ations), all of whom had been indicted in the course of the Iran-Contra investigation.
21 FEBRUARY 1994 Aldrich Ames’s thirty-one-year career in the CIA ends when he is arrested for conspiracy to commit espionage. Over the preceding nine years, he sold thou sands of classified documents and the names of ten CIA and FBI assets to Soviet and Russian intelligence officials. Several of the individuals he named were exe cuted. In April, after pleading guilty, Ames is sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.
JANUARY 1996 The CIA establishes ‘‘Alec Station’’ as a unit within the Counterterrorist Center at CIA headquarters. Modeled on an overseas CIA station, it fuses analysis, opera tions, and other functions. The purpose of this ‘‘virtual station’’ is to track Usama bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida, collect intelligence on them, and run operations against them. Its first chief is Michael Scheuer.
19 MAY 1996 Under pressure from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United States, the government of Sudan deports Usama bin Ladin, who had been operating in the country for five years. He and his al-Qa’ida terrorist organization find refuge with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. 23
FEBRUARY 1998 Usama bin Ladin and associates issue one of a series of anti-Western declarations. It calls on all Muslims to ‘‘kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it.’’ As reasons, he refers to U.S. occupation of the Ara bian Peninsula since 1991, continued aggression against Iraq, and support for Israel.
SEPTEMBER 2000 The CIA begins covert flights over Afghanistan with Predator unmanned aerial vehicles in its effort to locate Usama bin Ladin.
6 AUGUST 2001 The Presidential Daily Briefing provided by the CIA includes an item titled ‘‘Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in U.S.,’’ but the brief reveals little that is new, action able, or directly supportive of the claim made by the title.
11 SEPTEMBER 2001 (‘‘9/11’’) Terrorists from al-Qa’ida hijack four civilian airliners and crash two into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City and one into the Pentagon outside Washington, D.C. The fourth crashes in a Pennsylvania field after the pas sengers attempt to retake control from the hijackers. The attack results in the deaths of 2,973 people. President George W. Bush soon declares a Global War on Terrorism.
27 SEPTEMBER 2001 CIA officers and Special Operations Forces infiltrate Afghanistan in preparation for U.S. intervention against the Taliban regime and al-Qa’ida. The Northern Alli ance Liaison Team is established to coordinate with local anti-Taliban militias.
7 OCTOBER 2001 The overt phase of the Afghan War begins with U.S. aerial bombardment.
7 DECEMBER 2001 The Taliban abandon Kandahar, the last major Taliban stronghold in Afghanistan. Taliban and al-Qa’ida fighters retreat into the countryside and the border areas of Pakistan. Fighting continues.
23 JULY 2002 The chief of British intelligence, according to a confidential memorandum, tells Prime Minister Tony Blair: ‘‘Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy.’’ 1 AUGUST 2002 In the so-called Bybee Memo, the Department of Justice defines torture so nar rowly as virtually to eliminate limits on the treatment of suspected terrorists. It further suggests that any restrictions on the president’s authority to order inter rogation techniques of his choosing might be unconstitutional. The opinion remains secret for the next two years.
 26 AUGUST 2002 Vice President Dick Cheney delivers a speech that ‘‘goes beyond’’ the current intelligence regarding Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD), according to DCI George Tenet, but Tenet apparently does not protest.
7 OCTOBER 2002 President Bush delivers a speech in Cincinnati pressing the urgent need to address the threat from Iraq. Owing to CIA intervention, a reference to suspect intelligence regarding Iraqi efforts to buy uranium in Africa is dropped from the speech. xliv Timeline OCTOBER 2002 At the request of Congress and in anticipation of a war against Iraq, the CIA issues a National Intelligence Estimate, ‘‘Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction.’’ Post–invasion evidence will indicate that the programs did not exist. 3 NOVEMBER 2002 Using a Hellfire missile fired from a Predator unmanned aerial vehicle, the CIA kills Abu Ali al-Harithi and five others in Yemen. Al-Harithi was believed to be re sponsible for the October 2000 terrorist attack in Yemen against the destroyer U.S.S. Cole, in which seventeen sailors were killed.
 25 NOVEMBER 2002 President Bush establishes the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) to examine the intelligence monitoring of domestic and international terrorist activities prior to the 9/11 attacks.
28 JANUARY 2003 President Bush’s State of the Union address makes a forceful argument for war. The address includes the reference to Iraqi efforts to seek uranium in Africa, which was dropped from the Cincinnati speech in October. He attributes the in formation to British intelligence.
 5 FEBRUARY 2003 Secretary of State Colin Powell uses intelligence to make the case for war against Iraq before the United Nations Security Council. Post-invasion evidence will indi cate that many of the facts were wrong.
20 MARCH 2003 President Bush announces that the invasion of Iraq has begun.
6 JULY 2003 Former Ambassador Joseph Wilson writes in The New York Times that the CIA, prompted by Vice President Cheney, had sent him to Niger in February 2002 to look for evidence that Iraq had sought uranium. He had found none. Cheney later denies any knowledge of the trip.
29 SEPTEMBER 2003 The Department of Justice launches an investigation of senior administration offi cials to discover who revealed that Joseph Wilson’s wife, Valerie Plame, was a covert CIA officer, in violation of the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982. The investigation discovers that several officials had been describing Wilson’s trip to Africa as a junket arranged by his wife, ending her career as an undercover offi cer. Presumably, the reason was to punish Wilson for going public or to distance Cheney from the trip.
6 FEBRUARY 2004 President Bush creates the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States regarding WMD (the Robb-Silberman Commission) to investigate the intelligence used to justify the war with Iraq and to examine intelligence regarding North Korea, Libya, Afghanistan, and Iran. 9 JULY 2004 The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence criticizes the CIA and other agencies in a detailed, 511-page report, U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq. 22 JULY 2004 The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) issues its final report, calling for a reorganization of the intelligence community under a Director of National Intelligence.
29 JULY 2004 The Kerr Group issues Intelligence and Analysis on Iraq: Issues for the Intelligence Community, the third of a series of reports intended as an internal review by the CIA of its prewar Iraq assessments so as to draw lessons for the future.
AUGUST 2004 President Bush establishes the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), which in 2005 becomes part of the new Office of the Director of National Intelligence. There is some jurisdictional confusion between the NCTC and the more opera tionally oriented Counterterrorist Center (CTC), which continues as part of the CIA. 30 SEPTEMBER 2004 The Iraq Survey Group issues its final report, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, confirming that Iraq had had no WMD or pro grams to develop them prior to the invasion. It insists, however, that Saddam Hussein would have liked to have them. Further addenda are added in March 2005.
17 DECEMBER 2004 President Bush signs the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, enacting several of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, including the establishment of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
17 DECEMBER 2004 Congress passes the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004. The CIA loses its predominant position in the Intelligence Community as the position of Director of Central Intelligence is replaced by two: the Director of xlvi Timeline National Intelligence, with responsibility for communitywide coordination, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
30 DECEMBER 2004 The Department of Justice repudiates the Bybee Memo of 2002 regarding the per missibility of harsh interrogation techniques.
31 MARCH 2005 The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (the Robb-Silberman Commission) issues its final report, concluding that assessments of other countries’ WMD programs were less flawed than that of Iraq’s but that errors were still too common. 22 APRIL 2005 The Director of Central Intelligence is replaced by the Director of National Intelli gence and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. 
29 JUNE 2005 The CIA Office of Inspector General issues the OIG Report on CIA Accountability with Respect to the 9/11 Attacks. A redacted version is released to the public at the insistence of Congress in August 2007. 13 OCTOBER 2005 The Deputy Director for Operations becomes the Director of the National Clan destine Service. The director will ‘‘coordinate, de-conflict, and assess’’ human intelligence operations throughout the Intelligence Community. 21 DECEMBER 2005 The Director of National Intelligence establishes the National Counterprolifera tion Center to coordinate strategic planning within the Intelligence Community to support efforts to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. 30 DECEMBER 2005 President Bush signs the Detainee Treatment Act prohibiting torture and estab lishing uniform interrogation techniques. A presidential signing statement accom panying the document, however, raises questions as to whether he intends to apply the new law. In addition, secret Justice Department opinions may have al ready redefined existing harsh techniques as permissible under the new law. 13 JANUARY 2006 An attempt to kill Ayman al-Zawahiri, the deputy leader of al-Qa’ida, in the village of Damadola, Pakistan, with a Predator unmanned aerial vehicle results in the death of eighteen people, mostly women and children. Zawahiri is not present. Timeline xlvii JUNE 2006 In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court overrules the administration’s position that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, regarding the humane treat ment of prisoners, does not apply to suspected terrorists.
 6 SEPTEMBER 2006 President Bush publicly acknowledges the existence of the ‘‘black sites,’’ secret CIA detention centers for suspected terrorists at undisclosed locations overseas. He announces the transfer of fourteen detainees from these sites to the Defense Department’s detention center at Guant anamo Bay Naval Station, Cuba, but does not specify whether there are more detainees at the secret sites. 26 JUNE 2007 After thirty-four years, the CIA releases a redacted version of the ‘‘Family Jewels’’ file, the most famous set of secret documents in the history of the agency.
20 JULY 2007 President Bush signs an executive order applying Common Article 3 of the Ge neva Conventions to the detention and interrogation of suspected terrorists by the CIA, in compliance with a Supreme Court decision of the previous year. Certain behaviors are prohibited, but the order remains vague about what is allowed.
 SEPTEMBER 2007 The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence releases a less critical report, Prewar Intelligence Assessments about Postwar Iraq, but laments the Intelligence Commun ity’s failure to influence post-invasion policy.
11 OCTOBER 2007 News reports indicate that the CIA director has been investigating the agency’s Office of Inspector General. Some agency officials reportedly believe OIG investi gations have lasted too long and may not have been fair and impartial. Members of Congress voiced concern that the DCIA’s investigation of OIG could pose a conflict of interest.
 21 OCTOBER 2007 Vice President Cheney speaks of Iranian ‘‘efforts to destabilize the Middle East and to gain hegemonic power’’ and of ‘‘the inescapable reality of Iran’s nuclear program.’’ If Iran ‘‘stays on its present course, the international community is pre pared to impose serious consequences.’’
3 DECEMBER 2007 The Director of National Intelligence releases the ‘‘Key Judgments’’ of the National Intelligence Estimate Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities, which assesses that Iran halted the purely military aspects of its nuclear program in xlviii Timeline 2003. This sudden turnaround from previous assessments is attributed to new in formation and the application of analytic lessons from the Iraq War.
7 DECEMBER 2007 The New York Times reveals that in 2005 the CIA destroyed hundreds of hours of videotapes made in 2002 of the interrogation of two al-Qa’ida suspects held in se cret detention. The tapes may have revealed harsh interrogation techniques.
13 DECEMBER 2007 Memorandum by former 9/11 Commission Staff Director Philip Zelikow details the efforts of the commission to acquire information about the interrogation of al Qa’ida suspects. The CIA had not disclosed the existence of the videotapes.
2 JANUARY 2008 The Department of Justice launches a criminal investigation into the destruction of the CIA’s interrogation videotapes.
31 JANUARY 2008 DCIA Michael Hayden announces the establishment of an ombudsman for employees who believe the have been treated unfairly by the Office of Inspector General. The OIG reportedly agreed to tighten control over its investigative procedures.
Chapter 1 The Charter
he United States did not have a full-time civilian intelligence agency until World War II. The military services had their own agencies, beginning with the Office of Naval Intelligence in 1882. The FBI became involved in some aspects of intelligence work in Latin America in the 1930s and later sought unsuccess fully to reserve the intelligence function in that part of the world to itself. The first dedicated civilian intelligence agency was the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), established under President Franklin D. Roosevelt in June 1942. It was led by a New York lawyer named William J. ‘‘Wild Bill’’ Donovan, who had previously been named Coordinator of Information. The makeshift agency had both analytic and operational functions, although it had to put up with competitors, including the FBI in Latin America. The order establishing the OSS was brief: Presidential Military Order Establishing the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 12 June 1942 By virtue of the authority of the vested in me as President of the United States and as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, it is ordered as follows: 1. The Office of the Coordinator of Information, established by order of July 11, 1941, exclusive of the foreign information activities transferred to the Office of War Information by executive order of June 13, 1942, shall hereafter be known as the Office of Strategic Services, and is hereby transferred to the ju risdiction of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2. The Office of Strategic Services shall perform the following duties: a. Collect and analyze such strategic information as may be required by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. b. Plan and operate such special services as may be directed by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. 3. At the head of the Office of Strategic Services shall be a Director of Strategic Services who shall be appointed by the President and who shall perform his duties under the direction and supervision of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. 4. William J. Donovan is hereby appointed as Director of Strategic Services. The order of July 11, 1941, is hereby revoked. Franklin D. Roosevelt Commander in Chief Coming out of the war, Congress and President Harry S. Truman still had the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor very much on their minds, and Truman was already becoming concerned about the intentions of the Soviet Union.1 Congress concluded that the prevention of future Pearl Harbors required unity of com mand in the military and better intelligence, and this suited Truman as well. Al ready in 1944 Donovan was mapping out rough ideas for a permanent, civilian intelligence agency for the postwar period. This came in a memorandum to President Roosevelt dated 18 November 1944: Pursuant to your note of 31 October 1944, I have given consideration to the organi zation of an intelligence service for the post-war period. In the early days of the war when the demands upon intelligence services were mainly in and for military operations, the OSS was placed under the direction of the JCS. Once our enemies are defeated the demand will be equally pressing for informa tion that will aid us in solving the problems of peace. This will require two things: 1. That intelligence control authority reporting directly to you, with responsibil ity to frame intelligence objectives and to collect and coordinate the intelli gence material required by the Executive Branch in planning and carrying out national policy and strategy. I attach in form of a draft directive the means by which I think this could be realized without difficulty or loss of time. You will note that coordination and centralization are placed at the policy level but operational intelligence (that pertaining primarily to Department action) remains within the existing agencies concerned. The creation of a central authority thus would not con flict with or limit necessary intelligence functions within the Army, Navy, Department of State, and other agencies. In accordance with your wish, this is set up as a permanent long-range plan. But you may want to consider whether this (or part of it) should be done now, by executive or legislative action. There are common sense rea sons why you may desire to lay the keel of the ship at once. 2. The immediate revisions and coordination of our present intelligence system would effect substantial economies and aid in the more efficient and speedy termination of the war. Information important to national defense, being gathered now by certain departments and agencies, is not being used to full advantage in the war. Coordination at the strategy level would prevent waste, and avoid the pres ent confusion that leads to waste and unnecessary duplication. Though in the midst of war, we are also in a period of transition which, before we are aware, will take us into the tumult of rehabilitation. An adequate and orderly intelligence system will contribute to informed decisions. 2 The Central Intelligence Agency We have now in the Government the trained and specialized personnel needed to the task. This talent should not be dispersed. The notion of a new civilian intelligence agency immediately generated its own opposition. Existing bureaucracies, including the military intelligence agencies, the State Department, and the FBI, resented the potential competitor, especially when people talked of giving it centralizing or coordinating functions above them. Some members of Congress feared the establishment of a ‘‘secret police’’ or objected to suggestions that it should have the power to conduct ‘‘subversive operations abroad.’’ On the other hand, looming tensions with the Soviet Union reinforced in the minds of many people the need for a centralized intelligence function. President Truman abolished the makeshift OSS almost immediately after the war ended, in October 1945, and transferred its functions to the Departments of State and War. It was his intention to create a more formal and centralized intel ligence agency, but he expected to accomplish this as part of the larger project of ‘‘unifying’’ the armed forces. As an interim measure, Truman established the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) in January 1946, which was to coordinate existing intelligence operations but not to take their place. Its leader was given the title Director of Central Intelligence. That title thus preceded the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency, with which it would become identified. The CIG was to operate under the authority of the National Intelligence Authority, which consisted of a presidential representative and the secretaries of State, War, and the Navy. This arrangement survived a mere twenty months. In its place came the CIA. The agency’s charter was encompassed within the National Security Act of 1947, which was approved by Congress on 26 July 1947 and went into effect on 18 September of that year. In addition to founding the CIA, the act created the Department of Defense (referred to in the bill as the National Military Establishment) by merging the Department of War and the Department of the Navy. At the same time it separated the air force from the army, making the former a military service in its own right, and it gave each of the armed services its own ‘‘department’’ within the new department. In addi tion, the act created the National Security Council to advise the president with regard to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security. The portion of the National Security Act dealing with the CIA is Title I, Sec tion 102. Here is the charter as passed in 1947. Note that it has been amended many times since then. Central Intelligence Agency Sec. 102. (a) There is hereby established under the National Security Council a Central Intelligence Agency with a Director of Central Intelligence, who shall be the head thereof. The Director shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from among the commissioned officers of the armed services or from among individuals in civilian life. The Director shall receive compensation at the rate of $14,000 a year.2 (b) (1) If a commissioned officer of the armed services is appointed as Director then— (A) in the performance of his duties as Director, he shall be subject to no super vision, control, restriction, or prohibition (military or otherwise) other than The Charter 3 would be operative with respect to him if he were a civilian in no way con nected with the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, or the armed services or any component thereof; and (B) he shall not possess or exercise any supervision, control, powers, or functions (other than such as he possesses, or is authorized or directed to exercise, as Director) with respect to the armed services or any component thereof, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, or the Department of the Air Force, or any branch, bureau, unit or division thereof, or with respect to any of the personnel (military or civilian) of any of the foregoing. (2) Except as provided in paragraph (1), the appointment to the office of Director of a commissioned officer of the armed services, and his acceptance of and service in such office, shall in no way affect any status, office, rank, or grade he may occupy or hold in the armed services, or any emolument, perquisite, right, privi lege, or benefit incident to or arising out of any such status, office, rank, or grade. Any such commissioned officer shall, while serving in the office of Director, receive the military pay and allowances (active or retired, as the case may be) pay able to a commissioned officer of his grade and length of service and shall be paid, from any funds available to defray the expenses of the Agency, annual compensa tion at a rate equal to the amount by which $14,000 exceeds the amount of his annual military pay and allowances. (c) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 6 of the Act of August 24, 1912 (37 Stat. 555), or the provisions of any other law, the Director of Central Intelligence may, in his discretion, terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Agency whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States, but such termination shall not affect the right of such officer or employee to seek or accept employment in any other department or agency of the Government if declared eligible for such employment by the United States Civil Service Commission. (d) For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Gov ernment departments and agencies in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council— (1) to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelli gence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to national security; (2) to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordina tion of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national security; (3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities: Pro vided, That the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions: Provided further, That the departments and other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence: And provided further, That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure; (4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such addi tional services of common concern as the National Security Council deter mines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally; (5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct. 4 The Central Intelligence Agency (e) To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President, such intelligence of the departments and agencies of the Govern ment, except as hereinafter provided, relating to the national security shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such departments and other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, shall be made avail able to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation, and dissemi nation: Provided, however, That upon the written request of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make avail able to the Director of Central Intelligence such information for correlation, evalua tion, and dissemination as may be essential to the national security. (f) Effective when the Director first appointed under subsection (a) has taken office— (1) the National Intelligence Authority (11 Fed. Reg. 1337, 1339, February 5, 1946) shall cease to exist; and (2) the personnel, property, and records of the Central Intelligence Group are transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency, and such Group shall cease to exist. Any unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, or other funds available or authorized to be made available for such Group shall be available and shall be authorized to be made available in like manner for expenditure by the Agency. Note that some of the political, or ‘‘police state,’’ concerns about creating a new secret intelligence agency were addressed by expressly denying it ‘‘police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions.’’ At the same time, some of the bureaucratic concerns were addressed by allowing the exist ing agencies to continue their own intelligence operations geared to their own purposes: ‘‘the departments and other agencies of the Government shall con tinue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence.’’ Still, the Director of Central Intelligence, in addition to running his own agency, was expected to coordinate a large community of independent and semi independent agencies that he would never really control. This created a central tension in the office that it would never overcome. The early years of the CIA were marked by the difficulties of creating, organiz ing, and giving direction to a new bureaucracy. This had to be done amid a back ground of constant criticism, some of it rooted in fear or bureaucratic rivalry and some of it evidently inspired by actual bad management at the new agency. The bare bones of the charter were filled out through a series of confidential National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs).3 For example: National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5 Washington, December 12, 1947. ESPIONAGE AND COUNTERESPIONAGE OPERATIONS Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102(d) of the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that: 1. The Director of Central Intelligence shall conduct all organized Federal espio nage operations outside the United States and its possessions for the collec tion of foreign intelligence information required to meet the needs of all Departments and Agencies concerned, in connection with the national secu rity, except for certain agreed activities by other Departments and Agencies. The Charter 5 2. The Director of Central Intelligence shall conduct all organized Federal counter espionage operations outside the United States and its possessions and in occupied areas, provided that this authority shall not be construed to preclude the counter-intelligence activities of any army, navy or air command or installa tion and certain agreed activities by Departments and Agencies necessary for the security of such organizations. 3. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for coordinating cov ert and overt intelligence collection activities. 4. When casual agents are employed or otherwise utilized by an IAC Depart ment or Agency in other than an overt capacity, the Director of Central Intel ligence shall coordinate their activities with the organized covert activities. 5. The Director of Central Intelligence shall disseminate such intelligence infor mation to the various Departments and Agencies which have an authorized interest therein. 6. All other National Security Council Intelligence Directives or implementing supplements shall be construed to apply solely to overt intelligence activities unless otherwise specified. Or, another example: National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 3 Washington, January 13, 1948.4 COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, and for the purposes enunciated in paragraphs (d) and (e) thereof, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that the following over-all policies and objectives are established for the coordination of the production of intelligence: 1. In order that all facilities of the Government may be utilized to their capacity and the responsibilities of each agency may be clearly defined in accordance with its mission, dominant interest, and capabilities, the whole field of intelli gence production is divided into the following categories, and responsibilities are allocated as indicated: a. Basic Intelligence (1) Basic intelligence is that factual intelligence which results from the col lation of encyclopedic information of a more or less permanent or static nature and general interest which, as a result of evaluation and inter pretation, is determined to be the best available. (2) An outline of all basic intelligence required by the Government shall be prepared by the CIA in collaboration with the appropriate agencies. This outline shall be broken down into chapters, sections, and sub sections which shall be allocated as production and maintenance responsibilities to CIA and those agencies of the Government which are best qualified by reason of their intelligence requirements, produc tion capabilities, and dominant interest to assume the production and maintenance responsibility. (3) When completed, this outline and tentative allocations of production and maintenance responsibilities shall be submitted for NSC approval and issued as an implementation of this Directive. It is expected that as the result of constant consultation with the agencies by the Director of 6 The Central Intelligence Agency Central Intelligence, both the outline and the allocations will be revised from time to time to insure the production of the basic intelligence required by the agencies and the fullest possible use of current agency capabilities. Changes in the outline or allocations shall be effected by agreement between the Director of Central Intelligence and the agen cies concerned. (4) This basic intelligence shall be compiled and continuously maintained in National Intelligence Surveys to cover foreign countries, areas, or broad special subjects as appropriate. The National Intelligence Sur veys will be disseminated in such form as shall be determined by the Director of Central Intelligence and the agencies concerned.
(5) The Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for coordinat ing production and maintenance and for accomplishing the editing, publication, and dissemination of these National Intelligence Surveys and shall make such requests on the agencies as are necessary for their proper development and maintenance.
(6) Departments or agencies to be called on for contributions to this under taking may include agencies other than those represented permanently in the IAC. b. Current Intelligence
(1) Current intelligence is that spot information or intelligence of all types and forms of immediate interest and value to operating or policy staffs, which is used by them usually without the delays incident to complete evaluation or interpretation.
(2) The CIA and the several agencies shall produce and disseminate such current intelligence as may be necessary to meet their own internal requirements or external responsibilities.
(3) Interagency dissemination of current intelligence shall be based on interagency agreement including NSC Intelligence Directive No. 1 and the principle of informing all who need to know. c. Staff Intelligence (1) Staff intelligence is that intelligence prepared by any department or agency through the correlation and interpretation of all intelligence materials available to it in order to meet its specific requirements and responsibilities. (2) Each intelligence agency has the ultimate responsibility for the prepa ration of such staff intelligence as its own department shall require. It is recognized that the staff intelligence of each of the departments must be broader in scope than any allocation of collection responsibility or recognition of dominant interest might indicate. In fact, the full foreign intelligence picture is of interest in varying degrees at different times to each of the departments. (3) Any intelligence agency, either through the Director of Central Intelli gence or directly, may call upon other appropriate agencies for intelli gence which does not fall within its own field of dominant interest. Such requests shall be made upon the agencies in accordance with their production capabilities and dominant interest. (4) As a part of the coordination program, the Director of Central Intelli gence will seek the assistance of the IAC intelligence agencies in mini mizing the necessity for any agency to develop intelligence in fields outside its dominant interests.
The Charter 7 (5)
The CIA and the agencies shall, for purposes of coordination, exchange information on projects and plans for the production of staff intelligence.
(6) It shall be normal practice that staff intelligence of one agency is available to the other intelligence agencies permanently represented on the IAC. d. Departmental Intelligence (1) Departmental intelligence is that intelligence including basic, current, and staff intelligence needed by a Department or independent Agency of the Federal Government, and the subordinate units thereof, to exe cute its mission and to discharge its lawful responsibilities. e. National Intelligence (1) National intelligence is integrated departmental intelligence that covers the broad aspects of national policy and national security, is of concern to more than one Department or Agency, and transcends the exclusive competence of a single Department or Agency or the Military Establishment.
(2) The Director of Central Intelligence shall produce and disseminate national intelligence.
(3) The Director of Central Intelligence shall plan and develop the produc tion of national intelligence in coordination with the IAC Agencies in order that he may obtain from them within the limits of their capabil ities the departmental intelligence which will assist him in the produc tion of national intelligence.
(4) The Director of Central Intelligence shall, by agreement with the perti nent Agency or Agencies, request and receive such special estimates, reports, and periodic briefs or summaries prepared by the individual Departments or Agencies in their fields of dominant interest or in ac cordance with their production capabilities as may be necessary in the production of intelligence reports or estimates undertaken mutually.
2. The research facilities required by any agency to process its own current and staff intelligence shall be adequate to satisfy its individual needs after taking full cognizance of the facilities of the other agencies. Each agency shall endeavor to maintain adequate research facilities, not only to accomplish the intelligence production tasks allocated to it directly under the foregoing pro visions but also to provide such additional intelligence reports or estimates within its field of dominant interest as may be necessary to satisfy the requirements of the other agencies under such allocations.
3. For the purposes of intelligence production, the following division of inter ests, subject to refinement through a continuous program of coordination by the Director of Central Intelligence, shall serve as a general delineation of dominant interests: Political, Cultural, Sociological Intelligence Department of State Military Intelligence Department of the Army Naval Intelligence Department of the Navy Air Intelligence Department of the Air Force Economic, Scientific, and Technological Intelligence Each agency in accordance with its respective needs 8 The Central Intelligence Agency A key, top-secret directive of the National Security Council, NSC 10/2, came on 18 June 1948. With this order, the Truman administration authorized the CIA to engage in ‘‘covert operations.’’ Truman had been impressed by actions the agency had already taken earlier that year to distribute money to pro Western parties and labor unions in Italy to forestall Communist electoral suc cess there. The initial body for conducting these operations, the Office of Special Projects, did not last very long; within a few years it was merged into the new Directorate of Plans. Also to change were provisions requiring the office’s chief to be approved by outside officials, such as the Secretary of State. The basic pro visions of the directive, however, remain in effect.
National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects NSC 10/2
Washington, June 18, 1948.
1. The National Security Council, taking cognizance of the vicious covert activ ities of the USSR, its satellite countries and Communist groups to discredit and defeat the aims and activities of the United States and other Western powers, has determined that, in the interests of world peace and U.S. national security, the overt foreign activities of the US Government must be supple mented by covert operations.
2. The Central Intelligence Agency is charged by the National Security Council with conducting espionage and counter-espionage operations abroad. It therefore seems desirable, for operational reasons, not to create a new agency for covert operations, but in time of peace to place the responsibility for them within the structure of the Central Intelligence Agency and correlate them with espionage and counter-espionage operations under the over-all control of the Director of Central Intelligence.
3. Therefore, under the authority of Section 102(d)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council hereby directs that in time of peace: a. A new Office of Special Projects shall be created within the Central Intelli gence Agency to plan and conduct covert operations; and in coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to plan and prepare for the conduct of such operations in wartime. b. A highly qualified person, nominated by the Secretary of State, acceptable to the Director of Central Intelligence and approved by the National Secu rity Council, shall be appointed as Chief of the Office of Special Projects. c. The Chief of the Office of Special Projects shall report directly to the Direc tor of Central Intelligence. For purposes of security and of flexibility of operations, and to the maximum degree consistent with efficiency, the Office of Special Projects shall operate independently of other components of Central Intelligence Agency. d. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for: (1) Ensuring, through designated representatives of the Secretary of State and of the Secretary of Defense, that covert operations are planned and conducted in a manner consistent with US foreign and military policies and with overt activities. In disagreements arising between the Director of Central Intelligence and the representative of the Secre tary of State or the Secretary of Defense over such plans, the matter shall be referred to the National Security Council for decision. (2) Ensuring that plans for wartime covert operations are also drawn up with the assistance of a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and The Charter 9 are accepted by the latter as being consistent with and complementary to approved plans for wartime military operations. (3) Informing, through appropriate channels, agencies of the US Govern ment, both at home and abroad (including diplomatic and military representatives in each area), of such operations as will affect them. e. Covert operations pertaining to economic warfare will be conducted by the Office of Special Projects under the guidance of the departments and agencies responsible for the planning of economic warfare. f. Supplemental funds for the conduct of the proposed operations for fiscal year 1949 shall be immediately requested. Thereafter operational funds for these purposes shall be included in normal Central Intelligence Agency Budget requests.
 4. In time of war, or when the President directs, all plans for covert operations shall be coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In active theaters of war where American forces are engaged, covert operations will be conducted under the direct command of the American Theater Commander and orders therefore will be transmitted through the Joint Chiefs of Staff unless other wise directed by the President.
5. As used in this directive, ‘‘covert operations’’ are understood to be all activ ities (except as noted herein) which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any respon sibility for them. Specifically, such operations shall include any covert activ ities related to: propaganda, economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resist ance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups, and support of in digenous anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such operations shall not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations.
6. This Directive supersedes the directive contained in NSC 4-A, which is hereby cancelled.5
Finally, it appears that for the first two years of its existence, the CIA oper ated without having been formally granted the normal authority to receive or allocate funds or to engage in some of the other basic functions of any govern ment agency. Congress rectified this situation with the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, providing for procurement authorities, education and train ing, travel allowances, and other related expenses. In the process, however, Congress invented some special rules for the agency. For example, the CIA was authorized to receive funds that had been legally appropriated to other agencies for other purposes and to use them regardless of legal restrictions that might have been placed on them. Such practices would allow the agency to disguise the true dimensions of its budget. Other provisions also reinforced the agency’s secretive nature. Some of the precise wording is as follows:
Sec. 6. In the performance of its functions, the Central Intelligence Agency is authorized to—
(a) Transfer to and receive from other Government agencies such sums as may be approved by the Bureau of the Budget,6 for the performance of any of the func tions or activities under sections 102 and 3037 of the National Security Act of 1947 (Public Law 253, Eightieth Congress), and any other Government agency is author ized to transfer to or receive from the Agency such sums without regard to any provisions of law limiting or prohibiting transfers between appropriations. Sums transferred to the Agency in accordance with this paragraph may be expended for the purposes and under the authority of this Act without regard to limitations of appropriations from which transferred; [...] Sec. 7. In the interests of the security of the foreign intelligence activities of the United States and in order further to implement the provision of section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (Public Law 253, Eightieth Congress, first ses sion) that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, the Agency shall be exempted from the provisions of sections 1 and 2, chapter 795 of the Act of Au gust 28, 1935 (49 Stat. 956. 957; 5 U.S.C. 654), and the provisions of any other law which require the publication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency: Provided, That in furtherance of this section, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall make no reports to the Congress in connection with the Agency under section 607, title VI, chapter 212 of the Act of June 30, 1945, as amended (5 U.S.C. 947 (b)). [Sec. 10.] (b) The sums made available to the Agency may be expended without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of Govern ment funds; and for objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature, such expenditures to be accounted for solely on the certificate of the Director and every such certificate shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the amount therein certified.
There were numerous reforms of the agency over the succeeding decades. The most significant, however, came as a consequence of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent 9/11 Commission, which saw that tragedy as partially rooted in a lack of adequate coordination and information sharing among intelligence agencies. This was the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Pre vention Act of 2004, which went into effect in 2005. Conceived as an amendment to the National Security Act of 1947, it is many times longer than the original. The principal change that the act brought about was dividing the post of Director of Central Intelligence. Henceforth, the Director of the Central Intelli gence Agency would be responsible only for the operation of that agency. The separate, independent position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) would be responsible for coordinating the Intelligence Community and advising the president. It took the George W. Bush administration some time to fill the posi tion of DNI. According to some observers, this was because the new office took on all the responsibility for failure without any of the powers to assure success. The following are some brief excerpts of the act:
Subtitle A—Establishment of the Director of National Intelligence
SEC. 1101. REORGANIZATION AND IMPROVEMENT OF MANAGEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (a) IN GENERAL.—Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (0 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by striking sections 102 through 104 and inserting the following new sections: ‘‘DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
12 The Central Intelligence Agency
‘‘SEC. 102. (a) DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.—(1) There is a Director of National Intelligence who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Any individual nominated for appointment as Director of National Intelligence shall have extensive national security expertise. ‘‘(2) The Director of National Intelligence shall not be located within the Execu tive Office of the President. ‘‘(b) PRINCIPAL RESPONSIBILITY.—Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President, the Director of National Intelligence shall— ‘‘(1) serve as head of the intelligence community; ‘‘(2) act as the principal adviser to the President, to the National Security Coun cil, and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to the national security; and ‘‘(3) consistent with section 1018 of the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, oversee and direct the implementation of the National Intelli gence Program. ‘‘(c) PROHIBITION OF DUAL SERVICE.—The individual serving in the position of Director of National Intelligence shall not, while so serving, also serve as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency or as the head of any other element of the intel ligence community.
‘‘SEC. 102A. (a) PROVISION OF INTELLIGENCE.—(1) The Director of National Intelli gence shall be responsible for ensuring that national intelligence is provided— ‘‘(A) to the President; ‘‘(B) to the heads of departments and agencies of the executive branch; ‘‘(C) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior military commanders; ‘‘(D) to the Senate and House of Representatives and the committees thereof; and ‘‘(E) to such other persons as the Director of National Intelligence determines to be appropriate. ‘‘(2) Such national intelligence should be timely, objective, independent of politi cal considerations, and based upon all sources available to the intelligence commu nity and other appropriate entities. ‘‘(b) ACCESS TO INTELLIGENCE.—Unless otherwise directed by the President, the Director of National Intelligence shall have access to all national intelligence and intelligence related to the national security which is collected by any Federal department, agency, or other entity, except as otherwise provided by law or, as appropriate, under guidelines agreed upon by the Attorney General and the Direc tor of National Intelligence.
The Director of National Intelligence is then given some power to set priorities and influence the budgets of the various agencies within the Intelligence Com munity, to transfer funds between agencies, and to transfer personnel between agencies for up to two years. The director develops the consolidated National Intelligence Program budget, but the Secretary of Defense, who controls the larg est number of agencies within the community, is given a privileged position. The secretary ‘‘develops’’ his own budget while the director merely ‘‘participates.’’
‘‘(c)(3)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall participate in the develop ment by the Secretary of Defense of the annual budgets for the Joint Military Intel ligence Program and for Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities.
The act also provides for the redefinition of the CIA under the supervision of the Director of National Intelligence. The functions of the CIA remain essen tially the same, but it has taken on an expanded role in the direction and coordi nation of all human intelligence by all agencies. Congress also put considerable emphasis on improving the agency’s human intelligence capabilities.
‘‘SEC. 104. (a) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.—There is a Central Intelligence Agency. ‘‘(b) FUNCTION.—The function of the Central Intelligence Agency is to assist the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in carrying out the responsibilities specified in section 104A(c).
‘‘SEC. 104A. (a) DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.—There is a Direc tor of the Central Intelligence Agency who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. ‘‘(b) SUPERVISION.—The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall report to the Director of National Intelligence regarding the activities of the Central Intelli gence Agency. ‘‘(c) DUTIES.—The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall— ‘‘(1) serve as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency; and ‘‘(2) carry out the responsibilities specified in subsection (d). ‘‘(d) Responsibilities.—The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall— ‘‘(1) collect intelligence through human sources and by other appropriate means, except that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall have no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security functions; ‘‘(2) correlate and evaluate intelligence related to the national security and pro vide appropriate dissemination of such intelligence; ‘‘(3) provide overall direction for and coordination of the collection of national intelligence outside the United States through human sources by elements of the intelligence community authorized to undertake such collection and, in coordination with other departments, agencies, or elements of the United States Government which are authorized to undertake such collection, ensure that the most effective use is made of resources and that appropriate account is taken of the risks to the United States and those involved in such collection; and ‘‘(4) perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the President or the Director of National Intelligence may direct. ‘‘(e) TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT OF CIA EMPLOYEES.—(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may, in the discretion of the Director, terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Central Intelligence Agency whenever the Director deems the ter mination of employment of such officer or employee necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States. ‘‘(2) Any termination of employment of an officer or employee under paragraph (1) shall not affect the right of the officer or employee to seek or accept employment in any other department, agency, or element of the United States Government if declared eligible for such employment by the Office of Personnel Management.
14 The Central Intelligence Agency
‘(f) COORDINATION WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS.—Under the direction of the Direc tor of National Intelligence and in a manner consistent with section 207 of the For eign Service Act of 1980 (22U.S.C. 3927), the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall coordinate the relationships between elements of the intelligence community and the intelligence or security services of foreign governments or international organizations on all matters involving intelligence related to the national security or involving intelligence acquired through clandestine means.’’8 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the human intelligence officers of the intelligence community have per formed admirably and honorably in the face of great personal dangers;
(2) during an extended period of unprecedented investment and improvements in technical collection means, the human intelligence capabilities of the United States have not received the necessary and commensurate priorities;
(3) human intelligence is becoming an increasingly important capability to pro vide information on the asymmetric threats to the national security of the United States;
(4) the continued development and improvement of a robust and empowered and flexible human intelligence work force is critical to identifying, under standing, and countering the plans and intentions of the adversaries of the United States; and
(5) an increased emphasis on, and resources applied to, enhancing the depth and breadth of human intelligence capabilities of the United States intelli gence community must be among the top priorities of the Director of National Intelligence.
(c) TRANSFORMATION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.—The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall, in accordance with standards developed by the Director in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence— (1) enhance the analytic, human intelligence, and other capabilities of the Cen tral Intelligence Agency; (2) develop and maintain an effective language program within the Agency; (3) emphasize the hiring of personnel of diverse backgrounds for purposes of improving the capabilities of the Agency; (4) establish and maintain effective relationships between human intelligence and signals intelligence within the Agency at the operational level; and (5) achieve a more effective balance within the Agency with respect to uni lateral operations and liaison operations. (d) REPORT.—(1) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to the Director of National Intelligence and the congressional intelligence committees a report setting forth the following:
(A) A strategy for improving the conduct of analysis (including strategic analy sis) by the Central Intelligence Agency, and the progress of the Agency in implementing that strategy; (B) A strategy for improving the human intelligence and other capabilities of the Agency, and the progress of the Agency in implementing that strategy.
(2)(A)The information in the report under paragraph (1) on the strategy referred to in paragraph (1)(B) shall—
i. identify the number and types of personnel required to implement that strategy;
ii. include a plan for the recruitment, training, equipping, and deployment of such personnel; and
iii. set forth an estimate of the costs of such activities.
(B) If as of the date of the report under paragraph (1), a proper balance does not exist between unilateral operations and liaison operations, such report shall set forth the steps to be taken to achieve such balance.
In addition, the act created a sort of ombudsman to guard against bias or politicization of intelligence products
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the effective date of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall identify an individual within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence who shall be available to analysts within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to counsel, conduct arbitration, offer recommendations, and, as appropriate, initiate inquiries into real or perceived problems of analytic tradecraft or politicization, biased reporting, or lack of objec tivity in intelligence analysis.
(b) REPORT.—Not later than 270 days after the effective date of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall provide a report to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives on the implementation of subsection (a).
The act transferred the recently created National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) from the CIA to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). The CIA retained the separate Counterterrorist Center (CTC). The act also created the National Counter Proliferation Center and provided for the establishment of National Intelligence Centers on specialized topics. Note that some of the CIA’s prohibitions on domestic activity have been weakened vis- a vis the NCTC, but it has no operational responsibilities
‘‘SEC. 119. (a) ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CENTER.—There is within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence a National Counterterrorism Center. ‘‘
(1) There is a Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, who shall be the head of the National Counterterrorism Center, and who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. ‘‘
(2) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center may not simultane ously serve in any other capacity in the executive branch.
‘‘(d) PRIMARY MISSIONS.—The primary missions of the National Counterterrorism Center shall be as follows: ‘‘(1) To serve as the primary organization in the United States Government for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States Government pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism, excepting intelligence pertaining exclusively to domestic terrorists and domestic counterterrorism. ‘‘(2) To conduct strategic operational planning for counterterrorism activities, integrating all instruments of national power, including diplomatic financial, military, intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement activities within and among agencies. ‘‘(3) To assign roles and responsibilities as part of its strategic operational plan ning duties to lead Departments or agencies, as appropriate, for counterter rorism activities that are consistent with applicable law and that support counterterrorism strategic operational plans, but shall not direct the execu tion of any resulting operations. ‘‘(4) To ensure that agencies, as appropriate, have access to and receive all source intelligence support needed to execute their counterterrorism plans or perform independent, alternative analysis. ‘‘(5) To ensure that such agencies have access to and receive intelligence needed to accomplish their assigned activities. ‘‘(6) To serve as the central and shared knowledge bank on known and sus pected terrorists and international terror groups, as well as their goals, strategies, capabilities, and networks of contacts and support.
‘‘(e) DOMESTIC COUNTERTERRORISM INTELLIGENCE.—(1) The Center may, consistent with applicable law, the direction of the President, and guidelines referred to in section 102A(b), receive intelligence pertaining exclusively to domestic counterter rorism from any Federal, State, or local government or other source necessary to fulfill its responsibilities and retain and disseminate such intelligence. ‘‘(2) Any agency authorized to conduct counterterrorism activities may request information from the Center to assist it in its responsibilities, consistent with appli cable law and the guidelines referred to in section 102A(b).
‘‘(g) LIMITATION.—The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center may not direct the execution of counterterrorism operations.
‘‘(i) DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE.—The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall establish and maintain within the National Counterterrorism Center a Directorate of Intelligence which shall have primary responsibility within the United States Government for analysis of terrorism and terrorist organizations (except for purely domestic terrorism and domestic terrorist organizations) from all sources of intelligence, whether collected inside or outside the United States. ‘‘(j) DIRECTORATE OF STRATEGIC OPERATIONAL PLANNING.—(1) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall establish and maintain within the National Counterterrorism Center a Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning which shall provide strategic operational plans for counterterrorism operations conducted by the United States Government. ‘‘(2) Strategic operational planning shall include the mission, objectives to be achieved, tasks to be performed, interagency coordination of operational activities, and the assignment of roles and responsibilities. ‘‘(3) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall monitor the implementation of strategic operational plans, and shall obtain information from each element of the intelligence community, and from each other department, agency, or element of the United States Government relevant to monitoring the progress of such entity in implementing such plans.’’
‘‘NATIONAL COUNTER PROLIFERATION CENTER ‘‘Sec. 119A. (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment of the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, the President shall establish a National Counter Proliferation Center, taking into account all appropriate government tools to prevent and halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials and technologies. ‘‘(b) MISSIONS AND OBJECTIVES.—In establishing the National Counter Proliferation Center, the President shall address the following missions and objectives to pre vent and halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery sys tems, and related materials and technologies:
‘‘(1) Establishing a primary organization within the United States Government for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States pertaining to proliferation. ‘‘(2) Ensuring that appropriate agencies have full access to and receive all source intelligence support needed to execute their counter proliferation plans or activities, and perform independent, alternative analyses. ‘‘(3) Establishing a central repository on known and suspected proliferation activities, including the goals, strategies, capabilities, networks, and any individuals, groups, or entities engaged in proliferation. ‘‘(4) Disseminating proliferation information, including proliferation threats and analyses, to the President, to the appropriate departments and agencies, and to the appropriate committees of Congress. ‘‘(5) Conducting net assessments and warnings about the proliferation of weap ons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials and technologies. ‘‘(6) Coordinating counter proliferation plans and activities of the various departments and agencies of the United States Government to prevent and halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery sys tems, and related materials and technologies. ‘‘(7) Conducting strategic operational counter proliferation planning for the United States Government to prevent and halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials and technologies.
‘‘SEC. 119B. (a) AUTHORITY TO ESTABLISH.—The Director of National Intelligence may establish one or more national intelligence centers to address intelligence priorities, including, but not limited to, regional issues.
In addition, the act created the Joint Intelligence Community Council to bring together the appropriate department heads. Note that the act includes express provisions for members to have their dissenting opinions heard so as to avoid excessive consensus and to prevent the Director from dominating the Council. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency is not listed as among the members.
‘‘SEC. 101A. (a) JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COUNCIL.—There is a Joint Intelligence Community Council. ‘‘
(b) MEMBERSHIP.—The Joint Intelligence Community Council shall consist of the following:
‘‘(1) The Director of National Intelligence, who shall chair the Council.
‘‘(2) The Secretary of State.
‘‘(3) The Secretary of the Treasury.
‘‘(4) The Secretary of Defense. ‘‘
(5) The Attorney General.
 ‘‘(6) The Secretary of Energy. ‘‘(7) The Secretary of Homeland Security.
‘‘(8) Such other officers of the United States Government as the President may designate from time to time
‘‘(c) FUNCTIONS.—The Joint Intelligence Community Council shall assist the Direc tor of National Intelligence in developing and implementing a joint, unified national intelligence effort to protect national security by— ‘‘(1) advising the Director on establishing requirements, developing budgets, fi nancial management, and monitoring and evaluating the performance of the intelligence community, and on such other matters as the Director may request; and ‘‘(2) ensuring the timely execution of programs, policies, and directives estab lished or developed by the Director. ‘‘(d) MEETINGS.—The Director of National Intelligence shall convene regular meetings of the Joint Intelligence Community Council. ‘‘(e) ADVICE AND OPINIONS OF MEMBERS OTHER THAN CHAIRMAN.—(1) A member of the Joint Intelligence Community Council (other than the Chairman) may submit to the Chairman advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or advice or an opin ion in addition to, the advice presented by the Director of National Intelligence to the President or the National Security Council, in the role of the Chairman as Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Community Council. If a member submits such advice or opinion, the Chairman shall present the advice or opinion of such mem ber at the same time the Chairman presents the advice or opinion of the Chairman to the President or the National Security Council, as the case may be. ‘‘(2) The Chairman shall establish procedures to ensure that the presentation of the advice of the Chairman to the President or the National Security Council is not unduly delayed by reason of the submission of the individual advice or opinion of another member of the Council. ‘‘(f) RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONGRESS.—Any member of the Joint Intelligence Com munity Council may make such recommendations to Congress relating to the intel ligence community as such member considers appropriate.
Congress also instituted a requirement for alternative analysis. This was rooted in the belief that the failure to predict the 9/11 attacks was partially rooted in conventional thinking and excessive consensus.
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the effective date of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall establish a process and assign an individual or entity the responsibility for ensuring that, as appropriate, elements of the intelli gence community conduct alternative analysis (commonly referred to as ‘‘red-team analysis’’) of the information and conclusions in intelligence products. (b) REPORT.—Not later than 270 days after the effective date of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall provide a report to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee of the House of Representatives on the implementation of subsection (a).
1. ‘‘Historical Perspective,’’ in Michael Warner, ed., Central Intelligence: Origin and Evolution (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intelli gence, 2001): 1–18.
2. Specific dollar amounts have been removed by amendment.
3. See, for instance, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950: Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996): documents 422–435.
4. The fact that NSCID No. 3 is dated later than NSCID No. 5 suggests that this is a revision or replacement for an earlier version.
5. NSC 4-A had authorized the CIA to engage in a secret propaganda program.
6. Now called the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
7. Section 303 permitted the Director of Central Intelligence and certain other officials to appoint advisory committees and other part-time advisory personnel.
8. A note on the confusing format of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Preven tion Act (IRTPA): Everything up to this point, a total of about nineteen pages, constitutes Section 1101, paragraph (a), of the IRTPA, which is an insert into the National Security Act of 1947. The insert is identified by quotation marks. The following line begins with (b), since it is technically the second paragraph of the new law. The entire 1947 law was a page and a half. The IRTPA is 236 pages. The excerpts do not all follow the original order.
Chapter 2
 The Korean War
The Korean War offers examples of intelligence assessments being shaped by preconceived notions. Not only did the CIA and other agencies fail to predict the North Korean invasion of South Korean, but they neglected to anticipate Chinese intervention in the war despite Chinese warnings and failed for some time to realize that China had in fact intervened. The proximity and salience of the World War II experience and the notion that they confronted a Soviet-led global Communist movement influenced the participants’ expectations. They expected the next war, if one occurred, to be a confrontation on a global scale similar to the last one. They were not thinking in terms of limited warfare, and this delayed their recognition of what was actually happening. When North Korea invaded South Korea in June 1950, one of the United States’ first responses was to deploy troops to Europe in case Korea was a feint intended to distract attention from the main thrust. After the initial invasion, North Korean troops nearly succeeded in occupying the entire Korean Peninsula in a few weeks. American forces from Japan, operat ing with United Nations authorization, landed at Inchon in mid-September and quickly turned the situation around. Although UN forces initially said they sought only to expel North Korean forces from the south, they crossed the bor der at the 38th parallel and continued northward through North Korea toward the Chinese border, which ran along the Yalu River. The government of the Chinese People’s Republic—which had been established only one year earlier— began to issue warnings of possible intervention if UN forces did not halt their movement toward the border. How to interpret these warnings became the task of the CIA and the Intelligence Community as a whole. The Department of State, on 12 September 1950, requested ‘‘a coordinated intelligence estimate on Chinese Communist intentions concerning intervention in Korea.’’ Before a national intelligence estimate could be produced, the subject came up in a teleconference on 4 October 1950 between Washington and the Far  East Command (FEC). The record included a lengthy discussion of enemy capa bilities. One participant suggested the possibility of Chinese intervention in ter minology that would probably not have been used today With the collapse of the North Korean armies, the immediate problem facing the UN forces involves the attitude of the Communist Chinese and the Soviets ... . Will they intervene openly? ... It is accepted that Russia would find it both convenient and economical to stay out of the conflict and let the idle millions of Communist China perform task as part of master plan to drain US resources into the geo graphic ratholes of the Orient ... . The interest of all intelligence agencies is focused on the Yalu and the movements of the elusive LIN PIAO [the Chinese military commander in Manchuria, the part of China bordering North Korea] ... . The buildup of Chinese forces along the border has been reported ... massing of forces at Antung and other Manchurian crossings appears conclusive ... . Involves a pos sible 9/18 divisions organized into 3/6 armies of a total of 38 divisions and 9 armies now carried in all Manchuria ... . Formosan sources sometimes colored but only serious channel of information from within China flatly stated release or transfer of 9 divisions to North Korea ... . In view of these facts the potential exists for Chinese Communist forces to openly intervene in the Korean war if UN forces cross the 38th parallel.
That assessment, however, did not reflect the consensus of the Intelligence Community. On 12 October 1950, the director of the CIA sent the president a memorandum, noting that the State Department, the army, the navy, and the air force concurred in the estimates. The portions dealing with the possibility of Chinese intervention were succinct, depicting that eventuality as possible but not likely. It made similar conclusions regarding the possibility of direct inter vention by the Soviet Union. One can detect the underlying assumption that any new war involving either China or the Soviet Union would necessarily be on a scale comparable to World War II. This assumption apparently colored people’s assessments and led them to underestimate the possibility of limited intervention.
2. The Chinese Communist ground forces, currently lacking requisite air and na val support, are capable of intervening effectively, but not necessarily decisively, in the Korean conflict.
6. While full-scale Chinese Communist intervention in Korea must be regarded as a continuing possibility, a consideration of all known factors leads to the conclu sion that barring a Soviet decision for global war, such action in not probable in 1950. During this period, intervention will probably be confined to continued covert assistance to the North Koreans,
2. Soviet armed forces now in the Far East are capable of intervening over whelmingly in Korea virtually without warning,
6. It is believed that the Soviet leaders will not consider that their prospective losses in Korea warrant direct military intervention and a consequent grave risk of war. They will intervene in the Korean hostilities only if they have decided, not on the basis of the Korean situation alone, but on the basis of overall considerations, that it is to their interest to precipitate a global war at this time.
The Soviets did not intervene in Korea, apart from the provision of disguised aircraft and pilots, but the Chinese did intervene and did so en masse. In fact, the operation was already under way as the memorandum was issued. The pre vailing assumptions surrounding the issue of Chinese intervention, however, and the piecemeal nature of the early evidence of Chinese involvement delayed the realization that it had already happened. In late October, UN forces cap tured a small number of Chinese soldiers in various incidents, some of them in North Korean uniforms, but the prisoners’ stories of large-scale troop move ments were initially dismissed or downplayed. Only on 2 November did the Far East Command determine that Chinese intervention was now a ‘‘serious proximate threat.’’ With the realization that intervention was possible, and even happening, the Intelligence Community began to question the assumption that such a war must be ‘‘global.’’ They turned to the task of assessing China’s intentions and consid ering whether the war could be contained.
1. To estimate the scale and purpose of Chinese Communist intervention in North Korea and Chinese Communist capabilities and intentions. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 2. Present Chinese Communist troop strength in North Korea is estimated at 30,000 to 40,000. Chinese Communist ground units are engaging UN forces at various points ranging from 30 to 100 miles south of the Korean-Manchurian border. Recent action has been marked also by the appearance of Soviet-type jet fighters in combat with US aircraft over Korea. 3. Present Chinese Communist troop strength in Manchuria is estimated at 700,000. Of this number, there are at least 200,000 regular field forces. These troops strengths, added to the forces already in Korea, are believed to make the Chinese Communists capable of: (a) halting further UN advance north ward, through piecemeal commitment of troops; or (b) forcing UN with drawal to defensive positions farther south by a powerful assault. 4. The objective of the Chinese Communist intervention appears to be to halt the advance of UN forces in Korea and to keep a Communist regime in being on Korean soil. In accomplishing this purpose, the Chinese Communists would: (a) avert the psychological and political consequences of a disastrous outcome of the Korean venture; (b) keep UN forces away from the actual frontiers of China and the USSR; (c) retain an area in Korea as a base of Com munist military and guerrilla operations; (d) prolong indefinitely the contain ment of UN, especially US, forces in Korea; (e) control the distribution of hydroelectric power generated in North Korea and retain other economic benefits; and (f) create the possibility of a favorable political solution in Korea, despite the military defeat of the North Koreans. 5. The Chinese Communists thus far retain full freedom of action with respect to Korea. They are free to adjust their action in accordance with the development of the situation. If the Chinese Communists were to succeed in destroying the effective strength of UN forces in northern Korea, they would pursue their advantage as far as possible. If the military situation is stabilized, they may well consider that, with advantageous terrain and the onset of winter, their forces now in Korea are sufficient to accomplish their immediate purposes. 6. A likely and logical development of the present situation is that the opposing sides will build up their combat power in successive increments to checkmate the other until forces of major magnitude are involved. At any point in this development, the danger is present that the situation may get out of control and lead to a general war. 7. The Chinese Communists, in intervening in Korea, have accepted a grave risk of retaliation and general war. They would probably ignore an ultimatum requiring their withdrawal. If Chinese territory were to be attacked, they would probably enter Korea in full force. 8. The fact that both the Chinese Communists and the USSR have accepted an increased risk of general war indicates either that the Kremlin is ready to face a showdown with the West at an early date or that circumstances have forced them to accept that risk.
In late November, the CIA returned to the question of China’s intentions. Based on their perceptions of Chinese actions up to that point, the amended national intelligence estimate now saw their objectives as limited, although it did not depict their patience as limitless. Moreover, the risk of global war never receded completely from the scene.
1. To re-estimate the scale and purpose of Chinese Communist intervention in North Korea. CONCLUSIONS
2. The Chinese Communists will simultaneously: a. Maintain Chinese-North Korean holding operations in North Korea. b. Maintain or increase their military strength in Manchuria. c. Seek to obtain UN withdrawal from Korea by intimidation and diplomatic means. 3. In case of failure to obtain UN withdrawal by these means, there will be increasing Chinese intervention in Korea. At a minimum, the Chinese will conduct, on an increasing scale, unacknowledged operations designed to im mobilize UN forces in Korea, to subject them to prolonged attrition, and to maintain the semblance of a North Korean state in being. Available evidence is not conclusive as to whether or not the Chinese Communists are as yet committed to a full-scale offensive effort. Eventually they may undertake operations designed to bring about the withdrawal of UN forces from Korea. It is estimated that they do not have the military capability of driving the UN forces from the peninsula, but that they do have the capability of forcing them to withdraw to defensive positions for prolonged and inconclusive operations, which, the Communists might calculate, would lead to eventual UN withdrawal from Korea. 4. So long as Chinese intervention continues, the USSR will continue and possi bly increase its support to the Chinese by furnishing equipment, planes, tech nical advisers, and conceivably, ‘‘volunteers’’ as necessary to man the more intricate equipment. 5. The risk that a general war will develop already exists. The Soviet rulers may underrate this possibility but they appear to have allowed for it and to feel prepared to cope with it. The risk of open, direct Soviet intervention no longer appeared to be under consideration. Rather, the CIA assessed the possibility of more limited forms of Soviet participation or support, as in this examination of potential Soviet responses to the bombing of Chinese facilities in Manchuria.
1. To estimate whether, in the event of UN air attack on targets in Manchuria, the Soviet Air Force would participate in the defense of such targets. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 2. In the circumstances envisaged in the problem, the USSR would provide air craft, anti-aircraft artillery, and trained personnel as necessary for the defense of Manchurian targets. Sufficient resources for rendering such aid are avail able in the Soviet Far East. 3. Soviet participation in the defense of Manchurian targets could take any of the following forms: a. Actual participation without identification. b. The open participation of ostensibly volunteer units. c. The open participation of Soviet units as a limited commitment under the Sino-Soviet treaty. d. The open participation of Soviet units as an aspect of a general war forced on the Soviet Union under the Sino-Soviet treaty. 4. At least initially, the most likely form of Soviet participation in the air defense of Manchurian targets would be the first—i.e., actual participation in action without open identification. 5. The open participation of Soviet units would be unlikely unless general war should develop. 6. A substantial risk that the situation may degenerate into a general war al ready exists. UN air attack on targets in Manchuria, alone, probably would not cause the Soviet rulers to decide to launch a general war, inasmuch as the Kremlin’s basic decision for or against war would be based on global con siderations. The events likely to follow such attacks, however, would carry with them a greater probability of a general war developing.
In the end, UN forces did not bomb Manchuria, a decision that produced a major dispute with UN commander Gen. Douglas MacArthur. Nonetheless,
Soviet aircraft did participate ‘‘without identification’’ in the air war over Korea, but the Soviet Union limited its direct involvement in the war to that action. In the meantime, CIA estimates of the number of Chinese troops in Korea contin ued to increase. Then, on 26 November 1950, a teleconference discussing the possibility of a UN counteroffensive was interrupted by the following flash regarding a portion of the front manned by the army of South Korea, or the Republic of Korea (ROK):
Enemy of unknown strength is attacking across entire ROK II Corps front. All ele ments of ROK II Corps last reported withdrawing to south with plans to establish a defense line south of Okchon. ... An unknown size enemy force last reported to have taken Tokchon.
At that point, both the ‘‘accepted’’ and ‘‘tentatively accepted’’ identification of major units of Chinese Communist forces (CCF) and the estimates of deployed troop strengths skyrocketed in a very compressed time period. According to a series of teleconferences with the Far East Command:
Following strength figures set for CCF units in Korea: Accepted: 38, 29, 40, 42 Armies—46,700–70,900 Tentatively Accepted: 66th Army—12,600–18,900 Total CCF Strengths: 59,300–89,000 but if 20th and 50th Armies become accepted new total becomes: 84,500–127,000 [Telecon 27 November 1950]
Gave following report of CCF strength: Accepted: 119,777 Tentatively Accepted: 157,577 NK [North Korean] Strength: 41,165 [Telecon 28 November 1950
Gave accepted Chinese strength as 190,000 and added that there were indications that CCF were actually drawing on Chinese Communist Units in Manchuria. Pointed out that available potential in Manchuria was 355,000 combat troops and 370,000 line of communication troops.
 [Telecon 30 November 1950]
With the war fully in progress, the CIA took on an additional task, organiz ing guerrilla and intelligence operations behind enemy lines. Most of the people inserted behind the lines were Korean nationals. The person responsible for the operation was Hans V. Tofte, a Danish-born veteran of the OSS. Tofte arrived in Tokyo to take charge of covert operations in Korea in July 1950, only one month after the war began. He immediately proceeded to recruit agents, train them, and insert them into enemy-controlled territory. One year later, the CIA created an operational arm for this purpose, euphemistically called the Joint Advisory Commission–Korea (JACK).
The U.S. Army and, for a time, the U.S. Air Force were also conducting oper ations, primarily involving Korean nationals, behind enemy lines. Although the Air Force allowed the CIA the use of some of its aircraft to insert agents, much of the history of the operation—at least at headquarters level—was a tale jurisdictional conflict and bitterness. This continued even after the Far East Command attempted to streamline jurisdictional issues by subordinating JACK to its Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities, Korea (CCRAK).1
Operationally, the CIA parachuted thousands of Koreans behind enemy lines, 1,500 just in spring–summer 1952. Their assignment was to conduct guerrilla operations, gather intelligence, and rescue downed American fliers. Glowing reports were issued to headquarters about all they were accomplishing. In Sep tember 1952, John Limond Hart arrived to take up his post as the new Chief of Station in Seoul, the third since the start of the war. Hart eventually determined that virtually everyone inserted into North Korea had been captured or killed. Those few who had radioed back were compelled to do so at the behest of their captors and were reporting false information. Virtually every report sent to headquarters from the front for the previous one and a half years had been fab ricated, either by the enemy, by corrupt assets in South Korea, or by CIA offi cials themselves. These conclusions were successfully hushed up for nearly half a century.2
Donald Gregg, who as a college graduate ran a CIA training camp for Korean and other infiltrators on the Pacific island of Saipan, later commented on the effort to journalist Tim Weiner:
We didn’t know what we were doing. I asked my superiors what the mission was and they wouldn’t tell me. They didn’t know what the mission was. It was swash buckling of the worst kind. We were training Koreans and Chinese and a lot of other strange people, dropping Koreans into North Korea, dropping Chinese into China just north of the Korean border, and we’d drop these people in and we’d never hear from them again.3
 1. Richard L. Kiper, ‘‘Unconventional Warfare in Korea: Forgotten Aspect of the ‘For gotten War,’’’ Special Warfare 16:2 (August 2003): 26–37; Michael Haas, In the Devil’s Shadow: UN Special Operations during the Korean War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000).
2. Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA (New York: Doubleday, 2007): 49–62.
3. Ibid., 55.
Chapter 3 Cuba
On 1 January 1959, Cuban president Fulgencio Batista fled Havana, and a guer rilla leader named Fidel Castro Ruz assumed power on the island. Castro was at the head of a fairly broad coalition opposed to the Batista government, but over next few years he shifted his position to the left, forged an alliance with the Soviet Union, and merged his guerrilla movement with the Cuban Commu nists to form a new ruling party. The Soviet alliance had clear security implica tions for the United States because Cuba as a potential Soviet base was far more dangerous than Cuba alone. In addition, the Castro government began to spon sor guerrilla wars in other Latin American countries in an effort to create new allies, especially for a time after the Cuban Missile Crisis, when Cuba became disillusioned with the reliability of Soviet protection. Beyond the security threat, many in the United States seemed to be personally affronted that a country in such geographical proximity and so long under U.S. tutelage should turn its back on the United States and join its enemies. In any event, this animosity would last for decades, well beyond the existence of any real threat.
In the very beginning, however, these trends had not yet fully manifested themselves, although controversies were already brewing over issues such as anti-American statements and the trials of former Batista government officials. The questions at that time were: Who is this Fidel Castro, and what are his intentions? On 24 November 1959, the British ambassador to the United States reported to the Foreign Office on a recent meeting with the Director of Central Intelligence. Britain was considering selling jet fighters to Cuba, and the ambas sador was feeling out the potential U.S. reaction to such a deal. DCI Allen Dulles, however, had already made up his mind about Castro. For his own stra tegic purposes, he actually preferred to see the Cubans form a public link to the Soviet Union, which he assumed would be short-lived and useful in mobilizing opposition to the regime.
  Following personal for the Secretary of State from the Ambassador. Your telegram No. 5034: Cuba
1. I had to see Allen Dulles this morning on another matter and took the oppor tunity to discuss Cuba on strictly personal basis. 2. In reply to my question how long he thought Castro was likely to last, Mr. Dulles said that, if he had to guess, he would say something in the range of eight months. He thought that the next three or four months were going to be the testing time and, if Castro survived them successfully, he might even carry on for a number of years. Consequently he would far rather delay an answer to my question. 3. He then volunteered that there was at present in Cuba no opposition to Cas tro who were capable of action. Abroad there were a number of Batista adherents who were trying to get into touch with the United States Adminis tration, but they were, of course, worthless. The most hopeful prospect might lie amongst the people who had originally been supporters of Castro and had only recently become alienated. He gave as instances [Huber] Matos and the Chief of the Air Staff. If Castro continued on his present course, some thing might be made of an opposition consisting of such elements outside, and inside, Cuba. But the time for that had not yet come, though for our most confidential information, he was already making some contact with these people for possible future use. 4. From his own point of view, he said that he greatly hoped that we would decide not to go ahead with the Hunter deal. His main reason was that this might lead the Cubans to ask for Soviet or Soviet bloc arms. He had not cleared this with the State Department, but it was, of course, a fact that in the case of Guatemala it had been the shipment of Soviet arms that had brought the opposition elements together and created the occasion for what was done. The same might be true in the case of Cuba, and the presence, for instance, of MIGs would have a tremendous effect, not only in the United States, but with other Latin-American countries, quite apart from Trujillo [the dictator of the Dominican Republic]. 5. Summing up, he said that there was, of course, always the chance that Castro would get shot. If this did not happen, it was not impossible that within three or four months civil government just might break down. He himself was skeptical whether things would develop in this way to the point which would lead to Castro’s downfall. He had heard that the crop had been quite good this year and in these primitive countries where the sun shone, the demands of the people were far less than in more advanced countries. After, say, four months he would hope to be in a position to give a better estimate of Castro’s longer term prospects. 6. Meanwhile, he repeated that if, and only if, he had to give an off-the-cuff esti mate today, he would plump for something in the order of eight or nine months. But that would not, (repeat not) be for quotation and on this per sonal basis he again said he hoped that any refusal by us to supply arms would directly lead to a Soviet bloc offer to supply. Then he might be able to do something; for he was convinced that Castro was not only a bad man but had a streak of lunacy in his make-up which might have incalculable results. In other words, he was more like a Cuban Hitler than a Cuban version of Peron [a past Argentine dictator]. 7. I did, in fact, repeat to Mr. Hankey what I said in my telegram No. 2334, namely, that in my view, a decision to go ahead would not do deep or lasting damage here. This particularly if the news of our decision broke through a balanced statement of our own rather than a Press leak based on a Cuban version. But in the three weeks which have elapsed since my telegram, and during the longer period of your personal exchanges with Mr. Herter [the U.S. secretary of state], the situation in Cuba appears to have deteriorated, and attacks on the United States have sharpened. At any rate, public opinion in the United States has continued to harden under the insults of Castro. So far as we are concerned, there could, therefore, be no doubt that a decision on the lines set down in paragraph 5 of your telegram would come as a great relief to the United States Administration and public.
Britain did not supply the aircraft to Cuba, and an arms shipment from Bel gium mysteriously exploded in port. At that point, Castro began expropriating U.S. properties. Early in 1960, before final presidential approval had been granted, CIA Deputy Director for Plans Richard Bissell formed a task force under Jacob D. Esterline to plan for an invasion of Cuba to be carried out by Cuban exiles armed and trained by the CIA. Their hope was that the interven tion would trigger a broad-based popular uprising against Castro and his re gime. The group included many veterans of the Guatemalan operation of 1954. In March, it met with Joseph Caldwell King, the head of operations for Latin America, who was called ‘‘the colonel’’ (although he does not appear to have ever served in the military). The minutes of the meeting suggest that even at this early stage the CIA was aware of the many obstacles to success.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: First Meeting of Branch 4 Task Force, 9 March 1960 1. Mr. Esterline briefed the group on the current situation in Cuba with the report that an alert has been sounded to initiate Phase One of the unified evacuation plan in Cuba. He added that this group would be working largely together in operational programming and planning. 2. Col. King told the group that the DCI is presenting a special policy paper to the NSC 5412 representatives [a committee of the National Security Coun cil]. He mentioned growing evidence that certain of the ‘‘heads’’ in the CAS TRO government have been pushing for an attack on the U.S. Navy installation at Guantanamo Bay and said that an attack on the installation is in fact, possible. 3. Col. King stated that the first problem in this operation is how to reach the mass of Cubans with the truth. To date, he said, we have been denied use of certain American islands that might be useful for either PP [political and psy chological] or PM [paramilitary] activities. In addition, a number of the Chiefs of State of friendly smaller countries are, at the moment, unwilling to ‘‘stick their necks out further to support and operation directed at the overthrow of the CASTRO regime. They are in fact, worried that their respective countries may soon be the victims of Cuban exploitation. He said that unless Fidel and Raul CASTRO and Che GUEVARA could be eliminated in one package— which is highly unlikely—this operation can be a long, drawn-out affair and the present government will only be overthrown by the use of force. 4. Returning to the basic operational premises, Col. King said that the first problem is to reduce the base of support of the CASTRO Government with the masses (reportedly the regime now enjoys the support of between 60 and 70 percent of the population). An additional problem is that opposition forces have no real leader and are divided into many parts with some of the  more susceptible to merger than others. Three groups appear to be satisfac tory for initial exploitation and each of these has been asked to come up with names of potential candidates for paramilitary and allied training. Af ter training, this group could become the instructor cadre to train additional Cuban covert action groups. 5. The DCI, Col. King said, has approved the training of the instructor cadre at a U.S. military installation. The principal installation under consideration at the time is Fort Sherman in the Canal Zone which is under the control of the U.S. Army’s Jungle Warfare Training Center. The DCI has also approved the Phase Two training, which is the training of Cuban action groups, in non-U.S. territory. A given area in one of the Caribbean countries has been offered and is under consideration. Col. King expressed the opinion that the minimum time that will be consumed in this training will be between 6 and 7 months. It is hoped that during this period the acceptable opposition groups will have been merged and will have formed a government-in-exile to which all trained elements could be attached. 6. Col. King, addressing himself to the enemy’s capabilities and programs, said that CASTRO will unquestionably continue to train and arm various worker and student groups who can be mobilized into militia elements in support of the regular military establishment of Cuba. He added that reports indi cate that CASTRO has more arms and ammunition available to him now than BATISTA had at the height of his power and warned that under no cir cumstances should we underestimate the capabilities of the enemy. He said hat the Cuban operation would be far more difficult and complicated than the previous one conducted by this Division and that before this problem is solved, major operations will be necessary. 7. Capsulizing various intelligence reports, Col. King said the Cubans are now initiating operations with an objective of establishing revolutionary move ments in the Caribbean area that are not limited to those countries that are under dictatorships. With Ambassadors acting as chiefs of operations, the Cuban Government apparently hopes to overthrow the existing national governments and establish in their place governments that are far left and that are friendly to, and if possible, controlled by Cuba. Naturally, he added, this is generally in line with the objectives of International Communism which are, and for some time have been, to divide the traditional solidarity of the Latin American countries to the detriment of U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives. 8. In terms of operational problems, Col. King stated that he knew of no Latin American country whose people were less secure operationally than Cubans. On the CI [counterintelligence] side, he said that it is known that CASTRO has more than 122 agents in the Miami area alone. 9. In summarizing the more immediate requirements and possibilities, Mr. Esterline said that the support of all offices represented at the meeting will be required on a continuing basis. He added that support from the Office of Security, logistics and OTR and others would be needed comparatively soon
a. Assessment of potential recruits to the instructor cadres. b. Establishment of an operational base which will probably be located in the Miami area. c. The establishment of a secure base in a foreign country for the training of Cuban action groups.
10. He said that while we are awaiting national policy authorizations, Branch is proceeding with its planning operations and is preparing two projects at this  time, one to cover extensive radio operations which probably will include the establishment of a ‘‘gray’’ radio transmitter and another project for the development of air and maritime capabilities for the in-filtration of men and materiel. 11. He suggested that the group of specialists meet here at eh Branch weekly. The next meeting will be held on Tuesday, 15 March.* Although the overall Cuban project per se does not, as yet, have a cryptonym, Mr. Esterline explained the reasons for the formation of Branch 4 in WE Division and sug gested the use of ‘‘Branch 4’’ in communications would be sufficient to iden tify the subject. 12. He mentioned that the following Branch 4 personnel would be in contact with the participants at the meeting from time to time for planning the operational purposes: Mr. [—], DC/WH/4 Mr. David Phillips, Radio Operations Mr. Phillip Toomey, PP Mr. [—], Economic Action Mr. Adolf Lium Mr. E. A. Stanulis, Plans and PM Ops 13. Mr. Esterline indicated that an additional step in obtaining policy or opera tional support from other elements of the U.S. Government would be taken tomorrow, Thursday, 10 March 1960, when certain WE and PP Staff person nel would confer with Captain Spore, USN, a member of the Staff of the Office of Naval Operations, Department of Defense.
*0900 hours
While the initial meeting of the task force appeared cognizant of some of the problems that would confront the operation, the CIA issued an information report on 6 April 1961, shortly before the invasion, that was starkly at odds with the reality of the Castro government’s political strength. The subject of the report was ‘‘Signs of Discontent among the Cuban Populace; Activities of the Government to Strengthen the Regime.’’
1. The great mass of Cuban people believe that the hour of decision is at hand and that the survival of the CASTRO regime is in the balance. They expect an invasion to take place before mid-April 1961 and place great reliance in it. 2. The CASTRO regime is steadily losing popularity, and the lack of enthusiasm of the Cuban people is reflected in Habana, where housewives and servants must stand in line for hours to obtain such necessities as soap and lard. Cuban women have become the leaders of opposition activity and urge their husbands to under take action to alleviate the present situation. The people have begun to lose their fear of the government, and subtle sabotage is common. People deliberately break beer bottles and glasses, knowing that the government cannot replace them, and no one uses change, so that small commercial transactions have become hope lessly involved. CASTRO has said publicly that people who stand in line to pur chase scarce items are counterrevolutionaries because they are trying to show that the government cannot provide. As a result nearly everyone stands in line; lines at grocery stores can be seen extending for four to five blocks. Church attendance is at an all-time high as a demonstration of opposition to the government. 3. Travelers through the interior of Cuba have reported that the disenchantment of the masses has spread through all the provinces. Spokesmen of opposition groups  say that Santiago de Cuba and all of Oriente Province is seething with hate. For oppositionists Santiago is the easiest city in Cuba in which too operate. Workers there readily give all the support they can, including hiding underground leaders in their homes. Very few of the aims of the Cuban revolution have passed on to the Cuban masses. The salary of the cane-cutters has been cut about fifty per cent; fishermen must sell their catch to the National Institute for Agrarian Reform at low prices and are paid in script which they consider valueless. Consequently, it is difficult to buy fish, and the fishermen try every means to sell their products illegally on the free or black market. Many government housing units have been constructed, but few are occupied. The reason in some cases is that poor planning or lack of supplies has led to failure to install plumbing and sewage facilities. 4. The defection of Jose PARDO Llada, CASTRO propagandist and news commenta tor, has been discussed in all walks of life and is regarded as highly significant. Although everyone is aware that PARDO is a complete opportunist, it is also known that he often has the ability to predict the future and change his political affiliations. The ranks of the oppositionists will increase as more and more Cubans seek a means to join the ‘‘winning side.’’ 5. It is impossible to estimate the number of arms that have now passed into private hands. It is easy to obtain a gun in Habana; weapons, usually rifles, are furnished by underground organizations. No one wishes to cache any extensive amount of arms because of the difficulty in hiding them successfully. 6. It is generally believed that the Cuban Army has been successfully penetrated by opposition groups and that it will not fight in the event of a showdown. It is also certain that the police, who despise the militia, will not fight. The morale of the militia is falling. They have shown little wish to fight the opposition forces in the Escambray area of central Cuba, and some have been jailed for refusal to go to combat areas. Both militiamen and women try to find an excuse to wear civilian clothing, possibly because members of the opposition have been killing and wounding militia members in the streets and alleys of Habana and taking away their weapons. The government has had to disarm most of the women’s militia because opposition groups were taking their weapons away from them. 7. As a result of the evident lack of support for the regime among the armed forces and the militia, CASTRO appears to have shifted his trust to the Asociacion de Jovenes Rebeldes (AJR, Rebel Youth Association), which is composed of a large number of teen-agers from the lower classes. AJR members, uniformed and armed with Czech machine-guns, are arrogant and mean and are feared by the Cuban pop ulace. They are fiercely loyal to CASTRO because of their new-found notoriety and pay. The AJR is divided into military-type platoons and trained in military tactics. AJR members are used to show the force of the government at rallies and demon strations and also in attacks upon Catholics. Parents of members resent the forma tion of the AJR because it has brought about less of parental control and respect. 8. CASTRO’s decree of 1961 as the ‘‘Year of Education’’ and his order for closing all schools on 15 April and sending the students to rural areas to teach the farmers has caused much resentment among certain groups. Parents, especially of female students, do not want to send their children to rural areas to risk their health and lose the effects of their parental upbringing. Operators of private schools, whose fixed expenses will continue during the period of suspension of school, fear they will become bankrupt and be forced to ask the government to assume the operation of the school. 9. Habana is filled with Soviet, Satellite, and Communist Chinese nationals, who appear to be living comfortably at government expense, probably part of the barter plan between Cuba and bloc countries. Through an arrangement with the govern ment these nationals do not have to pay for expenses in public places but only sign a bill, which the owner of the establishment must present to the government for  reimbursement. Cuban employees do not like this procedure because it eliminates tipping and the owners of the establishment are uncertain over their reimburse ment. Soviet and Satellite officers are assigned to Cuban Government offices. Chi nese are more of a mystery to the Cubans, since they are seen in large numbers but their function is not known. It is speculated that they are working largely in the Chinese colony, that they are assigned to government agricultural co-operatives in the interior of the country, or that they are helping the militia in the Escambray as instructors in guerrilla warfare. 10. The military camp at Managua is probably the most important one in the Habana area; it is a central depot for cargos arriving on Soviet ships. The cargos are unloaded by Soviet crews under maximum security on to trucks covered with canvas. The convoy route is guarded by militiamen stationed at 25-yard intervals. On one occasion a canvas covering blew off a truck, and oblong boxes, approxi mately 25 feet long and two feet square, were observed. The airfield at Campo Libertad had recently become a maximum security area and is protected by fen ces, searchlights, and constantly manned .50-caliber machine-gun emplacements.
The landing of the Cuban exile force at the Bay of Pigs was a fiasco. Castro was aware that they were coming (although some of the reports he received were exaggerated), as was the New York Times. The Cuban army was prepared to meet the forces on the beach. High-ranking CIA officials were aware that they had lost the element of surprise, yet they—especially CIA Deputy Director for Plans Bissell—managed to convince themselves and the president that it did not matter. President John F. Kennedy—who had been inaugurated a few months before the landing and had approved the project, which had been in the planning stages for nearly a year—apparently never fully understood the nature of the operation. He canceled most of the planned air strikes against Cuba, believing that they would surely implicate the United States in what was being presented as an independent operation by Cuban exiles based in Central Amer ica. Bissell and other ranking officials insisted that this, too, could be done. Many would blame the president’s decision limiting air operations for the ulti mate failure at the Bay of Pigs. With some 20,000 Cuban troops massed to resist the invasion by 1,500 exiles, however, it appears that strikes by a few World War II–era aircraft would have had relatively little impact. For his part, Castro was able to use the invasion to bolster his regime, argu ing that it proved the United States was a threat and the Cuban oppositionists were merely the tools of a foreign power. Those exiles who were captured and later released included some who would go on to carry out unauthorized terro rist plots against Cuba for years to come. There were several after-action reviews of the operation. The CIA’s own inspector general, Lyman Kirkpatrick, Jr., issued a devastating critique, the ‘‘Inspector General’s Survey of the Cuban Operation,’’ in October 1961, which included the following:
C. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION 1. In evaluating the Agency’s performance it is essential to avoid grasping im mediately, as many persons have done, at the explanation that the President’s order canceling the D-Day air strikes was the chief cause of failure. 2. Discussion of that one decision would merely raise this underlying question: If the project had been better conceived, better organized, better staffed and better managed, would that precise issue ever have had to be presented for Presidential decision at all? And would it have been presented under the same ill-prepared, inadequately briefed circumstances? 3. Furthermore, it is essential to keep in mind the possibility that the invasion was doomed in advance, that an initially successful landing by 1,500 men would eventually have been crushed by Castro’s combined military resources strengthened by Soviet Bloc-supplied military materiel. 4. The fundamental cause of the disaster was the Agency’s failure to give the project, notwithstanding its importance and its immense potentiality for damage to the United States, the top-flight handling which it required— appropriate organization, staffing throughout by highly qualified personnel, and full-time direction and control of the highest quality. 5. Insufficiencies in these vital areas resulted in pressures and distortions, which in turn produced numerous serious operational mistakes and omissions, and in lack of awareness of developing dangers, in failure to take action to counter them, and in grave mistakes of judgment. There was failure at high levels to concentrate informed, unwavering scrutiny on the project and to apply experienced, unbiased judgment to the menacing situations that developed.
Allen Dulles stepped down as Director of Central Intelligence in September 1961. Richard Bissell, the Deputy Director for Plans, did likewise six months later.
The Bay of Pigs soured Kennedy to the CIA, but it did not put an end to cov ert operations against Cuba. There was already an anti-Castro underground movement on the island and, in the view of the White House, it needed an American official to direct it. That official had to be someone who had the presi dent’s confidence but was outside the CIA, even if the agency was responsible for implementation. The solution was the president’s brother, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, as noted in this memorandum from Richard Goodwin, a presidential aide
November 1, 1961
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT: I believe that the concept of a ‘‘command operation’’ for Cuba, as discussed with you by the Attorney General, is the only effective way to handle an all-out attack on the Cuban problem. Since I understand you are favorably disposed toward the idea I will not disclose why the present disorganized and uncoordinated operation cannot do the job effectively. The beauty of such an operation over the next few months is that we cannot lose. If the best happens we will unseat Castro. If not, then at least we will emerge with a stronger underground, better propaganda and a far clearer idea of the dimensions of the problems which affect us. The question then is who should head this operation. I know of no one currently in Cuban affairs at the State Department who can do it. Nor is it a very to get the State Department involved in depth in such covert activities. I do not think it should be centered in the CIA. Even if the CIA can find someone of sufficient force and stature, one of the major problems will be to revamp CIA operations and thinking—and this will be very hard to do from the inside.
I believe that the Attorney General would be the most effective commander of such an operation. Either I or someone else should be assigned to him as Deputy for this activity, since he obviously will not be able to devote full time to it. The one danger here is that he might become too closely identified with what might not be a successful operation. Indeed, chances of success are very speculative. There are a few answers to this:
(1) Everyone knowledgeable in these affairs—in and out of government—is aware that the United States is already helping the underground. The precise manner of aid may be unknown but the fact of aid is common knowledge. We will be blamed for not winning Cuba back whether or not we have a ‘‘command operation’’ and whether or not the Attorney General heads it. (2) His role should be told to only a few people at the very top with most of the con tact work in carrying out his decisions being left to his deputy. If that deputy is someone already closely identified with the conduct of Cuban affairs then it would appear as if normal channels are being followed except that decisive attention would be given to the decisions which came through those channels.
This still leaves a substantial danger of identifying the Attorney General as the fellow in charge. This danger must be weighed against the increased effectiveness of an operation under his command.
 /initialed/ Richard N. Goodwin
Richard Helms, at the time the CIA’s chief of operations (the second-ranking posi tion in the Directorate of Plans), attended a meeting the following January with Attor ney General Kennedy and representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and other representatives of the CIA. He reported back to John A. McCone, the new Director of Central Intelligence, as follows:
19 January 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT: Meeting with the Attorney General of the United States Concerning Cuba 1. I attended a meeting on Cuba at 11:00 A.M., today chaired by the Attorney General. Others present were: Brig. General E. S. Lansdale (OSD) Major James Patchell (OSD) Brig. General William H. Craig (JCS) Mr. [—] (CIA) Mr. George McManus (CIA) (The Department of State was not represented although invited.) 2. The Attorney General outlined to us ‘‘How it all started’’ findings as they developed, and the general framework within which the United States Gov ernment should now attack the Cuban problem. Briefly, these were the main points: (a) After failure of the invasion, the United States Government became less active on the theory ‘‘better to lay low.’’ (b) Over the months the complexion of the refugee flow changed (i.e., upper classes out first, then middle classes—dropping to lower middle class  etc.) which, he stated, indicated a strong feeling of opposition to Castro within Cuba. (c) Progress in Cuba toward a police and Communist state was more rapid during this period than that made by any country in Eastern Europe in an equivalent period of time. Because of the rapidity of advance, imme diate action on the part of the United States Government was necessary. (d) With these factors in mind, the Attorney General had a discussion at the White House during the autumn of 1961 with the President, the Secre tary of Defense, and General Lansdale. The Secretary of Defense assigned General Lansdale to survey the Cuban problem, and he (Lansdale) reported to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Attorney General (in late November) concluding:
(1) Overthrow of the Castro regime was possible
(2) Sugar crop should be attacked at once (3) Action to be taken to keep Castro so busy with internal problems (economic, political, and social) that Castro would have no time for meddling abroad especially in Latin America.
United States Government was precluded from destroying the current sugar crop (1) we were late and overly optimistic and (b) ‘‘the assets of the United States Government were not as great as we were led to believe.’’
e) Accordingly, a solution to the Cuban problem today carries ‘‘The top pri ority in the United States Government—all else is secondary—no time, money, effort, or manpower is to be spared. There can be no misunder standing on the involvement of the agencies concerned nor on their responsibility to carry out this job. The agency heads understand that you are to have full backing on what you need.’’ (f) Yesterday (18 January 1962), the President indicated to the Attorney Gen eral that ‘‘the final chapter on Cuba has not been written’’—it’s got to be done and will be done. (g) Therefore, the Attorney General directed those in attendance at the meet ing to address themselves to the ‘‘32 tasks’’ unfailingly (see program review—The Cuba Project dated 18 January 1962). He said, ‘‘It is not only General Lansdale’s job to put the tasks, but yours to carry out with every resource at your command.’’
3. The Attorney General inquired about the progress in establishing a refugee inter rogation center at Miami and was informed that this would be in operation by 15 February 1962—the target date. With respect to interrogating the back-log of Cubans in the U.S.A., we agreed that we would attack this problem by getting at the more recent arrivals first. The Attorney General was informed that one could not relate, in time, the establishment of an interrogation facility with the placing of agents in Cuba—in other words, a body of information would have to be developed by intensive interrogation of many sources over a period of time. 4. It was General Lansdale’s view that there were several tasks among the ‘‘32’’ outlined upon which action could be taken without awaiting this detailed intelligence information. He noted, for example, the defection of top Cubans as being within the immediate capabilities of the CIA.
Richard Helms Chief of Operations, DD/P
The planning for the operation, which acquired the code name Mongoose, proceeded apace. Key participants, including Gen. Lansdale, were increasingly convinced that the conditions in Cuba were ripe for an anti-Castro revolution. Indeed, Lansdale did not think the program, as planned, was ambitious enough to take advantage of the evolving political situation. In its first phase, as out lined by Lansdale in a memorandum to the Special Group (augmented) on 25 July 1962, the operation was limited to political, economic, and covert actions ‘‘short of inspiring a revolt in Cuba or developing the need for U.S. armed intervention.’’ Here, Lansdale reports on a meeting with President Kennedy, which included Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, head of the Special Group, which held over all responsibility for covert actions, and Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Lansdale’s briefing, in fact, reflected very little solid intelligence and a great deal of wishful thinking as he projected his own beliefs onto the people of Cuba. Curiously, McCone, the new Director of Central Intelligence, would allow neither Helms, the Chief of Operations, nor William K. Harvey, the head of the CIA’s Cuban task force, to attend the session.
16 March 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD By: Brig. Gen. Lansdale Subject: Meeting with President, 16 March 1962 Present: The President, General Taylor, the Attorney General, McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Gilpatric, General Lemnitzer, Mr. McCone, Alexis Johnson, myself. At the White House, 1600 hours, 16 March 1962. Prior to the President’s arrival, the group met in the Oval room. General Taylor handed out his ‘‘Guidelines for Operation Mongoose,’’ dated 14 March. I asked McCone about having Helms and Harvey, who were waiting outside, join us. McCone asked if I had any differences of opinion with them. I said that we were in agreement on operational procedures, as far as the guidelines would permit operations. McCone then said Helms and Harvey should stay outside (which he told the President later, also). McCone then asked me if I were in agreement with the concept contained in the ‘‘Guidelines.’’ I commented that they didn’t fit the conditions inside Cuba that were becoming more apparent to the operational people, including CIA operators, for whom I had respect; the chance of fracturing the regime and creating a valid revolution is becoming more feasible. I felt that we needed much more freedom to work on the revolutionary possibilities than is possible under the guidelines. The President then came in. General Taylor gave a brief report on developments since 30 November, said the Special Group felt that hard intelligence was needed before going ahead, and handed the President a copy of the revised Guidelines. (The President glanced at this momentarily and set it down on the table; Taylor had briefed him on the Guidelines the evening before.) The President then turned to me and asked me what was being done. I gave him a quick summary of the intelligence-collection plan through July, tell ing him that this was the Special Group’s plan, and describing the work so far of CIA and Defense. I told him that we finally were starting to get a really good team together for the operation, after much effort to get the U.S. pointed in the right direction. I noted that agents were to be trained or experienced in guerrilla warfare, that we needed U.S. military participation for support, including air re supply and maritime actions. He asked for details. Both General Lemnitzer and I told him about ‘‘sheep-dipping’’ U.S. military personnel, ‘‘sanitizing’’ equipment, and use of U.S. bases. I pointed out that PT boat silhouettes required a Navy base as cover, even if we called it ‘‘R&E’’ [Research and Engineering], that air resupply would be done at night from about 800 feet which entailed some risk which the Air Force was now assessing. He asked about maritime runs of the PT-boats; I explained our problems of ‘‘mother’’ ships, the LSD’s and 200-300 man crews, which we are trying to lick. I remarked that the thesis of creating a revolution inside Cuba looked just as valid as ever, and that CIA professionals were now agreeing more and more that both resistance and the possibility of fracturing the regime point to some real opportunities. I noted that we were checking out a number of leads, including rela tives of Fidel Castro, to assess the practical opportunities for splitting away some of the regime. If we could get some of the top Cuban leaders, and some units of the Cuban security forces to take to the hills, we would have conditions that would need quick exploitation—and we would have to be ready for this. I noted that we would have to supply arms and equipment; it is possible that this could be done without U.S. forces, if necessary. The President asked if U.S. military intervention was an issue that the Special Group was posing to him now. Taylor and the Special Group promptly said, ‘‘no.’’ General Lemnitzer commented that the military had contingency plans for U.S. intervention. Also, it had plans for creating plausible pretexts for the use of force, with the pretexts either attacks on U.S. aircraft or a Cuban action in Latin America that we would retaliate. The President said bluntly that we were not discussing the use of U.S. military force, that General Lemnitzer might find the U.S. so engaged in Berlin or elsewhere that he couldn’t use the contemplated 4 divisions in Cuba. So, we cannot say that we are able now to make a decision on the use of U.S. military force. The President then commented that he hoped something could be done about the press. That the newspapers would start conjecturing on operations just as they did in April 1961. I said that such conjecture was going on all the time, that any solid-looking reports might well be a real blessing, because as talk increases that the U.S. has the intention, somehow, to help the people of Cuba regain their free dom, that the people inside would get some hope. This spiritual factor, of having hope of something better than what they are now saddled with, is vitally impor tant at this time. The President then asked about immigration. Wouldn’t it be better to shut our doors to the people trying to get out, so that they would be forced to stay and take action against the regime? I pointed out that we still were giving them only two choices: either to escape to the U.S. and freedom, or to stay and be slaves. Once we are willing to go all the way in being sure that they win, then we might consider closing our doors—because we then will be helping them gain their freedom at home. Now, with 2,000 people fleeing every week, we would be foolish to remove this symbol of our sympathy and cut off the source of intelligence information and recruits. We must give the Cubans the chance and the help to free themselves. The Attorney General then mentioned Mary Hemingway [the widow of writer Ernest Hemingway], commenting on reports that Castro was drinking heavily in disgruntlement over the way things were going, and the opportunities offered by the ‘‘shrine’’ to Hemingway [at the house where he had lived in Cuba]. I com mented that this was a conversation that [TV journalist] Ed Murrow had had with Mary Hemingway, that we had similar reports from other sources, and that this was worth assessing firmly and pursuing vigorously. If there are grounds for action, CIA had some invaluable assets that might well be committed for such an effort. McCone asked if his operational people were aware of this; I told him that we had discussed this, that they agreed the subject was worth vigorous develop ment, and that we were in agreement that the matter was so delicate and sensitive that it shouldn’t be surfaced to the Special Group until we were ready to go, and then not in detail. I pointed out that this pertained to fractioning the regime. If it happened, it could develop like a brush fire, much as in Hungary, and we must be prepared to help it win our goal of Cuba free of a Communist government. General Lemnitzer mentioned the beach reconnaissance by the U.S. Navy, which was evaluated by the JCS as having little risk. UDT teams would do this at night, and would not need to surface. Mr. McCone mentioned that we were including sabotage in early actions. I com mented that we had a number of such actions listed, but were only planning on a few most necessary ones. One example was the Soviet patrol craft, for which both Navy and CIA were tasked to plan sabotage. The President asked how this might be done. I replied that fuel, lubricants, crews, and the patrol craft were all potential targets—that, for example, a boat laid-up for repair was a boat that wasn’t out on patrol at a critical period. Mr. [Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell] Gilpatric mentioned that Mr. [Secre tary of Defense Robert] McNamara was intensely interested in creating a Defense pool of resources for cover actions, for Colombia for example, so that we wouldn’t be faced with the problem of only having 4 PT boats as we do for Cuba. The meeting then broke up, with the president saying go ahead on the Guide lines. General Taylor asked for his copies of he Guidelines back. I said I needed a copy, for my guidance and to show the operators such as Harvey and Craig. The President expressed his appreciation for what had been done so far. Gen. Taylor didn’t persist in getting his copy back, so I retained it. By early October, the president (‘‘higher authority’’) was becoming increas ingly frustrated with the lack of results. At the same time, those responsible for the project were becoming frustrated with the conflicting limitations set on the operation by higher authority. DCI McCone, Deputy DCI Marshall Carter, and Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson spoke openly about the con tradictions between the requirement to keep the operation secret and the request to increase its scale. Despite the flurry of activity and the talk of ‘‘accomplishing the overall objective,’’ the impression emerges that there was no clear-cut plan or even purpose in sight, especially inasmuch as presumed objectives, such as inciting ‘‘an uprising,’’ were expressly prohibited.
 Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) on Operation MONGOOSE, 4 October 1962 PRESENT: The Attorney General; Mr. Johnson; Mr. Gilpatric, General Taylor, Gen eral Lansdale; Mr. McCone and General Carter; Mr. Wilson 1. The Attorney General opened the meeting by saying that higher authority is concerned about progress on the MONGOOSE program and feels that more priority should be given to trying to mount sabotage operations. The Attor ney General said that he wondered if a new look is not required at this time in view of the meager results, especially in the sabotage field. He urged that ‘‘massive activity’’ be mounted within the entire MONGOOSE framework.
There was a good deal of discussion about this, and General Lansdale said that another attempt will be made against the major target which has been the object of three unsuccessful missions, and that approximately six new ones are in the planning stage. Mr. Johnson said that ‘‘massive activity’’ would have to appear to come from within. He also said that he hopes soon to be able to present to the Group a plan for giving Cuban exiles more of a free hand, with the full realization that his would give more visibility to their activities. On this latter point, Mr. McCone said that he reserves judgment as to the feasibility and desirability of such a program. (Mr. Johnson agreed that he has reservations as well.) 2. Mr. McCone then said that he gets the impression that high levels of the gov ernment want to get on with activity but still wish to retain a low noise level. He does not believe that this will be possible. Any sabotage would be blamed on the United States. In this connection, he cited the enormous num ber of telephone calls that had been directed to the CIA at the time that the skin divers landed in Eastern Cuba and at the time Cuban exile students shot up the apartment house. He urged that responsible officials be prepared to accept a higher noise level if they want to get on with the operations. In partial rebuttal, the Attorney General said that the reasons people were so concerned at the times mentioned were: (a) the fact that the skin divers were Americans, and (b) that the student activity was irresponsible and fool ish, and if either of these had in fact been engineered by the U.S. it would have been a great mistake. He went on to say responsible people do wish to get on with operations but want to relate the possibility of attributability to the importance of the particular undertaking. He also questioned whether we are going down the right road or whether ‘‘more direct action’’ is not indicated. He urged that alternative and imaginative plans be developed for accomplishing the overall objective. 3. Returning to Mr. Johnson’s point about the necessity of massive activity coming from within, Mr. McCone pointed out that internal security [meas ures] are now so rigid that internal uprisings are sure to be suppressed. It was agreed that the current guidelines do not call for inciting such an uprising. 4. Mr. McCone and General Carter explained the tremendous efforts which are necessary to insure that an operation such as the sabotage one previously authorized cannot be pinned directly on the U.S. After considerable discus sion, the Group agreed that it is not necessary to go to such extreme lengths to guarantee non-attributability and that short cuts will be acceptable. 5. Mr. Gilpatric reported that Defense is now working hard on establishing a Cuban brigade. Recruits will be trained for four or five months and will then be on call for any future action. 6. General Taylor reported that the Joint Staff is refining various military con tingency plans, based on a variety of possible situations. Such situations include: Soviet action against Berlin; presence of Bloc offensive weapons in Cuba; attack against Guantanamo; a popular uprising; armed Cuban subver sion in the Hemisphere; and the establishment of a direct threat to the U.S. 7. The Group then turned to the subject of reconnaissance of Cuba. (Dr. Scoville and Colonel Steakley joined the Group for this part of the discussion.) It was pointed out that the Agency is now restricted to using its high perfor mance vehicle in the southeast quadrant of Cuba, because of the SAM [surface-to-air missile] sites. It was questioned whether this is a reasonable restriction at this time, particularly when the SAMs are almost certainly not operational.
Colonel Steakley and Dr. Scoville described for the Group a spectrum of reconnaissance activities which could be undertaken, ranging from low-level Navy fighters through drones, up to the Agency’s capabilities, particularly equipped with new radar countermeasures. The result of this discussion was that it was agreed that DOD and CIA should get together on recommendations for targets within Cuba that require coverage and on recommendations as to how to achieve this cover age. A meeting was set for next Tuesday, at which time DOD and CIA should be prepared to discuss all possibilities, including requirements, capa bilities, vulnerabilities, etc. 8. There was some discussion of the desirability of mining Cuban waters. It was pointed out that non-U.S.-attributable mines, which appear to be home made, are available and could be laid by small craft operated by Cubans. 9. It was agreed that the Attorney General should act as Chairman of the Spe cial Group (Augmented) at least for the time being. 10. It was agreed that four major points emerged from today’s discussion
a. We ought to go all out for increased intelligence.
b. There should be considerably more sabotage.
c. Restrictions on attributability can be relaxed so that training and other preparations can be subject to some short cuts.
d. All efforts should be made to develop new and imaginative approaches to the possibility of getting rid of the Castro regime
At that point, the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1963 erupted. One of the great landmarks of the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis brought the United States and the Soviet Union so close to the brink of nuclear conflict that it led both sides to stop and reconsider their current policies toward both each other and nuclear weapons. This relatively brief period of accord resulted in the sign ing of a treaty banning open-air nuclear tests (the first effective arms control agreement of the Cold War era) and the establishment of the ‘‘hotline,’’ provid ing direct communications (initially by teletype) between the White House and the Kremlin.
Although most of the world did not know of it for many years, a new open ing in U.S.-Cuban relations also came under consideration. Castro made the first move in that he sent out multiple tentative feelers to the Kennedy administra tion with suggestions that Kennedy might want to make a ‘‘first move.’’ One of these came by way of Lisa Howard, a former television actress who had made a name for herself as a correspondent able to get exclusive interviews with world leaders, starting with Nikita Khrushchev in 1960. She reported the proposal to the CIA upon returning from Havana. In the memo below, Richard Helms, although he could not get her name quite right, notified DCI McCone and other top officials of the initiative. Evidently, the CIA took advantage of the opportu nity to ask about various peripheral details, including Castro’s physical state, his awareness of Cuban police methods, what would happen if he were assassi nated (although that paragraph does not specifically cite Howard), the role of Soviet personnel, and how the Swiss ambassador was doing. (The Swiss embassy was representing U.S. interests in the absence of a U.S. embassy. Its role lasted until 1979, when the State Department opened an ‘‘interest section’’ in Havana.) For his part, in addition to asking about the Kennedys, Castro was interested in the influence of Adlai Stevenson, the two-time Democratic presidential nominee who was serving as ambassador to the United Nations and was open to U.S.-Cuban reconciliation, and James Donovan, a New York at torney who helped negotiate the release of Bay of Pigs prisoners and was also eager to serve as a go-between (a fact probably not known to Howard).
1 May 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
 Interview of U.S. Newswoman with Fidel Castro Indicating Possible In terest in 1. On 30 April 1963, Liza [sic] Howard, U.S. newswoman associated with the American Broadcasting Company, returned to Miami from Cuba where she had interviewed a number of high-ranking Cuban officials, including Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, Ernesto ‘‘Che’’ Guevara, Vilma Espin de Castro, Raul Roa, and Rene Vallejo. Her conversations with Fidel Castro totaled about ten hours and included one session on 22 April which lasted from 12:45 A.M. to 5:30 A.M. Following is an account of those conversations and Liza Howard’s observations concerning the present Cuban situation. 2. It appears that Fidel Castro is looking for a way to reach a rapprochement with the United States Government, probably because he is aware that Cuba is in a state of economic chaos. The October blockade hurt the Cuban economy. Liza Howard believes that Castro talked about this matter with her because she is known as a progressive and she talked with him in frank, blunt, honest terms; Castro has little opportunity to hear this type of conversation. Castro indicated that if a rapprochement was wanted President John F. Kennedy would have to make the first move. In response to the statement that Castro would probably have to make the first move, Castro asked what the U.S. wanted from him. When a return to the original aims of the revolution was suggested, Fidel said that perhaps he, President Kennedy, and Premier Nikita Khrushchev should discuss this. Liza Howard said that she thought it was a more likely topic for Castro to discuss with President Kennedy. Castro said that he doubted that President Kennedy would talk with him without Khru shchev being present. When Howard pressed Castro for further information on how a rapprochement could be achieved he said that steps were already being taken. Pressed further, he said he considered the U.S. limitation on exile raids to be a proper step toward accommodation. It is Liza Howard’s opinion that Castro wants to pursue the discussion of rapprochement with proper pro gressive spokesmen. Based on her discussions with the following persons Liza Howard feels that Guevara, Raul Castro, and Vilma Espin oppose any idea of rapprochement; Roa and Vallejo favor these discussions.
3. Castro asked Howard, who had previously interviewed Khrushchev, for an appraisal of him. When Howard said that Khrushchev was a shrewd politi cian who would break and dispose of Castro when the Soviets no longer needed him, Castro made no comment but only nodded his head as if in skeptical agreement. Liza Howard had no insight or advance notice on Cas tro’s travel to Moscow.
4. Castro appears healthy, has no visible nervous twitches or tics, and was calm, rational, humorous, and non-argumentative during all discussions. Vallejo, Castro’s personal physician, also acts as secretary, interpreter, and confidant.
5. Castro is in complete control in Cuba. No major decision is made without him. Neither Guevara nor Raul Castro would be able to rule Cuba if Fidel wee assassinated.  6. In discussions with Castro about terror and secret police methods Liza Howard received the impression that he was not completely aware of the extent to which terror has gripped Cuba. 7. Castro refers to Soviet troops in Cuba as ‘‘technicals’’ and indicated that they have a training mission in Cuba. He made the point, however, that if an internal revolt takes place in Cuba Soviet ‘‘technicals’’ would fight with Castro to put down a counterrevolution. 8. Liza Howard said that Emil Stadelhofer, Swiss Ambassador to Cuba, is an overworked, timid man who does not have Castro’s ear. She believes that the Swiss need a larger staff in Habana and that Stadelhofer needs recogni tion for a job well done. Howard also said that in her opinion the Western diplomatic community in Habana has no influence on Castro or his government.
9. While discussing a possible rapprochement Castro asked for full assess ments of President and Mrs. Kennedy, and Robert Kennedy, and wanted to know if Adlai Stevenson had power in the U.S. and if his voice was heard in President Kennedy’s councils. Castro commented that James Donovan was a good man; it was Liza Howard’s impression that Donovan had not talked politics with Castro but that Donovan had a platform from which he could launch political discussions on the philosophy of revolution.
10. Liza Howard said that she was willing to undertake further discussions with Castro concerning a possible rapprochement. Other possible candidates whom she suggested were [Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs] Edwin M. Martin, Adlai Stevenson, and [Governor of Puerto Rico] Luis Munoz Marin, She also mentioned Donovan but was not quite certain that he was progressive enough. Liza Howard is willing to arrange a meet ing for any U.S. Government spokesman with Castro through Vallejo, who will be the point of contact.
11. Liza Howard definitely wants to impress the U.S. Government with two facts: Castro is ready to discuss rapprochement and she herself is ready to discuss it with him if asked to do so by the U.S. Government. /signed ‘‘W. Lloyd George for’’/ Richard Helms Deputy Director (Plans)
The memo, marked ‘‘Secret: No Foreign Dissemination/Controlled Dissemi nation/No Dissemination Abroad/Background Use Only,’’ was considered sig nificant. In addition to being addressed to the DCI, copies were directed to the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Director of Intelligence and Research at the Department of State, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Attorney General, and within the CIA to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, the Deputy Director for Intelligence, the Assist ant Director for National Estimates, and the Assistant Director for Current Intel ligence. Marginal notations indicate that it was read by Special Assistant McGeorge Bundy and the president.
Over the course of the next several months, Howard arranged informal meet ings in New York between Castro’s confidante Ren e Vallejo and William Att wood, Stevenson’s deputy at the United Nations. On Cuba’s side, Vallejo was replaced by Carlos Lechuga, Cuba’s ambassador to the UN. Evidently, the CIA was kept in the dark about the initiative. The whole program came to an end, however, with Kennedy’s assassination on 22 November of that year. Gordon Chase, a member of the National Security Council staff who had advocated ‘‘quietly enticing Castro over to us,’’ highlighted the turmoil into which the assassination had thrown the strategy and the political difficulty that Lyndon Johnson, as a new president, would have in trying to renew it.
November 25, 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY SUBJECT: Cuba—Item of Presidential Interest 1. I assume you will want to brief the President on Bill Attwood’s Cuban exer cise that is presumably still in train. 2. My own thinking on this one, vis a vis the events of November 22, is still very fluid; but here it is. Basically, the events of November 22 would appear to make accomodation with Castro an even more doubtful issue than it was. While I think that President Kennedy could have accomodated with Castro and gotten away with it with a minimum of domestic heat, I’m not sure about President Johnson. For one thing, a new President who has no background of being successfully nasty to Castro and the Communists (e.g. President Ken nedy in October, 1962) would probably run a greater risk of being accused, by the American people, of ‘‘going soft.’’ In addition, the fact that Lee Oswald has been heralded as a pro-Castro type may make rapprochement with Cuba more difficult—although it is hard to say how much more difficult. 3. If one concludes hat the prospects for accomodation with Castro are much dimmer than they were before November 22, then Bill Attwood’s present effort loses much of its meaning. We would appear to have three alternative courses of action in handling the present status of the Attwood-Lechuga tie-line. a. We can tell Attwood that if Lechuga calls, Attwood should tell Lechuga that in view of recent events, he is not now prepared to talk about an agenda with Lechuga. b. We can tell Attwood that if Lechuga does not call over the next couple weeks (the Cubans may feel that November 22 has stopped all bets), he should take the initiative and get a message to the Cubans, that despite recent events, we are still prepared to hear what is on Castro’s mind. c. We can tell Attwood that if Lechuga calls about setting up an appointment between Attwood and Lechuga, that Attwood should schedule such a meeting for a few days later and call us immediately. However, if Lechuga does not call him, Attwood should take no initiative until and if he hears from us. 4. I choose 3 (c) above. While November 22 events probably make accomoda tion an even tougher issue for President Johnson than it was for President Kennedy, a preliminary Attwood-Lechuga talk still seems worthwhile from our point of view—if the Cubans initiate it. We have little or nothing to lose and there will be some benefits; at a minimum, we should get a valuable reading as to what Castro regards as negotiable (e.g. the Soviet tie-line?) and a hint as to how he views the effect of November 22 on Cuban/U.S. relations. At the same time, if the Cubans, who have the ball, feel that all bets are off, we should take no initiative until we have thought the problem through carefully. If we decide that course 3 (c) is the right one, the sooner we call Attwood, the better. In view of his and Stevenson’s activist tendencies in this matter, it seems conceivable to me that, not hearing from Lechuga in the near future, they will approach him and assure him that we feel the same way and that we are still prepared to hear what Castro has on his mind.
 /initialed/ Gordon Chase
Castro again sent out feelers through Lisa Howard. He even noted that if President Johnson had to make bellicose statements about Cuba to win reelec tion, he would understand. Stevenson also pressed for renewal of the dialog from his office at the UN. Some contacts were made, but little resulted from them. The following spring, Helms sent Bundy the following memo, apparently to let the White House know that the CIA had found out about the initiative on its own through its spies in Cuba.
4 March 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Bundy Special Assistant to the President
SUBJECT: Alleged Contacts between Castro and American Government
1. Against the background of the post-Special Group Meeting that you held late in the afternoon on 5 November 1963, I thought you would be interested in the following report which we have just received: 2. About the middle of February 1964, a high-ranking Cuban official who has close personal connections with top-level Government personalities in Cuba was told by Raul Roa Garcia, the Cuban Minister of Foreign Affairs, that President Kennedy, prior to his assassination, had ‘‘established certain con tacts’’ with Cuba. Roa said that emissaries from President Kennedy had been sent to make contact with the Cubans; he mentioned specifically that some contacts had taken place in New York, but did not make it clear whether New York was the only place where there had been such contacts. Roa did not describe or identify the emissaries. 3. According to Roa, Fidel Castro felt that it was possible that President Ken nedy would have gone on ultimately to negotiate with Cuba. Roa explained that such negotiations would not have been based on any ‘‘love for Cuba’’, but would have been in the nature of an acceptance of a fait accompli for practical reasons; this would have been to Cuba’s advantage, in Roa’s opinion. 4. Roa added that ‘‘it is believed’’ that President Johnson is unaware of his predecessor’s activities in this matter, and for this reason is not continuing President Kennedy’s policy. Castro referred to President Johnson in harsh terms in source’s presence.
Richard Helms
Deputy Director for Plans
1. For the full report and Bissell’s rebuttal, see Peter Kornbluh, ed., Bay of Pigs Declas sified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba (New York: The New Press, 1998).
Chapter 4
 Political Assassinations and Illicit Drug Tests
In early May 1973, a brief, one-page memo was addressed to William E. Colby regarding what the author considered ‘‘potentially embarrassing agency activ ities.’’ It would stand out like a flame among the often tedious and bureaucratic reports that poured into the ‘‘Family Jewels’’ file. The memo began modestly enough, with the case of Hans V. Tofte, who had been dismissed from the CIA in 1966 for mishandling classified documents. Tofte had rented out a basement apartment in his house without bothering to take secret papers out of it first.1 From there, the memo proceeded through illicit experiments regarding mind altering drugs to allegations of plots to assassinate foreign heads of state.
8 May 1973
 Executive Secretary, CIA Management Committee
SUBJECT: Potentially Embarrassing Agency Activities
The Office of the Inspector General has records on the following sensitive sub jects that either have been or might in the future be the source of embarrassment to the Agency. The report of the Board of Inquiry in the case of Hans Tofte. The Tofte affair was fully exposed in public, of course, but the report itself is closely held within the Agency. This office was designated as the custodian of the report, and we have the only surviving copy. An annex to the Inspector General’s report of survey of the Technical Services Division done in 1963. The annex deals with experiments in influencing human behavior through the administration of mind or personality altering drugs to unwitting subjects. An Inspector General report of investigation of allegations that the Agency was instrumental in bringing about the assassination of President [Ngo Dinh] Diem [of South Vietnam]. The allegations were determined to be without foundation. An Inspector General report of investigation of allegations that the Agency was instrumental in bringing about the assassination of President [Rafael Leonidas] Trujillo [of the Dominican Republic]. The investigation disclosed quite extensive Agency involvement with the plotters. An Inspector General report of investigation of allegations that the Agency con spired to assassinate Fidel Castro. The story first appeared in Drew Pearson’s col umn and has since appeared in Jack Anderson’s column. While the columns contained many factual errors, the allegations are basically true.
 [—signature, name, and title deleted—]
CASTRO The CIA’s most elaborate and most notorious effort to eliminate a political leader was the attempt to assassinate Cuba’s Fidel Castro.2 It is noteworthy that despite all the movies and novels about professional CIA assassins, when the decision was made to kill Castro the agency did not seem to believe it had anyone suitable on staff. This led it to contract the job out to the criminal underworld. That decision led several years later to the public exposure of the whole operation, when the agency refused to intervene on the gangster’s behalf in an unrelated criminal case. Initially, the assassination plot was more secret than the plan to organize the Bay of Pigs invasion. Even the personnel at JMWAVE, the CIA’s anti-Castro operations base in Florida, were not informed. In 1973, when DCI James Schle singer ordered CIA employees to report on illegal operations, several sources sent in reports regarding this scheme and the solicitation of gangster Johnny Roselli, who was to arrange it. Among the unexpected twists: the ‘‘negotiations’’ with a mob boss led to a botched attempt to spy on comedian Dan Rowan, who would later find fame on television as one of the hosts of Rowan & Martin’s Laugh-In. The following memorandum from the CIA’s Office of Security is one of the more detailed reports on the operation from the ‘‘Family Jewels’’ file.
SUBJECT: Johnny Rosell
1. In August 1960, [Deputy Director for Plans] Mr. Richard M. Bissell approached Colonel Sheffield Edwards to determine if the Office of Security had assets that may assist in a sensitive mission requiring gangster-type action. The mission target was Fidel Castro. 2. Because of its extreme sensitivity, only a small group was made privy to the project. The DCI [Allen Dulles] was briefed and gave his approval. Colonel J. C. King, Chief, WH [Western Hemisphere] Division, was briefed, but all details were deliberately concealed from any of the JMWAVE officials. Certain TSD [Technical Services Division] and Communications personnel participated in the initial planning stages, but were not witting of the purpose of the mission. 3. Robert A. Maheu, a cleared source of the Office of Security [and a former FBI agent], was contacted, briefed generally on the project, and requested to ascertain if he could develop an entr ee into the gangster elements as the first step toward accomplishing the desired goal. 4. Mr. Maheu advised that he had met one Johnny Roselli on several occasions while visiting Las Vegas. He only knew him casually through clients, but was given to understand that he was a high-ranking member of the ‘‘syndicate’’ and controlled all of the ice-making machines on the Strip. Maheu reasoned that, if Roselli was in fact a member of the clan, he undoubtedly had connec tions leading into the Cuban gambling interests.
5. Maheu was asked to approach Roselli, who knew Maheu as a personal rela tions executive handling domestic and foreign accounts, and tell him that he had recently been retained by a client who represented several international business firms which were suffering heavy financial losses in Cuba as a result of Castro’s action. They were convinced that Castro’s removal was the answer to their problem and were willing to pay a price of $150,000 for its successful accomplishment. It was to be made clear to Roselli that the United States Government was not, and should not, become aware of this operation. 6. The pitch was made to Roselli on 14 September 1960 at the Hilton Plaza Hotel, New York City. Mr. James O’Connell, Office of Security, was present during this meeting and was identified to Roselli as an employee of Maheu. O’Connell actively served as Roselli’s contact until May 1962 at which time he phased out due to an overseas assignment. His [Roselli’s] initial reaction was to avoid getting involved, but through Maheu’s persuasion, he agreed to introduce him to a friend, Sam Gold, who knew the ‘‘Cuban crowd.’’ Roselli made it clear he did not want any money for his part and believed Sam would feel the same way. Neither of these individuals were ever paid out of Agency funds. 7. During the week of 25 September, Maheu was introduced to Sam who was staying at the Fontainebleau Hotel, Miami Beach. It was several weeks after his meeting with Sam and Joe, who was identified to him as a courier oper ating between Havana and Miami, that he saw photographs of both of these individuals in the Sunday supplemental ‘‘Parade.’’ They were identified as Momo Salvatore Giancana and Santos Trafficant, respectively. Both were on the list of the Attorney General’s ten most-wanted men. The former was described as the Chicago chieftain of the Cosa Nostra and successor to Al Capone, and the latter, the Cosa Nostra boss of Cuban operations. Maheu called this office immediately upon ascertaining this information. 8. In discussing the possible methods of accomplishing this mission, Sam sug gested that they not resort to firearms but, if he could be furnished some type of potent pill, that could be placed in Castro’s food or drink, it would be a much more effective operation. Sam indicated that he had a prospective nominee in the person of Juan Orta, a Cuban official who had been receiving kick-back payments from the gambling interests, who still had access to Cas tro, and was in a financial bind. 9. TSD was requested to produce six pills of high lethal content. 10. Joe delivered the pills to Orta. After several weeks of reported attempts, Orta apparently got cold feet and asked out of the assignment. He suggested another candidate who made several attempts without success. 11. Joe then indicated that Dr. Anthony Verona, one of the principal officers in the Cuban Exile Junta, had become disaffected with the apparent ineffectual progress of the Junta and was willing to handle the mission through his own resources. 12. He [Verona] asked, as a prerequisite to the deal, that he be given $10,000 for organizational expenses and requested $1,000 worth of communications equipment. 13. Dr. Verona’s potential was never fully exploited, as the project was canceled shortly after the Bay of Pigs episode. Verona was advised that the offer was withdrawn, and the pills were retrieved. 14. Of significant interest was an incident which involved a request levied by Sam upon Maheu. At the height of the project negotiations, Sam expressed concern about his girlfriend, Phyllis McGuire, who he learned was getting much attention from Dan Rowan while both were booked at a Las Vegas night club. Sam intimacy with Miss McGuire. The technician involved in the assignment was discovered in the process, arrested, and taken to the Sheriff’s office for ques tioning. He called Maheu and informed him that he had been detained by the police. This call was made in the presence of the Sheriff’s personnel. Subsequently, the Department of Justice announced its intention to prose cute Maheu along with the technician. On 7 February 1962, the Director of Security briefed the Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, on the circumstan ces leading up to Maheu’s involvement in the wiretap. At our request, pros ecution was dropped. 15. In May 1962, Mr. William Harvey took over as Case Officer, and it is not known by this office whether Roselli was used operationally from that point on. 16. It was subsequently learned from the FBI that Roselli had been convicted on six counts involving illegal entry into the United States. Our records do not reflect the date of conviction, but it is believed to have been sometime dur ing November 1967. 17. On 2 December 1968, Roselli, along with four other individuals, was con victed of conspiracy to cheat members of the Friars Club of $400,000 in a rigged gin rummy game. 18. Mr. Harvey reported to the Office of Security of his contacts with Roselli during November and December 1967 and January 1968. It was his belief that Johnny would not seek out the Agency for assistance in the deportation proceedings unless he actually faced deportation. Roselli expressed confi dence that he would win an appeal. 19. On 17 November 1970, Maheu called James O’Connell, Roselli’s first Case Officer, to advise that Maheu’s attorney, Ed Morgan, had received a call from a Thomas Waddin, Roselli’s lawyer, who stated that all avenues of appeal had been exhausted, and his client now faces deportation. Waddin indicated that, if someone did not intercede on Roselli’s behalf, he would make a complete expose of his activities with the Agency. 20. On 18 November 1970, [DCI] Mr. Helms was briefed on the latest develop ment in this case, and it was decided that the Agency would not in any way assist Roselli. Maheu was so advised of the Agency’s position, and he was in complete agreement with out stand. He further advised that he was not concerned should Roselli decide to tell all. 21. Subsequently, Roselli or someone on his behalf furnished Jack Anderson details of the operation. Attached are two Anderson columns dealing with this matter. 22. The last known residence of Roselli was the Federal Penitentiary in Seattle, Washington.
As noted, the report came with two articles from The Washington Post by col umnist Jack Anderson: ‘‘6 Attempts to Kill Castro Laid to CIA’’ (18 January 1971) and ‘‘Castro Stalker Worked for the CIA’’ (23 February 1971). It was through these articles, along with an earlier one by Drew Pearson, that news of the CIA’s assassination activities first leaked to the public.
 The Lumumba case is highly complex. In August 1960, at the same time the order to kill Castro was issued, a similar order was directed against Patrice Lumumba, the thirty-six-year-old prime minister of the Republic of the Congo, which had just gained its independence from Belgium on 30 June 1960. The highly fractious country was so ill-prepared for independence that it had a total of thirteen college graduates and its army was led almost entirely by Belgian officers. Within days of independence, Lumumba faced a rebellion by Congo lese troops against their Belgian officers and a subsequent intervention by the Belgian army. Faced with suspicion from the West, he requested military assis tance from the United Nations and made ill-considered suggestions that he might turn to the Soviet Union for further help. The Americans did not know at the time that the Soviets turned him down, if only because they lacked the logis tical capability. The CIA station in Leopoldville (later, Kinshasa), the capital of the Congo, had a total of three case officers, all of them hastily reassigned from elsewhere. Not having any particular knowledge of Africa, they relied on Belgian sources and a few French-speaking Congolese for their information. Like many in the U.S. government, including President Eisenhower, they saw Lumumba as incompetent, uncooperative, and a potential Communist or Communist dupe. The Leopoldville station sent the following cable to CIA headquarters on 18 August 1960.3
Subsequent cables authorized efforts to replace Lumumba with ‘‘pro-Western group.’’ Washington preferred President Joseph Kasavubu, Lumumba’s partner rival in a coalition government, but Kasavubu was not sure he wanted to go as far as the some other Congolese politicians. A cable from the Leopoldville station followed on 24 August.
In Washington, the Special Group, a subcommittee of the National Security Council that dealt with covert operations, met on 25 August 1960 and ‘‘agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out ‘consideration’ of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba.’’ On 26 August, DCI Allen Dulles sent a cable to the Leopoldville station. To underline his seriousness, he issued the cable in his own name, rather than the more common ‘‘Director,’’ and referred to ‘‘high quarters,’’ indi cating the approval of the president.
CIA headquarters communicated with Leopoldville Chief of Station Larry Devlin through two channels. In the regular CIA channel, messages were dis tributed to the ambassador as well as to the CIA Chief of Station. In the PROP channel, messages went only to the Chief of Station. The regular channel carried messages noting that Lumumba was a growing problem and that something would have to be done about him because the ambassador would expect the agency to be talking about him. Messages through the secret PROP channel dis cussed assassination plans and advised Devlin not to pay attention to instruc tions related to the matter that appeared only in the regular channel.
At the beginning of September, the CIA had agreed to grant ‘‘financial sup port’’ to President Kasavubu, and four days later Kasavubu dismissed Lumumba as prime minister, citing the latter’s inability to suppress a secession movement in the mineral-rich Katanga province. Lumumba responded by dis missing Kasavubu as president; Parliament nullified both actions. In mid September, Kasavubu was deposed by Colonel Joseph-D esir e Mobutu, a former noncommissioned officer and former Lumumbist who had been made chief of the general staff. (He would later become President Mobutu Sese Seko). Mobutu declared Kasavubu, Lumumba, and all politicians ‘‘neutralized’’ for a period of time. In October, the CIA decided to give backing to ‘‘anti-Lumumba resistance groups’’ and then, in November, specifically to Mobutu. The operation regarding Lumumba, however, was to continue. As it turned out, Chief of Station Devlin was opposed to the notion of assassinating the prime minister, both for moral reasons and because he considered it unneces sary. Considering the likely career consequences, however, he did not say so openly. In late September 1960, Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, traveling as Joseph Braun or ‘‘Joe from Paris,’’ arrived in Leopoldville to deliver the poison for the job. Devlin regularly reported on the progress of his preparations but frequently stressing the difficulty of gaining access to Lumumba. In effect, it appears Dev lin simply dawdled until the poison went bad. The CIA then proposed sending a contract agent or a senior case officer to as sassinate Lumumba. It appeared that the agency was considering making this a full-time position for the contract agent.4
Devlin responded that, in view of his own multiple responsibilities, sending a senior case officer to handle the job was an excellent idea. He also again noted the difficulties of gaining access
Devlin responded that, in view of his own multiple responsibilities, sending a senior case officer to handle the job was an excellent idea. He also again noted the difficulties of gaining access The senior case officer also claimed he was opposed to the idea of assassina tion, but he said he would do what he could to ‘‘neutralize’’ him as a political factor. This involved luring him out of his house arrest and into the hands of the Congolese authorities. He appeared to Devlin to be proceeding with prepa rations for the assassination despite a lack of enthusiasm. The agency then sent the ‘‘third-country national’’ (code name: QJ/WIN) to carry out the task, although he was not informed of the exact nature of the task until he arrived. By that time, however, developments were about to follow a different trajectory. On 27 November, Lumumba escaped from the protective cordon placed around his offices. In December, Mo€ıse Tshombe, another former Lumumbist, declared the independence of Katanga with the encouragement of Belgium. Lumumba was captured by Mobutu’s forces as he tried to make his way to Katanga, in large part because he kept stopping en route and giving public speeches. He was turned over to the Katangan forces. He was tortured and then executed on 17 January 1961 by Belgian and Katangan soldiers.5 The ‘‘Family Jewels’’ file has only one further record regarding Lumumba.
14 February 1972
 In November 1962 Mr. [—] advised [Inspector General] Mr. Lyman Kirkpatrick that he had, at one time, been directed by [Deputy Director for Plans] Mr. Richard Bissell to assume responsibility for a project involving the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, then Premier, Republic of Congo. According to [—], poison was to have been the vehicle as he made reference to having been instructed to see Dr. Sidney Gottlieb in order to procure the appropriate vehicle. The file contains no explanation of why the Inspector General learned of the operation only two years after the fact, if this is indeed the first he heard of it. Neither does it say why it was formally entered into the record ten years after that, still fifteen months before Schlesinger’s call for incriminating documents, or (in its redacted form, at least) who entered it. After the death of Lumumba, civil war continued in the Congo for the next several years, drawing in the UN forces. This was followed by three decades of corrupt and brutal dictatorship under Mobutu (when the country was called Za€ıre) and then another civil war, which drew in the armies of several neighbor ing countries. In 2006, the Congo held its first free election since 1960. This chain of events was not necessarily the fault of the CIA. Nonetheless, the assassination of Lumumba, which the CIA did seek to bring about, was a rallying cry for decades.
TRUJILLO The Trujillo case, as noted above, involved ‘‘quite extensive Agency involve ment with the plotters.’’ By 1960, the dictator Rafael Leonidas Trujillo had been running the Dominican Republic for three decades.6 His regime was not a threat to the United States, nor was it allied to the enemies of the United States, but Trujillo was considered a brutal and increasingly arbitrary dictator. The Eisen hower and Kennedy administrations feared that the regime’s continued exis tence would eventually lead to a Cuban-style revolution, and both supported the activities of democratic Dominican dissidents who hoped to overthrow the regime. The Eisenhower administration considered contingency plans regarding the Dominican Republic as early as February 1960. That spring some dissidents made a request for twelve sterile (that is, untraceable) rifles with telescopic sights and 500 rounds of ammunition; they did not get them. In May 1960, the United States withdrew most of its diplomats from the country, including the CIA Chief of Station. This resulted in the anomalous circumstance in which the Consul General, Henry Dearborn, became both acting ambassador and de facto CIA Chief of Station. Diplomatic efforts were made to convince Trujillo to resign the presidency. The dissidents, however, seemingly convinced Dearborn that Trujillo had some outsized ambitions and capabilities. On 10 October 1960, his report to the State Department included the following: One further point which I should probably not even make. From a purely practical standpoint, it will be best for us, for the OAS [Organization of American States], and for the Dominican Republic if the Dominicans put an end to Trujillo before he leaves this island. If he has his millions and is a free agent, he will devote his life from exile to preventing stable government in the D.R., to overturning democratic governments and establishing dictatorships in the Caribbean, and to assassinating his enemies. If I were a Dominican, which thank heaven I am not, I would favor destroying Trujillo as being the first necessary step in the salvation of my country and I would regard this, in fact, as my Christian duty. If you recall Dracula, you will remember it was necessary to drive a stake through his heart to prevent a con tinuation of his crimes. I believe sudden death would be more humane than the so lution of the Nuncio who once told me he thought he should pray that Trujillo would have a long and lingering illness. Dearborn was immediately instructed to stop using normal State Department communications to convey such messages as they were distributed to nineteen different offices. A week earlier, however, on 3 October, the CIA had already drafted a tentative memo titled ‘‘Plans of the Dominican Internal Opposition and Dominican Desk for Overthrow of the Trujillo Government.’’ On 12 January 1961, in the closing days of the Eisenhower administration, the minutes of the Special Group, which approved covert operations, included the following: Mr. Merchant explained the feeling of the Department of State that limited supplies of small arms and other material should be made available for dissidents inside the Dominican Republic. Mr. Parrott said that we believe this can be managed securely by CIA, and that the plan would call for final transportation into the country being provided by the dissidents themselves. The Group approved the project.
The Special Group minutes do not specifically refer to assassination, although it is known that at least DCI Allen Dulles was aware of the dissidents’ intention to assassinate the Dominican president. In February, Dulles and Deputy Direc tor for Plans Richard Bissell informed the new Kennedy administration’s Special Group of their predecessors’ decisions, including ‘‘a list of significant projects’’ that the CIA planned to continue. The only indication in the minutes that the Dominican Republic was mentioned came in National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy’s request for a memorandum ‘‘on the subject of what plans can be made for a successor government to Trujillo.’’ The word ‘‘assassination’’ does not appear in the minutes, but later memoranda mention the provision of arms. A memorandum from Bissell to Bundy on 17 February 1961 anticipates an imminent clash between Trujillo and the opposition ‘‘which will end either with the liquidation of Trujillo or with a complete roll up of the internal opposi tion.’’ No objections were recorded. In the early months of 1961, CIA officials discussed various possible assassina tion methods with Dominican dissidents in New York. In March 1961, three .38-caliber pistols were sent to the CIA station in the Dominican Republic at Dear born’s request and turned over to the dissidents. In April, three .30-caliber carbines already located in the consulate were passed to the dissidents with the approval of the CIA. Dearborn was instructed not to inform the State Department. In February and again in March, the dissidents requested five M3 .45-caliber, or comparable, machine guns and 1,500 rounds of ammunition. This was actually the first request to be explicitly tied to a Trujillo assassination plan, although they were for the assailants’ ‘‘personal protection,’’ while a silent weapon would be used for the actual deed. By this time, however, CIA head quarters was having qualms. They responded that the time was not right and suggested that the ‘‘mere disposal of Trujillo might create more problems than solutions.’’ Moreover, the dissidents did not have the capacity to receive the arms directly and the CIA did not want to use U.S facilities anymore. Neverthe less, in April Bissell approved a waiver of the rule forbidding the use of the dip lomatic pouch to carry firearms.
A determination has been made that the issuance of this equipment to the action group [that is, the dissidents] is desirable if for no other reason than to assure this important group’s continued cooperation with and confidence in this Agency’s determination to live up to its earlier commitments to the group. These commit ments took the form of advising the group in January 1961 that we would provide limited arms and assistance to them provided they develop the capability to receive it. Operational circumstances have prevented this group from developing the assets capable of receiving the above equipment through normal clandestine channels such as air drops or sea infiltration.
In April 1961, however, came the disastrous Bay of Pigs operation against Cuba. After that, both the State Department and the CIA shifted gears and sought to dissuade the dissidents from any precipitous action, especially one that would result in a power vacuum, in view of the ‘‘unsettled conditions in Caribbean area.’’ Dearborn was instructed not to pass the machine guns to the dissidents. They responded that this was their affair and they were not taking instructions from the United States. They continued to press for the machine guns but vowed to continue with what they had if necessary. Dearborn advised headquarters that since the CIA was already implicated it may as well go ahead and give them the guns. There followed a stream of reports from Santo Domi ngo (in those days called Ciudad Trujillo) predicting Trujillo’s imminent assassi nation. Bissell recommended to Dulles that the machine guns be turned over, again in view of the agency’s ‘‘considerable investment in this dissident group and its plans.’’ This sentiment was not universal in the CIA, however. On 3 May 1961, the Deputy Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of the Directorate of Plans met with Adolph Berle, who was at the time Chairman of the Inter-Agency Task Force on Latin America. The Deputy Chief spoke initially of dissident plans to ‘‘overthrow’’ Trujillo. In a memorandum of conversation, Berle recorded:
On cross examination it developed that the real plan was to assassinate Trujillo and they wanted guns for that purpose. [The CIA officer] wanted to know what the policy should be. I told him I could not care less for Trujillo and that this was the general senti ment. But we did not wish to have anything to do with any assassination plots anywhere, any time. [The CIA officer] said he felt the same way.
The Special Group met again on 18 May:
 Cabell [Deputy DCI] noted that the internal dissidents were pressing for the release to them of certain small arms now in U.S. hands in the Dominican Republic. He inquired whether the feeling of the Group remained that these arms should not be passed. The members showed no inclination to take a contrary position at this time
At the same time, Washington continued to be concerned about the possibil ity of a Cuban-style revolution in other countries of the region, including the Dominican Republic. Efforts to overthrow the Dominican government were still a possibility—once arrangements for a new government could be made—and contingency plans for military intervention were to be drawn up, but not neces sarily for assassination. The following record comes from a meeting of the National Security Council held on 5 May 1961. Note that no assassination plot is likely to be ‘‘multilateral.’’
Agreed that the Task Force on Cuba would prepare promptly both emergency and long-range plans for anti-communist intervention in the event of crises in Haiti or the Dominican Republic. Noted the President’s view that the United States should not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo before we knew what government would suc ceed him, and that any action against Trujillo should be multilateral.
A memorandum dated 13 May 1961 and addressed to White House staff member Richard Goodwin is the first clear indication that the White House had been made fully aware of the situation. Goodwin circled the paragraph and underlined the word ‘‘neutralize.’’
CIA has had in the direct custody of its Station in Ciudad Trujillo [Santo Domingo], a very limited supply of weapons and grenades. In response to the urgent requests from the internal opposition leaders for personal defense weapons attendant to their projected efforts to neutralize TRUJILLO, three (3) 38 Cal revolvers and three (3) carbines with accompanying ammunition have been passed by secure means to the opposition. The recipients have repeatedly requested additional armed support.
A cable sent to Dearborn with the approval of the president on 29 May 1961 tried in essence to have it both ways. The U.S. government was intrigued by the notion of being associated with the removal of a hated dictator but did not want to be tied to an assassination.
[W]e must not run the risk of U.S. association with political assassination, since U.S. as matter of general policy cannot condone assassination. This last principal is overriding and must prevail in doubtful situation ... . Continue to inform dissident elements of U.S. support for their position ... . [Regarding the refusal to give them the machine guns,] [t]ell them that this is because of our suspicion that method of transfer may be unsafe. In actual fact, we feel that the transfer of arms would serve very little purpose and expose the United States to great danger of association with assassination attempt.
A CIA officer in the Dominican Republic responded that it was too late to avoid the association.
HQ aware extent to which US government already associated with assassination. If we are to at least cover up tracks, CIA personnel directly involved in assassination preparation must be immediately withdrawn.
On 30 May 1961, Trujillo was assassinated by members of the dissident action group using handguns and shotguns. Within days, Dearborn and all CIA per sonnel who had had contact with the dissidents were withdrawn from the Do minican Republic. The CIA station was ordered to destroy all records of contact and related matters except contingency plans and the 29 May cable to Dearborn.
Not all allegations of CIA plots to assassinate leaders turned out to be true, however, even some that originated with sources who ought to know. In 1973, John W. Dean III suggested a plot within the White House to assassinate Omar Torrijos, the populist military ruler of Panama. Dean was a former White House counsel who had been a key witness in testifying against the Nixon administra tion in the Congressional investigation of the Watergate affair. The statement created a commotion in Panama, the State Department, the National Security Council, and the CIA. The following confidential telegram (designated No. 112189) arrived on 11 June 1973 at the State Department from the U.S. embassy in Panama. (Recall that E. Howard Hunt, a former CIA official, was a member of the White House ‘‘plumbers’’ who had helped organize the Watergate break in on behalf of the Committee to Re-elect the President.)
Hemisphere (WH) Division of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Directorate of Operations. (At the time, Henry Kissinger was both National Security Adviser and Secretary of State.)
20 June 1973
John Dean Allegations to Newsweek Magazine 1. Mr. William Jorden, the Latin American referent on Dr. Kissinger’s Staff, called today in reference to State cable No. 112189, dated 11 June (attached). He said that he had specific reference to paragraph 2 of that cable and would like to have ‘‘everything and anything we know’’ on that subject in the Agency. 2. The undersigned indicated to Mr. Jorden that he had checked out the allega tion that some low level White House officials had considered assassinating Torrijos when the story first appeared in Newsweek and, despite checking outside WH Division also, could find no one in the Agency who could recol lect or find anything relating to such a plan on the part of any portion of U.S. officialdom. I told him that I felt sure that nothing of this nature had come to WH Division’s attention because for the period in question I had been Deputy Chief of WH Division and had heard nothing about any such plan. Mr. Jorden asked if the Agency knew anything about Howard Hunt having had a team in Mexico ‘‘before the mission was aborted’’ and I indicated that as far as I knew, the Agency had no information on Hunt being in Mexico on such a mission. I also indicated, however, they could have been and the Agency might well not know it simply because he could have used an alias and he is an American citizen, which is outside the Agency’s province and really the FBI’s business. I suggested that it might be best if he checked the FBI on that particular angle. Subsequently I checked with Mr. William Broe, the IG [In spector General], and Mr. John Horton, recently returned [—] and both indi cated that they had not run across any information concerning this latter allegation of Hunt and a team in Mexico on a mission related to Panama. 3. It was apparent that Mr. Jorden was under some pressure to refute to refute these allegations and was casting about in all directions to make as certain of his ground as he possibly could before he tried to do so.
 [—signature and name deleted—]
Deputy Chief Western Hemisphere Division
Allegations of assassination arose with regard to two key controversies involv ing the war in Vietnam. The first concerned the coup d’ etat against South
Vietnam’s leader, Ngo Dinh Diem, in 1963, during which the premier was assassinated.7 The second was Operation Phoenix, which has been depicted as an assassination campaign against local civilian organizers of the Viet Cong throughout South Vietnam. The agency has regularly denied responsibility for the coup and assassination of Diem, and it has said that the Phoenix program has been misinterpreted. In 1963, the U.S. government was concerned that South Vietnamese leader Ngo Dinh Diem was destabilizing his own country and undermining the war effort against the Viet Cong guerrillas, which were supported by the govern ment of North Vietnam. In part, this was a result of growing tensions between the Catholic Diem and Buddhist protesters, some of whom had engaged in self immolation. American officials were particularly concerned about the growing power of Diem’s tyrannical and unpopular brother and sister-in-law, Ngo Dinh Nhu and Madame Nhu.8 Although the CIA did not stage a coup against the Diem regime, it was aware that a coup was coming. The South Vietnamese military had previously informed CIA operative Lucien Conein of their intention to overthrow Diem, and Conein reported that to headquarters. President John F. Kennedy received a briefing on this the next day from DCI John McCone
9 July 1963
I. South Vietnam continues restive over the unresolved Buddhist issue and a coup attempt is increasingly likely.
II. South Vietnam’s arm commander, Major General Tran Van Don, told a CIA officer on 8 July that there are plans by the military to overthrow President Diem. A. Don did not specify the timing of such action, but hinted that it might be within ten days. He said all but one or two general officers were agreed on the plan.
B. The military is the key to any successful move to oust the government, and Don is a respected officer. That makes this report the most sub stantial of a recent series on reported coup plots.
C. Among such reports are a plot centered around Diem’s former security chief, Tran Kim Tuyen, alleged to have set a target date of 10 July and to be cooperating with some military elements.9
III. Some of these reports may represent government efforts to smoke out dis affected elements, but Diem’s handling of the Buddhist issue has caused serious stresses within the administration in both civilian and military circles.
A. General Don claims that the military feels it must act to prevent the Viet Cong from capitalizing on the continuing Buddhist crisis.
IV. Buddhist leaders are skeptical that Diem will honor the concessions he made to them in the 16 June agreement.
A. They say they are laying plans for further demonstrations and sacrifi cial suicides if necessary. Extremist Buddhists appear determined to keep up agitation until the government is brought down.
V. Meanwhile, President Diem, presumably reinforced by the known opposi tion of his brother Nhu to any appeasement of the Buddhists, is taking the line that the religious issue has been resolved, and that the Buddhists now are merely acting as tools of his foreign and domestic enemies—including the Viet Cong.
A. Diem recently stated privately that however reasonable the Buddhist religious demands might be, concessions to them would only encour age further demands.
B. Government actions continue to suggest that Diem is using the 16 June agreement to stall until a propitious time to crack down on the chief Buddhist agitators.
VI. The sudden trial of prisoners accused of involvement in the 1960 coup attempt appears designed in part to warn disaffected elements—and the US—against thinking about coups.
A. While the US Embassy has found no evidence of deliberate govern ment instigation of the police assault against US reporters, Diem is known to feel that US reporting on the Buddhists and on South Vietnam in general has encouraged anti-regime activity.
VII. There continues to be little sign that the Viet Cong have been able to exploit the Buddhist issue effectively. The crisis has as yet had no appreci able effect on the conduct of the war.
President John F. Kennedy eventually decided not to interfere to prevent the coup. This is reflected in a cable, dated 29 August 1963, from Secretary of State Dean Rusk to the U.S. ambassador in Saigon, Henry Cabot Lodge, and the com mander of the American military advisory group, General Paul Harkins.
1. Highest level meeting noon today reviewed your [Cable No.] 375 and reaf firmed basic course. Specific decisions follow:
2. In response to your recommendation, General Harkins is hereby authorized to repeat to such [South Vietnamese] Generals as you indicate the messages previously transmitted by CAS officers. He should stress that the USG [United States Government] supports the movement to eliminate the Nhus from the government, but that before arriving at specific understandings with the Generals, General Harkins must know who are involved, resources avail able to them and overall plan for coup. The USG will support a coup which has good chance of succeeding but plans no direct involvement of U.S. Armed Forces. Harkins should state that he is prepared to establish liaison with the coup planners and to review plans, but will not engage directly in joint coup planning.
3. Question of last approach to Diem remains undecided and separate personal message from Secretary to you develops our concerns and asks your comment.
 4. On movement of U.S. forces, we do not expect to make any announcement or leak at present and believe that any later decision to publicize such move ments should be closely connected to developing events on your side. We cannot of course prevent unauthorized disclosures or speculation, but we will in any event knock down any reports of evacuation.
 5. You are hereby authorized to announce suspension of aid through Diem Government at a time and under conditions of your choice. In deciding upon use of this authority, you should consider importance of timing and manag ing announcement so as to minimize appearance of collusion with the Gener als, and also to minimize danger of unpredictable and disruptive reaction by existing government. We also assume that you will not in fact use this authority unless you think it essential, and we see it as possible that Harkins’ approach and increasing process of cooperation may provide assurance of Generals’ desire. Our own view is that it will be best to hold this authority for use in close conjunction with the coup, and not for present encourage ment of Generals, but decision is yours.
NOTE: Passed to the White House, OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense], CIA with special captions.
Sensing what was afoot, Diem’s brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, planted stories about the CIA in the pro-government press in South Vietnam. These were then picked up by the U.S. press. Nhu revealed the name of the Saigon Chief of Sta tion, John Richardson; claimed that the CIA station was trying to undermine the embassy; and generally blamed CIA activities for the adverse turn in political trends. In response, DCI McCone prepared this (typically huffy) CIA briefing for President Kennedy on the agency’s role in South Vietnam.
8 October 1963
At your Wednesday [9 October] press conference you will undoubtedly be ques tioned about CIA’s role in South Viet Nam. This as you know has been the subject of countless erroneous and misleading news articles and editorials, the most vio lent of which have been introduced into the Congressional Record with equally violent speeches condemning CIA as ‘‘irresponsible,’’ and winding up with a demand for a Joint Watchdog Committee. The principal accusations are: 1. CIA makes policy independent of State Department. 2. CIA’s estimates and reports on South Viet Nam have been erroneous and many have been willfully withheld from our Ambassador and from U.S. pol icy makers. 3. CIA had undertaken activities beyond its area of competence, in secrecy and in contradiction of the desires of the Ambassador. 4. CIA is in violent disagreement with the Embassy, the military and other United States agencies in South Viet Nam. As you know the facts contradict these and a variety of other equally irresponsi ble statements made in the press or on the Floor of the Congress, the details of which I will not burden you with. The facts are: 1. CIA does not make policy nor do we express ourselves on policy except to the extent that I do personally as a member of your Executive Committee. 2. CIA estimates and reports on South Viet Nam have been consistently correct. They have reflected the autocratic character of the Diem regime for the past 9 years. They have reflected the tarnishing of the regime’s image in the eyes of the people of South Viet Nam and in world opinion for the past 18 months. They have reported on countless coup d’etat rumors and evaluated them as improbable of coming off because of a lack of unanimity among the military. They have reported favorable progress in the war, at the same time pointing out trouble spots such as the [Mekong] Delta [region]. In fact CIA’s reporting supports the logic of your decisions reached following the McNamara-Taylor mission.10 I might add that [—] who has been under such criticism recently has in my opinion been consistently right in his observations. 3. CIA has undertaken no activities of any nature which have not been approved by the Ambassador and agreed to by the Country Team. Moreover CIA’s activities, together with those of the military, USOM, AID, USIA, etc. are held under review by the Southeast Asian Task Force and the special Interdepartmental Counter Insurgency Group, hence there seems no founda tion for the allegations that CIA operates without control.11 4. Prior to about the first of September there had been no reports of conflicts between the CIA station in Saigon and the Embassy, the military or other agencies. Quite to the contrary, reports of a proper working relationship have been received by me from the Ambassador, from the innumerable missions which have gone to South Viet Nam, i.e. General Wheeler, Gen. Krulak, Mr. Forrestal, Adm. Felt, and indeed, my own observations on my visit there. Additionally a senior CIA officer and our Saigon Station Chief have attended every one of Secretary McNamara’s Honolulu meetings and at those meet ings the station’s activities have been reviewed and approved subject to mod ifications agreed to at the meeting. There is no doubt that the criticism which has found its way into hundreds of news articles and editorials is seriously eroding the spirit of this organiza tion which I have now spent two years trying to rekindle. I suggest in view of this it might be timely for you to put the entire matter in focus at your press conference and, if you do so, I believe the problem will disappear.
Through the summer and autumn of 1963, Kennedy and other members of the administration wavered in regard to the coup, proposing alternatives to force Diem to carry out reforms, for instance, and then returning to the coup idea when efforts failed. Members of the National Security Council once again had second thoughts in late October, after hearing a CIA assessment that the number of troops deemed likely to support the coup and the number of troops deemed loyal to Diem were roughly equal. Representatives of the CIA at the meeting were DCI John McCone; Richard Helms, then the Deputy Director for Plans; and William Colby, then the Chief of the Far East Division.
MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT October 29, 1963, 4:20 PM, Subject: Vietnam Others present: Vice President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Attorney General, Director McCone, General Taylor, General Krulak, Under Secretary Harriman, Mr. Alexis Johnson, Mr. William Bundy, Mr. Helms, Mr. Mendenhall (State), Mr. Colby (CIA), Mr. Bundy, Mr. Forrestal, Mr. Bromley Smith
Mr. Colby of CIA gave the current status of coup forces. He estimated that the pro Diem and anti-Diem forces were about even, approximately 9800 on each side, with 18,000 listed as neutral. The briefing was illustrated with a CIA order of battle map. The President asked what Diem had learned from the attempted coup in 1960. Mr. Colby replied that Diem now had much better communications with military  forces deployed outside Saigon. He could thus call into Saigon rapidly loyal forces to oppose rebel forces in the city. The 1960 coup was frustrated when forces out side Saigon remained loyal, moved into Saigon, and defeated the forces which had surrounded the palace. Mr. McGeorge Bundy suggested that the assessment just given the group be sent to Saigon to see if our officials there agreed with it. He asked whether Ambassador Lodge should return to Washington now and mentioned that some of those pres ent felt he should stay in Saigon. Secretary Rusk said we must assume that Diem and Nhu have heard rumors about a coup. The question for us is whether we think there is enough prospect of a successful coup to make the decision to keep silent. Should we let the coup gen erals know that a protracted civil war must not be the result of their efforts to over throw Diem? Should we tell them we would support them only if the coup is short and bloodless? If fighting between the two sides takes place, each will ask for our help. If we support Diem, then we will disrupt the war effort because we will be acting against those generals who are now fighting the war against the Viet Cong. If we support the rebel generals, then we will have to guarantee that they are suc cessful in overthrowing the Diem government. Ambassador Lodge was asked by General Don to stick to his departure plan so Lodge should go as he had planned. We now have little information. We need 48, not 4, hours advance notice of any coup. We should put or faith in no one, includ ing General Don. We should caution the generals that they must have the situation in hand before they launch a coup. We should tell them we have no interest what soever in a long civil war in South Vietnam. The President agreed that Ambassador Lodge should leave Saigon for Washing ton as planned. He thought the rebel generals should talk to General Harkins. He said the odds were against a coup. He suggested that General Harkins be put in charge of our mission in Saigon when Ambassador Lodge leaves. If Ambassador Lodge delays his departure, Diem will know we are aware of coup plans. It would be good to have Ambassador Lodge out of the country when a coup takes place. Regarding the estimate that the pro- and anti-Diem forces are evenly balanced, the President commented that it always looks this way until the coup actually begins. Then support for the coup is forthcoming, as was apparent, for example, in Korea. General Taylor cautioned against looking at the Vietnam situation as if it were a football game. He said a few key people are crucial to the success of the coup and are more important than total numbers. The President asked that we try to find out who these key people are. Secretary McNamara asked who of our officials in Saigon are in charge of the coup planning. He suggested that the Deputy Chief of Mission, Truehart, the Act ing Chief of CIA, [—], and General Harkins form a group which would (a) jointly decide on what our agent Conein would say and do, and (b) hear all of Conein’s reports. If any of these three disagree, a report would be sent back to Washington at once. General Harkins may not know what the Embassy and CIA are now doing. Truehart should head the Vietnamese country team until the coup was initi ated. At that time, General Harkins would take over with Truehart becoming his political adviser. Director McCone did not agree that a troika should be set up in Saigon. He said it would be better for the CIA officer to take direction rather than participate in a decision-making group. The Attorney General, acknowledging that he had not seen all of the reports, said that in his opinion the present situation makes no sense to him on the face of it. The situation in Vietnam is not comparable to that in Iraq or in a South American country where a coup could be brought off promptly. The situation now is no dif ferent than that of four months ago when the generals were not able to organize a coup. To support a coup would be putting the future of Vietnam and in fact all of Southeast Asia in the hands of one man not now known to us. Diem will not run from a fight or quit under pressure. A failure of a coup risks so much. The reports we have are very thin and the information about the assets which the rebel generals have at their command is limited. We have a right to know what the rebel generals are planning. We can’t go half way. If the coup fails, Diem will throw us out. If we send out the draft cable as it stands, it will appear that we are in favor of a coup and only want more information. ‘‘My view is the minority view.’’ Secretary Rusk replied that if we say we are not for a coup, then the coup minded military leaders will turn against us and the war effort will drop off rapidly. General Taylor said he agreed with the Attorney General. When pressed by the President, General Taylor said that even a successful coup would slow down the war effort because the new central government would be inexperienced. In addi tion, all of the provincial chiefs appointed by Diem would probably be replaced by a new government. Director McCone said he agreed with General Taylor. The failure of a coup would be a disaster and a successful coup would have a harmful effect on the war effort. The President asked General Taylor why all the province chiefs would be replaced. He replied that as Diem appointees they would be loyal to Diem, and, therefore, not trusted by the rebel generals who had overthrown Diem. Secretary Rusk said the important question was whether the rebel generals could achieve quick success. He felt that in the long run, if the Diem government continued, the war effort would go down hill. Mr. Harriman said it was clear that in Vietnam there was less and less enthusi asm for Diem. We cannot predict that the rebel generals can overthrow the Diem government, but Diem cannot carry the country to victory over the Viet Cong. With the passage of time, our objectives in Vietnam will become more and more difficult to achieve with Diem in control. The President said it appears that the pro- and anti-Diem military forces are about equal. If this is so, any attempt to engineer a coup is silly. If Lodge agrees with this point of view, then we should instruct him to discourage a coup. Mr. McGeorge Bundy said the most unfortunate development would be a three day civil war in Saigon. The time remaining for us to instruct Lodge is very short. If a military plane were sent to pick up Lodge, the Ambassador could stay longer in Vietnam during the uncertain days immediately ahead. Secretary McNamara thought that we ought to leave it up to Ambassador Lodge when he would leave Saigon for Washington. In commenting on the draft cable, he said he thought Lodge would read it as a change of signals. Lodge now believes that he is not to thwart a coup. The draft instructs him to call in Harkins, which would be difficult to do in view of the fact that Lodge is not now keeping General Harkins informed of developments. The Ambassador should be given an option to delay his return if he wishes. The President asked what were Lodge’s existing instructions. In reply, Secretary Rusk read a paragraph from the October 5 telegram. The President agreed to ask Lodge what he thought he ought to do about returning to Washington. Mr. McGeorge Bundy said the working group would rewrite the draft cable.
It proved too late for second thoughts. The coup was carried out on 1 No vember 1963, and proved successful. On the day of the coup, the CIA’s Lucien Conein was summoned to the Joint General Staff Headquarters of the South Vietnamese military. When he went, he brought with him $42,000 in cash. (By some estimates it was closer to $70,000.) It appears that no record was left concerning exactly how the money was used. Years later, a retired CIA official commented to William Colby [A]s you well know, when Lou Conein received his summons to report to the Joint General Staff Headquarters on 1 November 1963 a large amount of cash went with him. My impression is that the accounting for this and its use has never been very frank or complete.12
The Vietnamese generals behind the coup had also suggested to their CIA contact their intention to assassinate Diem in the process of the coup. The U.S. government did not approve of this, but neither did it do anything to prevent it. Conein feared that too much moralizing would simply cut off his access to inside information without preventing the outcome. Nevertheless, a case officer did warn Diem that it was coming. Diem was able to escape during the coup, but he turned himself over to the military high command afterward in return for a promise of safe conduct. He was never seen alive again
 The second matter regarding Vietnam was Operation Phoenix, technically not a CIA operation but a program of the South Vietnamese government. It was also known by its Vietnamese name, Phung Hoang. William Colby, later the Director of Central Intelligence, ran this program from 1968 to 1971, while officially detached from the CIA, and he was the one who revealed its existence to the public during Congressional testimony in 1971. The purpose of the program was to identify members of the Viet Cong and to classify them as local leaders, holders of other responsible positions, or just rank-and-file members. That infor mation was then shared with the South Vietnamese army, police, and govern ment at various levels. The Phoenix program had no armed units of its own. Collectively, Colby termed the subjects of his program as the Viet Cong Infra structure (VCI) and estimated their number at 70,000. In this way, he figured, action—whether surveillance, persuasion, detention, or attack—could be aimed at specific enemy targets rather than at random segments of the population as frequently occurred in this war as in others. Colby later objected to the depiction of Operation Phoenix as an assassination program, although a good many of the Viet Cong leaders identified were in fact killed. He issued the following directive in 1969, after a case officer objected to participating in the program based on rumors he had heard about it.
The Phoenix program is one of advice, support, and assistance to the GVN [Gov ernment of Vietnam] Phung Hoang program, aimed at reducing the influence and effectiveness of the Viet Cong Infrastructure in South Vietnam. The Viet Cong Infrastructure is an inherent part of the war effort being waged against the GVN
by the Viet Cong and their North Vietnamese allies. The unlawful status of mem bers of the Viet Cong Infrastructure (as defined by the Green Book and in GVN of ficial decrees) is well established in GVN law and is in full accord with the laws of land warfare followed by the United States Army. Operations against the Viet Cong Infrastructure include: the collection of intelli gence identifying those members, inducing them to abandon their allegiance to the Viet Cong and rally to the government, capturing or arresting them in order to bring them before Province Security Committees for lawful sentencing, and, as a final resort, the use of military or police force against them if no other way of pre venting them from carrying out their unlawful activities is possible. Our training emphasizes the desirability of obtaining these target individuals alive and of using intelligent and lawful methods of interrogation to obtain the truth of what they know about other aspects of the VCI. U.S. personnel are under the same legal and moral constraints with respect to operations of a Phoenix character as they are with respect to regular military operations against enemy units in the field. Thus, they are specifically not authorized to engage in assassinations or other violations of the rules of land warfare, but they are entitled to use such reasonable military force as is necessary to obtain the goals of rallying, capturing or eliminating the VCI in the RVN [Republic of (South) Vietnam]. If U.S. personnel come in contact with activities conducted by Vietnamese which do not meet the standards of land warfare, they are certainly not to participate fur ther in the activity. They are also expected to make their objections to this kind of behavior known to the Vietnamese conducting them, and they are expected to report the circumstances to the next higher U.S. authority for decision as to action to be taken with the GVN. There are individuals who find normal police or even military operations repug nant to them personally, despite the over-all legality and morality of these activ ities. Arrangements exist whereby individuals having this feeling about military affairs can, according to law, receive specialized assignments or even exemptions from military service. There is no similar legislation with respect to police-type activities of the U.S. military, but if an individual finds the police-type activities of the Phoenix program repugnant to him, on his application, he can be reassigned from the program without prejudice.
During his Congressional testimony in 1971, Colby noted that of those individ uals identified by the Phoenix program, approximately 17,000 had been granted amnesty, 28,000 had been captured, and 20,000 had been killed. He maintained that most of those killed had died as a result of ‘‘combat actions,’’ not assassina tion, but he admitted that he could not swear that assassination never occurred.13 Colby remained sensitive on the subject of the Phoenix program, especially regarding accusations that it was an assassination campaign. The issue came up, once again, in ‘‘Walter Scott’s Personality Parade,’’ a regular column in Parade mag azine, a California-based weekly newspaper supplement carried by The Washington Post among others. Despite the name, ‘‘Walter Scott’s Personality Parade’’ was writ ten by Lloyd Shearer, editor at large at Parade. It regularly offered answers to read ers’ queries on a diverse range of topics, with a heavy emphasis on celebrities but also including politics. On 9 January 1972, between items on actor Ernest Borgnine’s marital problems and Richard Nixon’s private golf course, this exchange appeared:
Q. Is there any agency of the U.S. government which has been authorized to include politi cal assassination in its practices? M. Wilson, Austin, Tex
A. The one U.S. agency which uses political assassination as a weapon is the Cen tral Intelligence Agency. Many of its men in Vietnam have assassinated civilian Communists in an effort to destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure. Operation Phoe nix run by the CIA established a new high for U.S. political assassinations in Viet nam, largely in response to enemy terrorist tactics which also include assassination, kidnapping, terrorism of all sorts. Colby, by this time the Executive Director-Comptroller of the CIA, responded with a letter addressed personally to Shearer, although only after sending it to numerous ranking CIA officials for review. There are several copies of a draft returned to Colby with marginal notations in the ‘‘Family Jewels’’
file. 5317
 Briley Place Washington, D.C.
 20016 January 11, 1972
Mr. Lloyd Shearer Editor at Large Parade Magazine 733 Third Avenue New York, New York 10017 Dear Mr. Shearer: In your issue of January 9th, one of Walter Scott’s Personality Parade responses stated that CIA ‘‘uses political assassination as a weapon’’ and that Operation Phoenix ‘‘run by the CIA established a new high for U.S. political assassinations in Vietnam.’’ Since I have held responsible positions in CIA for many years and was also (during detached service from CIA) responsible for U.S. support to Operation Phoenix, I believe I am uniquely qualified to testify (as I have in public session under oath to Senate and House Committees) that: a. CIA does not and has not used political assassination as a weapon. b. Operation Phoenix was run not by the CIA but by the Government of Viet nam, with support of the CORDS [Civil Operations and Revolutionary De velopment Support] element of the U.S. Military Assistance Command in coordination with several U.S. agencies including CIA. c. Operation Phoenix is not and was not a program of assassination. It coun tered the Viet Cong apparatus attempting to overthrow the Government of Vietnam by targeting its leaders. Wherever possible, these were apprehended or invited to defect, but a substantial number were killed in firefights during military operations or resisting capture. There is a vast difference in kind, not merely in degree, between these combat casualties (even including the few abuses which occurred) and the victims of the Viet Cong’s systematic cam paign of terrorism to which Mr. Scott quite accurately referred. In order to clarify this important question to the millions of concerned Americans who read Parade, I should appreciate your publishing this letter. Sincerely, /signed/ W. E. Colby
Shearer responded to Colby’s letter with skepticism, a hint of sarcasm, and with a challenge of his own.
February 7, 1972
Mr. W. E. Colby
 5317 Briley Pl. Washington, D.C. 20016
Dear Mr. Colby:
Thank you for your kind and informative letter of January 11 concerning Opera tion Phoenix. I don’t want to get into a running word-battle with you on the subject of politi cal assassination in Indo-China or the role of the CIA and other of our agencies in Operation Phoenix. I am just wondering if you would care to say flatly that the CIA has never used political assassination in Indo-China or elsewhere and had never induced, employed, or suggested to others that such tactics or devices be employed. If you will make that flat statement under oath, I will not only apologize, I will tango with Dick Helms in Garfinkel’s largest show window at 14th and F—providing, of course, Mrs. Helms gives her permission. Again, I thank you for your interest and commend you for the really outstand ing service you have rendered the country. You are indeed one of Helms’ finest. Respectfully,
A flat-out, sworn statement denying that the CIA had ever used assassination was more than Colby had bargained for. To begin with, these were the sorts of issues that were concealed from people who did not have a ‘‘need to know,’’ regard less of their security clearance. As executive director, however, he could now check with responsible officials beyond the Far East Division, with which he was person ally familiar.14 The ‘‘Family Jewels’’ file contains his handwritten notes as he gath ered information on actual and alleged assassination plots. In each case, he tried to reason how it was either not an operation of the CIA or not really an assassination.15
Notes: Diem: CIA had no forewarning of Diem’s assassination. CIA attempted to arrange a safe conduct out of Vietnam for Diem and Nhu. Lumumba: CIA had nothing to do with Lumumba’s death. Earlier, however, an action was initiated but abandoned. Castro: Part of the Bay of Pigs plan involved a commando unit targetted on Castro, the leader of the defending forces. This was part of a large paramilitary operation, not a political assassination. On a separate occasion, an action was initiated but abandoned. Counter-Terror: In Vietnam in 1964, teams were organized and paid by CIA to con duct operations against the Viet Cong. The teams later became the Provincial Re connaissance Units (PRU). These were a part of the war effort, not political assassination. When questions arose as to their tactics, CIA tightened its and the GVN [Government of Viet Nam] controls over them. Laos: In the war in Laos, commando and guerrilla squads played an important role against the North Vietnamese. These were a part of paramilitary and military oper ations, not political assassination.
Notes: Diem: CIA had no forewarning of Diem’s assassination. CIA attempted to arrange a safe conduct out of Vietnam for Diem and Nhu. Lumumba: CIA had nothing to do with Lumumba’s death. Earlier, however, an action was initiated but abandoned. Castro: Part of the Bay of Pigs plan involved a commando unit targetted on Castro, the leader of the defending forces. This was part of a large paramilitary operation, not a political assassination. On a separate occasion, an action was initiated but abandoned. Counter-Terror: In Vietnam in 1964, teams were organized and paid by CIA to con duct operations against the Viet Cong. The teams later became the Provincial Re connaissance Units (PRU). These were a part of the war effort, not political assassination. When questions arose as to their tactics, CIA tightened its and the GVN [Government of Viet Nam] controls over them. Laos: In the war in Laos, commando and guerrilla squads played an important role against the North Vietnamese. These were a part of paramilitary and military oper ations, not political assassination.
5317 Briley Place, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20016
29 February 1972
Mr. Lloyd Shearer Editor-at-Large Parade Magazine 140 N. Hamilton Drive Beverly Hills, California 90211 Dear Mr. Shearer: Thank you for your letter of February 7, 1972, and its kind words about me. As you can imagine, your challenge set me to work to meet it. As a result I can say, under oath if need be, that the CIA has never carried out a political assassination, nor has it induced, employed or suggested one which occurred. Whether this fully meets your challenge, I cannot say (it takes two to tango), but it is a long way from the original statement in Mr. Scott’s column that CIA ‘‘uses political assassination as a weapon.’’ Perhaps I am too sensitive, but I would hope you could set the re cord straight for your readers.
/signed/ W. E. Colb
If Colby was proud of his subtlety, it was wasted. Shearer was evidently out raged by the statement. He sent a further response, in which sarcasm com pletely took charge
April 30, 1972 Dear General Colby: (1) Thank you for your article, ‘‘Should Lesbians Be Allowed to Play Professio nal Football?’’ I found it intriguing, and we plan to run it in a future issue under your by-line, of course. (2) Thank you for arranging a tango with me and Dick Helms of Her Majesty’s Tel Aviv Rifles. Even at Williams, Dick was one of the great tango-artists of our time. Garfinkels, Woodrop-Lathrop, even Hechts—in fact, any place and time of your choosing is O.K. with me. (3) One sad note! Will you tell Angus16 we cannot use his new car bumper sticker: LICK DICK in ’72, because it is open to misinterpretation. In addi tion, we try to remain politically neutral.
(4) As to your willingness to say under oath that the CIA has never been part to political assassination, I, of late, have been travelling a good deal. In the course of my travels I happened to encounter Oleg Penkovsky—not your Oleg—but Penkovsky, a bartender in Cleveland, Ohio.17 Penkovsky told me that you signed a secrecy agreement, Form 270, witnessed by Victor L. Marchetti.18 Under the terms of this agreement you are pledged to eternal silence concerning CIA activities. Unless you have a special Papal dispensation—the kind given Allen Dulles and Lyman Kirkpatrick, Jr.,19 it seems to me you are lip-sealed. Perhaps this does not apply to hearings before the Senate Foreign Rela tions Committee or the prestigious Council on Foreign Relations. If this is so, please let me know; and we will take it from there. (5) I will be in Washington shortly staying at the home of [columnist] Jack Anderson out in Silver Spring. Perhaps we can meet there for a small sum mit. I will have with me several former Green Beret members who want to discuss with you the subject of CIA imposters in South Vietnam, who lied to them and me, too. Let me hear from you.
All the best,
There is an official routing slip, dated 4 may 1972, associated with the above letter in the ‘‘Family Jewels’’ file, forwarding it to the Director of Central Intelli gence, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and Mr. Thuermer. Across the slip, someone has scrawled, ‘‘I suggest we let the whole thing drop.’’
Apart from Operation Phoenix, the issue of assassination came into the open through the leaks and rumors surrounding the creation of the ‘‘Family Jewels’’ file. Colby discovered that it had gotten out when he was approached by Daniel Schorr, then with CBS News. In 1988, Colby was asked about this by the CIA Oral History Program.20
Yes. Daniel Schorr came to me and he dropped that little bombshell on my desk. President Ford, in a background discussion [about the refusal to release the Family Jewels to the public], had been asked, ‘‘Why are you defending this?’’ And he said, ‘‘Well, there are a lot of things in there you can’t handle.’’ ‘‘Such as?’’ And he said, ‘‘Assassinations.’’ They were all under background rules. The Times couldn’t use it. But as the newsmakers go, they talked [to other reporters]. So, Schorr had the view that there’s a story here if I can just get something to hook it on to. He came to me and said, ‘‘I understand from the president that there’s been assassinations going on in this country.’’ I said [to myself], ‘‘Oh, shit.’’ I really clammed up at that point because I knew I was in deep trouble. I said, ‘‘Well,’’ and I reverted to what I have done frequently [which was to] answer exactly what the man said. I said, ‘‘Well, no, not in this country.’’ But, I didn’t say anything beyond that. A staff historian went on to ask Colby if he had been ‘‘surprised about the assassination issue’’ itself. He responded:
No, not terribly. I don’t think I was morally shocked at it. If you really think about assassination, that’s what I was forced to do, it seems to me it just doesn’t add up. You think you can solve something by eliminating a guy—it’s playing God. You have no idea who is going to succeed him, you have no idea what the repercus sions will be, or, the worst, you getting caught doing it. The repercussions are potentially enormous. For intelligence operations, it seems to me that you have several simple ques tions to ask before you start one. One, how important is it? What are the risks? What is the impact if it goes sour? And on the last issue, it seems to me you have to turn it down. Now that is being pragmatic, not moral. I think there are moral considerations, too; but being pragmatic, I just think that assassination doesn’t work. Politically, it’s dynamite. We may do dumb things, we chased all the Japanese Americans off the west coast because we were scared. Countries do dumb things when they get scared.
In a separate interview by the Oral History Program, Helms was also asked about assassination. He gave a somewhat less nuanced response.
The Agency never assassinated anybody, ever. I was there from the day the doors opened until I left in ’73, and I know the Agency never killed anybody, anybody. You can take my word for it. If you can find anything in the record of anybody the Agency killed, bring it in here and show it to me. This whole business about Cas tro was caused largely by the fact that the task force that was working on Cuba had some ideas floated as to ways to get rid of Castro, to make him sick or to do something about him. I don’t want to go into a long disquisition about this assassi nation business. I’ve said everything I have to say before the Church Committee and there’s absolutely no percentage at this late date in my going over this whole area again because it gets complicated by nuances and who said what and who didn’t say what. I just really don’t want to go into it any further. I’ve told you we didn’t kill anybody, and it seems to me that’s the important thing. We didn’t even try to kill anybody.
One of the other notorious aspects of the history of the CIA involved ‘‘mind control’’ experiments on unwitting subjects as part of a program codenamed MKULTRA. In a particularly infamous episode, in 1953, Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, the head of the Chemical Division of the Technical Services Staff of the Directorate of Plans (and the same one who would later deliver the poison to Leopoldville), arranged for a group of scientists from the Special Operations Division of the U.S. Army’s Chemical Corps to be served Cointreau laced with LSD. This was reportedly done without approval, even against orders. One of the scientists, Dr. Frank Olson—who was himself developing biological weapons for potential use by the CIA—reportedly went out of his mind and later threw himself out a hotel window to his death. Gottlieb remained with the CIA for another twenty years, eventually becoming the Director of the Technical Services Division, as it was later called. There appear to be no records of the drug experiments, how ever. It is believed that Richard Helms had them destroyed when he left the agency early in 1973.21 Some sort of drug testing continued. The ‘‘Family Jewels’’ file includes the following cryptic note, apparently from William V. Broe, the Inspector General to William E. Colby, who was at the time Deputy Director for Operations and Executive Secretary of the CIA Management Committee. The undated note con cerns activities of the Office of Research and Development (ORD), a branch of the Directorate of Science and Technology. The ‘‘attached summary’’ mentioned does not appear in the ‘‘Family Jewels’’ file as released.
Executive Secretary
CIA Management Committee
SUBJECT: Drug Testing Program
1. The attached summary from ORD describes research into a behavioral drug. Conversations with [Deputy Director for Science and Technology] Carl Duck ett indicate that the reported drug was part of a larger program in which the Agency had relations with commercial drug manufacturers, whereby they passed on drugs rejected because of unfavorable side effects. The drugs were screened with the use of ADP equipment, and those selected for experimenta tion were tested at [—about three-fourths of a line deleted—] using monkeys and mice. Materials having further interest, as demonstrated by this testing, were then tested at Edgewood, using volunteer members of the Armed Forces.
 2. The program was teminated last fall. The computer program remains in the machine, its final disposition not yet having been decided.
3. Carl Duckett emphasizes that the program was considered as defensive, in the sense that we would be able to recognize certain behavior if similar mate rials were used against Americans.
 When Helms was asked about the issue of drug experimentation by the CIA Oral History Program in 1988, his response did not suggest that he was very concerned about it.22
Well, that has been a controversial issue from day one. There was the feeling, from Allen Dulles’s time on, that these drugs were available, that the Russians had access to them, maybe they were using them, so we should therefore know what they could do and what they couldn’t do, both for protection and in case it was felt at some time that it was desirable to make use of them. So that’s where the drug testing program originated. I know there’s been a great hoo-hah and lawsuits and all kinds of jiggery-pokery about whether this was done legally or illegally, morally or immorally, and there’s absolutely no percentage in my trying to sort this out and say which was which or which I thought was which. But it was estab lished that that was a legitimate function of the Agency to try and do this, and we went ahead and did it. One of the things that I think a thoughtful person might ask is: why is a country spending so much of its time complaining about a minor operation of this kind which has a useful function to it?
 Why is it that as a country we always have to wait until disaster strikes and then we want to spend billions of dollars trying to solve the problem? AIDS is a good example; cancer is a good example. We’re always late in the game, trying to run to catch up. So I have no apologies for that whole affair, and I think that some of the lawsuits have been absolutely egregious, I mean ridiculous. I can’t possibly explain why certain psychiatrists did the things that they did, but at least they were supposed to be reputable people at the time that they were given financing.
When the same issue was put to Colby, he allowed that it could have been handled differently.
I was understanding of the fact that you had a group of people in the Agency who were curious about the properties of some of these drugs and were legitimately fearful that they would be used against us. They had an idea of learning something about the properties. You can understand a scientist wanting to know how things work. Now, there are ways to do legitimate testing. You don’t want CIA to be on record as doing it, so you need some kind of a front to do it for you. But, there are rules about testing on human beings. The medical profession has them. I think you assume you would follow those rules. Apparently, they didn’t. This gets back to the old mystique idea—intelligence is different, we do things differently—which is nonsense. You know, that’s the thing that really scares you about intelligence agencies— where they go wrong is when they do violate people’s rights under the ‘‘higher good.’’ The KGB should not be our rationale
1. Of course, the documents were not supposed to have left headquarters in the first place. Tofte later attempted to sue DCI Richard Helms, claiming that the CIA security men who came for the documents seized his personal correspondence as well. This was the same Hans V. Tofte who had been in charge of CIA operations behind enemy lines in the Korean War.
2. See also U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report of the Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelli gence Activities, United States Senate: Together with Additional, Supplemental, and Separate Views (New York: W. W. Norton, 1976).
3. This and subsequent quotes from cables and official minutes regarding Lumumba are taken from Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders.
4. In 1961, the CIA considered establishing a permanent ‘‘executive action capabil ity,’’ which would include assassination in its repertoire. The project’s code name was ZR/RIFLE. This ‘‘third-country national,’’ known by the code name QJ/WIN, was recruited for ZR/RIFLE, but the agency claims that no assassination was ever carried out. See Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, 181–190.
5. John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006): 273–278; Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA (New York: Doubleday, 2007): 162–163; Larry Devlin, Chief of Station, Congo: A Memoir of 1960–67 (New York: Public Affairs Books, 2007). A book by investigative reporter Ludo de Witte, De moord op Lumumba (1999; also published as L’Assassinat de Lumumba [2000] and The Assassination of Lumumba [New York: Verso, 2001]) prompted the Belgian Parliament to hold an inquiry on Belgium’s role in Lumumba’s death. Excerpts of its final report, about 630 pages, can be found in Luc de Vos et al., Les Secrets de l’affaire Lumumba (Brussels: Racine, 2005). The full version is Bel gique, Chambre des repr esantants, Enqu^ete Parlementaire visant a determiner les circonstances exactes de l’assassinat de Patrice Lumumba et l’implication eventuelle des responsables politiques belges dans celui-ci (Brussels: The Chamber of Representatives of Belguim, 2001).
6. See Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, 191–215.
 7. On the Diem coup generally, see Howard Jones, Death of a Generation: How the Assassinations of Diem and JFK Prolonged the Vietnam War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); Seth Jacobs, Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America’s War in Vietnam, 1950–1963 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006)
8. In the Vietnamese practice, the family name comes first, followed by a generational name. Thus, Diem’s family name was Ngo, and members of his generation were named Dinh. However, perhaps because a small number of family names are extremely preva lent (especially Nguyen), people are identified by given name. Hence, President Diem, Madame Nhu, etc. The name Diem is pronounced ‘‘Zyem.’’
 9. This plot was foiled.
10. President Kennedy sent Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Maxwell D. Taylor on a fact-finding mission to South Vietnam in late September to early October 1963, where they could speak to Diem pri vately and evaluate the political and military situation.
11. USOM stands for the U.S. Operations Mission, an economic development office of AID; AID stands for the Agency for International Development; and USIA stands for the U.S. Information Agency.
12. Memorandum from Walter Elder, dated 1 June 1973. See the following chapter.
13. William Colby and Peter Forbath, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978): 266–276; Colby’s directive on 270–271.
14. See also, Colby and Forbath, Honorable Men, 311–312.
15. These are handwritten notes, and in some cases, lines run off the end of the page, but care has been made to make this transcription as accurate as possible. 16. Presumably CIA spokesman Angus Thuermer, who was responsible for dealing with the press.
17. Oleg Penkovsky was a Soviet military intelligence officer who provided a consider able amount of information to the CIA in the early 1960s.
18. A former CIA officer turned public critic, he was sued by the CIA for violating his secrecy agreement.
19. A former Director of Central Intelligence and a former CIA Inspector General.
20. ‘‘Oral History: Reflections of DCI Colby and Helms on the CIA’s ‘Time of Trou bles,’’’ Studies in Intelligence 51:3 (2007).
21. Jeffrey T. Richelson, The Wizards of Langley: Inside the CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001): 9–11; Weiner, Legacy of Ashes, 65–66. 22. ‘‘Oral History.’’
Chapter 5
At Headquarters in the 1960s:
A Brief Note
Most of the memoranda in the ‘‘Family Jewels’’ file deal with events of the late 1960s and the early 1970s. There is relatively little about earlier periods. Memo randa about efforts to find an assassin to kill Fidel Castro are a notable excep tion, dealt with in another chapter. A smaller exception is a single memorandum from Walter Elder. William E. Colby, Deputy Director for Operations and Executive Secretary, CIA Management Committee, turned to Elder in an effort to learn of possibly il licit activities of an earlier period for the ‘‘Family Jewels’’ file. Elder had been Assistant to the Director under Allen W. Dulles, John A. McCone, and William F. Raborn, Jr., in the early 1960s. His response to Colby’s query, although heav ily redacted, offered insights into a variety of topics, including the tapping of reporters’ phones, interagency rivalries, the CIA and labor unions, sloppy book keeping, reading other departments’ secret memos, and the tendency to avoid learning too many inconvenient facts.
1 June 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William E. Colby SUBJECT: Special Activities 1. Following our recent conversation, I have searched my memory and Mr. McCone’s files for examples of activities which to hostile observers or to someone without complete knowledge and with a special kind of motivation could be interpreted as examples of activities exceeding CIA’s charter. 2. First, as we discussed, on 7 March 1962, DCI McCone, under pressure from Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, agreed to tap the telephones of colum nists Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott in an effort to identify their sources for classified information which was appearing in their columns. Because the primary source appeared to be in the Department of Defense, McCone ordered me personally to brief General Joe Carroll, Director of DIA, orally, which I did. I understand more complete information on this operation is available from the Director of Security. I, personally, managed to avoid gain ing any knowledge of what precise actions were taken, what information was gained, what was done with it, and when the operation was terminated. 3. [—paragraph deleted; about 37 lines—] 4. Although certain activities never got beyond the planning stage, there are, I believe, three examples of such planning which could be subject to misinter pretation. One involved chemical warfare operations against [—about four fifths of a line deleted—]. A second involved a paramilitary strike against [—about two-thirds of a line deleted—]. Outside the United States Govern ment, General Eisenhower was briefed on such planning. A third, which assumes a new significance today, involved a proposal by [James J.] Angle ton and [Richard] Helms for a greatly increased intelligence collection effort against foreign installations in this country. This planning also involved a scheme for selected exposure of KGB activities and counteractions against the Soviet intelligence service. The reasons are still unclear to me why the FBI chose to brief the PFIAB [President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board] to the effect that CIA was planning to wiretap extensively and indis criminately in this country, to greatly increase the Agency representation in the Moscow Embassy, and generally to use KGB-type tactics, also exten sively and indiscriminately. This led to a heated exchange between DCI McCone and Mr. Belmont of the FBI, one such meeting taking place in the presence of the Attorney General. It is clear that the FBI was opposed to any such proposal then, as now, and the plan never went forward. 5. During the period when Des FitzGerald was in charge of the Cuban Task Force, DCI McCone’s office learned, quite by accident, that FitzGerald had secured the cooperation of several prominent US business firms in denying eco nomic items to Cuba. There was no question that the businessmen were glad to cooperate, but knowledge of this operation had to be rather widespread. 6. [—about six and a half lines deleted—] in connection with elections in Chile. On 12 May 1964 at a meeting of the 303 Committee [which approved covert operations], it was decided that the offers of American business could not be accepted, it being neither a secure way nor an honorable way of doing such business. This declaration of policy at this time bears on the recent ITT hearings, but I am not surprised that McCone has forgotten that he helped to set the precedent of refusing to accept such collaboration between the Agency’s operations and private business.1 7. At the direction of Attorney General Robert Kennedy and with the explicit approval of President Kennedy, McCone injected the Agency, and particu larly Cord Meyer [from the Directorate of Plans], into the US labor situation, and particularly to try to ameliorate the quarrel between George Meany [of the AFL-CIO] and Walter Reuther [of the UAW]. Cord Meyer steered a very skillful course in this connection, but the Agency could be vulnerable to charges that we went behind Meany’s back, or were somehow consorting with Reuther against Meany’s wishes. 8. There are three examples of using Agency funds which I know to be contro versial. One was the expenditure of money under Project MOSES in secur ing the release of Cuban brigade prisoners.2 Details of this operation are best known to Larry Houston, Mike Miskovsky, George MacManus, and James Smith. Second, as you well know, when Lou Conein received his summons to report to the Joint General Staff Headquarters on 1 November 1963 a large amount of cash went with him. My impression is that the accounting for this and its use has never been very frank or complete.3 Third, at one of the early Special Group meetings attended by McCone he took strong exception to proposals to spend Agency funds to improve the economic viability of West Berlin, and for an investment program in Mali. His general position was that such expenditures were not within the Agency’s charter, and that he would allow such spending only on the direct personal request of the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense, or the White House. 9. I raise these issues of funding because I remember the Agency’s being severely criticized by the House Appropriations Subcommittee for having spent $3,000 for stamps in connection with a program to buy tractors to secure the release of prisoners from Cuba. 10. Under the heading of old business, I know that any one who has worked in the Director’s office has worried about the fact that conversations within the offices and over the telephones were transcribed. During McCone’s tenure, there were microphones in his regular office, his inner office, his dining room, his office in East Building, and his study at his residence on White Haven Street. I do not know who would be willing to raise such an issue, but knowledge of such operations tends to spread, and certainly the Agency is vulnerable on this score. 11. Also under the heading of old business, [—just over three lines deleted—]. Shortly after the Cuban missile crisis, there was a disposition in Washington to reexamine the Bay of Pigs, and the fact that several Alabama National Air Guard officers lost their lives in the Bay of Pigs was surfaced with surpris ingly little excitement at the time. 12. During my stint on the 7th floor there was a special arrangement with the Office of Communications whereby the Director’s office gained access to non-CIA traffic. This surfaced briefly at one point shortly after Admiral Ray born [sic; Raborn] became DCI. He had visited the Signal Center and removed a copy of a telegram from the Embassy in the Dominican Republic for Under Secretary George Ball, Eyes Only. He returned to his office and proceeded to discuss this telegram with George Ball who was naturally quite curious as to how Rayborn knew about it, and also as to how Rayborn had it in his possession before Ball did. Ben Read in the Secretary of State’s office and I spent several weeks putting this one to rest. 13. Finally, DCI McCone, as you and I well know, operated on a very lofty plane, and I think certain of his activities could be misunderstood. One example was his decision in July of 1964 to have [Greek shipping magnate] Aristotle Onassis and [Greek soprano] Maria Callas flown from Rome to Athens on Air Force KC 135. Their arrival in Athens in this airplane attracted the attention of the local press and in due course Mr. John High tower, Chief of the Associated Press Bureau for Washington, came to see me to ask about the propriety of this action. 14. [—paragraph deleted; about ten lines—] 15. McCone dealt quite extensively with newsmen in Washington. In fact, they gave him a gift and a luncheon when he left Washington, which is perhaps indicative of the press’s relations with him. However, in the case of the Ross and Wise book, The Invisible Government, he did try to bring pressure on the publisher and the authors to change things.4 They did not change a comma, and I doubt that this old saw will ever sing again. 16. [—paragraph deleted; about four lines—] 17. The above listing is uneven, but I have a sinking feeling that discipline has broken down, and that allegations from any quarter which cast these things in the wrong light would receive great publicity and attention, and no amount of denial would ever set the record straight. If I may be of any assis tance in tracking down further details, I am of course at your disposal, but I would point out that I was very much in the position of the enlisted man who knew that the commissioned officers were aware of these activities and better able to judge their propriety and possible impact or misinterpretation.
 [—signature deleted—] WALTER ELDER
1. In 1970, International Telephone & Telegraph offered the CIA funds that were allegedly intended to prevent the Marxist candidate Salvador Allende from being elected president of Chile, where ITT had substantial investments. The CIA declined the offer but did suggest ways in which private corporations acting on their own could ‘‘create or accelerate economic instability in Chile.’’ Former DCI McCone was a member of the ITT board of directors at the time and was involved in making the offer. At Senate hearings conducted in 1973, there was conflicting testimony regarding the purpose of the funds, with ITT representatives claiming it was intended for investments to improve America’s image. See Time (9 April 1973).
2. The reference here is to the return of the captives from the Bay of Pigs invasion.
3. The reference here is to the military coup d’ etat against the South Vietnamese pre mier Ngo Dinh Diem. See Chapter
4, ‘‘Political Assassinations.’’
4. David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The Invisible Government (New York: Random House, 1964).
Chapter 6 Counterintelligence:
The Spies among Us
  Every intelligence agency must be concerned with the possibility that enemy intelligence agencies are trying to infiltrate it. Double agents and enemy spies are, of course, never as obvious as they appear in the movies. Infiltrators may or may not raise suspicions about themselves; so may perfectly innocent people. The handling of such matters may overlook horrendous security breaches, may ‘‘just save the day,’’ or may ruin lives for no good reason. For two decades, from 1954 to 1974, the head of counterintelligence within the Directorate of Plans was James J. Angleton. His outlook was shaped by an early experience in his career; in the late 1940s and early 1950s he had regularly shared details about secret operations over liquid lunches with the liaison from British intelligence, Kim Philby. Secret intercepts eventually revealed that Philby was a Soviet spy and was forwarding the information to Moscow, although Angleton was reluctant to believe it for some time. Philby was quietly pushed aside at the time, but he defected later, in 1963, and spent the rest of his life in Moscow. Angleton, according to some, became obsessive about the possibility of double agents within the CIA, although his defenders attributed the obses sion to the nature of counterintelligence work. The year after Philby’s defection, a Soviet intelligence agent named Yuriy Nosenko defected to the United States. Among other items of interest, Nosenko reported that he had known Lee Harvey Oswald after the latter’s defection to the Soviet Union but that the Soviets had had nothing to do with President Ken nedy’s assassination. Some of the things that Nosenko reported contradicted reports from another recent KGB defector, Anatoliy Golitsyn. The subsequent dispute over whether Nosenko was a genuine defector or a KGB-controlled plant supplying misleading information divided the CIA for years. Reexaminations of the case, and further disputes, were conducted peri odically into the 1980s. Indeed, it has never been resolved to everyone’s satisfac tion. Angleton and his Counterintelligence Staff and many in the Soviet Bloc Division of the Directorate of Plans believed that Nosenko had been sent inten tionally by the KGB and that the defection was a cover story. Those who believed Nosenko was a plant also came to think that the CIA was penetrated by Soviet spies. A widespread search for double agents ensued within the agency, which some termed a witch hunt.1 The following report regarding Nosenko comes from the ‘‘Family Jewels’’ file
SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko
Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, an officer of the KGB, defected to a representative of this Agency in Geneva, Switzerland, on 4 February 1964. The responsibility for his exploitation was assigned to the then SR [Soviet] Division of the Clandestine Service and he was brought to this country on 12 February 1964.2 After initial interrogation by representatives of the SR Division, he was moved to a safehouse in Clinton, Maryland, from 4 April 1964 where he as confined and interrogated until 13 August 1965 when he was moved to a specially constructed ‘‘jail’’ in a remote wooded area at [—]. The SR Division was convinced that he was a dispatched agent but even af ter a long period of hostile interrogation was unable to prove their contention and he was confined at [—] in an effort to convince him to ‘‘confess.’’ This Office together with the Office of General Counsel became increasingly con cerned with the illegality of the Agency’s position in handling a defector under these conditions for such a long period of time. Strong representations were made to the Director (Mr. Helms) by this Office, the Office of General Counsel, and the Legislative Liaison Counsel, and on 27 October 1967, the responsibility for Nosen ko’s further handling was transferred to the Office of Security under the direction of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, then Admiral Rufus Taylor. Nosenko was moved to a comfortable safehouse in the Washington area and was interviewed under friendly, sympathetic conditions by his Security Case Offi cer, Mr. Bruce Solie, for more than a year. It soon became apparent that Nosenko was bona fide and he was moved to more comfortable surroundings with consid erable freedom of independent movement and has continued to cooperate fully with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this Office since that time. He has proven to be the most valuable and economical defector this Agency has ever had and leads that were ignored by the SR Division were explored and have resulted in the arrest and prosecution [—one and a half lines deleted—]. He currently is liv ing under an alias; secured a divorce from his Russian wife and remarried an American citizen. He is happy, relaxed, and appreciative of the treatment accorded him and states ‘‘while I regret my three years of incarceration, I have no bitterness and now understand how it could happen.’’
William E. Colby commented briefly on the Nosenko case to the CIA Oral History Program in 1988:3
I’m not an expert on the Nosenko case, but I spoke to [former Deputy Director for Plans (DDP) Thomas] Karamessines about it, and I know that both Karamessines and Helms signed off on the fact that they accepted Nosenko’s story as basically true. Both of them are good, careful guys and they are not going to sign something that’s false. So, period, that did it. The Golitsyn thing is all over the place. I ran into the fact that some people were shoved out to outer darkness because they had somehow been in Berlin at the wrong time or something with no evidence—again, I am a lawyer—no evidence that they were in any way involved, but you had careers ruined. I said, ‘‘Bullshit, we are not going to do that.’’
Apart from the Nosenko affair, Colby in his memoirs and various memoranda repeatedly drew attention to Angleton’s insistence on continuing a program to inter cept and photograph first-class mail to and from the Soviet Union. Codenamed SRPOINTER, this program had begun in the early 1950s and continued until 1973. It was based at John F. Kennedy International Airport.4 A similar operation in San Francisco, called WESTPOINTER, intercepted mail to and from China. The following redacted memorandum provides some of the operational details of SRPOINTER.
22 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
 THROUGH: Mr. William E. Colby
Mr. Colby advised me that [—], extension [—], had called the Office of the Director in line with the Director’s memorandum to all employees dated 9 May 1973, requesting all employees to report activities which might be construed to be outside the legislative charter of the Agency. [—] is employed as a GS–5 clerk in the Cable Secretariat. He joined the Agency in September 1967 and worked in the Office of Security for 3–1/2 years before transferring to the Cable Secretariat in 1970. While in the Office of Security he was assigned to a support desk, SD3. The pri mary function of this desk was to [—just under one line deleted—]. During his assignment to this desk, [—] supported a project entitled SRPOINTER HTLINGUAL. [—] described the project as follows. The Office of Security [—] had a unit at JFK International Airport that photographed mail going to Soviet Bloc coun tries. This work was done by Agency staff employees. The mail was placed in bags by the regular Post Office employees and stacked. After their departure for the night, the Agency employees would open the mail and photograph it. Both incoming and outgoing mail, including postcards, were photographed. A watch list was maintained and priority was given to the names listed, but generally all mail was processed. The results of the operation were sent to Washington Headquarters where they were handled by [—]. He would receive a teletype advising him of the registry number and the number of items. He would check to see if the number of items received was correct and route the material to the appropriate offices. Generally about 1/4 of the material was separated into bundles bound with rubber bands. This portion was sent to TSD [Technical Services Division] for technical processing. The remaining material was sent to the CI [Counterintelligence] Staff, [—]. About twice a month the CI Staff would add names to or delete names from the list. [—] would send the changes in the list to the field office. The watch list was made up primarily of [—about a half line deleted—] who were in the United States. When [—] left the Office of Security in 1970, the project was still active. [—] was in no way emotional or belligerent. He presented the facts quickly and clearly and said he had no other information. He stated he would have come for ward with the information sooner but he had only recently had time to read the Director’s memorandum. The writer thanked him for his interest.
William V. Broe
Inspector General
In forwarding the previous memorandum from the Inspector General to the Director of Central Intelligence, Colby added a handwritten note to the cover sheet.
Recommend the IG express your appreciation to [—] & assure we will follow this up (which, of course, we already have done by terminating the activity).
Schlesinger, or someone on his behalf, responded with an even briefer note.
 Done—29 May 73
On top of the Nosenko affair and the mail program, it appears that Angleton was inexplicably allowed to take personal control of all relations with Israeli intelligence. In addition, Colby believed that the Counterintelligence Staff was too concerned with looking for spies within the CIA and not sufficiently inter ested in infiltrating the KGB. Once Colby became DCI, he began to push Angle ton out of the agency. The following comments by Colby are from the CIA’s Oral History Program:
I had first known of him [Angleton] when I was in Italy [in the 1950s]. He had su perb Italian contacts. He had been there in the latter part of the war and met a lot of people. He is a very opinionated guy, which is all right except the idea was that his reports should go straight to God. I remember really getting upset when I heard that he was back in Washington one time, stood on a street corner and a car drove by with Allen Dulles and [his brother] the secretary of state [John Foster Dulles], picked him up and they had a talk in the car. I said, ‘‘My God! Is this a se rious intelligence agency?’’ Having this guy with his strong opinions directly at the policy level without any analysis, any comparison with the other factors going on. It just violates my sense of what intelligence is all about. I spent some time gradually working him into a more normal pattern so that his reports would go in in an ordinary way and go into the ordinary analytical process. While they were valuable, they weren’t just rolled gold. I sort of had that sense that the Angleton approach was to run these highly personalized things. Then, remem ber, I was appointed for a while to take over the Soviet Division. I began the briefing and it was pretty clear that the Soviet Division in the Agency had been all tied up the last several years in this whole series of Nosenko and Golitsyn and all that crap. Every time they tried to move an inch, the CI people said, ‘‘No, it’s a fake.’’ I think that’s why Helms was going to send me there to try to straighten the goddamn thing out. Let Angleton do his thing, but get something going there that made sense. Then, of course, I went over to Vietnam, but that [the Nosenko affair] left a bad taste in my mouth. Seemed to me that we were hurting ourselves. I never thought that the object of CIA was to protect itself against the KGB. The object of the CIA is to get into the Kremlin; that’s what our function is. Sure, you protect yourself, but you goddamn well better have the offensive mission. So, I had doubts about that. Then I ran into the goddamn mail thing and Jim’s insistence on holding it. Then I ran into the Israeli business when I became DDO—here the Israeli account was over here in a corner someplace and had nothing to do with the rest of the Middle East. The officers in those stations were prohibited from communicating with each other. I said, ‘‘This can’t be serious! You’ve got a common problem in the Middle East and you’ve got two separate teams working on it that never talk to each other!’’ I mean it’s just nutty. I understand some of the reasons for it and all this, but I felt I had to change this. Then I found that he had a whole lot of people, a very large staff—I’ve forgotten how big it was—and I was under pressure to cut at that point. I had been trying to find out what the hell these people did. I couldn’t find that they were doing anything that I could understand. Seemed to me this was a good place to cut. So then when I was DDO, I broke off the Israeli thing, gave it to the NE [Near East] Division; then I made some cuts. Of course, we cut off the mail opening and so forth. It was obvious that I had no confidence in Jim actually running it. So, I tried to sort of edge Jim toward the door in a nice way, in as nice a way as possible by taking these things away, hoping he would get the point. I had a couple of conver sations with him, but I didn’t force it. I didn’t sort of say, ‘‘Out.’’ I should have. I now realize that I should have; it would have been much cleaner and noisier. I should have done it right when I came in, but I was, you know, concerned about him. He had done a lot for his country and I did not want to shame him. I wanted to edge him away. I had two or three conversations over the year with him, long conversations about moving, doing something else—all very subtle. He knew exactly what I was talking about and didn’t want any part of it. So, he dug his heels in.
Then, finally, when the Hersh thing5 blew I figured, ‘‘Oh, God, we’re going to get blamed for this but I am not going to go into this with Jim on my hands. I’ve got to be able to handle this without Jim’s problems.’’ So, I said, ‘‘Jim, go. You are finished. I will give you a job of writing the history of the CI Staff or something so you can be around, keep involved and so forth; but I am going to put in a new chief and a new staff, new systems.’’ And I did it.
After the Nosenko affair, counterintelligence cases were handled more dis creetly. Indeed, the Nosenko case led some to deride the whole counterintelli gence function. The following incident reported in the ‘‘Family Jewels’’ file reflects both suspicion and considerable indecision. As Colby noted to the deputy attorney general on 31 December 1974, this case also involved breaking into the former employee’s place of business and attempting to break into her home in search of evidence.6 Note also that at one time the CIA had a dozen people spying on its own file clerks in the Records Integration Division, although by 1973 the number had dropped to three.
11 May 1973
 SUBJECT: General: Office of Security Survey
[—one line deleted—
1. At the Director’s instruction, and with the concurrence of the then DD/P [Deputy Director for Plans], the Office of Security developed informants in RID [Records Integration Division] to report on the activities of RID employees on whom security questions had arisen. This program, which included upwards of a dozen informants at its peak, has declined to its present level of three, only one of whom is reporting regularly on matters of current interest. 2. The principal object of Security’s interest through this informant is a female who was employed in RID for a number of years until she resigned in 1969. Her resignation coincided with the initiation of a security review on her by the Office of Security, but Security does not know whether the employee was aware of this security review at the time of her resignation. 3. Security’s interest in this employee was occasioned by reports that she had developed an increasingly intimate acquaintance with a Cuban national. Report ing by one informant, who was also being developed by the Cuban, suggested that the Cuban might have an intelligence interest in the female. The same informant also subsequently reported that the Cuban had numerous other contacts among clerical and secretarial employees of the Agency. [—one and one-fourth lines deleted—] 4. Subsequent to her departure from the Agency, the ex-RID employee entered into a common-law marital relationship with the Cuban and joined him as partner in a photographic business. In this capacity she solicited business among CIA employ ees, especially those requiring passport photos. Recently, she and the Cuban sought to employ Security’s informant in this business on a part-time basis. 5. Information on the background of the Cuban is fairly extensive, but it is incon clusive. He is known to have been a member of anti-Castro organizations in this country. There are also reports that his mother was imprisoned in Cuba at one time. There are other episodes in his life that suggest intelligence involvement on his part with some hostile service, but this is not yet definitely established. 6. The Office of Security has had at times a second informant in this case. His reporting has tended to confirm reporting by the principal informant. [—one paragraph deleted; about 13 lines—] 8. The Office of Security has been running this operation for over two years, in an effort to obtain conclusive proof of its intelligence nature. CI Staff has been kept informed The FBI, which was informed of the case at an early stage, has declined to take responsibility for it, on grounds that it concerns CIA’s internal security. As a result, the Office of Security has been inhibited in the actions it can take against the Cuban suspect. On the other hand, Security has not taken any action against Agency employees for fear of compromising the operation. 9. It would appear to me that the Office of Security has dallied with this case long enough. Apparently unable through positive measures to resolve doubts about the case, O/S has followed the course of watchful waiting, hoping the Cuban would take precipitant action himself that would give us the evidence we seek. In the meantime, our knowledge of the relationship between the Cuban and the several other current Agency employees with whom he is known to have contact continues [—about seventeen lines deleted—] The possibility that the employee in SB [Soviet Bloc] Division may be passing information on CIA’s Soviet operations is too great to warrant further delay in moving against her. [—about ten lines deleted—]
The attitude toward the Counterintelligence Staff changed several times. As noted below, the agency began to realize in the mid-1980s that it was leaking in formation to the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, it took nine years to discover that there was in fact a double agent in the agency and that it was the person re sponsible for Soviet (and, later, Russian) counterintelligence, Aldrich Ames.7 The following is the unclassified summary the CIA Inspector General’s report of investigation, The Aldrich H. Ames Case: An Assessment of CIA’s Role in Identify ing Ames as an Intelligence Penetration of the Agency, dated 21 October 1994.
1. In the spring and summer of 1985, Aldrich H. Ames began his espionage activities on behalf of the Soviet Union. In 1985 and 1986, it became increasingly clear to offi cials within CIA that the Agency was faced with a major CI problem. A significant number of CIA Soviet sources began to be compromised, recalled to the Soviet Union and, in many cases, executed. A number of these cases were believed to have been exposed by Edward Lee Howard, who fled the United States in September 1985 to avoid prosecution for disclosures he made earlier that year. However, it was evident by fall of 1985 that not all of the compromised sources could be attributed to him. 2. Later in 1985, the first Agency efforts were initiated to ascertain whether the unex plained compromises could be the result of a) faulty practices by the sources or the CIA officers who were assigned to handle them (i.e., whether the cases each contained seeds of their own destruction), b) a physical or electronic intrusion into the Agency’s Moscow Station or Agency communications, or c) a human penetra tion within the Agency (a mole). Although they were never discounted altogether, the first two theories diminished in favor over the years as possible explanations for the losses. A ‘‘molehunt’’—an effort to determine whether there was a human penetration, a spy, within CIA’s ranks—was pursued more or less continuously and with varying degrees of intensity until Ames was convicted of espionage in 1994, nine years after the compromises began to occur. 3. The 1985–1986 compromises were first discussed in late 1985 with DCI William Casey, who directed that the Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) make every effort to determine the reason for them. In January 1986, SE Division instituted new and extraordinary compartmentation measures to prevent further compro mises.8 In the fall of 1986, a small Special Task Force (STF) of four officers operat ing under the direction of the Counterintelligence Staff (CI Staff) was directed to begin an effort to determine the cause of the compromises. This effort, which was primarily analytic in nature, paralleled a separate FBI task force to determine whether the FBI had been penetrated. The FBI task force ended, and the CIA STF effort diminished significantly in 1988 as its participants became caught up in the creation of the Counterintelligence Center (CIC). Between 1988 and 1990, the CIA molehunt came to a low ebb as the officers involved concentrated on other CI mat ters that were believed to have higher priority. 4. In late 1989, after his return from Rome, Ames’s lifestyle and spending habits had changed as a result of the large amounts of money he had received from the KGB in return for the information he provided. Ames made no special efforts to conceal his newly acquired wealth and, for example, paid cash for a $540,000 home. This unexplained affluence was brought to the attention of the molehunt team by a CIA employee in late 1989, and a CIC officer began a financial inquiry. The pre liminary results of the financial inquiry indicated several large cash transactions but were not considered particularly significant at the time. 5. Nevertheless, information regarding Ames’s finances was provided to the Office of Security (OS) by CIC in 1990. A background investigation (BI) was conducted and a polygraph examination was scheduled. The BI was very thorough and pro duced information that indicated further questions about Ames and his spending habits. However, this information was not made available to the polygraph exam iners who tested him, and CIC did not take steps to ensure that the examiners would have full knowledge of all it knew about Ames at the time. In April 1991, OS determined that Ames had successfully completed the reinvestigation poly graph with no indications of deception, just as he had five years previously. 6. In 1991, CIA’s molehunt was revitalized and rejuvenated. Two counterintelligence officers were assigned full-time to find the cause of the 1985–86 compromises. The FBI provided two officers to work as part of the molehunt team. 7. During this phase, attention was redirected at Ames and a number of other possi ble suspects. In March 1992, a decision was made to complete the financial inquiry of Ames that had been initiated in 1989. In August 1992, a correlation was made between bank deposits by Ames that were identified by the financial inquiry and meetings between Ames and a Soviet official that the Agency and FBI had author ized in 1985. The joint CIA/FBI analytic effort fort resulted in a report written in March 1993, which concluded that, among other things, there was a penetration of the CIA. It was expected by CIA and FBI officials that the report, which included lists of CIA employees who had access to the compromised cases, would be reviewed by the FBI in consideration of further investigative steps. 8. The totality of the information available to CIC and the FBI prompted the FBI to launch an intensive CI investigation of Ames. During this phase, the FBI attempted to gather sufficient information to determine whether Ames was in fact engaged in espionage, and the Agency molehunt team was relegated to a support ing role. Every effort was made to avoid alerting Ames to the FBI CI investigation. According to FBI and Agency officials, it was not until a search of Ames’s residen tial trash in September 1993, which produced a copy of an operational note from Ames to the Russians, that they were certain Ames was a spy. After the FBI had gathered additional information, Ames was arrested on February 21, 1994 and pled guilty to espionage on April 28, 1994. 9. The two CIA officers and the two FBI officers who began working in earnest on the possibility of an Agency penetration in 1991 under the auspices of the Agency’s CIC, deserve credit for the ultimate identification of Ames as a hostile intelligence penetration of CIA. Without their efforts, it is possible that Ames might never have been successfully identified and prosecuted. Although proof of his espionage activities was not obtained until after the FBI began its CI investiga tion of Ames in 1993, the CIA molehunt team played a critical role in providing a context for the opening of an intensive investigation by the FBI. Moreover, although the CIA and the FBI have had disagreements and difficulties with coor dination in other cases in the past, there is ample evidence to support the state ments by both FBI and CIA senior management that the Ames case was a model of CI cooperation between the two agencies. 10. From its beginnings in 1986, however, the management of CIA’s molehunt effort was deficient in several respects. These management deficiencies contributed to the delay in identifying Ames as a possible penetration, even though he was a careless spy who was sloppy and inattentive to measures that would conceal his activities. Despite the persistence of the individuals who played a part in the molehunt, it suffered from insufficient senior management attention, a lack of proper resources, and an array of immediate and extended distractions. The exis tence and toleration of these deficiencies is difficult to understand in light of the seriousness of the 1985–86 compromises and especially when considered in the context of the series of other CI failures that the Agency suffered in the 1980s and the decade-long history of external attention to the weaknesses in the Agency’s CI and security programs. The deficiencies reflect a CIA CI function that has not recovered its legitimacy since the excesses of James Angleton, which resulted in his involuntary retirement from CIA in 1974. Furthermore, to some extent, the ‘‘Angleton Syndrome’’ has become a canard that is used to downplay the role of CI in the Agency. 11. Even in this context, it is difficult to understand the repeated failure to focus more attention on Ames earlier when his name continued to come up throughout the investigation. He had access to all the compromised cases; his financial resources improved substantially for unestablished reasons; and his laziness and poor per formance were rather widely known. All of these are CI indicators that should have drawn attention to Ames. Combined, they should have made him stand out. Arguably, these indicators played a role in the fact that Ames was often named as a prime suspect by those involved in the molehunt. 12. One result of management inattention was the failure of CIA to bring a full range of potential resources to bear on this counterespionage investigation. There was an over-emphasis on operational analysis and the qualifications thought nec essary to engage in such analysis, and a failure to employ fully such investiga tive techniques as financial analysis, the polygraph, behavioral analysis interviews, and the review of public and governmental records. These problems were exacerbated by the ambiguous division of the counterespionage function between CIC and OS and the continuing subordination by the Directorate of Operations (DO) of CI concerns to foreign intelligence collection interests Excessive compartmentation has broadened the gap in communications between CIC and OS, and this problem has not been overcome despite efforts to improve coordination. CIC did not share information fully with OS or properly coordinate the OS investigation process. 13. These defects in the Agency’s capability to conduct counterespionage investiga tions have been accompanied by a degradation of the security function within the Agency due to management policies and resource decisions during the past dec ade. These management policies emphasize generalization over expertise, quantity over quality, and accommodation rather than professionalism in the security field. This degradation of the security function has manifested itself in the reinvestiga tion and polygraph programs and appears to have contributed to Ames’s ability to complete polygraphs successfully in 1986 and 1991 after he began his espionage activities. 14. Beyond defects in counterespionage investigations and related security programs, the Ames case reflects significant deficiencies in the Agency’s personnel manage ment policies. No evidence has been found that any Agency manager knowingly and willfully aided Ames in his espionage activities. However, Ames continued to be selected for positions in SE Division, CIC and the Counternarcotics Center that gave him significant access to highly sensitive information despite strong evidence of performance and suitability problems and, in the last few years of his career, substantial suspicion regarding his trustworthiness. A psychological profile of Ames that was prepared as part of this investigation indicates a troubled em ployee with a significant potential to engage in harmful activities. 15. Although information regarding Ames’s professional and personal failings may not have been available in the aggregate to all of his managers or in any complete and official record, little effort was made by those managers who were aware of Ames’s poor performance and behavioral problems to identify the problems offi cially and deal with them. If Agency management had acted more responsibly and responsively as these problems arose, it is possible that the Ames case could have been avoided in that he might not have been placed in a position where he could give away such sensitive source information. 16. The principal deficiency in the Ames case was the failure to ensure that the Agency employed its best efforts and adequate resources in determining on a timely basis the cause, including the possibility of a human penetration, of the compromises in 1985–86 of essentially its entire cadre of Soviet sources. The indi vidual officers who deserve recognition for their roles in the eventual identifica tion of Ames were forced to overcome what appears to have been significant inattentiveness on the part of senior Agency management. As time wore on and other priorities intervened, the 1985–86 compromises received less and less sen ior management attention. The compromises were not addressed resolutely until the spring of 1991 when it was decided that a concerted effort was required to resolve them. Even then, it took nearly three years to identify and arrest Ames, not because he was careful and crafty, but because the Agency effort was inadequate. 17. Senior Agency management, including several DDOs, DO Division Chiefs, CIC and DO officials, should be held accountable for permitting an officer with obvious problems such as Ames to continue to be placed in sensitive positions where he was able to engage in activities that have caused great harm to the United States. Senior Agency management, including at least several DCIs, Deputy Directors, DO Division Chiefs, and senior CI and security officials, should also be held accountable for not ensuring that the Agency made a maximum effort to resolve the compromises quickly through the conduct of a focused investigation conducted by adequate numbers of qualified personnel.
1. On the Nosenko controversy, see Richards J. Heuer, Jr., ‘‘Nosenko: Five Paths to Judgment,’’ in H. Bradford Westerfield, ed., Inside CIA’s Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency’s Internal Journal, 1955–1992 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995): 379–414. One of Nosenko’s original handlers was the author Tennent H. Bagley, who wrote Spy Wars: Moles, Mysteries, and Deadly Games (New Haven, CT: Yale Univer sity Press, 2007).
2. In 1966, the Soviet (SR) Division was merged with the East European (EE) Division to form the Soviet Bloc (SB) Division.
3. ‘‘Oral History: Reflections of DCI Colby and Helms on the CIA’s ‘Time of Trouble,’’’ Studies in Intelligence 51:3 (2007).
4. The facility was officially designated New York International Airport on 31 July, 1948, but was widely known as Idlewild Airport after the golf course that had been there. It officially became John F. Kennedy International Airport on 24 December, 1963.
5. See Chapter 12, ‘‘The Family Jewels.’’
6. See Chapter 12, ‘‘The Family Jewels.’’
7. See also ‘‘An Assessment of the Aldrich H. Ames Espionage Case and Its Implica tions for U.S. Intelligence,’’ Report prepared by the Staff of the Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, 103rd Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994); Tim Weiner et al., Betrayal: The Story of Aldrich Ames, an American Spy (New York: Random House, 1995).
8. The Soviet East European Division, later renamed the Central Eurasia Division, directed operations related to the Soviet Union and its successor states.
Chapter 7
The Search for Foreign Instigators:
Operation Chaos and the Intelligence Evaluation Committee
Espionage conducted within the United States or against U.S. citizens was one of the few clear prohibitions placed on the CIA by its charter, the National Secu rity Act of 1947. The clearest violation of that was the MHCHAOS program, also known as Operation Chaos. After reports began leaking to the public in the 1970s, MHCHAOS took on legendary proportions in the press and popular books. As depicted in the ‘‘Family Jewels’’ file, it takes on more modest propor tions and a greater foreign focus. Nonetheless, it did create files and a computer database on thousands of U.S. citizens in violation of the CIA’s charter. It was not, however, a CIA initiative. The MHCHAOS program commenced in 1967 in response to President Lyn don B. Johnson’s insistence that ‘‘foreign communists’’ lay behind the antiwar movement and other dissident groups operating in the United States at that time. The program was continued into the administration of President Richard M. Nixon, who shared Johnson’s views on dissidents. It had been created spe cifically for that purpose and was run by the Special Operations Group (SOG) under Richard Ober. Closely related to MHCHAOS in concept was the Intelligence Evaluation Committee. An interdepartmental body established under Nixon in 1970, the Intelligence Evaluation Committee was also assigned to study the foreign roots of internal dissidence, and its existence was also regarded as a secret. Counter intelligence Chief James Angleton noted in a memo to William E. Colby (dated 8 May 1973) that the driving force behind the Intelligence Evaluation Committee was Assistant Attorney General for Internal Security Robert Mardian. At that time, May 1973, Mardian was facing a grand jury.1 Ober, the chief of the SOG, also served on the staff of the Intelligence Evalua tion Committee and as an alternate member of the committee itself. Within the committee, the CIA was assigned to deal only with the foreign aspects of issues It appears that most members of the Intelligence Evaluation Committee may have been unaware of the existence of the separate CIA program. DCI Richard Helms stated that he repeatedly reported to the president that no evidence of significant foreign links had been found. The president repeat edly told him to try harder. Reports from the Intelligence Evaluation Committee, transcribed below, give an indication of how spare some of the findings were. In the process, however, Ober’s group within the CIA studied 7,000 FBI files and generated a computerized database containing more than 300,000 names.2 The MHCHAOS program was so secret that few within the CIA knew of its existence. It reported directly to Helms, who relayed its findings to the president. An indication of the secrecy surrounding MHCHAOS comes in the following note from the ‘‘Family Jewels’’ file addressed to William Colby from a friend.
15 May 1973
Dear Bill, Prior to my assignment in Nha Trang [South Vietnam] I was assigned to the CI [Counterintelligence] Staff for approximately 20 months. While I was with the Staff I was led to believe that one of the ‘‘Groups’’ on the ground floor, [—] was involved in domestic operations. I believe their target(s) were minority group(s). The Chief and Deputy Chief of the Group at that time were Dick Ober and [—] respectively. One of their Case Officers, [—] spent over 50% of his time TDY [on temporary duty] within the United States. It was my understanding they reported only to the White House and to Dick Helms. Other members of the Staff, including myself, had limited access to the [—] area, only when necessary and escorted at all times. Perhaps you were or are now aware of what the operations are. However, I believe I would be remiss in not responding to the book cable (407190). And per haps their operations might have been outside the legislative charter. Also, during my tour with the CI Staff I accidentally learned they launched someone into Vietnam while you and [—] were there. I believe this was without the knowledge or approval of Chief, [—] (If I recall, the Case Officer was [—].) I mention the latter only because of the following: When they learned that [—] was being reassigned from Saigon to Chief Operations, FE [Far East], they also learned that I was a friend of [—] and from the same area [—]. As a result they cautioned me not to discuss any of their operations with [—]. This I did not do. [—paragraph deleted; about six lines—]
 Sincerely, [—name deleted—]
In a heavily redacted memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence (dated 8 May 1973) in the ‘‘Family Jewels’’ file, the Deputy Director for Intelli gence includes this brief comment
OCI [Office of Current Intelligence], in 1967 and 1968, prepared intelligence memo randa on possible foreign connections with the US anti-war movement and world wide student dissidence (including the SDS) at the request of the White House.
Another memorandum in the file, from the Office of Current Intelligence to the Deputy Director for Intelligence and dated the previous day, elaborated on the surveillance of the antiwar movement without mentioning the code name In response to Johnson’s instructions, DCI Richard Helms told the Counterintel ligence Division to work with the FBI and ‘‘to collect whatever information was available through our own sources.’’ It appears that CI’s activities were limited to reporting on contacts with foreign ‘‘elements’’ and governments through its stations in other countries. Note that for a few months the CIA or the National Security Agency (NSA) or both had been intercepting phone calls between the United States and foreign countries as well as phone calls between foreign countries that were routed through the United States.3 7
May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence VIA: Deputy Director for Intelligence FROM: Director of Current Intelligence SUBJECT: Activity Related to Domestic Events
1. In late 1967 OCI participated in the preparation of several short intelligence memoranda dealing with the foreign connections of US organizations and activists involved in the anti-war movement. The main purpose of these reports, prepared at the request of the White House, was to determine whether any links existed between international Communist elements or for eign governments and the American peace movement. The conclusion reached was that there was some evidence of ad hoc contacts between anti war activists at home and abroad but no evidence of direction or formal coordination.
2. In October 1967 President Johnson expressed interest in this subject and or dered a high level interdepartmental survey. In response to his personal request to the DCI, Mr. Helms asked the CI Staff to collect whatever informa tion was available through our own sources and through liaison with the FBI and to pass it to OCI, which was directed to prepare a memorandum from the DCI to the President.
3. A book message requirement was sent to all stations to report whatever infor mation was on hand relevant to this subject. Although agent reports on Com munist front operations overseas were of some value, the primary source of information on the activities of US activists—and that was quite limited— was sensitive intercepts by NSA [National Security Agency], which had been similarly tasked by the White House.
4. A draft memorandum was jointly prepared by OCI and CI Staff and for warded to the DCI. He passed this typescript memo, dated 15 November 1967, to the President personally. The White House copy is now in the files of President Johnson’s papers at the library in Austin. 5. Brief follow-up memoranda were prepared and forwarded to the White House on 21 December and 17 January 1968. According to our best recollec tion, no further finished intelligence reports on international connections of the peace movement were produced.
[—signature and name deleted—] Director of Current Intelligence
Another memorandum from the ‘‘Family Jewels’’ file gives some of the operational details of MHCHAOS. This memo denies strongly that the program involves domestic espionage.
 The MHCHAOS Program
1. The MHCHAOS program is a worldwide program for clandestine collection abroad of information on foreign efforts to support/encourage/exploit/ manipulate domestic U.S. extremism, especially by Cuba, Communist China, North Vietnam, the Soviet Union, North Korea and the Arab fedayeen.
 2. The MHCHAOS program has not and is not conducting efforts domestically for internal domestic collection purposes. Agency efforts are foreign. Foreign oriented activity in the United States has been of two types: a. Selected FBI domestic sources who travel abroad in connection with their extremist activity and/or affiliations to make contact with hostile foreign powers or with foreign extremist groups have been briefed and debriefed by Headquarters officers. The briefing has included appropriate opera tional guidance, including defensive advice.
b. Americans with existing extremist credentials have been assessed, recruited, tested and dispatched abroad for PCS assignments as contract agents, primarily sources offered for such use by the FBI. When abroad they collect information responsive to MHCHAOS program require ments. They are thus used primarily for targeting against Cubans, Chi nese Communists, the North Vietnamese, etc. as their background and their particular access permits. It should be noted that the [—] aspect of the [—] project of the East Asia Division is similar to the MHCHAOS program.4
3. As indicated earlier, MHCHAOS is a foreign program, conducted overseas, except for the limited activity described above. The program is and has been managed so as to achieve the maximum feasible utilization of existing resources of the Operations Directorate. No assets have been recruited and run exclusively for the MHCHAOS program. Instead, emphasis has been placed on the exploitation of new and old Agency assets who have a by product capability or a concurrent capability for provision of information re sponsive to the program’s requirements. This has involved the provision of custom-tailored collection requirements and operational guidance. This col lection program is viewed as an integral part of the recruitment and collec tion programs of China Operations, Vietnam Operations, Cuban Operations, Soviet Bloc Division operations and Korean Branch operations. Agents who have an American ‘‘Movement’’ background or who have known connec tions with the American ‘‘Movement’’ are useful as access agents to obtain biographic and personality data, to discern possible vulnerabilities and sus ceptibilities, and to develop operationally exploitable relationships with recruitment targets of the above programs. These assets are of interest to our targets because of their connections with and /or knowledge of the American ‘‘Movement.’’ Over the course of the MHCHAOS program, there have been approximately 20 important areas of operational interest, which at the present time have been reduced to about ten: Paris, Stockholm, Brus sels, Dar Es Salaam, Conakry, Algiers, Mexico City, Santiago, Ottawa and Hong Kong.
4. The MHCHAOS program also utilizes audio operations, two of which have been implemented to cover targets of special interest. a.
[—paragraph deleted; about eight lines—]
b. [—paragraph deleted; about ten lines—]
5. MHCHAOS reporting from abroad relating to the program originates in two ways: Individuals who are noted in contact with Cubans, the Chinese Communists, etc., and who appear to have extremist connections, interests or background are reported upon. Other individuals are reported upon in response to specific Headquarters requirements received from the FBI because such individuals are of active investigatory security interest to the FBI.
6. All cable and dispatch traffic related to the MHCHAOS program is sent via restricted channels. It is not processed by either the Cable Secretariat or the Information Services Division. The control and retrievability of information obtained, including information received from the FBI, is the responsibility of the Special Operations Group.
7. Information responsive to specific FBI requirements is disseminated to the FBI via special controlled dissemination channels, i.e., by restricted han dling of cable traffic or via special pouch and specially numbered blind memoranda.
8. Information of particular significance, when collected, has been disseminated by special memorandum over the signature of the Director of Central Intelli gence to the White House (Dr. Kissinger or John Dean), as well as to the At torney General, the Secretary of State and the Director of the FBI.
The following memorandum introduces the Intelligence Evaluation Commit tee. Attached to it is the table of contents of one of its studies, The Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information, suggesting that the publication of the Penta gon Papers caused the committee to broaden its interests somewhat beyond for eign instigators. This memorandum comes from the ‘‘List of Delicate Matters’’ within the ‘‘Family Jewels’’ file.
7 May 1973
SUBJECT: Intelligence Evaluation Committee and Staf
1. Background: Formed December 1970. Membership: Department of Justice (Chairman); FBI (active staff participation agreed to only in May 1971); Department of Defense; Secret Service; National Security Agency; CIA and any necessary representatives of other Departments or Agencies. (Following have participated: Treasury, State.) Staff: IES Executive Director John Dough erty and later Bernard Wells supplied by Department of Justice with title of Special Assistant to the Attorney General in reporting through the Assistant Attorney General for Internal Security Robert Mardian and later William Olsen. IES has received requirements directly from and delivered reports directly to John Dean of the White House. 2. CIA Participation: Contributions on foreign aspects (by memorandum with no agency letterhead or attribution). Contributions occasionally include for eign intelligence provided by FBI and NSA. 3. Special Report: The Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information, No vember 1971. Initiated July 1971 by the White House as a consequence of the President’s concern about the release of the Pentagon Papers by Daniel Ells berg. Both Robert Mardian and G. Gordon Liddy initially involved in tasking the IES to produce this evaluation. Drafting done by IES Staff members from Justice and FBI. Only Agency participation was editorial review. (Table of contents attached).
Page Introduction
1 Problems
Relating to the Disclosure of Classified Information 3
Executive Orders and Related Directives 8
 Effectiveness of Existing Security Regulations 13
Lessons of the ‘‘Pentagon Papers’’ 18
Conclusions and Recommendations 31
By May 1973, CIA Inspector General William Broe was becoming concerned that the agency faced an unfortunate combination of factors: leaks to the press regarding the Intelligence Evaluation Committee and growing resentment within the CIA regarding MHCHAOS.
30 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William E. Colby SUBJECT: MHCHAOS and [—] I call to your attention the attached sensitive annexes to our 1972 report of survey of EUR [Europe] Division. You have seen them before, but a fresh look at them might be in order in the light of current developments. [—just over one line deleted—] The recent revelations about the activities of the Intelligence Evaluation Committee are getting close to our MHCHAOS program. We are particularly concerned about MHCHAOS because of the high degree of resent ment we found among many Agency employees at their being expected to par ticipate in it.
William V. Broe
Inspector General
Attachments [not included]
The ‘‘Family Jewels’’ file offers a number of reports from the International Evaluation Committee submitted by Ober as well as a somewhat expanded version of his earlier background memorandum on the committee. These are preceded by two brief notes, the first addressed to Colby and the second to Inspector General Broe. The name of the originator has been deleted from each.
 Mr. Colby Attached is the material we requested from Dick Ober:
A. Ten Reports, Subj: Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Har ass the Republican National Convention
B. Five Reports, Subj: Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Har ass the Democratic National Convention
C. Two Memoranda re Agency support to Secret Service for Democratic and Republican Convention
Ober advises that the only American we report on to the IEC is Rennie Davis.
(14 May 73)
Mr. Broe: Dick Ober has been advised that this package is being sent to you. Since knowl edge of the existence of this Committee has been strictly limited, I’ve asked that it be delivered to you unopened. Although it has an ER number on it, it has not been sent through that office—I gave them only the day, subject, and originator.
 15 May 73
[Note on routing sheet from Ober to Evans, dated 14 May 1973:] Attached are
1. Background note on the Committee per your request of this morning.
2. Copies of memoranda concerning Agency support to Secret Service (7 April and 23 June 1972).
 Intelligence Evaluation Committee and Staff 1. Background: Formed December 1970 to produce fully-evaluated national domestic intelligence studies, including studies on demonstrations, subversion, extremism and terrorism. Membership: Department of Justice (Chairman); Federal Bureau of Investigation; Department of Defense; Secret Service; National Security Agency; Central Intelligence Agency; and as necessary representatives of other Departments or Agencies (following have participated: Treasury and State). Staff: IES, Executive Director John Dougherty and later Bernard Wells supplied by Department of Justice with title of Special Assistant to the Attorney General reporting to the Assistant At torney General for Internal Security Robert Mardian and later William Olson. IES has received requirements directly from and delivered reports directly to John Dean of the White House. The White House has insisted that the existence of this Commit tee be kept secret. Awareness of its existence within the Agency has been limited to DCI, DDO (DDP), C/CI and four officers of this office.5 2. CIA Participation: Contributions on foreign aspects (by memorandum with no Agency letterhead or attribution). Contributions occasionally include foreign intelligence provided by FBI and NSA. The Chief of the Special Operations Group serves as the Agency representative on the Intelligence Evaluation Committee Staff and as the alternate to the Agency representative on the Com mittee (who is the Chief, Counterintelligence Staff).
3. Special Report: The Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information, Novem ber 1971. This study was initiated in July 1971 by the White House as a conse quence of the President’s concern about the release of the Pentagon Papers by Daniel Ellsberg. Both Robert Mardian and G. Gordon Liddy initially involved in tasking the IES to produce this evaluation. Drafting done by IES Staff mem bers from Justice and FBI. Only Agency participation was editorial review.
4. Republican National Convention (21–24 August 1972): At the request of the White House, a series of estimates was prepared by the IES on ‘‘Potential Disruptions at the 1972 Republican National Convention, Miami Beach, Florida.’’ The Agency provided from February through August 1972 periodic contributions for these estimates concerning foreign support for activities planned to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention (copies attached).
5. Democratic National Convention (10–13 July 1972): At the request of the White House, a series of estimates was prepared by the IES on ‘‘Potential Dis ruptions at the 1972 Democratic National Convention, Miami Beach, Florida.’’ The Agency provided between March and July 1972 contributions on foreign support for activities planned to disrupt or harass the Democratic National Convention (copies attached).
Attachments: a/s 23 FEB 1972
Not to go through any registries.
14 May 1973
SUBJECT: Foreign Support For Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Repub lican National Convention
1. There are only limited indications thus far of foreign efforts to inspire, support or take advantage of activities designed too disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican Party in San Diego, 21–23 August 1972.
2. Some American participants at the Soviet-controlled World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina, held 11–13 February 1972 in Paris/Versailles, attempted unsuccessfully to include a call for international dem onstrations to take place at the time of the Republican National Convention. A representative of the San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC), one of the domes tic action groups targeting the Republican Convention, requested the American Delegations’ Steering Committee at the World Assembly to include a specific call for international support of activities against the Republican convention in their proposal to the Action Commission of the World Assembly. This request, how ever, was dropped as too divisive by the Steering Committee, despite initial indi cations that the proposal would be taken to the floor of the Assembly.
3. John LENNON,6 a British subject, has provided financial support to Project ‘‘YES,’’ which in turn paid the travel expenses to the World Assembly of a representative of leading antiwar activist Rennie DAVIS. (DAVIS’ representa tive is tentatively planning to assist in preparations for disruptive actions at the San Diego Convention.) Project ‘‘YES’’ is an adjunct to another LEN NON-supported project, the Election Year Strategy Information Center (EYSIC), of which Rennie DAVIS is a key leader, which was set up to direct New Left protest activities at the Republican National Convention. In Paris Rennie DAVIS’ representative to the World Assembly met at least once with officials of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam; it is not known if the Republican National Convention was discussed.
4. The SDCC is planning for foreign support for its harassment of the Republi can convention. A working draft plan of the SDCC includes proposals for
(a) the use of a special television network to broadcast video-taped messages from other countries, including coverage of sympathetic demonstrations else where; and
(b) broadcasts over public address systems of live telephone calls from the Vietnamese in Paris7 and from the Communist Chinese and others at the United Nations.8 21 MAR 1972 Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention
 Indications remain limited, thus far, of foreign efforts to inspire, support or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of 98 The Central Intelligence Agency the Republican Party in San Diego, 21–23 August 1972. The concept of coordinated international support for domestic activities in the United States was generally endorsed at the recent World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina; however, the Conference issued no specific call for international sup port of disruptive actions at the American national political conventions. BACKGROUND: At the Soviet-controlled World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peo ples of Indochina, held in Versailles from 10–13 February 1972, there was no men tion of American plans for demonstrations at both the Republican and Democratic National Conventions. The final draft resolution from the Conference’s ‘‘Action Commission’’ contains an appendix submitted by American delegates whose goal was to secure global coordination for domestic actions in the United States. It calls for international support to six weeks of domestic antiwar actions and demonstra tions, from 1 April to 15 May 1972, and concludes with the statement: ‘‘This cam paign will lead up to the Democratic Party Convention at Miami on July 9, 1972, and the Republican Party Convention in San Diego on August 21, 1972.’’ The final ‘‘Resolution of the Paris World Assembly for the Peace for the Peace and Independence of the Indochinese People’’ of 13 February 1972, drafted by the ‘‘Political Commission’’ states: ‘‘In the United States particularly, the protest against the war is voiced more and more strongly, under various forms, such as draft evasions, deser tions, resistance, demonstrations which now affect even the soldiers. The As sembly calls for support to these progressive and antiwar forces in the United States, and asks the governments to grant asylum to deserters and to support their right to repatriation. All together, the peoples of the world will efficiently help to impose on the U.S. Government the restoration of peace, and independence and freedom in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.’’
 The San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC), one of the domestic action groups targetting on the Republican Convention, is planning, in addition to demonstra tions, for a ‘‘large exposition in the campsights (sic) called Expose 72, which with movies, exhibits, displays will portray the struggles of people all over the world.’’ Plans for activities at Expose 72 are believed to include (a) the use of a special tele vision network to broadcast video-taped messages from other countries, including coverage of sympathetic demonstrations elsewhere; and
 (b) broadcasts over public address systems of live telephone calls from the Vietnamese in Paris and from the Communist Chinese and others at the United Nations. In addition, the SDCC has suggested that, in order to ‘‘outflank NIXON domestically and internationally,’’ international opposition can be expressed ‘‘by obtaining the authority of other countries and liberation movements to carry their flags in SDCC demonstrations.’’ 24 APR 1972 Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention SUMMARY: There is little new evidence of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of actions designed to disrupt or harass the Republican National The Search for Foreign Instigators 99 Convention in San Diego, 21 to 23 August 1972. The Students for a Democratic So ciety, in joining the ranks of domestic groups planning actions at the Republican Convention, has adopted a proposal to cooperate with Mexican workers and stu dents in a demonstration in Tijuana, Mexico, during the Convention. The San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC), another domestic group targetting on the Convention, has received a letter of solidarity from the North Vietnamese. The let ter is of interest as an indication of North Vietnamese contact with the SDCC; such contact will be required for the SDCC to implement its earlier-reported plans for broadcasts over public address systems during the Convention of live telephone calls from the Vietnamese in Paris.
 At its recent convention in Cambridge, Massachusetts, held 30 March to 2 April 1972, the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) adopted a proposal to hold dem onstrations at the San Diego–Tijuana border during the Republican National Con vention. The proposal included a call for SDS to cooperate with Mexican workers and students in an action to occur during a fiesta in Tijuana, where Convention delegates will be entertained. The North Vietnamese have given their endorsement to the San Diego Conven tion Coalition (SDCC) in the form of a letter from the Vietnam Committee for Soli darity with the American People (VCSWAP), a quasi-official organ of the North Vietnamese Government. The letter, which has been circulated by the SDCC and is dated 27 January 1972, expresses ‘‘great delight’’ with the formation of the SDCC, and conveys the Committee’s ‘‘best wishes of militant solidarity and friendship.’’ The VCSWAP requests that the SDCC write often and ‘‘send us materials you have.’’ 23 MAY 1972 Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention SUMMARY: Indications remain limited of foreign plans or attempts to inspire, support, influ ence, or exploit actions designed to disrupt or harass the Republican National Con vention in Miami, Florida, 21–23 August 1972.9 [—about four lines deleted—] The British-based International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace (ICDP) has distributed a ‘‘Spring Offensive Calendar’’ of activities in the United States against the war based on a submission by the People’s Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ). The calendar includes actions planned in connection with the Republican Convention.
 [—paragraph deleted; about six lines—]
The International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace, a British-based antiwar organization and one of the more prominent member organizations of the Stockholm Conference,10 has attached a ‘‘Spring Offensive Calendar’’ to the April– May 1972 issue of its regular international publication Vietnam International. The calendar had been furnished by the People’s Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and included the following entry:
August 21–23 Republican Convention, San Diego. Demonstrations organized by the San Diego Convention Coalition, Box 8267, San Diego, Ca. 92103.
The ICDP commentary on the PCPJ calendar urges demonstrations in support of some of the dates listed but does not specifically call for actions in connection with the Republican Convention.
14 JUN 1972
Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention
SUMMARY: The only new indication of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed to disrupt or harass the Republican National Conven tion in Miami, Florida, 21–23 August 1972, is an expression of interest by a member of the North Vietnamese Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks in the plans of the major antiwar organizations in the United States for demonstrations in connection with the political conventions of both major parties. DEVELOPMENTS: In mid-May 1972, a member of the North Vietnamese Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks invited a visitor to contact him again when the visitor returned from an imminent trip to the United States. The North Vietnamese official gave the visitor the New York City addresses of the People’s Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and the National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC), and asked the visitor to inquire at their offices regarding their plans for demonstrations during the coming summer. The North Vietnamese official stated that he was especially interested in plans for actions in connection with the Democratic and Republican National Conventions.
 28 JUN 1972
Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention There are no additional indications of any substantial foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican Party in Miami, Florida, 21–24 August 1972.
 26 JUL 1972
Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention
SUMMARY: New indications of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, influence, or exploit activities designed to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in Miami, Florida, 21–24 August 1972, consist of the following: A leader of the Peo ple’s Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) has stated that demonstrations will be organized to take place at United States and allied military installations abroad during the period immediately before and during the Republican Convention. The PCPJ leader also stated that representatives of the Stockholm Conference on Viet nam will participate in activities in connection with the Convention. The Anti-War Union (AWU), a domestic organization which has been active in planning demon strations in connection with the Republican National Convention, has sent a dele gation to Paris, France, to meet with officials of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV)11 and with the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG).12 No information is presently available, however, indicating that actions at the Republican Convention have been discussed at these meetings.
In an early July 1972 meeting with prominent members of foreign antiwar organiza tions, a representative of the People’s Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ), who occupies an important position within that organization, discussed the plans of the PCPJ in connection with the upcoming election campaign in the United States. The PCPJ representative stated that during the period 14–23 August, a ‘‘People’s Cam paign Against Bombing’’ would be waged in U.S. cities involved in the manufacture and shipping of materials for use in Vietnam, and that similar actions will be organ ized at United States and allied military installations abroad. The PCPJ representative further stated that ‘‘dramatic demonstrations’’ in protest of the bombing of Vietnam are being organized by the ‘‘Republican Party National Convention Coalition’’ to occur on 21 August 1972. In an apparent reference to the 21 August actions, the PCPJ leader added that representatives of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam will speak on the subject of the alleged American bombing of dikes in North Vietnam. (Com ment: We have no present information concerning plans of Stockholm Conference rep resentatives to travel to the United States during the Republican National Convention; nor do we have any additional information concerning plans of Stockholm Conference representatives to participate in activities connected with the Republican Convention.) The Anti-War Union (AWU), a domestic group engaged in organizing counter activities at the Republican National Convention, has sponsored the travel of a delega tion of activists to Paris, France, to meet with officials of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG). An advance party has already met with the DRV and PRG representatives to discuss the agenda for meetings with the full AWU delegation. Although no informa tion is presently available indicating that actions at the Republican Convention have been discussed or are scheduled to be discussed at meetings between the AWU delega tion and the DRV/PRG officials, it is known that members of the AWU advance party have asked for advice from the PRG officials regarding the stance the AWU should take on certain questions relating to the presidential elections. It is also known that the DRV officials have questioned the AWU advance party about the political mood in the United States. One of the AWU delegation members has stated that upon their return to the United States about 26 July 1972, some of the members will speak at rallies, over the radio, and on television, to ‘‘educate the American people about the consequences of voting for Nixon, and the need to end the war and defeat Nixon.’’ The delegation member added that the demonstrations at the Republican Convention will be ‘‘unique.’’
2 AUG 1972
Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention
There are no new indications of specific foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, influence, or exploit activities designed to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in Miami, Florida, 21–24 August 1972. Although meetings have been held recently in Paris, France, between American antiwar activists and representatives  of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Gov ernment of South Vietnam (PRG), currently available information indicates that the DRV/PRG officials made no efforts to encourage or give guidance to the American participants with respect to the upcoming Republican National Convention. Private discussions, separate from the meetings with the entire American delegation, were conducted by both the DRV and the PRG officials; at present, we have no information regarding the substance of these private exchanges. A second group of activists, con sidered more important than the first delegation, is scheduled to travel to Paris on or about 1 August 1972 for further consultations with the PRG and DRV representatives.
In recent meetings in Paris, France, with members of an American delegations sponsored by the Anti-War Union (AWU), representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG) were very guarded with respect to discussing activities at the Republican National Convention. Although the Vietnamese repeatedly ques tioned the Americans concerning the mood of the antiwar movement in the United States, they made no direct reference to the Republican Convention, except for one instance when PRG Deputy Chief Nguyen Van TIEN accused President Nixon of using the private and public sessions of the Paris peace talks as ‘‘propaganda for the Republican Convention.’’ TIEN then urged the Americans to promote and propagandize the Seven Point Plan offered by the PRG. The Americans, too, for the most part, refrained from discussing the Convention, other than to estimate that demonstrators will number about 10,000 at the Convention. Following their meeting on 22 July 1972 with the AWU delegation, the PRG offi cials held additional talks with sub-groups of the delegation. Additionally, at least one of the American participants was invited by the DRV officials to return for fur ther discussions. At present, there is no information available concerning the sub stance of these private exchanges. A second, more important delegation of Americans connected with the Anti War Union is scheduled to travel
to Paris circa 1 August 1972 for further consulta tion with DRV and PRG representatives. This second group is scheduled to be led by Rennie DAVIS, founder and leader of the AWU. This will be DAVIS’ second trip to Paris within recent months for discussions with DRV and PRG representa tives. Upon his return from his first trip, DAVIS publicly stated that the AWU would demonstrate at both the Democratic and the Republican Convention, but that the AWU’s chief target would be the Republican Convention.
 9 AUG 1972
Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention
There are no new indications, as of this date, of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican Party in Miami, Florida, 21–24 August 1972.
16 AUG 1972
A parallel, albeit shorter, series of reports focused on exactly the same ques tion regarding the Democratic National Convention, which was to be held in Miami as well. The conclusions were also similar. 06 MAR 1972
Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt Or Harass the Democratic National Convention
There are no direct indications thus far of foreign efforts to inspire, support or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Democratic Party in Miami, 10–13 July 1972. The concept of coordinated international support for domestic activities in the United States was generally endorsed at the recent World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina; however, the Conference issued no specific call for international sup port of disruptive actions at the American national political conventions.
At the Soviet-controlled World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples’ of Indochina, held in Versailles from 10–13 February 1972, there was men tion of American plans for demonstrations at both the Republican and Democratic National Conventions. The final draft resolution from the conference’s ‘‘Action Commission’’ contains an appendix submitted by the American delegates whose goal was to secure global coordination for domestic actions in the United States. It calls for international support to six weeks of domestic antiwar actions and dem onstrations, from 1 April to 15 May 1972, and concludes with the statement: ‘‘This campaign will lead up to the Democratic Party Convention at Miami on July 9, 1972, and the Republican Party Convention in San Diego on August 21, 1972.’’ The final ‘‘Resolution of the Paris World Assembly for the Peace and Independ ence of the Indochinese People’’ of 13 February 1972, drafted by the ‘‘Political Commission’’ states:
‘‘In the United States particularly, the protest against the war is voiced more and more strongly, under various forms, such as draft evasions, desertions, resistance, and demonstrations which now affect even the soldiers. The As sembly calls for support to these progressive and antiwar forces in the United States, and asks the governments to grant asylum to deserters and to support their right to repatriation. All together, the peoples of the world will efficiently help to impose on the U.S. Government the restoration of peace, independence and freedom in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.’’
09 MAY 1972
Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Democratic National Convention
SUMMARY: New indications of foreign efforts or plans to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed to disrupt or harass the Democratic National Convention in Miami, 10–13 July 1972, are limited to a reiteration by a member of the Secretar iat of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam of a statement previously issued by the World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina. The Assembly’s pronouncement generally endorsed the concept of international sup port to a campaign of anti-Vietnam War activities in the United States leading up to the Democratic and Republican Conventions, but made no specific call for sup port of disruptive actions at the conventions themselves.
[—paragraph deleted; about eight lines—]
The World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina, of which the Stockholm Conference was a major organizer, had earlier enunciated a similar statement in an appendix to the final draft resolution of the Assembly’s ‘‘Action Commission.’’ The appendix called for international support to six weeks of domestic antiwar actions and demonstrations, from 1 April to 15 may 1972, and concluded with the statement: ‘‘This campaign will lead up to the Democratic Party Convention at Miami on July 9, 1972, and the Republican Party Convention in San Diego on August 21, 1972.’’
 23 MAY 1972
Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Democratic National Convention
 Indications remain limited of foreign plans or attempts to inspire, support, influ ence, or exploit actions designed to disrupt or harass the Democratic National Con vention in Miami, Florida, 10–13 July 1972.
[—about four lines deleted—]
The British-based International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace (ICDP) has distributed a ‘‘Spring Offensive Calendar’’ of activities in the United States against the war based on a submission by the Peoples’ Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ). The calendar includes actions planned in connection with the Democratic Convention.
 [—paragraph deleted; about six lines—]
The International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace, a British-based antiwar organization and one of the more prominent member organizations of the Stockholm Conference, has attached a ‘‘Spring Offensive Calendar’’ to the April– May 1972 issue of its regular international publication Vietnam International. The calendar had been furnished by the People’s Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and included the following entry: July 9–12 Democratic Convention, Miami Beach. Demonstrations organized by Florida People’s Coalition, Box 17521, Tampa, Florida 33612. The ICDP commentary on the PCPJ calendar urges demonstrations in support of some of the dates listed but does not specifically call for actions in connection with the Democratic Convention.
7 JUN 1972
Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Democratic National Convention
SUMMARY: The only new indication of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed to disrupt or harass the Democratic National Conven tion in Miami, Florida, 10–13 July 1972, is an expression of interest by a member of the North Vietnamese Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks in the plans of the major antiwar organizations in the United States for demonstrations in connection with the political conventions of both major parties. DEVELOPMENTS: In mid-May 1972, a member of the North Vietnamese Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks invited a visitor to contact him again when the visitor returned from an imminent trip to the United States. The North Vietnamese official gave the visitor the New York City addresses of the People’s Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and the National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC), and asked the visitor to inquire at their offices regarding their plans for demonstrations during the coming summer. The North Vietnamese official stated that he was especially interested in plans for actions in connection with the Democratic and National [sic] Conventions.
21 JUN 1972
Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Democratic National Convention
There are no additional indications, as of this date, of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Democratic Party in Miami, Florida, 10–13 July 1972.
As noted above, these reports were accompanied in the file by two relating to CIA support granted to the Secret Service during the conventions. Also included was the original Secret Service request. The CIA’s role, based on the unredacted portions of the memo, was primarily concerned with tracking potential foreign threats, including Cuban intelligence operations, but also with vetting thousands of names of hotel and convention employees. The first memo also acknowledges in passing that the agency had formerly targeted Latin American exile groups in the United States, but that responsibility had passed to the FBI.
23 JUN 1972
 Executive Director/Comptroller
VIA: Acting Deputy Director for Plans
Agency Support to the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) for National Democratic (10–14 July 1972) and National Republican (21–24 August 1972) Conventions
1. This memorandum is for the information of the Executive Director/Comptroller.
2. Authorization for CIA support to the U.S. Secret Service for the Democratic and Republican National Conventions is contained in a memorandum of 7 April 1972 from Chief, CI [Counterintelligence] Staff to the DCI which was concurred in by the ADDP [Acting Deputy Director for Plans] and approved by the DCI on 10 April 1972 (copy attached).
3. On 13 April 1972 the [—] met with the Miami USSS representative and Mr. [—] of USSS headquarters to discuss preliminary planning for [—] support to the USSS prior to and during subject conventions. On 17 April 1972 the [—] and [—] met with Mr. [—] at Headquarters to implement the preliminary planning agreed upon in Miami and to determine the extent of Headquarters support required by the USSS.
 4. The basic agreement mutually concurred in by the USSS and Headquarters representatives provided that:
a. [—] would conduct name traces on all Cubans of interest to USSS.
b. CIA Headquarters would conduct name traces on all other foreign born persons of interest to the USSS.
c. CIA would keep the USSS informed of any events in the Caribbean and Latin American areas that would have any bearing on the USSS protective mission during the convention periods. This would include briefings on Cuba and Cuban policies toward the United States and on activities of Cuban intelli gence operations which could affect the security of the conventions.
d. Coverage of Latin American exile groups in the United States would be the responsibility of the FBI since CIA had ceased the extensive coverage formerly targeted against these groups since it was now considered an in ternal security function.
5. [—paragraph deleted; about thirteen lines—]
6. [—] has arranged the rental of a safehouse about five minutes from convention center which will provide a secure and nearby meeting site for USSS and Agency personnel. This safehouse will be available just prior to and during both conventions. A Headquarters officer will TDY [be sent on temporary duty] to Miami prior to the conventions and remain until the conventions adjourn to assist [—] in providing the support described in paragraph four above.
7. Station WH/Miami is in daily contact with the USSS in Miami, utilizing JMFALCON as a meeting site when necessary. The location of Station WH/ Miami ( JMCOBRA) has not been revealed to the USSS. (JMCOBRA is located some distance from JMFALCON.) Additionally, the Miami Security Filed Office maintains normal liaison with the local USSS Miami unit.13
8. The [—] understands that no personnel will be present at the convention hall, that they will not provide any equipment unique to the Agency, nor will it provide the use of any other facilities other than the safehouse described in paragraph six.
9. A copy of this memorandum is being sent to
[—] to insure that the [—]
is fully conversant with the guidelines and basic agreements with the Secret Service, and has all of the information agreed upon in Headquarters. /signed/ Theodore G. Shackley Chief Western Hemisphere Division Attachment
7 APR 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director for Plans
CIA Support to the Secret Service For the Democratic National Convention in Miami, Florida July 9–15, 1972
1. This memorandum describes the support which the Secret Service has requested from CIA with regard to the Democratic National Convention. It is recommended that the Agency furnish the support outlined in paragraph 3 of this memorandum and your approval is requested. 2. By memorandum 1-30-610.53 of 30 March (attached as reference), the Secret Ser vice has requested a meeting with appropriate Agency officers to discuss the Agency’s support to the Secret Service prior to and during the Democratic National Convention. The Secret Service plans to send an agent to Miami on 11 April to commence preparations for the convention and wishes to have the meet ing with Agency Headquarters officers prior to the agent’s departure for Miami.
3. While details regarding the type of support which the Secret Service will request of the Agency will not be known until there has been a meeting with the Secret Service on this matter, it is evident from the Secret Service memo randum and from our experience in supporting the Secret Service at the Re publican Convention in Miami in 1968 that the Secret Service desires:
A) Briefings on Cuba and Cuban policy towards the United States. Counter intelligence information on Cuban operations against the United States which could affect the security of the convention.
B) Briefings on Cuban exile activities in the United States.
C) Name checks on hotel and convention employees; name checks on those persons in the Miami area whom the Secret Service considers a threat to its protective mission.
D) A watchlist of persons whom the Agency considers a potential threat to the security of the convention.
E) Liaison with a designated officer [—several words deleted—] for the purpose of conducting name checks against [—] files and other files available [—several words deleted—].
4. Agency support to the Secret Service for the convention will be centralized at Headquarters and will be controlled by Headquarters. Chief, [—], under the general supervision of the CI Staff, will serve as the coordinator of this support.
 [—signature deleted—]
James Angleton
Chief, CI Staff
1 Attachment
1-30-610.53 Date: March 30, 1972
TO: Central Intelligence Agency ATTN: Mr. [—]
Democratic National Convention—Miami, Florida, July 9–15, 1972
In view of our responsibilities regarding the protection of Presidential candi dates, we have initiated security preparations for the Democratic National Conven tion, which will be held in Miami, Florida, between July 9–15, 1972.
We request a meeting as soon as possible between representatives of our Intelli gence Division and your agency to discuss intelligence support prior to and during the Democratic National Convention. We are specifically interested in discussing the appropriate channels for routing name checks of hotel and convention employ ees, as well as other individuals of protective interest to this Service. We anticipate there will be several thousand names to be checked. We would also like to discuss the current Cuban situation, particularly any existing relationships between pro Cuban groups in the Miami area and mainland Cuba, since we consider these groups to be a potential threat to our protective mission.
1. For the Angleton memo, see ‘‘The List of Delicate Matters.’’ Mardian was convicted along with John Mitchell, H. R. Haldeman, and John Ehrlichman on charges of conspiracy, obstruction of justice, and perjury in connection with the Watergate cover-up. Mardian’s conviction was later overturned because his attorney had been ill. Stanley I. Kutler, The Wars of Watergate: The Last Crisis of Richard Nixon (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990): 576.
2. Richard Helms, with William Hood, A Look over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency (New York: Random House, 2003): 279–282; William Colby, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978): 313–317.
3. See Chapter 9, ‘‘Assistance to Police and Other Agencies.’’
4. To the left of the last sentence is a handwritten marginal notation: ‘‘U.S. citizens recruited to go abroad.’’
5. DCI stands for the Director of Central Intelligence; DDO (DDP) stands for the Deputy Director for Operations (formerly called Deputy Director for Plans); and C/CI stands for the Chief, Counterintelligence. 6. Formerly of the Beatles.
 7. Paris was the site of the long-stalled Vietnam peace negotiations. 8. The People’s Republic of China had just assumed, in 1971, the United Nations seat previously held by the Republic of China (Taiwan). The Nixon administration, seeking improved relations with the PRC, acquiesced in this change, which it could have vetoed in the UN Security Council.
 9. The venue of Republican National Convention, originally San Diego, was changed to Miami Beach in May, just three month before the event. The principal reason was an accusation by columnist Jack Anderson that ITT had made a $400,000 donation for the San Diego convention in return for a favorable decision by the Department of Justice on an antitrust case. See Vincent S. Ancona, ‘‘When the Elephants Marched Out of San Diego: The 1972 Republican Convention Fiasco,’’ Journal of San Diego History 38:4 (Fall 1992). 10. The Stockholm Conference on Vietnam was a semipermanent body organized by the World Peace Council. Based in Helsinki, Finland, the World Peace Council had direct ties to the Soviet Union and was widely considered to be controlled by the Communist Party or the KGB.
11. The government of North Vietnam.
12. The revolutionary organization seeking to overthrow the government of South Vietnam with the assistance of North Vietnam. It was widely considered an instrument of the North Vietnamese government and was displaced when the two countries were merged under the North Vietnamese government, one year after the fall of Saigon.
13. The CIA’s Western Hemisphere Division (WH) maintained a station in Miami (Sta tion WH/Miami, codenamed JMCOBRA) from which to observe Cuba and maintain con tact with Cuban exile groups. JMFALCON is presumably a ‘‘base’’ subordinated to the main ‘‘station.’’
Chapter 8
‘‘CIA’s Domestic Activities’’: The Management Advisory Group
The CIA’s legislative charter, the National Security Act of 1947, is vague on many issues but clear about the intention to prohibit the agency from any involvement in law enforcement. This has been interpreted as a prohibition against domestic activities. The agency does not appear to have engaged in widespread domestic espionage, but incidents have occurred, either directly or indirectly (as in training given to metropolitan police forces), especially during the antiwar demonstra tions of the Vietnam era. In the years just before the Daniel Ellsberg and Watergate cases, there were already persistent stories of CIA involvement in domestic affairs, including domestic espionage. These stories appeared in the media and were occasionally denied by the CIA leadership. The agency’s leaders, however, do not appear to have fully convinced even their own staff. Evidence of this emerges in a series of memoranda triggered in the spring of 1971 by the CIA Management Advi sory Group (MAG), which had been created to improve communications between agency leaders and junior personnel. The MAG was concerned about the rumors, prevalent even within the agency, of domestic spying and feared that the CIA was leaving itself exposed to its political adversaries.
25 March 1971
Management Advisory Group
 THROUGH: The Executive Director
SUBJECT:  CIA Domestic Activities
MAG is concerned that CIA avoid involvement in the current expose of the domes tic intelligence activities of the Army and other federal agencies. We believe that  there are CIA activities similar to those under scrutiny which could cause great embarrassment to the Agency because they appear to exceed the scope of the CIA charter. Except for the Agency’s statutory CE/CI [Counterespionage/Counterintel ligence] responsibilities, MAG opposes any Agency activity that could be con strued as targeted against any person who enjoys the protection of the US Constitution—whether or not he resides in the United States. Except in those cases clearly related to national security, no US citizen should be the object of CIA opera tions. We realize that on occasion the CIA will develop information about some cit izen who is engaged in activities inimical to the interests of the United States. Such information should quickly be turned over to the proper agencies of government for further action, even if it means that sometimes an essentially home-oriented agency may be asked to perform in a limited operational capacity overseas. If we do not pursue such a course, one day the public and the Congress will come to have grave doubts about our role in government, and may severely restrict our ability to perform those tasks properly assigned to the CIA.
The initial MAG memorandum does not appear to have elicited much of a response. Eight months later, prompted by further public accusations, the group issued a more detailed follow-up memorandum.
Nov 71
THROUGH: The Executive Director–Comptroller
 SUBJECT: CIA’s Domestic Activities
 REFERENCE: MAG Memorandum, ‘‘CIA’s Domestic Activities,’’ March 1971
1. MAG is seriously concerned about possible repercussions which may arise as the result of CIA’s covert domestic activities. Public revelation that CIA has become involved in collecting information on U.S. citizens would likely redound to the Agency’s discredit and jeopardize overall Agency programs. 2. MAG first expressed its concern about CIA’s covert domestic activities in a memo for the DCI, transmitted through the Executive Director–Comptroller in the Spring of 1971 (Attachment A). MAG’s concern has increased recently because of such articles as Vic Marchetti’s UPI interview (Attachment B)1 and the 10 October New York Times article concerning rupture of FBI-CIA rela tions (Attachment C). Both hint at extremely sensitive Agency involvement in domestic activities. Additionally, the DCI addresses to the American Society of Newspaper Editors (Attachment D) and to the CIA Annual Awards cere mony (Attachment E) make rather categorical denials of Agency covert tar geting on U.S. citizens. Agency employees aware of the various sensitive operations in question know that there is qualifying language explaining CIA involvement. However, MAG believes that in the event of an expose, such es oteric qualifiers will be lost on the American public and that there is probably nothing the Agency could say to alleviate a negative reaction from Congress and the U.S. public. It is MAG’s fear that such a negative reaction could seri ously damage our Congressional relations, affect our work against priority foreign targets and have significant impact on the viability of CIA. 3. There are indications that the Agency, in responding to CE/CI requirements, is collecting information on selected U.S. citizens both at home and abroad. In operational areas which are highly sensitive and potentially explosive (e.g., domestic radical or racial groups) this Agency must carefully weight the needs and pressures for collecting and maintaining this information against the risk and impact of revelation should the operation become compromised or public knowledge. We therefore urge that all domestic collection and action programs be severely reviewed so that only those be continued which are of the highest priority and which absolutely cannot be undertaken by domestic agencies. CIA should not take on requirements of this type by default. 4. Not all of the members of MAG are privy to CIA’s direct or indirect involve ment in domestic activities. Those who are aware probably know only parts of the whole picture. But our increasing concern and our intense interest in maximizing the Agency’s ability to do its proper job, impel us to bring our serious apprehensions to your attention.
Attachments B, C, D and E
Attachment B—Vic Marchetti’s UPI Interview, from U.S. News and World Report, 11 October 1971: ‘‘Fearing today that the CIA may already have begun ‘going against the enemy within’ the United States as they may conceive it—that is, dissident student groups and civil-rights organizations ...’’ ‘‘Because the men of the Agency are superpatriots, he said, it is only natural for them to view violent protest and dissidence as a major threat to the nation.... The inbred CIA reaction, he said, would be to launch a clandestine operation to infil trate dissident groups. That, said Marchetti, may already have started to happen. ‘I don’t have very much to go on,’ he said. ‘Just bits and pieces that indicate the U.S. Intelligence Community is already targeting on groups in this country that they feel to be subversive. ‘I know this was being discussed in the halls of the CIA, and that there were a lot of people who felt this should be done.’ ’’
Attachment C—New York Times, 10 October, ‘‘FBI-CIA Relations:’’ ‘‘Information generally exchanged between the FBI and the CIA might concern such subjects as officers of the Black Panther Party traveling overseas ... and American youngsters cutting sugar cane in Cuba.’’
Attachment D—DCI Address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors: ‘‘And may I emphasize at this point that the statute specifically forbids the Cen tral Intelligence Agency to have any police, subpoena, or law-enforcement powers, or any domestic security functions. I can assure you that except for the normal responsibilities for protecting the physical security of our own personnel, our facilities, and our classified information, we do not have any such powers and function; we have never sought any; we do not exercise any.
In short; we do not target on American citizens.’’
Attachment E—DCI Address to CIA Annual Awards Ceremony: ‘‘I gave a talk to the American Society of Newspaper Editors last winter, as you know, and I did it for only one purpose. That was to try and put in the record a few of these denials that we’ve all wanted to see put in the public record for some time. And you can rely on those denials. They’re true, and you can use that as any text that you may need to demonstrate that we’re not in the drug traffic, and that we’re not trying to do espionage on American citizens in the United States.’’
With the second memorandum, the MAG eventually succeeded in getting a meeting with the Deputy Director for Plans, that is, the head of the Clandestine Service. He took the opportunity to explain to them why their concerns were not going to be fully addressed. At the same time, he tried to assure them that such activities were limited and usually not really espionage.
 21 December 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director–Comptroller SUBJECT: Meeting with MAG Group 1. I met with the MAG group this morning for little over an hour, and I set forth as candidly as possible those counterintelligence and counterespionage responsibilities of ours overseas which make it mandatory for us occasionally to take an interest in American citizens overseas. I explained the requirements placed on us by the Department of Justice for overseas checks, and also the fact that our normal overseas operations against Soviets and others sometimes pro duce leads to Americans in conspiratorial contact with our Communist targets. 2. I was asked about our having sent Agency representatives to the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in 1968 and I explained that I never heard of such a thing and did not believe it. I pointed out that, as they knew, the press had reported fully on the Agency participation at the beginning of the sky mar shalling program and I assumed they saw nothing wrong with this. They agreed. I also pointed out that, at President Kennedy’s funeral, with scores of im portant foreign personalities here, the Agency lent some assistance to the Secret Service, and here again the group understood that this was a legitimate function. 3. The group made it clear that their concern was over the Agency image if the general public were aware that some of our activities, wherever they took place, were targeted against Blacks. I said that we did not target against Americans of any color in this country, and that the Clandestine Service was colorblind when it came to carrying out its overseas CI responsibilities and it would continue to be so. 4. I agreed that the Director should be asked to speak a little more fully and clearly on whether we ‘‘target against American citizens’’ so that there is no ambiguity. 5. I told the group that we must expect all kinds of irresponsible accusations in the press, such as the one in the January 1972 issue of RAMPARTS magazine in which Bob Kiley and Drex Godfrey, it is suggested, are still in the employ of CIA working on a CIA plan to improve police organizations in this coun try.2 I said that this was palpably false as anyone who knows Kiley and God frey would understand. The group mentioned Dick Ober’s unit and said that there was a lot of scuttlebutt that the purpose of this unit was to keep book on Black Power adherents.3 I denied this saying that our interest was as I had explained it previously. 6. I do not know whether this is a fair assumption, but Dick Ober’s machine program is not handled in the Clandestine Service and it is possible that someone is misreading and misinterpreting the intent of Ober’s program from fragmentary bits and pieces that may be discernible from the handling of the machine program. I do not state this as a fact because I have not exam ined it that closely. 7. I told the group that I had offered to enlighten it candidly on what we do so that they would at least have the facts and I said that I assume you would take it from here. /signed/ Thomas H. Karamessines Deputy Director for Plans
The MAG members did not express dissatisfaction with the Karamessines meeting, but neither had they been set at ease. They intended to press the issue further.
23 December 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Executive Director–Comptroller SUBJECT: CIA’s Domestic Activities REFERENCE: MAG Memoranda on same subject dated March 1971 and November 1971 As requested, MAG met with the DDP on 21 December and discussed with him the referenced memoranda on CIA’s covert domestic activities. Our exchange con sisted primarily of the DDP responding to the MAG memoranda as they related to activities of the Clandestine Service alone. The DDP made it clear that he spoke only for his Service. Since MAG’s initial concern over covert domestic activities extended to, while not being restricted to, the Clandestine Service, it recommends that the referenced memoranda be also brought to the attention of appropriate sen ior officials in other Agency components. The Management Advisory Group
The Executive Director–Comptroller is a position roughly equivalent to Chief of Staff. The incumbent at the time was Col. Lawrence K. White (known to his friends as ‘‘Red’’ White), who was just about to retire. (He would be replaced by William E. Colby, just back from Vietnam.) White was clearly annoyed with the group’s demands, but he met with them and also looked further into the ba sis for accusations of CIA activity at the 1968 Democratic National Convention. This he found to be insignificant.
Executive Director–Comptroller/initialed LKW/
 4 January 1972
1. I met with the outgoing and incoming MAG Cochairmen. We discussed a number of topics but concentrated particularly on their two most recent memoranda concerning domestic activities. I expressed slight irritation with their second memorandum, which is a shotgun approach to the problem, and asked them to be specific if they have anything in mind. I said I understand they have heard that we sent a surveillance team to the Democratic National Convention. Mr. [—] said that he made this statement because an Office of Security employee reported in his presence that he personally was a member of a team which went to the Convention.4 (I subsequently raised this with [Director of Security] Howard Osborn, who after investigating reported back that the Secret Service asked us for two technicians during the Democratic National Convention. These technicians were formally detailed to the Secret Service and went to Chicago, where they did RF [Radio Frequency] monitor ing under the supervision of the Secret Service. The Secret Service apparently calls RF monitoring ‘‘audio surveillance,’’ and it seems that, during the discus sion that took place at the Senior Seminar, those who heard this assumed that ‘‘surveillance’’ meant actual surveillance of the candidates, when actually the meeting rooms were being checked to ensure they had not been bugged. I have reported all this to the Director and shall discuss it with MAG when I have din ner with them on 11 January.
Colby, as the new Executive Director–Comptroller, later responded to the issues raised by the MAG with a memorandum to the various division chiefs. The memo reiterated and reemphasized existing policies on a number of issues related to domestic activities, but it also gave examples of justifiable partial exceptions to the general rules. (To be sure, some of the exceptions are a bit vague: ‘‘Security investigations are conducted on ... security problems which arise.’’)5 As a curious consequence of this, the document, which was purport edly intended to soothe staff concerns, was not to be shared openly with the staff as a whole. Colby limited the distribution of the document to ranking per sonnel, and it appears that the subject was not to be discussed unless employees raised it first.
21 APR 1972
Deputy Director for Intelligence Deputy Director for Plans Deputy Director for Support Deputy Director for Science and Technology Heads of Independent Offices (For Distribution to Office/Division Chief Level Only)
SUBJECT: CIA Activities in the United States
1. From time to time some of our employees express concern over various allega tions or rumors of CIA activities in the United States. The attached memoran dum is designed to clarify this subject so that supervisors can authoritatively reply to any employees indicating such concern. It is a statement of the facts of the situation. If incidents or activities are reported which appear to conflict with this statement, they should be reported to appropriate senior authority for resolution (or correction if unauthorized activities might have occurred). 2. Because of the possible sensitivity of this description of the Agency’s method ology, this memorandum is not being given the usual broad distribution of the ‘‘FYI—Allegations and Answers’’ series. Office and Division Chiefs are urged, however, to use it to inform Branch Chiefs so that its points can be readily available to supervisors to react to expressions of employee concern.
 /signed/ W. E. Colby
Executive Director–Comptroller
In a variety of ways it has been alleged that CIA is working within the United States, with particular attention to extremist groups.
1. Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, subparagraph D3, states, ‘‘The Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or in ternal security functions.’’ In his speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors on 14 April 1971, the Director stated: ‘‘I can assure you that except for the normal responsibilities for protecting the physical security of our own personnel, our facilities, and our classified information, we do not have any such powers and functions; we have never sought any; we do not exercise any. In short, we do not target on American citizens.’’ In the Director’s ‘‘State of the Agency’’ speech to employees on 17 Septem ber 1971, he said: ‘‘I gave a talk to the American Society of Newspaper Editors last winter, as you know, and I did it for only one purpose. That was to try and put in the record a few of these denials that we’ve all wanted to see put in the public record for some time. And you can rely on those denials. They’re true, and you can use that as any text that you may need to demonstrate that we’re not in the drug traffic, and that we’re not trying to do espionage on American citizens in the United States, and we’re not tapping telephone lines, and that we’re not doing a lot of other things that we’re accused of doing. One of the things that tends to perpetuate some of these silly ideas are jokes that are made about them, particularly about domestic espionage. Although the jokes have no basis in fact they nevertheless give us a name which we don’t deserve. I don’t say that that makes all that much difference, but it does make some difference, and this tends to spill over, so I would like to suggest that if you have it in your hearts to do so that you speak up when the occasion arises and try to set the facts straight.’’ 2. From time to time some employees have been concerned that Agency activ ities might conflict with these statements. They can be assured that Agency activities do not. For clarification, some activities which may have been sub ject to misunderstanding are listed as follows: a. Domestic Contacts. The Domestic Contact Service establishes discreet but overt relationships with American private citizens, commercial, academic and other organizations and resident aliens for the purposes of collecting on a voluntary basis foreign intelligence information or soliciting their cooperation in assisting the Agency to perform its mission overseas. Records of the individuals and organizations cooperating with the Agency are maintained as a necessary practical element of this process. b. Security Investigations. Security investigations are conducted on prospec tive employees, contractors, and consultants, and on security problems which arise. These investigations involve a wide range of investigative pro cedures, including neighborhood inquiries, checks with other Government agencies, review of credit reports, and interviews with former employers and business associates. This is essential to assure that our personnel pos sess a high degree of integrity, sense of responsibility, and competence and to protect classified information and sensitive intelligence sources and methods. The resulting files are held separately by the Office of Security and are not merged with other Agency files. c. Foreign Resources. On some occasions, foreign citizens of interest to CIA are contacted and recruited in America for work abroad. The purpose of this activity is entirely restricted to the Agency’s foreign operations. d. Recruitment. CIA recruiters maintain a wide variety of contacts within the United States, assisting individuals interested in employment with CIA to learn more about it and to join its employee force. e. Contracting. In the course of CIA business and operations, a number of contracts for procurement, research, or analysis are made with a variety of U.S. companies and individuals. This in no way constitutes operations in the U.S. but rather secures the assistance of these groups in carrying out the CIA mission against foreign targets f. Operations. The 1967 Katzenbach Committee report was approved by the Director in March 1967 and is binding on any of our relations with Ameri can organizations today. It specifically prohibits covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any U.S. educational or private voluntary organization. Any relationship or operation the Agency has with an American organization must be and is within these guidelines.6 g. Details or Loans. On rare occasions, details of technically qualified CIA personnel, technical advice, or loans of CIA equipment have been made available to other U.S. agencies at their request to assist them to carry out their responsibilities. An example is the skymarshal program, in which some CIA personnel were temporarily detailed to the FAA in order to assist in a rapid initiation of that program. Such personnel and equipment are under the operational control of the receiving agency. Assistance of this nature in no way constitutes an assumption of responsibility or authority by CIA for the program. h. Counterintelligence and Drugs. To carry out its responsibilities for coun terintelligence, CIA is interested in the activities of foreign nations or intelligence services aimed at the U.S. To the extent that these activities lie outside the U.S., including activities aimed at the U.S. utilizing U.S. citi zens or others, they fall within CIA’s responsibilities. Responsibility for coverage of the activities within the U.S. lies with the FBI, as an internal security function. CIA’s responsibility and authority are limited to the for eign intelligence aspect of the problem, and any action of a law enforce ment or internal security nature lies with the FBI or local police forces. (CIA’s assistance to the U.S. Government program against narcotics and drugs is handled in the same fashion.) i. Operational Support. To support CIA operations, arrangements are made with various U.S. business or other entities to provide cover or other sup port for CIA personnel or activities abroad. This can include proprietaries formed or controlled by CIA. While these may exist within the U.S., their purpose is to conduct or support operations abroad. j. Defectors. As provided by law, CIA occasionally resettles in the U.S. defectors and other foreign individuals of operational interest. This reset tlement may involve a new identity, relocation, employment, etc. Although this activity takes place in this country, its purpose is the sup port of operations abroad.
It appears that the MAG was largely responding to rumors, which evidently ran rampant in the secretive atmosphere of the CIA. What was the basis of these rumors? Among the concerns raised by the MAG was the purported surveil lance of domestic radical and Black Power groups within the United States. In fact, a series of memoranda in the ‘‘Family Jewels’’ file dealt with reports writ ten on these or closely related topics. While some of the memoranda are vague as to which agency conducted the actual surveillance, others insist it was the FBI and that the CIA had played no domestic investigative role. In 1968, the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), within the Directorate of Intelligence, produced a paper on the topic of student dissidents titled ‘‘Restless Youth,’’ which included a section dealing with an American youth organization, Students for a Democratic Society (SDS).7 According to a memo from the Deputy Director for Intelligence to the Inspector General (dated 22 May 1973), two versions had been produced, one with the chapter on the American organi zation and one without any reference to it.
The full version of the paper was distributed only to President Lyndon B. John son, National Security Adviser Walter Rostow, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance. The sanitized version had a wider distribution, but it was still lim ited to only twenty people outside the CIA. After the change of administration in 1969, the sanitized version alone was distributed to Vice President Spiro Agnew and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger. Attorney General John Mitchell received an even more abbreviated edition. A memo from the Director of Current Intelligence, dated 7 May 1973 and reproduced below, stated that an updated ver sion of the full report went to the White House in February 1969. The following memorandum, from 1968, reflected the cautious attitude taken toward its distribution. Note that the issue raised was not the need for secrecy for national security’s sake, but the ‘‘considerable notoriety’’ that would be raised if the CIA admitted to being interested in the topic. Note, too, that the in terest was said to have originated not within the CIA, but was forced upon it by the head of the National Security Council staff.
17 September 1968
 Dissemination of OCI Paper on Student Dissidents
1. Dissemination to the Cabinet and within the Intelligence Community—The pa per Restless Youth is sensitive because of the subject matter, because of the like lihood that public exposure of the Agency’s interest in the problem of student dissidence would result in considerable notoriety, particularly in the university world, and because pursuant to Mr. Rostow’s instructions, the author included in his text a study of student radicals in the United States, thereby exceeding the Agency’s charter. We have sanitized the paper for dissemination to mem bers of the President’s Cabinet and within the Intelligence Community by elim inating altogether the chapter which discusses Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and by striking from the Prospects section all mention of SDS. 2. Outside the Community but within the Government—We believe that the ba sic text should be further edited for the purpose of eliminating even the most casual reference to the domestic scene—lest someone infer from such a chance reference that the original paper had contained a section on American students. The nineteen country chapters which form Part II of Restless Youth can be distributed within the Government, provided that the controls appro priate to their classification are observed. To do the editing and reprinting required would take several days at least. 3. Release to the academic world or to the public—For the reasons set forth above, we believe that release of the basic text would harm the Agency. The country chapters could not be released without first being rewritten to eliminate all clas sified information. Once this was done, they would duplicate information al ready available in the open press. There is no lack of overt literature on the subject of student dissent; virtually every publisher includes at least one title on his current listing. Moreover, other agencies of government, such as Health, Education andWelfare, have sponsored research on the subject and are prepared to publish their findings. Consequently, we recommend against public release.
The Director of the Office of Current Intelligence provided a memorandum giving background on the Restless Youth study. From this memo it appears that the FBI had done the actual domestic spying on which the analysis was based, although there is also reference to assistance in the report’s preparation from the CIA’s Counterintelligence (CI) and Covert Action (CA) staffs.
 7 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence VIA: Deputy Director for Intelligence FROM: Director of Current Intelligence SUBJECT: Activity Related to Domestic Event
1. In late spring of 1968 Walt Rostow, then Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, tasked the DCI with undertaking a survey of world wide student dissidence. Confronted by tumult at campuses like Columbia and mindful of the violence accompanying student outbursts at Berlin’s Free University and elsewhere, Rostow sought to learn whether youthful dissi dence was interconnected; spawned by the same causes; financed and hence manipulated by forces or influences hostile to the interests of the US and its allies; or likely to come under inimical sway to the detriment of US interests. 2. The paper was prepared by [—] of OCI with the assistance of the CA and CI Staffs. The DDI [Deputy Director for Intelligence], D/OCI [Director of the Office of Current Intelligence], and [—] met with Rostow to elicit the reasons for his or the President’s concerns and to agree on the sources to be exam ined, the research methods to be followed, etc. 3. Written during the summer of 1968, the most sensitive version of Restless Youth comprised two sections. The first was a philosophical treatment of student unrest, its motivation, history, and tactics. This section drew heavily on overt literature and FBI reporting on Students for a Democratic Society and affiliated groups. In a sense, the survey of dissent emerged from a shorter (30 pages) typescript study of SDS and its foreign ties the same author had done for Mr. Rostow at the DCI’s request in December 1967. (We no longer have a copy.) 4. Because of the paucity of information on foreign student movements, it was necessary to focus on SDS which then monopolized the field of student action here and abroad. A second section comprised 19 country chapters—ranging from Argentina to Yugoslavia—and stood by itself as a review of foreign stu dent dissidence. 5. Because SDS was a domestic organization, the full paper Restless Youth, including the essay on worldwide dissent went only to nine readers. A copy may be in the Johnson Library. 6. Following the paper’s favorable reception by the President and Mr. Rostow, the DCI briefed the NSC [National Security Council] on student dissent. The sensitive version subsequently was updated and sent to the White House in February 1969. 7. The less sensitive text was disseminated in September 1968 and then updated and issued again in March 1969 and August 1970.
 [—signature deleted—] Richard Lehman Director of Current Intelligence
The daily log kept by Inspector General William V. Broe noted on 30 May 1973 that the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) analysts had not in fact written the SDS chapter at all:
1100: [—] called WVB, to bring to his attention the fact that Kissinger has asked for some papers he’d received in the summer of 1970; now wants to see them again. One, Restless Youth (June 1970). OCI wrote a whole set of country chapters; and [—] of the CS [Clandestine Service] (since left CIA) wrote a more sensitive piece drawing on US and other countries for examples to make its point. OCI balked— didn’t want to do anything on the US side. The whole project eventually was turned over to CA [Covert Activities].
A second memorandum from the Director of the Office of Current Intelli gence dealt with two studies about black radicalism in the Caribbean that touched upon domestic topics as well. This one does specify the use of ‘‘volumi nous’’ material from the Special Operations Group of the Counterintelligence Staff. There was also reporting on the foreign travels of Stokely Carmichael, an American Black Power activist (although he had been born in Trinidad) who in 1966–1967 had been chairman of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Commit tee and in 1968 became a leader of the Black Panther Party.
 7 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director for Intelligence
 FROM: Director of Current Intelligence
SUBJECT: Activity Related to Domestic Events
1. OCI began following Caribbean black radicalism in earnest in 1968. The em phasis of our analysis was on black nationalism as a political force in the Caribbean and as a threat to the security of the Caribbean states. Two DDI [Di rectorate of Intelligence] memoranda were produced on the subject: ‘‘Black Radicalism in the Caribbean’’ (6 August 1968), and ‘‘Black Radicalism in the Caribbean—Another Look’’ (12 June 1970). In each a single paragraph was devoted to ties with the US black power movement; the discussion primarily concerned visits of Stokely Carmichael and other overt contacts. 2. In June 1970, Archer Bush of OCI was asked to write a memorandum with special attention to links between black radicalism in the Caribbean and advocates of black power in the US. The record is not clear where this request originated, but it came through channels from the DCI. The paper was to be treated as especially sensitive and was to include material provided by the Special Operations group of the CI Staff. The CI Staff material was volumi nous but did not provide meaningful evidence of important links between militant blacks in the US and the Caribbean. This, in fact, was one of the con clusions of the paper. The memorandum was produced in typescript form and given to the DCI. 3. For several months in the first half of 1968 the Caribbean Branch wrote peri odic typescript memoranda on Stokely Carmichael’s travels abroad during a period when he had dropped out of public view. Our recollection is that the memoranda were for internal CIA use only, although a copy of one was inad vertently sent to the FBI.
 [—signature deleted—] Richard Lehman Director of Current Intelligenc
The Ballou case was another source of the rumors that fed the MAG’s con cerns regarding domestic activities. In this case, these rumors led to an internal investigation. This peculiar matter became the focus of a series of memoranda in the ‘‘Family Jewels’’ file as senior CIA leadership endeavored to figure out just what it was. Here, an allegation was made of CIA involvement in a police raid that ended in a shooting incident.
 25 May 1973
1. On 17 May the name of [—] was referred to this office as having attempted to contact the Director concerning ‘‘activities outside the Agency.’’ I attempted to contact [—] on 21 and 22 May, but he was on leave. On 23 May he stated he wanted to check a portion of his information and asked if he could come to my office on 24 May.
2. [—] came into the Agency as a JOT8 in October 1957 and is currently a [—] assigned to the Soviet/EE Section. He has a very strong personnel file.
3. [—] advised that in August 1971 he attended the Advanced Intelligence Semi nar. On the first evening of the seminar the students had a ‘‘getting ac quainted’’ session where each one gave a brief description of his duties. One of the students, [—] of the Office of Security, however, carried on after the session was over and expanded on the briefing he had given. He claimed that CIA was cooperating with the Montgomery County Police [in Maryland], stating that the Office of Security gave electronic and other support to that organization.
4. He further indicated that the Office of Security had been involved in the ‘‘Ballou case.’’ [—] described the Ballou case as follows: The residence of Mr. Ballou, an antique gun collector in Silver Spring, Maryland, was raided on 7 June 1971 by the Montgomery County Police and some Federal law enforce ment officers. After the officers, dressed in civilian clothes, had forced their way into the house, Ballou picked up an antique pistol. The officers immedi ately opened fire and wounded Ballou seriously. He spent a long time in the hospital and is partly paralyzed at the present time. His case was given much publicity in the Washington Post at the time. There was additional publicity in the last several months when Ballou instigated a lawsuit against the raid ing officers.
5. [—] identified another student, [—], who was assigned to IAS, as a friend of [—]. He stated that [—] also seemed to know the specifics of the Ballou case.
6. I thanked [—] and told him this was just the type of information we wanted to receive so that it can be investigated and appropriate action taken if the in formation is borne out.
7. This office will follow up on this allegation and advise the Director concern ing our finding.
 [—signature deleted—]
William V. Broe
Inspector General
F. P. Bishop of the Inspector General’s office was assigned to get to the bot tom of this question. Armed with a list of the participants in the Advanced Intelligence Seminar, he interviewed the various people mentioned in the original allegation. He began, however, with Director of Security Howard Osborn. (This memo appears to be a rough draft.) 30 May 1973
MEMO OF RECORD: SUBJECT: Talk with Howard Osborn, Dir. Security Re: [—]
 [—]  Report of Statements made by [—]
I talked with Mr. Osborn on 30 May about Mr. [—] statements concerning remarks made by Mr. [—] at the Advanced Intelligence Seminar No. 6 during the period 8–24 Sept. 1971. Mr. Osborn said that the fact that the Office of Security had relations with the local police forces in the Metropolitan Washington Area had been reported to the DCI in the Family Jewels memo dated 16 May 1973, but that he had no knowledge of the Ballou case and had not previously heard of any Agency involvement in or connection with the case. He suggested that I go ahead and talk to Mr. [—] and get what facts I could from him, but that he also intended to talk to Mr. [—] later himself. He remarked that Mr. [—] was a very good briefer, but inclined to be over-expansive at times and talk too much. [—signature deleted—]
F. P. Bishop
Bishop interviewed the person who had been so talkative at the Advanced Intelligence Seminar.
31 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Interview with [—], Office of Security
1. On 31 May 1973 I questioned [—] about what he had said at the Advanced Intelligence Seminar No. 6 and the extent and nature of the relations he had had with the Montgomery County Police. He said that he and others had been encouraged to discuss their work and the problems related thereto with other Seminar members and told that what they said would be ‘‘non-attributable.’’ In this context he had discussed the Office of Security’s relations with local Police Forces including the Police Force in Montgomery County. He said he mentioned the ‘‘Ballou case’’ as an example of how the Montgomery County Police had used equipment provided by the Agency in their work, but denied that he had said or implied that the Agency was ‘‘involved’’ in the Ballou case. He said that he had also related to the other Seminar members the fact that the Agency had provided assistance to the Secret Service in connection with the protection of the President and Vice President and that he and others had been detailed to work with the Secret Service on counter-audio activities at the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago and the Republican National Con vention in Miami. I asked [—], who was on the Chicago detail, if he was detailed to protect the Vice President. He said that he was detailed to Tom Kelly, Deputy Chief of the Secret Service and worked in effect as a member of the Secret Service under Mr. Kelly. 2. I questioned [—] as to whether his relations with the Montgomery County Police was training oriented, equipment oriented, or if he had engaged in any operations or activities with the police. He said his relations with the Police had been entirely equipment-oriented and had been limited to the Chief of Police and one or two senior Inspectors. The extent of assistance given con sisted of the Agency providing the Police with surplus technical equipment which was of no further use to the Agency, and briefing them as to its use. He said he would not define these briefings as training, but admitted that it might be so construed. 3. [—] said that his only knowledge of the ‘‘Ballou case,’’ except what he read in the papers, came from one telephone conversation he had with Inspector [—] of the Montgomery County Police sometime after accounts of the Ballou shooting had appeared in the press. He said the Inspector called to thank him for some amplifying equipment the Agency had given the Police and mentioned that it had probably saved the life of a policeman. He said that the Inspector explained to him that the account of the incident appearing in the press was not the whole story, that with the aid of the equipment the Agency had provided the Police had been able to intercept a telephone call from Ballou to a friend in which Ballou had outlined plans to ‘‘kill a cop.’’ The Police had then staged a raid to forestall Ballou’s plan and it was during this raid that Ballou was shot. [—] said that he had had no other conversa tions with the Montgomery County Police on that subject. He said he had mentioned it at the Seminar as an example of the sensitivity involved in the Agency’s dealings with domestic Police Forces. He said he recalled that there was quite a bit of discussion and argument by the Seminar members about the propriety of the Agency assisting local police forces and working with the Secret Service in the U.S., but that he did not recall any extensive discus sion about the Ballou case and that at no time had he said that the Agency was directly involved. [—] said he remembered that [—] seemed particularly concerned about the Agency’s involvement in domestic activities and that sometime later, around January or February 1972, [—] talked to Colonel White [the Executive Director–Comptroller] about his concern and Colonel White in turn talked to the Director of Security. Since that date, he said, he has not had any further direct contact with the Montgomery County Police, based upon orders of the Director of Security.
 [—signature deleted—]
An interview followed with another participant in the Advanced Intelligence Seminar as a witness to the exchanges that had occurred there. This person, who had been a chairman of the MAG, is one of the deleted names in the clos ing paragraph of the previous memorandum.
31 May 1973
1. [—] said he recalled [—] talking about the Office of Security’s liaison with the Police Force in the Metropolitan Area and that the Ballou case was men tioned. He also recalled that [—] had mentioned that the Agency had pro vided assistance to the Secret Service in connection with surveillance work against radical groups at the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago. He said that he could not remember exactly what [—] said, but he did recall that there was considerable discussion and debate among the class members about the propriety of the Agency engaging in such activities. 2. Later in January or February 1972, at a time when [—] was Chairman of the Management Advisory Group (MAG), he said he discussed these matters and questioned the extent to which the agency should become involved in domestic intelligence activities, with Colonel White and later with Mr. Colby. The MAG also raised the general problem in a couple of their papers, but without citing specific detailed examples. He said he understood that Colonel White had taken the matter up with the Director of Security and that some changes had been made as a result.
[—signature deleted—]
 F. P. Bishop
Bishop interviewed yet another participant in the Advanced Intelligence Seminar, presumably in an effort to corroborate the other stories.
29 May 1973
Bishop interviewed yet another participant in the Advanced Intelligence Seminar, presumably in an effort to corroborate the other stories.
29 May 1973
Possible Agency Involvement in Outside Activities on Basis of Informa tion Provided by [—] On 29 May 1973 I talked to Mr. [—] who was a classmate of [—] and [—] at the Advanced Intelligence Seminar No. 6 held on 8–24 September 1971. Mr. [—] said that each student was asked to describe and talk about his work in the Agency and he recalled that Mr. [—] had talked about the Office of Security’s liaison with, and assistance given to and received from, the Police Departments in the Washington Metropolitan area. He said he could not recall specifically what was said, but to the best of his memory, Mr. [—] described training given to either the Prince George’s or Montgomery County Police concerning surveillance methods and electronic tech niques. He said that he did not recall any discussion of the ‘‘Ballou case’’ and that he had no knowledge of that case other than what he had read in the newspapers.
 [—signature deleted—]
F. P. Bishop Inspector
Bishop returned to the Office of Security on 4 June to compare notes with Osborn. On 6 June, the Inspector General reported back to Schlesinger, by way of Colby, to relate the findings and essentially dismiss the original allegations. The Office of Technical Services (OTS, formerly the Technical Services Divi sion) provided false identification papers for employees operating under cover. The director of the office evidently believed that some of these had been used within the United States, but in this case very few details survived the CIA cen sor. Nevertheless, the following memo reveals a bit about the procedures used:
28 May 1973
 Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT: Documentation Support for Use in the United States 1. As you are aware this office provides document support for a variety of cov ert activities. [—about four lines deleted—] Specific use is not always  available to this office and should properly come from the requesting office who can provide the details. U.S. alias documentation use in the United States is approved by the Office of Security and normally has the concurrence of Central Cover Staff or FI [Foreign Intelligence] and CI [Counterintelli gence] Staffs. Requests received by this office from outside the Clandestine Service are approved by an appropriate office of the DDO. 2. A review of this office’s document support files for the period 1 January 1972 to date indicates that the following number of U.S. alias document requests were fulfilled for probable use in the United States. The statistics below are broken down by requester: [—about three and a half pages deleted—]
 [—signature and name deleted—]
Director Office of Technical Services
On the other hand, the Office of Training (OTR) insisted that none of its dis guises or false identity papers were used illicitly, although they may have been used at public locations in the United States. The following memo also makes clear that not everything from OTS was ‘‘high-tech:’’
18 June 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General SUBJECT: Use of Disguise and Alias Documentation Within the U.S.
REFERENCE: Memo dtd 30 May 73 to DTR fm [—]
Subj: Issuance of Disguise Materials for Probable Use Within U.S. or Its Territories
1. The Associate Deputy Director for Operations has asked that we give you a detailed report of the actual use that the Office of Training has made within the U.S. of all disguise materials and alias documentation we have obtained for our staff members and students. 2. Disguise Materials OTR has obtained from OTS disguise materials—including glasses, wigs, mustaches, and special shoes to increase height—for 12 staff instructors at the Domestic Training Station [DTS]. The purpose of these materials is to increase the difficulty that students in the Basic Operations Course and Advanced Operations Course will have in recognizing instructors during problems and exercises conducted [—] near DTS. Exercises include surveil lance, countersurveillance, brush passes, and dead-drop problems in which instructors monitor student activity. These exercises are run under carefully controlled conditions only in areas where adequate liaison exists with local authorities to avoid any flap should difficulty arise during an exercise. [—paragraph of about four lines deleted—] [—2’’ x 2’’ box, centered in page, deleted—] The sole use of disguise materials by these instructors has been or will be in support of the training exercise noted above. At no time have the materials been used for other purposes. 3. Alias Documents U.S. alias documents consisting primarily of business and social cards, but also including drivers’ licenses and social security cards, have been used for more than a year by students [—one and a half lines deleted—]. At the con clusion of the course, the alias documents are collected from the students and returned to OTS. Again, these documents are used only under carefully con trolled conditions in an environment [—] where adequate liaison with local authorities exists to contain any flap; and the documents are used only for the purposes stated. 4. A thorough canvass of all elements of OTR discloses no other instance in recent years in which we have used disguise materials or alias documenta tion within the U.S. or obtained such materials for that purpose.
 [—signature and name deleted—]
 Director of Training
Finally, in a memorandum to the Office of the Deputy Director for Intelli gence (O/DDI), the Director of the Central Reference Service (CRS) outlined the CIA Library’s quite limited holdings on domestic topics. A slight allowance was made, however, for open-source information on ‘‘extremists.’’ The memo also has an intriguing gap related to imagery.
7 May 1973
SUBJECT: Involvement in Domestic Affairs
1. This memorandum responds to the DDI’s request for a listing of any ques tionable involvements in domestic affairs. I do not believe that CRS is doing anything that a reasonable man could construe as improper. 2. CRS does, of course, have several programs to acquire still pictures, movies, videotapes [—approximately 10 lines deleted—]. 3. CRS files do not generally bear on U.S. citizens or organizations. The bio graphic file-building criteria specifically excludes U.S. nationals unless the person has become of such major importance in the political life of a foreign country that the file is essential. (To my knowledge, only 2 persons so qual ify. [—one and three-fourths lines deleted—]. Our Cuban files probably include some persons who are now U.S. citizens but we have no way to sepa rate them; we have files on U.S. defectors to Cuba.) 4. The CIA Library has several informal snag files intended to aid the librarians in answering the kinds of questions that they know they will get on a continu ing basis. An appointments file is a collection of clippings on appointed federal officials: who holds what job when and what is his background? The extremist files are a collection of folders on a variety of organizations and a few people with intricate organizational links. Any sort of extremism is grist for these par ticular files. And a few persons, e.g., Rap Brown and Eldridge Cleaver [leaders of the Black Panther Party], have dossiers consisting almost exclusively of clip pings from public media. These files are unclassified and consist mostly of clippings from the public press: U.S., foreign, underground, scholarly. 5. I am not aware of any other kind of involvement in domestic activities that is not related to development of techniques or logistics or legitimate training of CRS personnel.
 [—signature deleted—]
H. C. Eisenbeiss Director, Central Reference Service
NOTES 1. Victor Marchetti was a former employee of the CIA; indeed, he had been an assist ant to Richard Helms. Disillusioned with the agency, he resigned and became its most public critic. A book by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intel ligence (New York: Knopf, 1974), was published shortly before the Senate hearings on intelligence activities and contributed to an anti-CIA attitude among the public. It caused a sensation, in part, because the CIA took Marchetti to court to compel him to delete pas sages comprising one-fifth of the book prior to publication. (Marchetti, like all former CIA employees, had signed a severance agreement permitting the CIA to review any publication that might reveal classified material.) The court allowed about half of the deletions to be made and permitted Marchetti and Marks to put the other half back in. Knopf printed the book with blank spaces to indicate the deleted passages and printed the reinstated passages in bold for easy identification.
2. This is presumably the same story printed in the Quicksilver Times. See below.
3. Richard Ober was in charge of the Special Operations Group (SOG), which sought evidence of foreign support for U.S. dissident groups, especially the antiwar movement. The ‘‘machine program’’ mentioned in the next paragraph refers to the computerized database that Ober developed. See Chapter 7, ‘‘The Search for Foreign Instigators: Opera tion Chaos and the Intelligence Evaluation Committee.’’
4. See the memoranda below related to the Ballou case.
 5. An earlier draft of the memorandum, which was distributed among the highest level officers and to the MAG cochairmen for comment in March 1972, was also con tained in the ‘‘Family Jewels’’ file. The earlier draft suggested that Colby did intend to distribute it in a future issue of ‘‘FYI—Allegations and Answers.’’ It specifically men tioned the ‘‘Management Advisory Group, among others,’’ as reporting concern. The draft also cited an article in the Quicksilver Times (20 January 1972) under the ‘‘Allega tion’’ rubric, noting that the ‘‘two gentlemen’’ mentioned in the article were no longer associated with the agency. (An incomplete clipping from the Quicksilver Times, an underground newspaper printed in Washington, D.C., was also included in the file. It alleged that agents from the CIA, FBI, and Treasury had engaged in an ‘‘effort to pin the bank bombings on radical groups.’’ The two names mentioned were Robert Kiley, identi fied in the article as a former special assistant to Helms, and Drexel Godfrey, identified as a former Director of Current Intelligence.) The draft reversed the order of items ‘‘a’’ and ‘‘b’’ and did not include ‘‘security problems which arise’’ among the targets of secu rity investigations. Item ‘‘h’’ did not call special attention to the drug program. The item titled ‘‘Operational Support’’ was originally titled ‘‘Cover’’ and placed last on the list. Several items were reworded, presumably to make them clearer.
6. The Katzenbach Committee issued its recommendation on 29 March 1967, and President Lyndon B. Johnson immediately adopted it as policy. The issue had been prompted by news stories alleging long-term financial subsidies from the CIA to certain student organizations both at home and abroad. The committee consisted of Under Sec retary of State Nicholas deBelleville Katzenbach, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare John W. Gardner, and Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms. See the Department of State Web site, 32679.htm.
7. For OCI memoranda dealing with the antiwar movement, see Chapter 7, ‘‘The Search for Foreign Instigators: Operation Chaos and the Intelligence Evaluation Committee.’’ 8. A JOT is a member of the Junior Office Training program
Chapter 9
 Assistance to Police and Other Agencies
  The ‘‘Family Jewels’’ file contains numerous memoranda related to assistance that the CIA rendered to federal agencies that were primarily concerned with domestic matters. These were not necessarily the most controversial of CIA activities. Many of them appear in the ‘‘Family Jewels’’ file primarily because they involved contacts with people who were later connected to Watergate. Sometimes, however, they did cross the line that was intended to separate for eign intelligence activity from domestic law enforcement. In a memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence dated 8 May 1973, for example, the Deputy Director for Intelligence lists the few and insubstantial contacts his staff had had with various Watergate figures. He then goes on to note ‘‘domestic activities which might appear questionable to outsiders.’’ About six of these have been redacted from the text. Some of the others are fairly be nign, such as reviewing NASA satellite photos in search of images too ‘‘sen sitive’’ for public release. Other topics, however, do relate to domestic dissidents and police activity.1
The memo noted, for example:
DCS [Domestic Contact Service] accepts information on possible foreign involve ment in US dissident groups and on the narcotics trade when sources refuse to deal with the FBI and BNDD [Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs] directly.
Accompanying this memorandum in the file was another one, dated the pre vious day, to the Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI) from the Director of the Domestic Contact Service (DCS), which elaborated on that office’s role. For an agency prohibited from operating within U.S. borders, this subdivision would seem to particularly problematic. Although it was restricted to using open sour ces of information, the DCS operated out of small offices in a number of U.S. cities. In the normal course of its operations, it would contact Americans who had visited ‘‘closed societies’’ and inquire about anything they may have noticed that might be of use to the CIA. It also rendered support to other
members of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB, that is, the intelligence community). Despite the DCS’s seemingly precarious position with regard to domestic activities, its director in 1973 did not believe it had done anything at all untoward. Nevertheless, about 70 percent of the points he had to make were redacted out of the memo in the ‘‘Family Jewels’’ file. 7 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT: DCS Domestic Activity
To the best of my knowledge, DCS has not engaged in any activity outside the CIA charter or that could be construed as illegal. Some of the functions that we perform under HR 1–13f(i) of providing operational support within the US to all elements of CIA and to the USIB-member agencies, however, are perhaps border line or could be construed as illegal if misinterpreted. For example: [—four paragraphs deleted—] 5. Collect information on possible foreign involvement or penetration of US dissi dent groups, but only in a passive manner and only when the source has refused to pass the information directly to the FBI. 6. Collect information on the narcotics trade, but again only in a passive manner when the source has refused to pass the information directly to BNDD or the FBI. [—three paragraphs deleted—] 10. Acquire routing slips recording the fact of overseas telephone calls between persons in the US and persons overseas and telephone calls between two for eign points routed through US switchboards. This activity lasted for approxi mately six months but has ceased. [—one paragraph deleted—] /signed/ JAMES R. MURPHY Director, Domestic Contact Service.
The following memos relate to assistance rendered clandestinely to the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), a relatively short-lived agency that was the successor to the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and was in turn replaced by the Drug Enforcement Agency. Because the activity involved a connection with a predominantly domestic law-enforcement agency, it came within the purview of DCI James Schlesinger’s request for information on illegal activities.
7 May 1973
Memorandum to: The Inspector General Subject: Office of Security Survey—Office of Security Support to BNDD In December 1970, Robert Ingersoll, head of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dan gerous Drugs, asked Mr. Helms if the Agency could give him some assistance in shoring up the internal integrity of the BNDD. According to Mr. Ingersoll, the old Federal Bureau of Narcotics had been heavily infiltrated by dishonest and corrupt elements, who were believed to have ties with the narcotics smuggling industry. Ingersoll wanted us to help him recruit some thoroughly reliable people who could be used, not only as special agents in his various offices around the country, but also to serve as informants on the other BNDD employees in these offices.
[—one page deleted—]
A related question concerned whether, and how much, to continue the BNDD program. The following memo was addressed to William E. Colby in his capacity as the Executive Director of the CIA Management Committee. He held this position at the same time that he was Deputy Director for Operations. 25 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary, CIA Management Committee
1. This memorandum sets forth a recommendation for your approval in para graph 5. 2. For the past several years, this office has been supporting the Bureau of Nar cotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) by spotting, assessing, and recruiting per sonnel to form an internal security unit whose primary mission is the detection of corruption within the BNDD. Subsequent to the recruitment and training stage, the individuals selected are turned over to the Chief Inspector of BNDD for operational guidance and handling in their various domestic assignments. 3. Recently, this Agency has extended this activity by supporting BNDD in the covert acquisition of individuals who are hired as Staff Agents utilized under nonofficial cover and directed against the principal international drug traf fickers. These individuals are true employees of the BNDD and, although all administrative details relative to their employment are handled within the Agency, they are unaware of any Agency involvement. 4. It is felt at this time that a reaffirmation of our support to BNDD in Project TWO-FOLD is necessary and desirable. 5. Therefore, it is recommended that approval be granted for the continuation of Project TWO-FOLD as originally approved by the Director of Central Intel ligence on 12 February 1971.
Howard J. Osborn
 Director of Security
A notation at the bottom of the above memo recorded the response, which indicated the agency’s eagerness at the time to remain strictly within the rules.
Per Mr. Colby’s recommendation and DCI concurrence, terminate paragraph 2 ac tivity and continue paragraph 3 only as the activity pertains to foreign intelligence abroad. Copy furnished IG [Inspector General].
At times, of course, the CIA did not have much choice when it came to sup porting the budgets of other government agencies.
February 7, 1972
The Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control was created Septem ber 7, 1971, by the President to centralize his attack on the international drug traffic. The Committee does not have a separate budget
Salary and administrative support for its small, full-time staff has been provided by the Executive Office of the President. Other expenses are being charged to the constituent agencies and departments. The Bureau of Customs, BNDD, and AID/Office of Public Safety have provided support to date.2 The CIA should be prepared to defray not more than fifteen thousand dollars in overseas travel expenses for Cabinet Committee staff during the remainder of FY-1972. Walter G. Minnick, the Committee’s Staff Coordinator, can be contacted for fur ther details. Thank you for your assistance
Egil Krogh, Jr.3
 Executive Director Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control
For many agencies, cooperation with the CIA meant turning to it as a source of sophisticated espionage gadgets as well as disguises, false identity papers, and so forth. At the time the ‘‘Family Jewels’’ were being assembled, the office responsible for issuing such items was involved in a reorganization. Prior to 4 May 1973, it was the Technical Services Division (TSD), a branch of the Direc torate of Plans (Operations). At that time, however, DCI Schlesinger moved it to the Directorate of Science and Technology and renamed it the Office of Techni cal Services (OTS). In the following memo, written four days later, the head of the office is addressing his new boss, the Deputy Director for Science and Tech nology, but he is describing the past activities of the TSD. In it, he outlines the nature of his office’s cooperation with other agencies, ranging from the Defense Department to the U.S. Postal Service, and some of the procedures involved. Perhaps because his boss is new to this responsibility, he goes into some detail. Note that in addition to a variety of mundane topics, there are also items such as teaching ‘‘surreptitious entry’’ techniques to Washington-area police depart ments. Also, the sometimes complex authorization requirements (and the nag ging for the return of borrowed items) give some idea of life in the intelligence bureaucracy.
 8 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science & Technology
SUBJECT: TSD Support to Other Agencies
1. Technical Services Division’s charter (CSI 1–9) requires that it provide techni cal assistance to both CIA operations and other activities as may be directed by the Deputy Director for Operations. 2. Over the years the chief non-CIA recipients of this support have been the Department of Defense, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Nar cotics and Dangerous Drugs, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of State, United States Postal Service, Secret Service, Agency for International Development, and the White House. 3. While varying widely among the different recipients, these services have included training and materials, and in a few instances participation in the fields of audio and visual surveillance, secret writing and related communica tions, personal protection, alias documentation and questioned document examination, disguise, concealment devices, electronic beaconry, illicit nar cotics detection, and counter-sabotage/terrorism. 4. In most instances requirements for this support are received by TSD through higher echelons (Officer of the Director or Deputy Director for Operations). Unless the service involved is a trivial or continuing one, the request is referred to the Foreign Intelligence Staff Departmental Coordination Group for coordination and approval at the appropriate Agency levels. Approval within TSD by the Chief of Operations or Development and Engineering and the Chief of TSD or his Deputy also is required. 5. The attachment lists the primary services provided to the organizations named in Paragraph two. 6. Issuance of forged personal identity documentation by TSD is controlled according to two broad criteria: type of requester; and type of documentation requested. A request for denied area documentation from a DDO [Directorate of Operations] Area Division is honored after proper validation. Free world documentation may require some extra coordination however. [—just over five lines deleted—] 7. Unless ordered otherwise by higher Agency authority, no U.S. documenta tion is issued by TSD Headquarters without prior coordination with the Office of Security and the Central Cove Staff. TSD Regional Bases require at least the validation of U.S. documentation requests by the COS [Chief of Sta tion], or his designated representative, of the requesting Station. Because it could be used [—about three-fourths of a line deleted—], no U.S. Birth Certif icate is issued without approval of the DDO [Directorate of Operations] via Central Cover Staff. Backstopped major credit cards are issued by Office of Security, not TSD. 8. Provision of forged documentation to non-DDO requesters, whether they be CIA or other Agency requesters, always requires approval of non-TSD offices. Support to the military for instance would be validated by FI [Foreign Intelli gence] Staff/Departmental Coordination Group at Headquarters or by the COS overseas having responsibility for coordination of the operation. BNDD requests are coordinated with DDO/NARCOG [Narcotics Coordination Group]. Requests for documentation of Immigration and Naturalization Serv ice is coordinated via the Alien Affairs Staff. 9. Authentication items are issued on a loan basis and must be returned to TSD or accounted for. After any documentation has been issued, TSD retains pho tographs and records of such support until the documentation has been returned to TSD. If the material is not returned after a reasonable time, the re quester is reminded of the outstanding documentation. /signed/ Sidney Gottlieb Chief Technical Services Division
Department of Defense Documents, disguise, concealment devices, secret writing, flaps and seals [that is, techniques for opening and resealing envelopes]; counterinsurgency and counter sabotage courses have been furnished to all intelligence elements of the Department of Defense and certain elements of the Special Forces. All requests are coordinated with the FI Departmental Coordination Group at Headquarters and with the Chief of Stations overseas. In turn these elements furnished TSD with exemplars of foreign identities documents, foreign cachets, foreign intelligence secret writing systems, and foreign intelligence concealment devices. Selected audio requirements have been furnished overseas for CI [Counterintelligence]-type cases. Federal Bureau of Investigation At the request of the FBI we cooperate with the Bureau in a few audio surveil lance operations against sensitive foreign targets in the United States. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Beacons, cameras, audio and telephone devices for overseas operations, identity documents, car-trailing devices, SRAC [short-range agent communications], flaps and seals and training of selected personnel responsible for use thereof has been furnished this Bureau. All requirements are sent to DDO/NARCOG for coordina tion with area divisions and for action by TSD if appropriate. Requests overseas are coordinated with the COS or his designee before action by TSD is taken. Immigration and Naturalization CI analysis of foreign passports and visas, guidance in developing tamperproof alien registration cards, [—a half line deleted—] have been furnished the Service. Requests are forwarded directly to TSD for coordination within TSD if technical, with the FI Departmental Coordination Group if operational. Department of State Technical graphics guidance on developing a new United States Passport, analy ses of foreign passports, car-armoring and personnel locators (beacons) for Ambas sadors have been supplied the State Department. In addition, analyses and exposure of black letter operations against the United States abroad are made. All graphics requirements are forwarded to TSD for further coordination within the Division. The Department of State furnishes exemplars of foreign passports, for eign visas and in the past passports on a priority basis. Postal Service The Office of Chief Postal Inspector has had selected personnel attend basic sur veillance photographic courses, has been furnished foreign postal information and has been the recipient of letter bomb analyses, furnished [—] typewriter analyses. Requirements are coordinated with the DDO and DDO/EA. The Post Office has furnished TSD with exemplars of letter bombs and [—just over one line deleted—]. We also have an arrangement with the Post Office to examine and reinsert a low volume of certain foreign mail arriving in the United States. Secret Service Gate passes, security passes, passes for Presidential campaign, emblems for Presidential vehicles, and a secure ID photo system have been furnished this Serv ice. Blanket approval for graphics support has been granted to the Deputy Director for Operations. In each case TSD requests approval from the DDO. U.S. Agency for International Development We furnish instructors to a USAID-sponsored Technical Investigation Course (Counter Terror) at [—about nine and a half lines deleted—]. White House Stationary, special memoranda, and molds of the Great Seal have been furnished the Social Secretary. The Deputy Director for Operations is apprised of these requirements.
Police Representing Washington, Arlington, Fairfax and Alexandria During the period 1968–1969 a series of classes reflecting basic and surveillance photography, basic audio, locks and picks, counter-sabotage and surreptitious entry were given to selected members from the above-mentioned cities. Overall training was approved by the Director of Central Intelligence and in turn valida tion was required for each course from the Director of Security. It is worth noting that, apart from the redactions, the preceding memorandum from the ‘‘Family Jewels’’ file had marginal ink marks highlighting certain points. These were references to programs involving the FBI, the U.S. Postal Service (spe cifically, furnishing foreign postal information and receiving foreign mail), and the entire paragraph concerning local police departments. The document was accompanied by a brief note to Colby from Executive Director Benjamin Evans (the chief of staff). Evans evidently thought the memorandum, although intended for an internal file, deserved to be sanitized. Perhaps it is worth noting that Got tlieb was dismissed within two weeks of writing these memos.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Colby Carl Duckett [the Deputy Director for Science and Technology] brought this up and said he is very uncomfortable with what Sid Gottlieb is reporting and thinks the Director would be ill-advised to say he is acquainted with this program. Duck ett plans to scrub it down with Gottlieb but obviously cannot do it this afternoon. Ben Evans
8 May 1973
Gottlieb’s original memorandum was also accompanied by another set of memo randa, dated the same day, 8 May 1973. (Evans’s note may well have been referring to these also.) The cover sheet notes, ‘‘Attached herewith are additional explana tions of TSD support to other U.S. Government agencies.’’ These additional files have undergone a more thorough redaction than the original. Note that the second memorandum below highlights that, apart from teaching techniques to local police departments, the CIA could also gain useful technical information from the police.
TSD has had a close working relationship with the FBI over the past few years. The FBI is the only organization that has been fully briefed on TSD audio techni ques and equipment. The following are situations where TSD equipment and guid ance were involved in operations: [—about one and a half pages deleted—]
 8 May 1973
SUBJECT: Contacts with Domestic Police Organizations
1. In December 1968, July 1969 and December 1970, SDB [Special Development Branch] provided basic counter-sabotage familiarization training for selected members of the Washington metropolitan area police departments. The training was given at the Fairfax County pistol and rifle range. Authorization for the train ing came from DDP [Deputy Director for Plans] and Chief, Office of Security.
2. On occasion during the past few years, under the auspices of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration [LEAA] of the Department of Justice and with the approval of CI Staff and Office of Security, SDB provided train ing and familiarization to police officers of several domestic police depart ments in the uses of the Explosives Residue Detection Technique and Trace Metals Detection Technique. These techniques had been declassified and are currently available to the law enforcement community. The National Bomb Data Center publishes periodic guidance in their uses. 3. In order to augment the SDB mission responsibilities in the field of counter sabotage and counter-terror, SDB officers have in the past two years visited, under appropriate covers, the explosives disposal units of the New York City police department, Dade County (Miami) Florida Dept. and the Los Angeles Police Dept. Also in March 1973, two SDB officers attended the Explosives and Ordnance Disposal Conference in Sacramento, California, sponsored by LEAA. When the recent letter bomb menace began in September 1972, our li aison with the NYCPD bomb squad paid off in that we had complete infor mation on letter bomb construction in hours, enabling the Agency to make worldwide dissemination within a day. [—signature and name deleted—]
 In addition to printing of various passes and identification emblems, TSD has also supplied the Secret Service with some U.S. alias documentation: [—about 19 lines deleted—] Of course, the requests handled by TSD were not always highly controversial or exotic. Sometimes, they did not have much of an effect, either.
25 May 1973
 Loan of Tape Recorder to Passport Office
1. Late in 1971 (December, I believe), the Deputy Director for the Passport Office, Department of State, (Mr. Robert Johnson) informally queried me on whether that office might borrow a small tape recorder for use by the Direc tor of the Passport Office (Miss Frances Knight) to record a meeting she had scheduled with representatives of a foreign government.
2. I conveyed this request to the then Chief, [—about a half line deleted—] and subsequently held several discussions with representatives of our [—] office. It was decided to loan the Passport Office a small commercial recorder (Nor elco Cassette Recorder, Model 150), which we had in stock.
3. A representative of our Training Branch [—] and I delivered the recorder to Miss Knight’s office and [—] demonstrated the recorder’s capabilities and instructed her in its use. She did not seem too pleased at the recording qual ity; however, the recorder was left with her.
 4. On this date (21 May 1973) I asked Mr. Johnson to check on the status of the recorder. He said it was never used in any way. I therefore retrieved it from the Passport Office and delivered it to Training Branch [—].
 [—signature and name deleted—] OTS/[—]
In the following memo, a portion of the CIA’s support for domestic police ac tivity has come to the attention of the special Watergate prosecutors, giving rise to the possibility that they could uncover further unspecified programs. Note the reference to ‘‘highly sensitive activities which could cause the Agency severe embarrassment,’’ the nature of which evidently could not be divulged even in an internal memorandum.
17 December 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Recent Activities of the Watergate Special Prosecution Staff
1. Early in the evening of 10 December 1973, I received a telephone call from [—three-fourths of a line deleted—] who informed me that he, in turn, had received a call from [—half line deleted—] Intelligence Division, Washington Metropolitan Police Department.
2. It seems that [—] had just spent an hour in conversation at his home with a [—half line deleted—] in the Washington Metropolitan Police Department who had reported to him on his interview that afternoon with a Mr. Martin and a Mr. Horowitz, prosecutors of the Watergate Special Prosecution Staff. [—] had been subpoenaed for his appearance and he indicated to [—] that the two prosecutors were principally concerned with two matters: a. What type of training had the Agency given members of the Washington Metropolitan Police Department? How long were the courses? How often were they given? b. What support did the Agency provide to the Washington Metropolitan Police Department during demonstrations occurring in the Washington area in late 1969 and early 1970?
3. [—] said that he had been shown a long list of names and asked if any of them had been involved either with the training given the Washington Met ropolitan Police Department or the support to the Washington Metropolitan Police Department during the demonstrations. [—] could remember only three names on the list. They were: [—half line deleted—]
4. The three individuals named by [—] did in fact participate in both the train ing and support during the demonstrations. They are only three among others of my [—one-fourth of a line deleted—] special support group who were involved in these activities. Of extreme sensitivity is the fact that these same individuals were engaged in other highly sensitive activities which could cause the Agency severe embarrassment if they were surfaced today in the current ‘‘Watergate climate.’’
5. I briefed the Director personally on this development and he indicated that if the training and demonstrations surfaced that he would simply acknowledge that this had occurred but as he had assured members of Congress, we would not engage in this type of activity in the future. He agreed with my suggestion that we have the Legislative Counsel brief Congressman [Lucien N.] Nedzi and Senator [John C.] Stennis on this since they have already been briefed on all activities of this nature undertaken by the Agency in the past. I briefed Mr. John Warner, Acting General Counsel, and agreed with him that we would make no effort to brief members of my [—one-fourth of a line deleted—] until and if they are subpoenaed. Mr. Warner or members of his Staff will then caution them to only answer questions asked and not volun teer additional information. I am making a copy of this memorandum  available to [—] of the Inspector General’s Staff at the suggestion of the In spector General, who I also briefed on this development. /signed/ Howard J. Osborn Director of Security
Some department heads showed annoyance at having to report on contacts with other agencies, listing every innocuous detail and maintaining that each program was legal or even mandated. Others, however, were already growing intimidated by the growing public attention the agency was receiving. The fol lowing memorandum came from the Office of Electronic Intelligence (OEL or ELINT), within the Directorate of Science and Technology. Electronic intelli gence deals with aspects of electromagnetic signals other than the actual content of the communications. Note that the Director of OEL, John McMahon, went on to become Deputy Director of Central Intelligence in the 1980s.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology
SUBJECT: Policy Regarding Assistance to Agencies Outside the Intelligence Community on Speech Processing Problems
1. Recent public concern over Agency affiliations with law enforcement activities has made me wary of offering speech processing assistance to various other government agencies. My concern here is restricted to government activities outside the Intelligence Community. Because of a scientific community aware ness of the expertise of members of OEL in speech processing problems, we are often asked by individuals in government for help on various speech problems. The requests are usually informal on a person-to-person basis. While most of these contacts involve only an exchange of unclassified infor mation, several have involved the use of laboratory resources. 2. Contacts have come from the FBI, Attorney General’s office, Bureau of Nar cotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), Post Office, and the Treasury Depart ment. Of the above, assistance to BNDD had been specifically sanctioned by Mr. Helms [the former DCI]. In one recent instance where a noisy tape was to be used in a court case, care was taken to insure that the processing of the tape was done entirely by a BNDD employee even though it was done in an Agency laboratory using the Agency’s Coherent Spectrum Shaper equipment. 3. Providing services of this kind to other agencies has not as yet imposed a sig nificant workload on us and there is a benefit to us in that such contact ena bles the staff to test techniques and equipment on a variety of speech problems. Informal interactions at the technical level are fruitful in terms of helping us to accomplish Agency goals. Hence we would be willing to con tinue to support other departments on an ad hoc basis, but would appreciate your guidance re the wisdom of OEL’s involvement in ‘‘domestic’’ activities.
 [—signature deleted—] JOHN N. MCMAHON
Director of ELINT DD/S&T
The National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC; then part of the Di rectorate of Science and Technology, but now absorbed into the separat
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency) seemingly took pains to list its every contact with another agency. An episode involving the journalist Jack Anderson was an effort to determine the source of leaked agency documents (the memo does not specify whether it worked), a questionable law-enforcement activity, although some might argue that it contained an internal security element since the object was to find the source of leaks within the CIA. The memo also describes the review of NASA satellite images, presumably either to prevent the release of images of secret installations or to find secret installations of other countries that might have been photographed inadvertently. Some of the pro grams have clear law-enforcement implications, but several others are con cerned with assuring public safety.
 8 May 1973
Questionable NPIC Projects
1. Leaks of Jack Anderson In January 1972, NPIC performed image enhancement techniques on TV tapes of a Jack Anderson show. The purpose was to try to identify serial numbers of CIA documents in Anderson’s possession. The request was lev ied on NPIC through the Office of Security.
 2. The Poppy Project NPIC has provided the services of one PI [photographic interpreter] to assist an interagency effort to detect poppy cultivation. In addition the Center has provided the contractual mechanism in support of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs for a multispectral crop study by a private company.
 3. Reviews of NASA Collected Imagery NPIC has and continues to conduct reviews of satellite imagery from NASA programs to identify ‘‘sensitive’’ frames of photography not releasable to the public and to ascertain the intelligence potential of the imagery. This service has been provided for GEMENI and ERTS photography and preparations are underway for review of SKY LAB [sic] imagery.
4. Peaceful Uses of Satellite Imagery NPIC has been requested to provide a number of looks at domestic coverage for special purposes. Examples include:
Santa Barbara Oil Spill
Los Angeles Earthquake
Sierra Snow (flood threat)
Current Mississippi
Floods Hurricane Cammile [sic]
Damage on the Coast of the Gulf of Mexico
Civil Disturbance in Detroit
OEP [Office of Emergency Preparedness] U.S. Data Base
One branch of the CIA that one might not expect to find enmeshed in contro versy was the Federal Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). FBIS (often pro nounced ‘‘fibbis’’) subscribes to foreign news services and records foreign public radio and television broadcasts, translates the contents into English, and distributes the transcripts to government agencies, university libraries, and others. The service claims to have a decision from the CIA’s Office of General Counsel stating that this is not a violation of copyright laws. Despite the open unclassified nature of the transcripts, they have customarily carried the false claim that FBIS is part of the Department of Commerce. FBIS potentially vio lated the restrictions on CIA activity by cooperating with law-enforcement agen cies in need of translation services.
8 May 1973
SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities
1. FBIS has been engaged in no activities related to the Ellsberg and Watergate cases. 2. FBIS operations occasionally extend to the domestic arena. From time to time, FBIS linguists are made available to DDO [Directorate of Operations] or Office of Communications components for special operations (usually abroad) involv ing close-support SIGINT [signals intelligence] work or translation of audio take. On one occasion recently DDO, on behalf of the FBI, requested the services of several FBIS linguists skilled in Arabic to work directly for the FBI on a short term project here in Washington. The arrangements wee made by Mr. Oberg of the DDO CI [Counterintelligence] Staff. He said the project was very highly clas sified and that FBIS participation was approved by Mr. Colby [then Deputy Director for Operations] and the Director. FBIS participation was approved by the Director of FBIS after a check with the ADDI [Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence]. Other examples of sensitive linguistic support work are help [sic] in the handling and resettlement of defectors, the recent assignment of and em ployee to the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to transcribe recordings in a rare Chinese dialect, and the detailing of another Chinese linguist on two occasions to assist in the U.S. military training of Chinese Nationalist cadets. [—paragraph about copyright issues, partially deleted—] 4. The routine FBIS monitoring of foreign radio broadcasts often involves state ments or speeches made by U.S. citizens using those radio facilities. Examples are statements made or allegedly made by American POWs in Hanoi [North Vietnam], by Jane Fonda in Hanoi and by Ramsey Clark in Vietnam. At the request of FBI and the Department of Justice, and with the approval of the CIA Office of General Counsel, we have on occasion submitted transcripts of such broadcasts to the Department of Justice as part of that Department’s considera tion of a possible trial. In such cases, we have been required to submit names of FBIS monitors involved, presumably because of the possibility they might be required as witnesses. (In one case in 1971, an FBIS staff employee was directed to appear as an expert witness in the court-martial of a Marine enlisted man charged with aiding the enemy in a broadcast from Hanoi.) FBIS views all this with misgivings. Monitoring such broadcasts is incidental and we rue attribu tion of their news to FBIS, and we should not be considered policemen main taining surveillance of traveling Americans.
 [—paragraph deleted—]
 [—signature deleted—]
E. H. Knoche
 Director Foreign Broadcast Information Service 
Sometimes the clandestine nature of the agency itself—even when secrecy probably was not necessary—could make an activity seem suspicious. When a 1970 speech by President Nixon on the subject of Cambodia elicited of flood of correspondence, Nixon decided that he wanted to respond personally to all the ‘‘pro’’ letters. (The State Department was responding to the ‘‘cons.’’) Since the White House budget would not cover the expenses of postage, the printing of response cards, and the addressing of envelopes by machine for tens of thou sands of responses, it was decided to charge part of it to the CIA. The CIA, however, while willing to cover the expenses, was not willing to let any (non CIA) government auditor know how it spent its money. The CIA’s budget is, af ter all, a secret. Therefore, it was decided that the requisite government form that accompanied the check (Form 1080 or Form 1081, depending on the memo) would explain only that the check was ‘‘for classified services per our conversa tion.’’ This explanation surely was destined to raise more eyebrows than the real reason. Pages 75–104 of the ‘‘Family Jewels’’ file are devoted to this issue. Finally, let us note that assistance was not restricted to agencies of the execu tive branch. The following notation is from the minutes of the CIA Executive Committee’s regular morning meeting of 3 February 1972.
A/DDS [Associate Deputy Director for Support] reported the House Appropria tions Committee request for a finance officer to assist them in work on the budget. He added that we have provided such assistance in the past, and the Director interposed no objection.
 1. For activities related to surveillance of the antiwar movement, see Chapter 7, ‘‘The Search for Foreign Instigators: Operation Chaos and the Intelligence Evaluation Committee.’’
2. AID stands for the Agency for International Development.
3. Krogh also was in charge of the White House Special Investigations Unit, more commonly known as the ‘‘plumbers.’’ See Chapter 11, ‘‘Watergate.’’
4. This was the same Sidney Gottlieb who had engaged in illicit drug tests and who had delivered the poison with which Patrice Lumumba was to be assassinated. See Chapter 4, ‘‘Political Assassinations and Illicit Drug Tests.’’
Chapter 10
On 4 September 1970, Salvador Allende Gossens won a plurality of 36.3 percent in a three-way presidential election in Chile. Allende, a Socialist, was the candi date of a fractious leftist coalition of parties called Popular Unity (Unidad Popu lar, UP). Since he did not have a clear majority of the vote, the Chile constitution required that his election be confirmed by Congress. Such an outcome was not uncommon in Chile, which had a well-developed democratic tradition, and it was customary for Congress to unite behind the first-place candidate.1 Outwardly, the Nixon administration feigned an air of indifference. National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger sarcastically dismissed Chile’s strategic signif icance, referring to the country as a ‘‘dagger pointed at the heart of Antarctica.’’ In reality, the administration, viewing Allende’s election through the prism of the Cold War, feared that Chile would become an ally of Cuba in supporting revolution and subversion throughout Latin America. In the end, it appears that Allende never did act to promote revolution abroad. In fact, those favoring, or engaged in, armed revolution tended to be suspicious of Allende and his ‘‘peaceful path to socialism’’ with its necessary faith in the efficacy of elections and ‘‘bourgeois institutions.’’ The White House assigned the CIA to take action to prevent the expected outcome of the Congressional vote. On 16 September 1970, DCI Richard Helms held his first meeting on an operation to be codenamed FUBELT. FUBELT was kept secret even from the National Security Council. In contrast to the govern ment’s more ‘‘open’’ policy toward Chile, it came to be known as Track Two.
16 September 1970
SUBJECT: Genesis of Project FUBELT
1. On this date the Director called a meeting in connection with the Chilean sit uation. Present in addition to the Director were General Cushman, DDCI Col. White, ExDir-Compt; Thomas Karamessines, DDP; Cord Meyer, ADDP; William V. Broe, Chief WH Division; [—] Deputy Chief, WH Division, [— about one line deleted—] Chief, Covert Action, WH Division; and [—] Chief, WH/4.2 2. The Director told the group that President Nixon had decided that an Allende regime in Chile was not acceptable to the United States. The Presi dent asked the Agency to prevent Allende from coming to power or to unseat him. The President authorized ten million dollars for this purpose, if needed. Further, The Agency is to carry out this mission without coordination with the Departments of State or Defense. 3. During the meeting it was decided that Mr. Thomas Karamessines, DDP, would have overall responsibility for this project. He would be assisted by a special task force set up for this purpose in the Western Hemisphere Divi sion. [—just under two lines deleted—] 4. Col. White was asked by the Director to make all necessary support arrange ments in connection with the project. 5. The Director said he had been asked by Dr. Henry Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to meet with him on Friday, 18 Sep tember to give him the Agency’s views on how this mission could be accomplished.
 /signed/ William V. Broe
 Chief Western Hemisphere Division.
The following month, Karamessines met with Kissinger and Alexander Haig, who at the time was Kissinger’s deputy, at the White House to review the pro gress of the operation. The Chilean Congress was expected to confirm Allende’s election, and the army commander, Gen. Ren e Schneider, was adhering to the Chilean military’s traditional role of supporting constitutional procedures. The vote in Congress was scheduled for 24 October and the inauguration for 3 No vember 1970. The CIA, nevertheless, had made contact with several disaffected military factions that were willing to consider organizing a coup d’ etat. Initial contacts with Roberto Viaux, a recently retired general who the previous year had led a brief military rebellion for higher wages, proved disappointing in the agency’s view. In the meantime, Ambassador Edward Korry, whose opinion ated cables on Allende had become famous within the U.S. government as the ‘‘Korrygrams,’’ had been freelancing on his own.
 15 October 1970
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Karamessines, Gen. Haig at the White House—15 October 1970
[—paragraph deleted; about fourteen lines—]
1. Then Mr. Karamessines provided a run-down on Viaux, the Canales meeting with Tirado, the latter’s new position (after Porta was relieved of command ‘‘for health reasons’’) and, in some detail, the general situation in Chile from the coup possibility viewpoint. 2. A certain amount of information was available to us concerning Viaux’s alleged support throughout the Chilean military. We had assessed Viaux’s claims carefully, basing our analysis on good intelligence from a number of sources. Our conclusion was clear: Viaux did not have more than one chance in twenty—perhaps less—to launch a successful coup. 3. The unfortunate repercussions, in Chile and internationally, of an unsuccess ful coup were discussed. Dr. Kissinger ticked off his list of these negative possibilities. His items were remarkably similar to the ones Mr. Karamessines had prepared. 4. It was decided by those present that the Agency must get a message to Viaux warning him against any precipitate action. In essence, our message was to state, ‘‘We have reviewed your plans, and based on your information and ours, we come to the conclusion that your plans for a coup at this time cannot succeed. Failing, they may reduce your capabilities for the future. Preserve your assets. We will stay in touch. The time will come when you with all your other friends can do something. You will continue to have our support.’’ 5. After the decision to defuse the Viaux coup plot, at least temporarily, Dr. Kissinger instructed Mr. Karamessines to preserve Agency assets in Chile, working clandestinely and securely to maintain the capability for Agency operations against Allende in the future. 6. Dr. Kissinger discussed his desire that the world of our encouragement to the Chilean military in recent weeks be kept as secret as possible. Mr. Karames sines stated emphatically that we have been doing everything possible in this connection, including the use of false flag officers, car meetings and every conceivable precaution. But we and others had done a great deal of talking recently with a number of persons. For example, Ambassador Korry’s wide ranging discussions with numerous people urging a coup ‘‘cannot be put back into the bottle.’’ [—about two and a half lines deleted—] (Dr. Kissinger requested that copy of the message be sent to him on 16 October.) 7. The meeting concluded on Dr. Kissinger’s note that the Agency should con tinue keeping the pressure on every Allende weak spot in sight—now, after the 24th of October, after 5 November, and into the future until such time as new marching order are given. Mr. Karamessines stated that the Agency would comply.
When instructions were sent to the Santiago Station the next day, it was clear that by putting the Viaux plot on hold, the CIA had not given up on all coup possibilities. Note that in this cable, someone has substituted handwritten de scriptive terms for redacted names.
With the Viaux path closed off, the CIA’s Santiago Station pursued a plot developed by Gen. Camilo Valenzuela. Valenzuela’s plan, like Viaux’s, called for kidnapping Gen. Schneider, who remained opposed to any military inter vention in politics. The kidnapping would not only remove Schneider from the scene, it would be blamed on pro-Allende forces and would then be used as a pretext for the army to seize power. To carry out the plan, however, Valenzuela said he needed ‘‘sterile’’ weapons that could not be traced to him or the Chilean military. CIA headquarters found a request from the military for a secret ship ment of arms to be a bit curious. The following three cables, one (Santiago 562
sent to CIA headquarters from the Santiago Station and two replies (Headquar ters 854 and 856), were all sent on 18 October 1970. These cables, too, have de scriptive terms to replace redacted names.
The Valenzuela group attempted to kidnap Gen. Schneider but failed because Schneider altered his travel plans. They were preparing a second attempt when, unexpectedly on 22 October, the Viaux group made its own attempt to kidnap Schneider despite having been warned off by the CIA. Schneider was acciden tally shot in the process and died. Outraged, the Chilean military rallied around Schneider’s replacement, Gen. Carlos Prats, and around Allende. On 24 Octo ber, the Chilean Congress confirmed Allende’s election by 153 votes to thirty five, with seven abstentions. The Nixon administration endeavored to isolate and undermine the Chilean government over the course of the next three years and provided financial sup port to opposition groups, but it backed away from further involvement in coup plotting. Meanwhile, Allende’s domestic political situation proved fragile. He faced hostility from some portions of the population from the beginning, as he sought to nationalize mines and other large-scale business enterprises. His plan to carry out a peaceful social revolution within the terms of the constitution was constrained by the fact that he was supported by barely more than one-third of the electorate. The more radical elements inside and outside his government took unauthorized actions that went beyond, or even against, his stated policies, such as seizing and occupying medium-sized factories, and then challenged him to stop them, which he was unwilling or unable to do. Such actions alien ated middle-class segments of the population that might have been won over to Allende’s peaceful revolution. The economy suffered from antigovernment strikes by small businesses and independent truckers. The government’s expan sive spending policies fueled hyperinflation. The polity became highly polarized and confrontational. On 11 September 1973, Allende was overthrown in a violent military coup led by Gen. Augusto Pinochet. It appears that the CIA did not organize or en courage the coup, but knew of the planning, and Pinochet was well aware of the U.S. government’s hostility toward Allende. On 18 September 2000, in response to a Congressional mandate (the Hinchey Amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000), the National Intelligence Council issued a report titled ‘‘CIA Activities in Chile,’’ or the Hinchey Report, based on a review of CIA records, oral histories, and mem oirs. The following excerpt from the Hinchey Report describes the CIA’s actions in the period leading up to the 1973 coup:
The CIA continued to collect intelligence on Chilean military officers actively opposed to the Allende government, but no effort was made to assist them in any way. Some CIA assets and contacts were in direct contact with coup plotters; CIA guidance was that the purpose of these contacts was only to collect intelligence. As coup rumors and planning escalated by the end of 1972, CIA exercised extreme care in all dealings with Chilean military officers and continued to monitor their activities but under no circumstances attempted to influence them. By October 1972 the consensus within the US government was that the military intended to launch a coup at some point, that it did not need US support for a successful coup, and that US intervention or assistance in a coup should be avoided. On 21 August 1973 the 40 Committee approved a $1 million supplemental budget to increase support for opposition political parties, bringing the total amount of covert funding spent during the Allende period to approximately $6.5 million. In late August the Station requested authorization to provide maximum support for the opposition’s efforts to encourage the entrance of the Chilean mili tary into the Allende cabinet. The resignation of Army Commander General Carlos Prats (whose actions were strongly constitutionalist) and his replacement by Gen eral Augusto Pinochet (not a coup plotter, but apparently willing to concede to a coup) appeared to further unify the Armed Forces and strengthened the institution as a political pressure group. The UP Government appeared to fear a possible mili tary coup and was unsure how to react to such a development. The Station realized that the opposition’s objectives had evolved to a point inconsistent with current US policy and sought authorization from Washington to support such an aggressive approach. Although the US Ambassador in Chile agreed with the need for Washington to evaluate its current policy, he did not con cur in the Station’s proposal, fearing that it could lead to a de facto US commit ment to a coup. In response, CIA Headquarters reaffirmed to the Station that there was to be no involvement with the military in any covert action initiative; there was no support for instigating a military coup. On 10 September 1973—the day before the coup that ended the Allende Government—a Chilean military officer reported to a CIA officer that a coup was being planned and asked for US Government assistance. He was told that the US Government would not provide any assistance because this was strictly an internal Chilean matter. The Station officer also told him that his request would be for warded to Washington. CIA learned of the exact date of the coup shortly before it took place. During the attack on the Presidential Palace and its immediate after math, the Station’s activities were limited to providing intelligence and situation reports. Allende’s death occurred after the President refused an offer from the military to take him and his family out of the country. Available evidence indicates that President Allende committed suicide as putchist troops entered his offices. A credi ble source on Allende’s death was Dr. Patricio Guijon, a physician who served on the President’s medical staff. Guijon was in the Presidential Palace, La Moneda, with Allende during the assault and claimed that he witnessed Allende shoot him self with a rifle. The Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation in 1991 also concluded that Allende took his own life. There is no information to indi cate that the CIA was involved in Allende’s death. Supporters of the coup later published a ‘‘white book’’ to justify Allende’s overthrow. The book included documents related to ‘‘Plan Z,’’ a supposed pro gram of the Allende government to assassinate prominent military and political figures in order to forestall a coup. Many commentators have alleged that ‘‘Plan Z’’ was a CIA fabrication. While the CIA agrees that it was most likely a fabrica tion, it denies any involvement in producing it. In the aftermath of the coup, the CIA cooperated with the new Pinochet gov ernment, which developed a reputation for brutality at home and the assassina tion of opposition members in exile. Contact was maintained with known violators of human rights when they were determined to be useful as sources of intelligence, including information on the behavior of the Pinochet government and on the activities of the remnants of the leftist opposition. (The policy on main taining contact with known human-rights violators was changed in the mid 1990s.) The Hinchey Report summarizes the situation post-coup Chile this way:
Given the wide variety and nature of CIA contacts in Chile, the issue of human rights was handled in various ways over the years. Some examples:  Before the 1973 coup, the issue of human rights was not addressed in liaison contacts and intelligence reporting.  One CIA contact was known to be involved in an abortive coup attempt on 29 June 1973, and another was involved in the successful 11 September 1973 coup.  In October 1973, the CIA had credible information that a high-level contact was involved in specific human rights abuses; contact was severed.  Although the CIA had information indicating that a high-level contact was a hard-liner and therefore more likely to commit abuses, contact with him was allowed to continue in the absence of concrete information about human rights abuses.  CIA maintained indirect contact with a source in close contact with human rights violators. There was no evidence that the source engaged in abuses, but he almost certainly knew about the practice. The intelligence value of the contact was sufficiently important that the contact was not dropped.  In the case of an individual about whom the CIA had information concerning a corruption issue that may have been related to human rights issues, a decision was made to seek contact given his position and potential intelligence value.  In more than one case, in light of the contacts’ service affiliation and position, it seemed likely that they were involved in, knew about or covered up human rights abuses. However, because such contacts allowed the CIA to accomplish its intelligence-reporting mission and maintain a channel through which to voice concerns about human rights abuses, contact was continued.  In a few cases, although the CIA had knowledge that the contact represented a service with a known history of human rights abuses, contact was continued because refusing such contact would have had a negative impact on the CIA intelligence collection mission.  In some cases careful checks of contacts’ human rights records were not conducted, and a deliberate risk-versus-gain decision was not made. In such cases, if a contact was deemed to have intelligence value, continuing contact was authorized.  Information concerning human rights abuses of then current and former CIA contacts was disseminated to the intelligence and policy communities.
Chief among those violators was Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, the head of  Chilean intelligence. Contact with him continued because it was determined to be essential to the CIA’s intelligence-gathering function. In addition to abuses within Chile, however, Contreras also proved to be involved in a campaign of assassination abroad that reached the streets of Washington, D.C. On this, the Hinchey Report notes, in part:
In addition to information concerning external threats, CIA sought from Contreras information regarding evidence that emerged in 1975 of a formal Southern Cone cooperative intelligence effort—‘‘Operation Condor’’—building on informal cooperation in tracking and, in at least a few cases, killing political opponents. By October 1976 there was sufficient information that the CIA decided to approach Contreras on the matter. Contreras confirmed Condor’s existence as an intelligence-sharing network but denied that it had a role in extra-judicial killings. Former Allende cabinet member and Ambassador to Washington Orlando Letelier and his American assistant, Ronni Moffit, were killed in a carbombing in Washington on 21September 1976. Almost immediately after the assassination, rumors began circulating that the Chilean government was responsible. CIA’s first intelligence report containing this allegation was dated 6 October 1976. During October 1976, the Department of Justice and the CIA worked out how the CIA would support the foreign intelligence (FI) aspects of the legal investigation. At that time, Contreras’ possible role in the Letelier assassination became an issue. By the end of 1976, contacts with Contreras were very infrequent. During 1977, CIA met with Contreras about half a dozen times; three of those contacts were to request information on the Letelier assassination. On 3 November 1977, Contreras was transferred to a function unrelated to intelligence so CIA severed all contact with him. Nonetheless, CIA intelligence reporting continued to follow Contreras’ activities closely. After a short struggle to retain power, Contreras resigned from the Army in 1978. In the interim, CIA gathered specific, detailed intelligence reporting concerning Contreras’ involvement in ordering the Letelier assassination. While some of this material has been released, some remains classified and another portion has been withheld at the request of the Department of Justice, which continues to pursue the investigation.
1. For further information on the CIA and Chile, see Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability (New York: New Press, 2003);
Jonathan Haslam, The Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende’s Chile: A Case of Assisted Suicide (New York: Verso Books, 2005); and Kristian Gustafson, Hostile Intent: U.S. Covert Operations in Chile, 1964–1974 (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2007).
 2. DDCI stands for Deputy Director of Central Intelligence; ExDir-Compt. stands for Executive Director–Comptroller; DDP stands for Deputy Director for Plans; ADDP stands for Associate Deputy Director for Plans; WH stands for Western Hemisphere; and WH/4 stands for Western Hemisphere Task Force 4 (the Cuba Task Force).
Chapter 11
At 2:30 A.M. on Saturday, 17 June 1972, five men were caught breaking into the Democratic National Committee (DNC) headquarters in an effort to adjust lis tening devices that they had planted there earlier. The DNC was located in a Washington, D.C., apartment-and-office complex known as the Watergate, and thus the name Watergate passed into the everyday lexicon of nearly every American and many others around the world.1 Despite monumental specula tion, false leaks to the press from the White House, and some misleading evi dence, the CIA’s connection to Watergate was not so much the break-in or even its cover-up, but rather a tale of efforts to avoid being swept up in its political aftermath. Among the five burglars arrested that night was James W. McCord, a former employee of the CIA’s Office of Security who was at the time the security coor dinator of Richard Nixon’s electoral campaign organization, the Committee for the Re-election of the President (also called the Committee to Re-elect the Presi dent; officially abbreviated CRP but widely known as CREEP, even among its staff). The others were Cuban Americans who had been involved in past CIA operations and had been told that the break-in would further the cause of Cuban liberation. One of the Cuban Americans had in his possession a passport in the name of Edward V. Hamilton. This was an alias once assigned to E. Howard Hunt, who had retired from the Clandestine Service two years earlier. The actual purpose of the break-in had been political espionage organized by CRP on behalf of the president’s campaign, but the apparent links to the CIA were numerous.
Indicted together with the five Watergate burglars (on 15 September 1972) would be G. Gordon Liddy, a CRP counsel and former FBI agent who had organized the break-in, and E. Howard Hunt. Hunt had been in charge of prop aganda activities for the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961 and was once a Chief of Station in South America, where an ambassador described him as ‘‘totally self-absorbed, totally amoral, and a danger to himself and anybody around him.’’ 2 After retiring in 1970, he took a position at the White House. Eventually, he became a member of the White House’s informal investigations unit, the ‘‘plumbers,’’ which was established in 1971 to stop ‘‘leaks’’ to the press of information about the Vietnam War. The Nixon White House, including National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, had a deep-rooted concern—some would say obsession—with violations of secrecy and leaks to the press, which they frequently blamed on members of Congress. This was despite the fact that they appear to have been responsible for a great many of the leaks themselves. For example, the minutes of DCI Richard Helms’s morning staff meeting for 18 January 1973 included the following item
[John] Maury noted that in response to Tom Korologis’ (Special Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs (Senate)) request for materials on instances where classified information had been leaked to the press, he assembled a paper on this topic and provided it with a note that an examination of most leaks reveals that the White House and Executive Branch are the guilty parties
In any event, Hunt had been responsible for recruiting most of the others involved in the burglary. The FBI investigation continued after the indictments, and it was joined by a Congressional investigation early the following year. The ultimate result came on 9 August 1974, when Richard Nixon became the first U.S. president in history to resign from office in disgrace. In the interim, however, the CIA was in turmoil. On the day of the break-in, the CIA’s Director of Security Howard Osborn informed DCI Richard Helms of the arrest and of the McCord connection. At the time, Osborn was still uncertain of the Cubans’ connection to the agency, although he knew they were ‘‘Miami,’’ not ‘‘Havana.’’ He assured Helms that it had not been a CIA operation. Starting the following Monday, the break-in was a topic of the director’s regular morning staff meetings. Following the agency’s natural impulse, CIA representatives were not to be forthcoming with information for outsiders, which probably added to the public atmosphere of suspicion. In the beginning, however, Helms and other members of the Executive Committee seemed to believe that the episode would not have too strong an impact on the CIA. According to the morning meeting minutes, from the ‘‘Family Jewels’’ file:
19 June 1972 The Director noted the 17 June arrest of James W. McCord and four others who were apprehended at the Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate. With the Director of Security present to provide biographic details, the Director made it perfectly clear that responses to any inquiry with respect to McCord or Howard Hunt, who may be implicated, are to be limited to a statement that they are former employees who retired in August and April 1970 respectively. The Director asked that this guidance be disseminated via staff meetings. The Director asked that any inquiry from other elements of the government be referred to the Director of Security who is to be the focal point. Inquiries from the press are to be referred to Mr. [John] Unumb who may say that McCord worked in the Office of Security. The Director noted that we have no responsibility with respect to an investigation except to be responsive to the FBI’s request for name traces. It was noted that Howard Hunt may have done some work since retirement in connection with the preparation of supporting material for some awards. The Executive Director was asked to review this topic and report to the Director. 20 June 1972 In response to the Director’s request, the Director of Security highlighted developments over the past twenty-four hours with respect to the McCord/Hunt, et al., situation. He noted that the late edition of the New York Times carries a different story by Tad Szulc than that which appeared in the edition received here. The Director of Security anticipates inquiries on [Cuban American burglar] Bernard L. Barker’s situation, and it was noted that Mr. Barker was hired by the Agency in 1960 and terminated in 1966. The Director complimented Unumb on his handling of inquiries and asked that future inquiries be met with a response confined to the fact that, now that we have acknowledged that both McCord and Hunt are former Agency employees, we know nothing more about the case and the caller should be referred to the FBI as appropriate. 21 June 1972 In view of the coverage in today’s New York Times and Washington Post, [John M.] Maury recommended that Chairman [Lucien N.] Nedzi [of the House Subcommittee on Intelligence Operations] be briefed on the McCord affair and that this briefing include all our information about the others involved. The Director asked Maury to touch base with the Director of Security and prepare a briefing paper on this topic for his review. Citing the number of distorted rumors about this matter, the Executive Director said that during the course of the day he hopes to provide a suggested Headquarters Bulletin for all employees for the Director’s review. Unumb noted a number of inquiries from the press with respect to the CubanAmericans involved in the bugging attempt at the Democratic National Committee headquarters and their alleged involvement in the Bay of Pigs, etc. The Director asked that such inquiries be met with an explanation that we are not prepared to be helpful on this matter. 22 June 1972 Unumb observed that inquiries on the McCord/Hunt situation seem to be slackening off. 23 June 1972 The Director called D/OCI’s [the Director of the Office of Current Intelligence] attention to coverage of the McCord affair in the Metro Section of today’s Washington Post and asked that future issues of the ‘‘CIA Operations Center Morning Newspaper Highlights’’ include press items on this topic. Maury noted that he briefed Chairman Nedzi on the McCord/Hunt situation and on a security case. On that day, the ‘‘McCord affair’’ was to take a more serious turn for Helms and his associates. Nixon instructed his chief of staff, H. R. Haldeman, to call in Helms and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters (a recent presidential appointee who Nixon thought would be a ‘‘good friend’’ at the CIA) and instruct them to intervene with FBI Acting Director L. Patrick Gray to forestall the investigation into the Watergate break-in. The following excerpts are from the ‘‘smoking gun’’ tape, recorded by the president with a concealed tape recorder in the Oval Office. Its eventual release, in 1974, prompted the House Judiciary Committee to vote for Nixon’s impeachment on the charge of obstruction of justice. He resigned from the presidency before the full House had an opportunity to vote.3 The scene is in the White House on the morning of 23 June 1972.
HALDEMAN: Okay—that’s fine. Now, on the investigation, you know, the Democratic break-in thing, we’re back to the—in the, the problem area because the FBI is not under control, because Gray doesn’t exactly know how to control them, and they have, their investigation is now leading into some productive areas, because they’ve been able to trace the money, not through the money itself, but through the bank, you know, sources—the banker himself. [...] That the way to handle this is for us to have Walters call in Pat Gray and just say, ‘‘Stay the hell out of this ... this is ah, business here we don’t want you to go any further on it.’’ That’s not an unusual development ...
HALDEMAN: ... and, uh, that would take care of it.
PRESIDENT: What about Pat Gray, ah, you mean he doesn’t want to?
HALDEMAN: Pat does want to. He doesn’t know how to, and he doesn’t have, he doesn’t have any basis for doing it. Given this, he will then have the basis. He’ll call Mark Felt in, and the two of them ... and Mark Felt wants to cooperate because ... 4
HALDEMAN: He’s ambitious ...
HALDEMAN: Ah, he’ll call him in and say, ‘‘We’ve got the signal from across the river [that is, from the CIA] to, to put the hold on this.’’ And that will fit rather well because the FBI agents who are working the case, at this point, feel that’s what it is. This is the CIA. [After discussing whether the burglars’ funds could be traced to CRP, they conclude that stopping the investigation is safer than relying on ever larger numbers of people to lie for them.]
HALDEMAN: Well, if they will. But then we’re relying on more and more people all the time. That’s the problem. And ah, they’ll stop if we could, if we take this other step.
PRESIDENT: All right. Fine.
HALDEMAN: And, and they seem to feel the thing to do is get them to stop? PRESIDENT: Right, fine.
HALDEMAN: They say the only way to do that is from White House instructions. And it’s got to be to Helms and ah, what’s his name ... ? Walters. PRESIDENT: Walters.
HALDEMAN: And the proposal would be that Ehrlichman (coughs) and I call them in.
PRESIDENT: All right, fine.
HALDEMAN: And say, ah ... PRESIDENT: How do you call him in, I mean you just, well, we protected Helms from one hell of lot of things.
HALDEMAN: That’s what Ehrlichman says. [At this point Nixon tries to construct an argument, or to convince himself, that they are doing the CIA a favor. The Cuban American connection would bring up the Bay of Pigs scandal, although the basic facts were already public knowledge.] PRESIDENT: Of course, this is a, this is a hunt, you will—that will uncover a lot of things. You open that scab there’s a hell of a lot of things and that we just feel that it would be very detrimental to have this thing go any further. This involves these Cubans, Hunt, and a lot of hanky-panky that we [in the White House] have nothing to do with ourselves. [Nixon and Haldeman discussed the Watergate role of CRP head John Mitchell and that of G. Gordon Liddy. (Nixon considered Liddy ‘‘a little nuts.’’ ‘‘I mean he just isn’t well screwed on is he? Isn’t that the problem?’’) They then concluded that an FBI interrogation of presidential aide Charles Colson had created an opportunity by turning suspicion away from the White House.]
HALDEMAN: An interrogation, which he did, and that, the FBI guys working the case had concluded that there were one or two possibilities, one, that this was the White House, they don’t think there is anything at the Election Committee, they think it was either a White House operation and they had some obscure reasons for it, nonpolitical ...
HALDEMAN: Or it was a ...
PRESIDENT: Cuban thing—
HALDEMAN: Cubans and the CIA. And after their interrogation of, of ... PRESIDENT: Colson.
HALDEMAN: Colson, yesterday, they concluded it was not the White House, but are now con vinced it is a CIA thing, so the CIA turn off would ...
PRESIDENT: Well, not sure of their analysis, I’m not going to get that involved. I’m (unintelligible).
HALDEMAN: No, sir. We don’t want you to.
PRESIDENT: You call them in.
PRESIDENT: Good. Good deal! Play it tough. That’s the way they play it and that’s the way we’re going to play it.
HALDEMAN: O.K. We’ll do it. [Later in the conversation, Nixon returned to the theme, concerned that Helms and Walters not suspect why they are doing this.]
PRESIDENT: When you get in these people when you ... get these people in, say: ‘‘Look, the problem is that this will open the whole, the whole Bay of Pigs thing, and the President just feels that,’’ ah, without going into the details ... don’t, don’t lie to them to the extent to say there is no involvement, but just say this is a sort of comedy of errors, bizarre, without getting into it, ‘‘the President believes that it is going to open the whole Bay of Pigs thing up again. And, ah, because these people are plugging for, for keeps and that they should call the FBI in and say that we wish for the country, don’t go any further into this case,’’ period! [In another meeting with Haldeman that afternoon, in the midst of an unrelated conversation, Nixon returned to the theme that ending the investigation was for the good of the CIA but was also concerned that Helms not become suspicious.] PRESIDENT: [ ... ] Just say that I have to look at the primaries (unintelligible) recover (unintelli gible) I just don’t (unintelligible) very bad, to have this fellow Hunt, ah, you know, ah, it’s, he, he knows too damn much and he was involved, we happen to know that. And that it gets out that the whole, this is all involved in the Cuban thing, that it’s a fiasco, and it’s going to make the FB, ah CIA look bad, it’s going to make Hunt look bad, and it’s likely to blow the whole, uh, Bay of Pigs thing which we think would be very unfortunate for the CIA and for the country at this time, and for American foreign policy, and he just better tough it and lay it on them. Isn’t that what you ...
HALDEMAN: Yeah, that’s, that’s the basis we’ll do it on and just leave it at that.
PRESIDENT: I don’t want them to get any ideas we’re doing it because our concern is political.
PRESIDENT: And at the same time, I wouldn’t tell them it is not political.
HALDEMAN: Right. PRESIDENT: I would just say ‘‘Look, it’s because of the Hunt involvement,’’ [ ... ]
Haldeman and Ehrlichman met with Helms and Walters that same afternoon and followed the scenario as laid out with the president. Rather than being con vinced by the Bay of Pigs argument, Helms and Walters found it baffling.5 They came away with the conviction, however, that this was an order from the White House and not a search for the truth. Although they complied initially, they soon reversed course. They came to suspect that the CIA (and perhaps them selves personally) was being framed to appear as the guilty party behind the Watergate break-in.6 Later, in Congressional testimony, Walters described the encounter with Hal deman and Ehrlichman and several follow-up meetings with White House Counsel John Dean and Acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray. The testimony was reprinted in the CIA Employee Bulletin of 21 May 1973 and a copy was included in the ‘‘Family Jewels’’ file. DDCI STATEMENT ABOUT THE WATERGATE CASE The following statement was made by Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters during a recent appearance before a Congressional Committee. On 23 June 1972 I was ordered by a phone message from my office to be at the White House at about 1300 [1:00 P.M.] with Director Helms. I had lunch with Mr. Helms and we went to Mr. Ehrlichman’s office at the White House. Present were Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Helms and myself. As I recall it, Mr. Halde man said that the Watergate incident was causing trouble and was being exploited by the opposition. It had been decided at the White House that I would go to Act ing FBI Director Gray and tell him that now that the five suspects were arrested, further enquiries into the Mexican aspects of this matter might jeopardize some of the CIA’s covert activities in that area.7 An appointment was made for me to see Mr. Gray at 1430 [2:30 P.M.] that same day. I went over and told him that I had been directed by top White House officials to tell him that further investigation nto the Mexican aspects of the Watergate episode might jeopardize some of the Agency’s covert actions in that area. He said that he understood the agreement between the FBI and the Agency regarding their sources but that this was a com plicated case. He would not violate the agreement with CIA regarding sources. On my return to the Agency I checked to see whether there was any danger in the Agency’s covert sources if the Mexican part of the investigation continued and ascertained that on one believed that this was the case. No one had any knowledge of the plan to bug the Democratic National Committee. On June 26 the Counsel to the President John Dean called me and asked me to come and see him about the matter I had discussed with Haldeman and Ehrlich man. He said I could check with Ehrlichman and I did. He said I could talk to Dean so I went to Dean’s office at 1145 [11:45 A.M.] on June 26. I informed Dean that I had checked carefully to see whether there was any jeop ardy to the Agency’s sources by a further investigation of the Mexican sources of this matter and found there was none. Dean then asked whether the CIA might have taken part in the Watergate episode without my knowing it. I said that this was not possible. I knew the Agency had no part in the operation against the Democratic National Committee. I therefore could not say that further investigation would jeop ardize Agency sources. I felt that someone had bungled badly and that the responsi ble parties should be fired. He asked whether there was not some way in which the Agency might have been involved. I said that I had checked with Director Helms and was convinced it was not. Any attempt to stifle this investigation would destroy the effectiveness of the Agency and the FBI and would be a grave disservice to the President. I would have no part in it and was quite prepared to resign on the issue. He asked whether I had any ideas on what might be done and I replied that those responsible should be fired. He seemed disappointed and I left. The following day I saw Dean again in his office at his request. He again reviewed the Watergate Case saying that some witnesses were getting scared and were ‘‘wobbling.’’ I said that no matter how scared they got, they could not involve the CIA because it was not involved in the bugging of the Watergate. He then asked if the CIA could not furnish bail and pay the suspects’ salaries while they were in jail, using covert action funds for this purpose. I replied that this was out of the question. It would implicate the Agency in something in which it was not implicated. Any such action by the Agency would imply an order from the highest level and I would not be a party to any such action. It would be a grave disservice to the President and the country and would destroy the CIA’s credibility with the Congress and the people. I would resign rather than do this and, if ordered to do it, I would ask to see the President to explain the reasons for my refusal. Furthermore, when the Agency expended funds in the U.S., we had to report this to the Oversight Committees of the Agency in Congress. He was much taken aback by this and agreed that risks of implicating the CIA and FBI in this matter would be enormous. I said that what was now a painful wound could become a mortal one. What was now a ‘‘conventional explo sion could be turned into a multi-megaton explosion.’’ I again advised him to fire the responsible parties. Again Dean sent for me on the 28th of June and I saw him at his office at 1130 that day. He enquired whether I had learned anything more about CIA involve ment. I replied that there was no involvement of the Agency in the bugging of the Watergate. He then asked whether I had any ideas and I said that I had none which could be helpful. Perhaps the Cubans who were anti-Castro might have had a hand in it but the CIA did not. On July 5 I received a call from Acting Director of the FBI Gray saying that he could not stop further investigation of the Mexican aspects of this matter unless he had a formal letter from the Director of CIA or me asking him to do this. I said I would come to his office and I saw him at 1000 the following morning. I told him that I could not tell him that further investigation would jeopardize the Agency’s covert sources. I had checked on this and it was not so. I had ascer tained that General Cushman had initially authorized the issuance of some equip ment to Howard Hunt without knowing its purpose other than that it was, as I understood it, to shut off ‘‘leaks.’’ This was long before the Watergate bugging. Since then I had carefully checked and there was no other involvement of any sort by the CIA in the operation against the Watergate. I said that attempts to cover this up or to implicate the CIA or FBI would be detrimental to their integrity and a dis service to the President and the country. I would have no part in this and was quite prepared to resign on this issue. He said that he shared my views regarding the importance of the integrity of our agencies and he too was prepared to resign on this issue. I gave Gray a list of the equipment the Agency had given Hunt and the account of our dealings with the former CIA employees up to the termination of their employment with the Agency long before the Watergate episode. I saw Gray again on the 12th of July and gave him one additional memorandum regarding the contact furnished Hunt. We reviewed the matter reiterating the posi tion we had taken previously. I said that I had told Dean that the best solution would be to fire those responsible. Gray said he had made the same recommenda tion. Once again we agreed that anything that might damage the integrity of the FBI and CIA would be a grave disservice to the President and the Government. In February 1973 shortly after Dr. Schlesinger became Director I told him of my conversations with Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Dean. In February Dean called Dr. Schlesinger to see if the Agency could get back from the FBI the material it had sent to the Justice Department concerning our contact with Hunt. Dr. Schlesinger and I agreed that this could not be done. I attempted to contact Dean but he was in Florida. On his return I saw Dean in his office on February 21 and told him that we could not ask the FBI for our material back. That would only serve to implicate the CIA and I could not and would not do it. I had seen Acting FBI Director Gray that morning and told him of Dean’s request and our refusal. He agreed saying that he could not do such a thing. Since that date I have had no further contact with Dean. The above represents my recollection of what occurred and the dates are checked in my appointment book.8 Nixon won reelection in November despite the CIA’s refusal to cooperate. Three weeks after that, he dismissed Helms (effective February 1973) and replaced him with James Schlesinger, who at the time was the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. In 1971, as deputy director of the Office of Man agement and Budget, Schlesinger had authored A Review of the Intelligence Com munity (the Schlesinger Report), in which he argued that the Intelligence Community had grown too large and expensive and was mismanaged. (One of his recommendations was to establish the post of Director of National Intelli gence, a proposal that was adopted thirty-three years later.) Now he was given instructions to shake up the CIA, and he dismissed some 1,400 officials during his brief, seventeen-week tenure. In the meantime, between July 1972 and January 1973, James McCord had sent six letters to Helms and other agency officials, five anonymous and one signed ‘‘Jim.’’ In these letters, which have been described as ‘‘confused’’ and ‘‘disjointed,’’ he implied that he was under pressure from the White House to pin the blame for the break-in on the CIA. The first letter, in fact, had initially been dismissed as ‘‘crank mail.’’ In a five-page affidavit signed on 23 May 1973
Director of Security Osborn stated that Helms and the CIA General Counsel had determined that the agency was under no obligation to inform the FBI or the Justice Department of the letters. Helms, with the General Counsel’s con sent, instructed Osborn ‘‘to retain them in a secure file and take no action with regard to them.’’ Schlesinger and Colby learned of the McCord letters only after Schlesinger’s 9 May 1973 request to agency employees for information regard ing potentially illicit activities.9 (See Introduction.) Following up Schlesinger’s general request to agency employees for informa tion regarding potentially illicit activities, Colby, who at the time was both Deputy Director for Operations and Executive Secretary of the CIA Manage ment Committee, sent out a specific order regarding information related to the Watergate matter.
23 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: All Employees SUBJECT: Agency Involvement in the Watergate Case
1. The leadership of the Agency continues to make a determined effort to investi gate all aspects of Agency involvement with the ‘‘Watergate’’ case or any of those persons connected with it. The results of these investigations have been given to the appropriate legislative, executive, and judicial elements of the Government investigating these matters. Each employee has been asked and is directed to report to the Director any knowledge he or she has of the Watergate affair and related matters, any persons connected with it, or any other illegal activity in which they believe the Agency was involved in any way. 2. In consonance with the foregoing, anyone who has had any connection or contact with individuals on the attached list, or anyone in their offices or any one purporting to act for them or acting pursuant to their authority, should report these contacts fully. Activities of these and other individuals include not only the Watergate affair, but any investigative work on the Pentagon Papers/Ellsberg case and any contacts relating to the Executive Branch and White House efforts to locate and stem leaks of classified information to the press starting as early as July 1970. 3. Any work done by anyone in the Agency on any of these subjects, or any knowl edge related thereto, should be reported to the IG [Inspector General] through the appropriate Deputy Director, or directly and personally to the Director. 4. It is imperative that every piece of information bearing on these matters be reported immediately for evaluation by the senior management of the Agency. The public interest requires that all information be produced and reported to our oversight committees (on a classified basis if necessary) so that the Agency’s actual role will be clarified with respect to various charges and speculation.
W. E. Colby
Executive Secretary CIA Management Committee
Attachment APPROVED
 /signed/ James R. Schlesinger
H. R. Haldeman
John D. Ehrlichman
John Dean
Egil Krogh
David Young
E. Howard Hunt
 G. Gordon
Liddy James
W. McCord
Charles W. Colson
John J. Caulfield
Eugenio Rolando
Martinez Careaga
Juan Rigoberto
Ruiz Villegas
Bernard L. Barker
Virgilio Gonzales
 Frank Anthony Sturgi
The CIA reviewed its files and found that Hunt and McCord cropped up in some unexpected places, especially after 7 July 1971, when presidential aide John Ehrlichman called to tell the CIA to provide Hunt with any equipment and other assistance he requested. Questions as to the purpose of the equipment were not asked. Evidently, Hunt and McCord saw former CIA employees as the sort of people they needed. They made use of the External Employment Assis tance Branch (EEAB), an office that helps employees leaving the agency find outside jobs. For example, a four-page memo on various topics from the Direc tor of Personnel, included in the ‘‘Family Jewels’’ file, contains the following paragraphs:
8. Hunt Requests a Lockpicker: This is a record of External Employment Assis tance Branch’s action on a request from Howard Hunt for a lockpicker who might be retiring or resigning from the Agency. Sometime in the spring of 1972, Frank O’Malley of EEAB received a call from Howard Hunt who asked Frank if he had a retiree or resignee who was accom plished at picking locks. Mr. O’Malley sent him a resume on Thomas Amato who retired 31 July 1971. Mr. O’Malley did not document his EEAB record to show the date of this exchange, but [—] (who also works in EEAB) opines that it occurred sometime between March and May 1972. All of the above information was reported to the Office of Security on 4 October 1972 following the FBI’s contact with the Agency regarding Howard Hunt. 9. Resume Sent to McCord: [—], a contract employee who retired in September 1971, was a client of the External Employment Assistance Branch in his search for a job after retirement. One of the leads given to [—] was James McCord’s se curity business. EEAB sent a resume to McCord, but [—] was not hired. In mid-summer 1972, [—] telephoned EEAB from Chicago. (He had a job there with Halifax Security Co., a lead provided by EEAB, but until this tele phone call he had not notified EEAB that he had the job and had moved from the D.C. area.) He said he had been visited by a Special Agent of the FBI who told [—] that his resume had been found among McCord’s papers. The Agent wanted to know if [—] had any connection with McCord. [—] explained how the resume got to McCord. After the Agent left him, [—] telephoned EEAB. [—] of OP [Office of Personnel] and [—] of OS [Office of Security] were notified immediately.
The same day he requested information on illicit activities, DCI Schlesinger had to testify before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Intelligence Operations regarding the CIA’s connections with Hunt, all of which, of course, preceded his tenure at the agency.
9 MAY 1973
Mr. Chairman, I am here to discuss the questions that have arisen over CIA’s real and alleged role in the events that occurred in 1971 and 1972. I have opened a detailed investigation into the precise nature of that role. I can report to you on what Agency records, now being intensively reviewed, reveal at this juncture. However I do not yet know that I have all the facts in the matter. Nonetheless, I am pleased to present to you such facts as are now available, and I will certainly provide you with any further details as they come to my attention. Let me start with the Agency’s relationship with Mr. Howard Hunt, whose testi mony has recently been made public. Mr. Hunt was a staff employee of the Agency from 8 November 1949 to 30 April 1970. At that time he retired from the Agency. He performed one editorial job of writing up a recommendation for an award for one of our officers in November 1970. He was not paid for these serv ices, although the Agency placed the sums of $200.00 and $50.00 in two charitable organizations for the service performed. In early July 1971, General [Robert] Cushman, then the Deputy Director of Cen tral Intelligence, received a telephone call from the White House. He was informed that Mr. Hunt had become a consultant on security affairs for the White House, and a request was made that Mr. Hunt receive assistance from the Agency. The minutes of the Agency Morning Meeting of 8 July 1971 indicate that the DDCI (General Cushman) reported a call by John Ehrlichman stating that Howard Hunt had been appointed a White House security consultant. On 22 July 1971, Mr. Hunt visited General Cushman at the CIA building. Accord ing to the records, Mr. Hunt stated that he was being charged with a highly sensitive mission by the White House to visit and elicit information from an individual whose ideology he was not entirely sure of, and for that purpose he said he was asked to come to the Agency to see if he could get two things: identification documents in alias and some degree of physical disguise, for a one-time operation. He stressed that he wanted the matter to be held as closely as possible and that he would like to meet the Agency people in an Agency safehouse. Agency records indicate that, in the course of the conversation, Mr. Hunt referred to Mr. Ehrlichman by name and General Cushman acknowledged an earlier call from Mr. Ehrlichman to him. The Committee may desire to query General Cushman whose knowledge would not come from such secondary sources. General Cushman directed the appropriate technical service of the Agency to be of assistance to Mr. Hunt, based on the above request. On 23 July 1971, Mr. Hunt was given alias documents, including a Social Security card, driver’s license, and several association membership cards, in the name of ‘‘Edward Joseph Warren’’ similar to material he had been furnished for operational use while he had been an Agency employee, under the name of ‘‘Edward V. Hamilton.’’ The same day Mr. Hunt was also given disguise materials (a wig, glasses, and a speech alteration device)
By calling an unlisted telephone number given him, Mr. Hunt arranged several additional meetings with Agency technical officers, the dates of which cannot be provided with precision. In these, he requested and was provided a commercial tape recorder (in a typewriter case) and a commercial Tessina camera disguised in a tobacco pouch. He also brought in a then-unidentified associate (later identified from press photos as Mr. G. Gordon Liddy) and secured for him a disguise (wig and glasses) and alias documents in the name of ‘‘George F. Leonard.’’ The Agency technical officers met these requests despite the absence of the pro cedural steps and approvals normally required by Agency regulations. However, they became increasingly concerned at the escalation of Mr. Hunt’s requests for as sistance. These finally included a request from Mr. Hunt to be met on the morning of 27 August 1971, upon his return from California, to have a film developed and returned to him. This was done the same day. He also asked for a New York mail address and telephone-answering service for operational use. The technical officers raised their concerns with senior officers, who noted the possibility that these activities could involve the Agency in operations outside its proper functions. As a result, again according to Agency records, General Cush man telephoned Mr. Ehrlichman at the White House on 27 August 1971 and explained that further such assistance could not be given. Mr. Ehrlichman agreed. The request for mail address and telephone answering service was not honored. On 31 August 1971, Mr. Hunt contacted the technical officers again, requesting a credit card, but this was refused. Mr. Hunt had also made a request on 18 August 1971 for the assignment of a secretary he had known during his Agency career. This was also refused. The earlier-furnished alias documents and other material were not recovered, however, except for the Tessina camera which was returned on 27 August as unsuitable. Since the end of August 1971, the Technical Services Division has had no further association with Mr. Hunt. As a point of reference, I would note that the break-in of the office of Mr. Ellsberg’s psychiatrist took place on or about 3 September 1971. The Agency outlined the above events to Mr. Patrick Gray, Acting Director of the FBI, in letters dated 5 and 7 July 1972, and a meeting on 28 July 1972. A series of questions were asked the Agency on 11 October 1972 by Mr. Earl Silbert, Principal Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Columbia. On 24 October 1972, Attorney General Kleindienst and Assistant Attorney General Petersen reviewed the 5 and 7 July transmittals together with additional, more detailed but undated materials that had been provided to Acting FBI Director Gray on 18 October 1972. The Agency is aware that this material was reviewed on 27 November 1972 by Mr. Silbert, who asked additional questions on that date as well as on 29 November 1972. Written responses to the foregoing questions were provided on 13 December 1972. An additional submission was made to the Assistant Attorney General Petersen on 21 December 1972. This material was discussed at a meeting held with Assistant Attorney General Petersen and Mr. Silbert on 22 December 1972. All of the foregoing materials can be made available to the Committee if it so desires. As a separate matter, which was not known by those who prepared the material for the Department of Justice in the fall of last year, the Office of Medical Services of the Agency prepared and forwarded to the White House two indirect personality assess ments of Mr. Daniel Ellsberg. The Agency has had a program of producing, on a selec tive basis, such assessments or studies on foreign leaders for many years. In July 1971, Mr. Helms, then Director, instructed Agency officers to work with Mr. David Young of the White House Staff relative to security leaks in the Intelligence Community. Mr. Young requested a study on Mr. Ellsberg in the latter part of July 1971, which Agency activity was apparently approved by Mr. Helms. At that time, Mr. Young supplied raw material consisting principally of newspaper and magazine articles together with some State Department and Justice Department papers. The first assessment delivered to the White House dated 9 August 1971, was judged insuffi cient. As a result, there were several meetings between Dr. Malloy, Mr. Hunt, and Mr. Liddy, in which classified information of the Justice and State Departments was introduced. One such meeting occurred on 12 August 1971. Additional material was transmitted by Mr. Hunt on 12 October, and another meeting was held on 27 October. These meetings led to a second version of the assessment, dated 9 Novem ber 1971. This document was delivered to the Executive Office by Dr. Malloy on 12 November 1971. Agency records indicate that Mr. Helms had previously communi cated with Mr. Young indicating that he had read both reports. In another contact ‘‘about October 1971,’’ an Agency officer arranged to provide Mr. Hunt certain unclassified materials from CIA files relative to a 1954 French case of leakage of Government documents. These were delivered to his office at the White House. In closing, I would like to stress several conclusion of my investigation so far: a. CIA had no awareness of the details of Mr. Hunt’s activities. The Agency’s impression was that Mr. Hunt was engaged in an activity related to identify ing and closing off the security leaks that were so much a preoccupation of the Government at the time. b. The Agency was insufficiently cautious in the initiation of its assistance to Mr. Hunt. Later, when the nature of Mr. Hunt’s requests for assistance began to indicate a possible active involvement by the Agency in activities beyond its charter, the Agency terminated the relationship and refused fur ther assistance. c. The preparation of a profile on an American citizen under these circumstances lies beyond the normal activity of the Agency. It shall not be repeated—and I have so instructed the staff. This shall not be made a part of the regulations governing such activities. d. As Director, I have called for a review of all Agency activities and the termi nation of any which might be considered outside its legitimate charter. In addition to requesting this review from my subordinates, I have directed each employee and invited each ex-employee to submit to me any cases which they may question. I am determined that the Agency will not engage in activities outside of its charter but will concentrate its energies on its im portant intelligence mission.
Not everyone at CIA headquarters was impressed with the Director’s testi mony. A draft circulated for commentary drew the following assessment from the Office of National Estimates in the Director of Intelligence, which is con tained in the ‘‘Family Jewels’’ file.
 8 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. W. E. Colby Executive Secretary, CIA Management Committee FROM: Director, National Estimates SUBJECT: Comments on Proposed DCI Statement (Hunt Case) Since you are aware that I have no facts bearing on the case, I take it that you asked for comment from the following point of view: will the proposed statement be well received by the committee? The main questions in the committee’s mind will be: Did CIA cooperate wit tingly in activities which were both illegal and outside its charter? Or did it only respond supinely to higher authority even though it had some reason for suspect ing illegal conduct? Tactically, I think there would be advantage in coming to grips frankly with these questions in the statement itself. The text in its present form could be taken as a minimum factual response which doesn’t quite get at the heart of the matter. I think it preferable, in the interest of the Agency’s reputation on the Hill, to proceed to candor directly rather than to be drawn to it by subsequent questioning. Key follow-up questions which can be anticipated would include the following: Why is there no record of the initial Ehrlichman-Cushman contact? If Cushman recorded the conversation with Hunt, was he not already sus picious of the latter’s purpose and why didn’t he ask? At a minimum, could he not have inquired whether ‘‘the individual whose ideology we aren’t entirely sure of’’ was an American citizen? When Cushman told Ehrlichman on 27 August 1971 that CIA was sus pending support to Hunt, was it only on the ground that the latter had become ‘‘too demanding’’? Why was the personality study on Ellsberg provided when it was obvious hat this action transgressed the Agency’s charter? Obviously most questions that will be raised can only be answered by Helms and Cushman personally. Nevertheless, I think the DCI would be well advised to provide a candid evaluation of these proceedings in his intial statement. To do so voluntarily would make more persuasive the assurances the Committee will want that nothing of the sort will be done under his direction of the Agency.
/initialed/ John Huizenga
In the meantime, CIA employees who had any hint of a connection with the Watergate burglars could expect repeated visits from the FBI. Such was the case of Charles W. Kane and his unnamed friend in Florida
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Service
SUBJECT: Contacts with Individuals Named in the Watergate Matter
1. I am addressing this to you instead of to the Director of Central Intelligence since I doubt that the information contained herein is of such significance to warrant his interest and because it has been on record with the Agency since July 1972. However, if you feel that the information is of such interest that it should be forwarded to the Director I shall put it in the proper format to do so. 2. My only contact with anyone named in connection with the Watergate and related matters was through [—], a former employee now retired and living in Winterhaven, Florida. In December 1971, [—] called me from Florida and advised that he wanted to get in touch with Howard Hunt. He said that he did not have Hunt’s home phone number and that it was probably unlisted but that since Hunt was a former employee, could I contact Hunt and ask him to give [—] a call. I had only met Hunt once about 10 years before but I agreed to relay the message. I called Howard Hunt at his home and told him that [—] did not have his home phone and requested he call [—]. Mr. Hunt thanked me for relaying the message and said that he would call [—]. This seemed of little consequence to me in December 1971 but in July 1972 [—] of the Office of Security contacted me in regard to the FBI investigation of the Watergate situation. At that time I informed [—] of the telephone call from —] in December 1971. Attached is a copy of a Memorandum for the Record prepared by [—] as a result of our conversation. 3. In the summer of 1972 I took my family to Disney World in Florida and took the occasion to drop in to see [—]. [—] told me in a private conversation that he had been interviewed three or four times by the FCI in connection with the Watergate affair and he related to me his contact with Howard Hunt. On 19 July 1972 after my return from Florida I reported this conversation to the Director of Security and made it a Memorandum for the Record. This memo randum was sent to Mr. Colby and a copy of the memorandum is attached. 4. Other than knowing Mr. McCord through his employment with the Agency and meeting Mr. Hunt once in about 1959, I do not know nor have I had any contact with any individuals named or knowledge of related matters now receiving attention in the press. /signed/
 Charles W. Kane
Special Assistant to the Deputy Director for Management and Services
SUBJECT: Conversation with [—]
1. While on leave visiting Disney World in Florida, I dropped in to see [—], who lives in Winterhaven, Florida. [—] retired from the Agency about five years ago on disability due to a serious heart condition. He was with the Office of Security for about 20 years prior to his retirement. 2. During a private conversation, [—] told me that he had been interviewed three or four times by the FBI in connection with the McCord-Hunt affair. I asked him why he had been interviewed, and he told me that in late 1971 he had been contacted by Howard Hunt who suggested that he consider an assignment as Security Officer for the Republican Party. [—] visited Washing ton in January 1972 to discuss the proposed position with Howard Hunt who apparently was acting on behalf of the Republican Party. [—] furnished a re sume to Hunt and discussed the position with him. Ultimately, he decided not to accept the position because he felt that his heart condition would not allow him to become involved in such activity. 3. According to [—], during the meeting with Mr. Hunt they discussed some of the requirements of the job. At that time they discussed a need for both a positive and a counteraudio [that is, eavesdropping and jamming] program and a need for a good security program both before and during the National Convention. [—] indicated that he sincerely believed that the Republican Party did need a security officer and a good security programmer but felt that he could not afford to accept the job even though it was a very lucrative offer. Apparently, money was not a problem. 4. When [—] declined, he indicated that Mr. Hunt asked for any other recom mendations he might have. According to [—], he told Mr. Hunt that most of the people he knew were still in the Agency, but he did furnish the name of [—], who might be possibly ready to retire from the Agency. 5. [—] informed me that he assumed that the Bureau obtained his name due to the resume he furnished Mr. Hunt. He said that the Bureau had talked to him on three or four occasions and that he had written up about a 40 page statement concerning his dealings with Mr. Hunt. When asked about Mr. McCord, [—] said that he really did not know McCord that well and declined any knowledge of Mr. McCord’s technical capability. 6. [—] indicated that he had not been in touch with Mr. Hunt since the early part of 1972 and knew nothing of the Watergate operation. He stated that he had gained the impression from the Bureau interview that the technical devi ces were being removed at the time of arrest and were not being installed as originally reported. 7. All of the above information was volunteered by [—] and I really did not get involved in any discussion on the matter other than to comment that I hated to see the Agency’s name connected with such an incident in any way. The above conversation took place during a 10 or 15 minute period and no other discussion relating to this incident was held. It is being reported for the re cord and for information of the Director of Security. /signed/ Charles W. Kane
17 July 1972
 SUBJECT: Charles W. Kane [—]
1. Last week Special Agent Arnold Parham of the FBI contacted the Acting DD/OS [Deputy Director, Office of Security]. He asked whether the Subjects worked for the Central Intelligence Agency. Previously, requests of this na ture were followed up by the FBI with an interview of the subjects. 2. I briefed Mr. Colby who is the Agency’s focal point on the ‘‘Watergate’’ case and the Acting DD/S of the FBI inquiry. Mr. Colby suggested that we deter mine the extent of involvement and indicated that we advise the Bureau of their employment. 3. When Agent Parham was again contacted and advised of the Subjects’ employment with the Agency, he indicated that the Bureau does not wish to interview them. 4. The office of the DD/PS will interview [—] in the same fashion as [—] was previously interviewed. [Marginal note: ‘‘Already did. See file 7/21.’’] 5. I called Mr. Kane both at his office and his residence and learned that he is in Florida and will return to duty on 17 July. I called Mr. Kane this morning to advise him of the inquiry. 6. Mr. Kane stated that he had no firm conclusion as to how the Bureau obtained his name. He stated that he has seen Mr. Hunt on only one occasion in 1959. At that time Hunt was the Chief of Station, [—]. The meeting was occasioned by the fact that Mr. Kane [—about one line deleted—] Mr. Kane state further that around Christmas time of 1971 he received a call from [—] who wanted to get in touch with Mr. Hunt. [—] asked Mr. Kane how he could get in touch with him. Mr. Kane obtained Mr. Hunt’s telephone number through telephone information channels whereupon he passed the number on to [—]. 7. Mr. Kane stated that he has information that [—] has talked to the FBI on sev eral occasions in connection with the current investigation and that he surmi ses that the Bureau may have obtained his name from him.
[—] Deputy Director of Security
In some cases, CIA officials feared that the most routine contacts would be picked up and blown out of proportion by a hostile press. This was the case with John Mitchell’s briefer from the Office of Current Intelligence. Mitchell, Nixon’s cam paign manager in the election of 1968, served as attorney general during Nixon’s first term and then resigned to become chairman of CRP for the 1972 election. He was deeply involved in the decisions to carry out and cover up the Watergate break-in and, consequently, is believed to be the first cabinet member to do jail time.
 7 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM: Director of Current Intelligence
SUBJECT: Activity Related to Domestic Events
1. OCI provided current intelligence briefings to John Mitchell as Attorney Gen eral. With the approval of the DCI, this practice began in the pre-inaugural period in New York and continued until Mr. Mitchell’s resignation as Attor ney General. The OCI officer assigned to this duty had a daily appointment with Mr. Mitchell in his office at Justice.
2. The briefings provided were strictly on foreign intelligence, and were a legiti mate service for CIA to provide to an official advisor to the President who sat on, among other bodies, the 40 Committee [which approved and oversaw cov ert operations]. It must be presumed, however, that our man’s daily visits were known and speculated on elsewhere in Justice. The problem comes in the potential press treatment: ‘‘CIA Officer in Continuous Contact with Mitchell.’’ The Director of the Central Reference Service (CRS) drew attention to an even more innocuous connection with David R. Young, Jr.: Young, a former member of Kissinger’s National Security Council staff, had, along with Egil Krogh, Jr., been put in charge of the White House ‘‘special investigations unit.’’
 7 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT: Contacts with David Young
1. In the summer of 1972, I had frequent contacts with David Young. He was in this building under my control once. These contacts related solely to Execu tive Order 11652 and the NSC [National Security Council] directive con cerned therewith. Young was apparently at the time in the process of drafting the NSC directive. The visit to the building under my control was for a briefing on CRS processes for storage and retrieval of documents and is apparently reflected in the paragraph of the directive concerned with the Data Index. I visited him in his White House office at least twice in the com pany of an inter-Agency group concerned with the Data Index.
2. In August of 1972, [—] also visited Mr. Young’s office in the company of an inter-Agency group to discuss CIA compliance with the data index instruc tions. To the best of my knowledge no one in CRS had any contact with Mr. Young in his role as a ‘‘plumber.’’
 [—signature deleted—] H. C. Eisenbeiss Director, Central Reference Service
1. For a detailed history of the Watergate episode, see Stanley I. Kutler, The Wars of Watergate: The Last Crisis of Richard Nixon (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990); and Stanley I. Kutler, Abuse of Power: The New Nixon Tapes (New York: Free Press, 1997). A briefer account is Keith W. Olson, Watergate: The Presidential Scandal that Shook America (Law rence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2003).
2. Quote cited in Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA (New York: Dou bleday, 2007): 318.
3. Audio recordings and transcripts are available at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library Web site,
4. W. Mark Felt was the Deputy Director of the FBI. More than thirty years later it was revealed that Felt was ‘‘Deep Throat,’’ the inside source who was leaking informa tion about the Watergate cover-up to the Washington Post. See Bob Woodward, The Secret Man: The Story of Watergate’s Deep Throat (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005); Mark Felt and John O’Connor, A G-Man’s Life: The FBI, Being ‘‘Deep Throat,’’ and the Struggle for Honor in Washington (New York: PublicAffairs Books, 2006).
 5. Richard Helms, with William Hood, A Look over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency (New York: Random House, 2003): 9–10. 6. See Vernon A. Walters, Silent Missions (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1978): 587– 604; Helms, A Look over My Shoulder, 3–13; and Weiner, 318–322.
7. The real point was to prevent the FBI from discovering that the money used to pay the burglars came from illegal presidential campaign contributions ‘‘laundered’’ through Mexico.
8. The reprint of Walters’s testimony in the ‘‘Family Jewels’’ file is illegible in parts, but the testimony can also be found in Special Subcommittee on Intelligence, House Committee on Armed Services, Inquiry into the Alleged Involvement of the Central Intelli gence Agency in the Watergate and Ellsberg Matters (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975): 45–47. The testimony was given on 16 May 1973. Original ‘‘memo randa for record’’ on which the testimony was based can be found on pages 107–114.
9. McCord’s letters do not appear in the ‘‘Family Jewels’’ file, although a copy of a UPI news report about the letters is followed by four blank pages. See also William Colby and Peter Forbath, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (New York: Simon & Schus ter, 1978): 339–340.
Chapter 12
 The ‘‘Family Jewels’’
As noted in the Introduction, the creation of the ‘‘Family Jewels’’ file would prove to be a landmark in the history of the CIA. Coming in the midst of the Watergate scandal, word of the file’s existence opened a period of turmoil that could have ended in the agency’s dissolution. The order to collect the documents was given on 9 May 1973 by James R. Schlesinger, during the seventeen weeks he served as DCI before being named Secretary of Defense.1 It came in response to a newspaper report about the trial of Daniel Ellsberg, which revealed that a former CIA officer, E. Howard Hunt, had burglarized the office of Ellsberg’s psychiatrist with CIA equipment on behalf of the Nixon White House. The Nixon administration had become highly concerned—obsessed, some would say—about leaks to the press regarding the conduct of the Vietnam War, even though administration officials were actually responsible for many of the leaks themselves. A particular focus of their concern was the unauthorized release to the New York Times of the Pentagon Papers, a classified multivolume study done in 1968 on how the United States had become involved in the war. (The study had been commissioned because, by 1968, even the Department of Defense had lost track of how it had happened.) In 1971, the White House organized an unofficial investigative unit, which came to be known as the ‘‘plumbers,’’ to stop these leaks. Hunt was a key member of this group. It tran spired that Daniel Ellsberg had been responsible for the Pentagon Papers affair, but the burglary of his psychiatrist’s office was to find compromising material to use against Ellsberg, not to compile evidence of his guilt. Hunt’s name was already known to the public by May 1973 because, in the interim, he and James W. McCord, another former CIA employee, had been indicted for their roles in the break-in at the Democratic National Committee headquarters in the Watergate. If nothing else, the CIA’s charter forbade it to conduct operations within the United States, and Hunt’s illegal activities threatened to compromise it. Schlesinger—irate at not having been informed of the Hunt connection in the Ellsberg case and his use of CIA equipment— ordered all present and former officials to report to him immediately on any current or past matters that might fall outside of the agency’s legal authority.2 9 May 1973
1. Recent press reports outline in detail certain alleged CIA activities with respect to Mr. Howard Hunt and other parties. The presently known facts behind these stories are those stated in the attached draft of a statement I will be making to the Senate Committee on Appropriations on 9 May.3 As can be seen, the Agency provided limited assistance in response to a request by senior officials. The Agency has cooperated with and made available to the appropriate law-enforce ment bodies information about these activities and will continue to do so.
 2. All CIA employees should understand my attitude on this type of issue. I shall do everything in my power to confine CIA activities to those which fall within a strict interpretation of its legislative charter. I take this position because I am determined that the law shall be respected and because this is the best way to foster the legitimate and necessary contributions we in CIA can make to the national security of the United States.
3. I am taking several actions to implement this objective: I have ordered all senior operating officials of this Agency to report to me immediately on any activities now going on, or that have gone on in the past, which might be construed to be outside the legislative charter of this Agency. I hereby direct every person presently employed by CIA to report to me on any such activities of which he has knowledge. I invite all ex-employees to do the same. Anyone who has such information should call my secretary (extension 6363) and say that he wishes to talk to me about ‘‘activities outside CIA’s charter.’’
4. To ensure that Agency activities are proper in the future, I hereby promul gate the following standing order for all CIA employees: Any CIA employee who believes that he has received instructions which in any way appear inconsistent with the CIA legislative charter shall inform the Director of Central Intelligence immediately.
James R. Schlesinger
The result was a compilation of years of CIA misdeeds. Schlesinger gave Deputy Director for Operations William E. Colby the added title of Executive Secretary, CIA Management Committee, and placed him in charge of the issue. Within weeks, Colby succeeded Schlesinger as Director of Central Intelligence. Colby personally referred to the file as the ‘‘our skeletons in the closet,’’ but it soon became known within the agency as the ‘‘Family Jewels.’’ This was an allusion to an earlier secret document of that name, a loose-leaf binder in which Allen Dulles listed sensitive sources and German contacts at his OSS station in Switzerland during World War II.4 In both cases, the ‘‘Family Jewels’’ were to be kept under the strictest confidentiality. What was actually in the file? It proved not to be representative of overall CIA activities. In fact, it was not even representative of the agency’s disreputable activities. The CIA’s legislative charter, the National Security Act of 1947, was vague in many respects, but it had specifically prohibited the agency from operat ing within the United States or investigating U.S. citizens. Therefore, those topics—including some items that were fairly innocuous and others that were not—dominated the material that agency employees forwarded to Schlesinger’s office. There is very little about foreign operations. Still, there is at least passing reference to activities of note, including plots to assassinate foreign leaders (none of which seem to have succeeded), drug experiments on unwitting subjects, and, of course, equipment lent to the White House ‘‘plumbers’’ who burglarized the Democratic Party campaign headquarters at the Watergate. Some of the docu ments simply report that a given department did nothing, in its view, that was outside the charter. Even those items that are not scandalous can be informative, however, as they show various departments within the agency trying to educate a new DCI as to what it is that they do (at least at this specific point in history). Although the documents in the ‘‘Family Jewels’’ file did not leak to the press, stories and rumors about them eventually did and this produced a scandal. The investigative journalist Seymour Hersh, then with the New York Times, picked up ‘‘bits and pieces’’ of information on the subject. On an earlier occasion, Hersh had discovered information on the Glomar Explorer, a ship the CIA used to attempt to raise a sunken Soviet submarine, without the Soviets knowing, to see what secrets the agency could learn. At that time, Colby intervened personally with Hersh and convinced him not to publish the story. Now, Colby tried that approach again. The CIA Oral History Program asked him about it in 1988.5
Did you ever wonder where he got the bits and pieces?
I long ago gave up trying to figure out where journalists get their information. I mean, they develop lots and lots of sources. Very rarely do they have a source who gives them the whole thing. They are very clever about the way they call somebody to get the remotest kind of a hint that there might be something; then they ask this one, they ask that one, and they ask the other. You know, inside of a few hours on the telephone, they have most of the story in this town. Did you feel that Hersh had very much information regarding abuses when he met with you in December of ’74? Oh, yes. He had them all in exaggerated terms when he walked in, yes. He said, ‘‘you guys have been in wiretaps, you have been in mail openings, you have been in surveillances, you have been breaking into people’s houses.’’ He had it all. Did he mention assassination, by chance? No. He didn’t have assassinations—domestic [operations], you see, that was the thrust of it. He said this thing is bigger than My Lai—he’s the guy that broke My Lai.6 ‘‘This is a much bigger story’’—that was his phrase. I said, ‘‘Sy, you’ve got it all wrong. What you have gone into is a few little things here and there over the 25 years that we did that were a little bit over the line. They were few and far between. There were no massive, no big [domestic] intelligence operations.’’ And I frankly feel that that was the eventual story even though you had a lot of hullaba loo—when you read the Rockefeller Report, and the Church Report on the domes tic side, you really have kind of odds and ends here and there. So I told him, ‘‘Come on in, I’ll talk to you. You got it all wrong.’’ I was hoping to bring him down. He was going to write something, I knew it. I was hoping to bring him down a bit and didn’t. He took it as a confirmation, you see. That’s the other thing that is frequently said, if I had said nothing, he wouldn’t have had a confirmation. But since I said, ‘‘There are some little things that happened,’’ that was confirmation. He took it as confirmation. even though I was saying it didn’t happen.
On 22 December 1974, the New York Times carried Hersh’s banner headline across its front page: ‘‘Huge C.I.A. Operation Reported in U.S. against Antiwar Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon Years.’’ The ‘‘Family Jewels,’’ which began as a damage-control exercise, had become an enormous liability. Inasmuch as Nixon had resigned from the presidency in August 1974, DCI Colby soon found himself having to explain the file to the new administration of President Gerald R. Ford. On the last day of 1974, Colby and the CIA General Counsel met with Deputy Attorney General Laurence H. Silberman (identified in the record as LHS) and Associate Deputy Attorney General James A. Wilderotter (JAW) and presented them with an effective summary of the file’s highlights. Several of these points will be discussed in more detail in later chapters.
FILE DATE: January 3, 1975
FROM: James A. Wilderotter
Associate Deputy Attorney General
CIA Director William Colby and CIA General Counsel John Warner met with LHS and JAW Tuesday, December 31 to discuss certain matters, including items apparently reported to the President by Colby in connection with the recent New York Times articles. Colby did not show us his report to the President, but para phrased that portion of its contents which, in Colby and Warner’s judgment, pre sented legal questions. Colby began the meeting by describing the management style of former CIA Director Richard Helms. According to Colby, Helms utilized a very ‘‘compartmen talized’’ organizational structure, with each head of a constituent unit within the organization reporting directly to Helms. Colby described it as like ‘‘spokes from a hub,’’ with Helms as the ‘‘hub’’ and the various compartmentalized units consti tuting the ‘‘spokes.’’ It was possible to be in one ‘‘spoke’’ and have no knowledge of what the other ‘‘spokes’’ were doing. Colby indicated that the various Watergate revelations touched the CIA in sev eral ways, including: (a) Howard Hunt; (b) the matter of ‘‘psychological profiles;’’ and (c) the McCord letters to the CIA. Colby indicated that former CIA Director James Schlesinger sent a memorandum on May 9, 1973 to all CIA employees, directing them to report on all activities undertaken that may have fallen outside the CIA’s charter. When the reports came in, Colby—by then the CIA Director— sent out ‘‘corrective’’ memoranda. According to Colby, the reports submitted in response to Schlesinger’s May 9, 1973 memorandum constitute the ‘‘skeletons in the closet,’’ and form the basis of Colby’s recent report to the President. Colby and Warner are trying to track down more details about the various ‘‘skeletons.’’ The ‘‘skeletons’’ related to us by Colby are as follows:
(1) In 1964, a Russian defector was brought to the United States; apparently, CIA thought he was a ‘‘fake.’’ The defector, a Russian citizen, was immedi ately confined in a house in Maryland, and later in a CIA facility in Virginia, for about two years. Apparently, he was interrogated during the two-year physical confinement. This defector in now settled in the United States, is married, and still works voluntarily with the CIA. According to Colby, former CIA Director McCone approve this confinement. Colby stated that occasionally, the CIA confines defecting individuals, but only outside the United States. Defectors are interrogated in the United States only voluntarily; according to Colby, ‘‘they can walk away any time.’’ Colby speculated that the confinement of the Russian defector from 1964 to 1966 might be regarded as a violation of the kidnapping laws. (2) In 1963, the CIA wiretapped two columnists—Robert Allen and Paul Scott—following a column in a newspaper in which they disclosed certain national security information. CIA records indicate that the wiretapping was approved by McCone after ‘‘discussions’’ with then Attorney General Robert Kennedy and then Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. The wiretaps, which continued from March 12 to June 15, 1963, were described as ‘‘very productive’’—among those overheard calling Allen and Scott were twelve Senators, six Congressmen and so forth. Apparently, the tap did not disclose the source of the security information published in the Allen-Scott column. (3) From February 15 to April 12, 1972, ‘‘personal surveillances’’ were con ducted by CIA on Jack Anderson and members of his staff (Les Whitten, Britt Hume, and Mr. Spear). The physical surveillances consisted only of watching the targets, and involved no breaking, entry, or wiretapping. Apparently, the physical surveillance occurred after Jack Anderson’s series of ‘‘tilt toward Pakistan’’ stories.7 The physical surveillances were author ized by Helms and conducted by the CIA’s Office of Security. (The Office of Security was headed by Howard Osborn from 1967 to 1973.) (4) Between October, 1971 and January, 1972, the CIA conducted a physical surveillance of Mike Getler, a Washington Post reporter. Again, there is no indication of wiretaps, a break-in, or entry. Like the Anderson surveillan ces, the Getler physical surveillance was apparently authorized by Helms and run by the CIA’s Office of Security. (5) In 1971, the CIA had reason to suspect a [former] female CIA employee, who was then living with a foreign (Cuban) national. The former CIA em ployee and the Cuban national apparently maintained a joint residence and a joint place of business. CIA agents broke into the business premises and unsuccessfully attempted to break into the residence to search for any documents the former employee may have taken with her. The agents found nothing. The break-in apparently occurred in Fairfax, Virginia, and was conducted by the Office of Security. (6) In July 1970, CIA agents broke into and entered an office occupied by a for mer defector who was still ‘‘on contract’’ to the CIA, looking for CIA docu ments he may have had. The operation was conducted by the Office of Security, and occurred in Silver Spring, Maryland. (7) CIA agents apparently ‘‘talked their way into’’ the apartment of one Toftey [sic; Hans Tofte]—at that time a CIA employee—to recover CIA documents he had converted. The documents were recovered, and Toftey was promptly fired. Toftey apparently sued Helms, alleging that, in addition to the CIA documents, the CIA agents had also taken some of his, Toftey’s, personal correspondence. The suit was dismissed. (8) Between 1953 and 1973, the CIA’s Counterintelligence Staff screened—and in some cases opened—mail to and from the Soviet Union going through Kennedy Airport Mail Depot. This operation was terminated in 1973 by Colby. While it was in existence, it was ‘‘cleared by’’ at least three Post masters General and CIA records indicate that Helms discussed it with then Attorney General John Mitchell. (9) From 1969 to October 1972, the Far East Division of the CIA reviewed, in San Francisco, mail going to and from the People’s Republic of China in an operation similar to the Soviet one at Kennedy Airport. Apparently the CIA sought in this operation ‘‘tips’’ with respect to possible sources, con tacts, etc.; the CIA was apparently also interested in mail handling proce dures within the PRC. (10) Between 1963 and 1973, the CIA funded research in some institutions, apparently including academic institutions, on the general subject of be havioral modification. According to Colby, these activities included the participation—on an ‘‘unwitting basis’’—of some U.S. citizens, who were not told of the true nature of the testing. The example given by Colby was that of a pole put in the middle of a sidewalk, with people’s observations recorded as to which side of the pole they would walk. Apparently, some of the other testing also included reactions to certain drugs, although it is not known whether any ‘‘unwitting’’ individuals were used with respect to that type of experiment. In response to a question from LHS, Colby and Warner indicated they would provide more information on these activities, but that their own knowledge of them was very limited at this point. (11) The CIA apparently ‘‘plotted’’ the assassination of some foreign leaders, including Castro, Lumumba, and Tujillo. The CIA had no role whatsoever in Lumumba’s murder on January 17, 1961. With respect to Trujillo’s assas sination on May 30, 1961, the CIA had ‘‘no active part;’’ but had a ‘‘faint connection’’ with the groups that in fact did it. In connection with these matters, Warner referred to 18 U.S.C. 960, concerning ‘‘expeditions against a friendly nation.’’ (12) Between 1967 and 1971, the CIA covertly monitored dissident groups in the Washington, D.C., area (and possibly elsewhere) who were considered to pose a threat to CIA installations. The monitoring apparently consisted of physical surveillance only; no wiretaps were involved. Some results might have been distributed to the FBI. (13) Between May and September 1971, the CIA conducted a physical surveil lance of a Latin American female (and others, including U.S. citizens), apparently in the Detroit area, who had advised the CIA of a plot to assas sinate Helms and then Vice President Agnew. It is possible that a ‘‘mail cover’’ was also utilized. It is likely that the Secret Service was advised of the assassination threat with respect to the Vice President. (14) In 1972, the CIA conducted a physical surveillance of Victor Marchetti— who wrote a book about the CIA—to determine his contacts with CIA employees.8
Except as noted, Colby and Warner did not indicate whether any of the above items had been approved by any individuals outside the CIA
*** Colby then discussed a program conducted by the CIA beginning in 1967 and aimed at identifying possible foreign links to American dissidents. This program was handled in the CIA by James Angleton and Richard Ober. Around July 1967, Helms sent a cable from CIA Headquarters referring to CIA’s ‘‘participation in an inter-agency group’’ with respect to these matters. Apparently, the cable also refers to ‘‘overseas coverage of subversive students and related activities.’’
Apparently, a November, 1967, document in the CIA’s possession refers to a CIA survey of anti-war activities, including the U.S. peace movement and foreign groups.
In September, 1969, according to CIA documents, Helms reviewed the CIA’s efforts against ‘‘the international activities of radicals and black militants.’’
Apparently, under this program, the CIA alerted people abroad to try to identify the foreign contacts of American dissidents. According to Colby, many requests in this area were originated by the FBI. Colby also indicated that the CIA had appa rently placed some agents in the peace movement in the United States, with the purported purpose of establishing credentials to travel abroad. A ‘‘by-product’’ of these agents-in-place was information on the domestic activities of various peace organizations.
Apparently, these CIA agents undertook no disruptive activities. Apparently, the CIA’s files under this program contain the names of some 9,900 plus Americans. In response to a question from LHS referring to the New York Times stories about the ‘‘files on 10,000 Americans,’’ Colby indicates that the CIA’s ‘‘9,900 names’’ is not the same as the IDIS master subject index described in the December 30, 1974, memorandum from LHS to Philip Areeda, Counsel to the President.
According to Colby, approximately two-thirds of the names in the CIA’s ‘‘9,900 plus’’ list were the results of either FBI requests or reports from the CIA’s foreign offices.
The other one-third consists of FBI reports on Americans in the peace movement, but no other information. Colby indicated he does not know why the CIA had these latter reports since no foreign travel was involved, etc.
He specu lated that they were kept as a result of the tendency of bureaucrats to retain paper whether they needed it or acted on it or not. According to Colby, the ‘‘Huston Plan’’ and the subsequent establishment of the Intelligence Evaluation Committee ‘‘gave stimulus’’ to this entire effort by the CIA. Colby, after reviewing this program, considers it ‘‘worthless’’ from an intelligence standpoint. Among other things, the Soviets apparently thought U.S. dissidents were too unruly to be trusted with any sensitive operations.
Colby also reported on three other items:
(1) At the CIA’s request, the Sheriff of San Mateo, California, polygraphed cer tain applicants for employment in an experiment to test the effectiveness of the polygraph. (2) Colby and Warner indicated that the CIA utilizes certain systems to create alias documents, such as birth certificates. Other documents—such as credit cards—are used for what Warner described as ‘‘flash’’ purposes; that is, they are not utilized in themselves, but are used only to corroborate the operative identifying document (such as a birth certificate). For example, a false credit card or similar materials described by Warner as ‘‘pocket litter’’ will not be used to actually charge credit purchases but rather only to corroborate a driver’s license or birth certificate. When documents of a Federal Agency are involved—such as a Social Security Card—the CIA does not manufac ture or otherwise create the documents except with the knowledge of that Federal Agency. Warner indicated, however, that it may be a violation of some State Laws to ‘‘manufacture’’ or otherwise forge state agency docu ments. Colby and Warner indicated that this was an on-going operation. (3) Colby indicated that the CIA occasionally tests experimental electronic equipment on American telephone circuits. The CIA apparently has estab lished guidelines for these tests, which provide among other things that no records may be kept, no tapes and so forth.
From the Department of Justice, Colby returned to the White House to dis cuss the report that he had delivered to the president earlier. Political conse quences were already threatening, and Congress was preparing to launch investigations. Note that at this time there were still no Congressional commit tees devoted wholly to intelligence matters. (In this document, the words in square brackets were printed that way in the original.)
PARTICIPANTS: President Ford William E. Colby, Director, Central Intelligence Agency Philip W. Buchen, Counsel to the President John O. Marsh, Jr., Counsellor to the President Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
DATE AND TIME: Friday, January 3, 1975 5:30 P.M
The Oval Office
The White House
SUBJECT: Allegations of CIA Domestic Activities 
President: I asked Phil and Jack to analyze the [Colby] report for me, but first, why don’t you tell me where we are. Colby: We have a couple of problems—one within the agency and one with Con gress. Already the two Armed Services committees, the two Appropriations com mittees, and Muskie9 want me to testify. I think we have a 25-year-old institution which has done some things it shouldn’t have. On the dissidents, the major effort was to check if there were any foreign connections. But we held it so close there was unease within the Agency— was it really done for the foreign connections or was it anti-dissident? We infil trated some people so they could go overseas. That was okay, but in the course of training within the groups they wrote on the dissidents. We passed the informa tion to the FBI and they passed information to us. But what would happen is we would file reports the FBI gave us. That, together with our reports from overseas, amounts to about 10,000. So we can’t deny that, but I will have to try to clarify it. President: When were the names gathered? Colby: Beginning in ’67. It was formally terminated in March ’74. President: When was the Schlesinger directive? Colby: In May 1973. Schlesinger was concerned when things popped up—the psy chological profiles, and letters from McCord about CIA and Watergate. So, to find everything, he put out this directive. My report has some of it; I will cover the others now. I briefed Nedzi in July 1973; I gave Stennis a general briefing and Symington a detailed one.10 [He showed the President a loose-leaf book.] President: What did the three say? Colby: I said ‘‘Here it is; we are not going to do it again.’’ I then gave specific instructions to the Department. In March 1974, we stopped the program and I put it together with the dissident program and treated them as one. He mentions mail opening. We did have a New York and Los Angeles program in the ’50s of opening first-class airmail from the USSR. For example, we have four to Jane Fonda. That is illegal, and we stopped it in 1973. In San Francisco we had one with respect to China, to find out who the contacts were. Some letters were opened. We did break in to some premises to see whether there were classified documents. President: Were these former employees, or people on the payroll? Colby: Former employees. President: Had they been fired? Colby: One had just left—he wasn’t fired. President: Who would approve such operations? Colby: I would think only the Director, but possibly at these times the Director of the Office of Security. The third area is the fact that we surveilled some people to find out why they had classified information. Some of the names are pretty hot. [He mentioned a cou ple of reporters.] In 1971, we surveilled Mike Getler. He had run a story which was an obvious intelligence leak. President: Who would have approved that? Colby: I’m pretty sure it was Helms,11 but whether it was directed from higher up I don’t know. In 1972, at the time of the India-Pakistan war, we put a tap on Jack Anderson and three of his associates. President: Who ordered it? Colby: Helms. Whether on his own or not, I don’t know. This was not illegal, but (perhaps) outside our jurisdiction. We also followed some of our employees or for mer employees. Unfortunately, one was Marchetti. Again, it was not illegal, but it’s a highly emotional area. President: Was this outside the Agency’s charter? Colby: Helms says this is a gray area. We have the responsibility to protect our sources and information. President: What would you have done? Colby: I said at my confirmation that I have the duty but not the authority. I would go to the FBI or somewhere like that. We have also run some wiretaps. Most of them on our employees, but not all. Edgar Snow, for example.12 Generally, from 1965, they were approved by the At torney General. One other was a defector, but most of them were employees. I doubt that before 1963 we had attorney general approval. These were from 1951 through 1965. The last tap recorded was in 1971. None of these have anything to do with the Hersh story, but he lists all these activities as being part of the anti-dissident effort. Marsh: But Hersh will say that out of the dissident program came the IEC13 and this is where the Getler and Anderson taps are very worrisome. He will say we turned to the IEC for operations when we couldn’t get action from regular agencies. Buchen: The directive was 9 May; the report was May 21. Isn’t that a bit short? Colby: Most of these skeletons were around, but just in memory rather than on pa per. It didn’t take much to get them on paper
President: Who would have known of the dissident group? Colby: The Director, Karamessines, the Deputy Director, Ober—30 to 40 people were in the group. President: Who assigned Ober over here?14 Colby: When we terminated the program, I nominated him. [General Scowcroft described how the NSC got him and what his normal NSC duties were.] Colby: That’s about it. We did collect the names of some Congressmen—who weren’t in Congress when we got the names. [He gave the President a paper on this.] An ‘‘X’’ by the names means we ran a clearance for the purposes of collaboration with them; ‘‘Y’’ means the name came up in connection with a foreign country. [The President leaves.] Buchen: The last directives are undated. Why? Colby: They were all issued at the same time. Marsh: They will try to get this all linked with Watergate. Do you think there is a connection? Colby: Watergate is a code word. Only that concern about dissidents and leaks may have hyped by political concerns. [Buchen and Marsh asked a series of questions. The President then returned.] President: Is counterintelligence work suffering because of a lack of coordination with the FBI? Colby: No. We are cooperating well. I think NSCID 9 will formally regularize the arrangement we’ve had with the FBI since 1966.15 Colby: We obviously have a problem since we lost four of our top people. President: Tell me about them. Colby: It has to be a highly compartmented activity. Angleton is an unusual type and totally dedicated to his mission. He is very intense. I thought of asking him to retire when I took over. I didn’t because of the human factors. He also handled the Israeli account. On Friday before the Hersh ar ticle appeared, I told him he could move or retire. Of the other three, one had already decided to retire. His deputy we told that he wouldn’t be the chief and he retired. The third was younger, but he thought appa rently he might get the job and he retired when he didn’t. Helms helped Hunt get a job with Mullens when he retired.16 President: We plan to do three things: One, early next week, all the Intelligence chiefs will come in and I will say, ‘‘You know what the law is and I expect you to obey.’’ Two, I’m going to appoint a Blue Ribbon Committee to look into all of this.17 Three, I am going to suggest to the Hill that a joint committee is the best way for them to go to investigate. We don’t want to destroy but to preserve the CIA. But we want to make sure that illegal operations and those outside the charter don’t happen. Colby: We have run operations to assassinate foreign leaders. We have never suc ceeded. [He cited Castro, Trujillo, General Sneider of Chile, et al.]18 There’s another skeleton: A defector we suspected of being a double agent we kept confined for three years.
There is one other very messy problem. After the ITT-Chile Congressional investigation, there was an allegation that our testimony was not all kosher. I don’t think there was any criminal action, but there was some skating on thin ice. There is an old rule that to protect sources and information you could stretch things. But the White House hasn’t been told about my book of skeletons.
The next day, President Ford met with Henry Kissinger, who at the time was both Secretary of State and National Security Adviser (technically, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs). Rather than being concerned about criminal activities by the CIA, Kissinger appeared to be more upset about the political implications of the revelations, including the implications for the CIA itself. Beyond that, he viewed the agency’s revelations concerning Chile, which had not been part of the leak, as a sign of a conspiracy against him personally. He favored getting rid of Colby, after a decent interval, for his role in the revela tions. The two of them considered possible replacements, including Ronald Rea gan, former Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and David Packard, the cofounder of the Hewlett-Packard Company who had served as Deputy Secretary of Defense (1969–1971) during Nixon’s first term. (The eventual choice, replacing Colby in 1976, would be George H. W. Bush.)
 President Gerald R. Ford Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State And Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
DATE AND TIME: Saturday, January 4, 1975 9:40–12:20 P.M
PLACE: The Oval Office The White House
Kissinger: What is happening is worse than in the days of McCarthy. You will end up with a CIA that does only reporting, and not operations. He [Colby] has turned over to the FBI the whole of his operation. He has offered to resign and I refused. It is not my prerogative, but I said not until you are proved guilty of criminal conduct. The President: I agree. Kissinger: Helms said all these stories are jus the tip of the iceberg. If they come out, blood will flow. For example, Robert Kennedy personally managed the opera tion on the assassination of Castro. [He described some of the other stories.] I told him Buchen would warn him and he won’t say anything incriminating. The President: I know Dick Helms and think very highly of him. Kissinger: The Chilean thing—that is not in any report. That is sort of blackmail on me. The President: What can we do? We can get Griswold, Lemnitzer, Friendly, Rea gan, Jack Connor, Shannon, Dillon Kissinger: You might think of Rusk. This will get very rough and you need people around who know the Presidency, and the national interest. What Colby has done is a disgrace. The President: Should we suspend him? Kissinger: No, but after the investigation is over you could move him and put in someone of towering integrity. When the FBI has a hunting license into the CIA, this could end up worse for the country than Watergate. The President: Would Rusk have known any of this stuff? Kissinger: Why don’t you ask him? [Discussed the Moorer spying incident and what he did to protect the institution of the JCS.]19
[Rumsfeld20 enters to talk about Rusk.]
Kissinger: [Discusses some of the legislative restrictions.] The President: [Talks to Rusk.]
 [Tries to call Dave Packard.] [Buchen and Marsh come in.] [The Blue Ribbon announcement is reviewed.]
In an effort to prevent a Congressional investigation, Ford ordered a Blue Ribbon commission, led by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, to investigate allegations of domestic spying. Nevertheless, two Congressional investigations, one led by Senator Frank Church and the other by Representative Otis Pike, ensued in 1975–1976.21 Henry Kissinger chaired a meeting in February 1975 to devise a strategy for dealing with Congressional investigations. Again, whereas Colby was concerned about the CIA’s illegal activities, Kissinger appeared to be primarily concerned with the political consequences of the revelations. These included the possibility of constraints on future covert operations and the threat of looking like a ‘‘cream puff’’ if the world discovered how few covert opera tions there actually were. His continuing concern with leaks also showed. Note that the list of participants included James Schlesinger, whose memorandum started this particular turmoil, but the transcript indicates him making only a single comment
 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Dr. James R. Schlesinger,
Secretary of Defense William Colby,
Director, Central Intelligence Agency Philip Areeda,
Deputy Counsel to the President Mr. Laurence Silberman,
Deputy Attorney General Martin R. Hoffman,
General Counsel, Department of Defense Lt. General Brent Scowcroft,
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
 DATE AND TIME: Thursday, February 20, 1975 10:36–11:33 A.M. PLACE: Secretary Kissinger’s
Office The White House
SUBJECT: Investigations of Allegations of CIA Domestic Activities Secretary Kissinger: Shouldn’t we discuss what we are trying to achieve in these investigations and what we are trying to prevent? The fact of these investigations could be as damaging to the Intelligence Com munity as McCarthy was to the Foreign Service. The nature of covert operations will have a curious aspect to the average mind and out of perspective it could look inexplicable. The result could be the drying up of the imaginations of the people on which we depend. If people think they will be indicted ten years later for what they do. That is my overwhelming concern. NSA [National Security Agency], I don’t know what the abuses are. Secretary Schlesinger: Legally NSA is spotless. Secretary Kissinger: If they are only looking at illegal activities. Mr. Silberman: There aren’t enough illegal activities for them to chew on. Director Colby: The issue will be, do we do these things? Mr. Areeda: Church says he’s going back to look into the legal, moral, and political cost-effectiveness aspects of it. Secretary Kissinger: Then we are in trouble. The committees and staff don’t inspire confidence. Harrington and Miller are professional leakers. Miller is also violently anti-Vietnam and he believes the way to get the government is to leak it to death. Director Colby: My idea to control this is to get secrecy agreements. That keeps them from publishing. Secretary Kissinger: In their own names. You can’t keep them from Sy Hersh. Director Colby: Our testimony will have numbers in place of names. We will divide them into three categories in increasing order of sensitivity. Secretary Kissinger: Who gets the lists? Director Colby: The chairmen. It is under their control. If he insists on a name in category 3, we then move carefully—we either tell him, refuse on my initiative, or buck it to the White House. Secretary Kissinger: You can initially take a position on professional judgment, but then we must go to the President. Bill should invoke himself first so as not to invoke the President initially in each case. We must say this involves the profound est national security. Of course, we want to cooperate, but these are basic issues of national survival. Mr. Areeda: Should the President meet with [Sen. John] Tower and Church to make these points? Secretary Kissinger: In all the world, the things which hurt us the most are the CIA business and Turkey aid.22 The British can’t understand us. [Foreign Secretary James] Callaghan says insiders there are routinely tapped. Our statements ought to indicate the gravity with which we view the situation. Why can’t Bill testify? Director Colby: Names, countries of operations. Secretary Kissinger: You can’t even do it by country X. And Church wants to prove you shouldn’t do it at all. Director Colby: I would do it in executive session. If it leaks then we have a good case.
Mr. Silberman: I agree. Our position on executive privilege would be better if we had a leak first. Secretary Kissinger: What if Miller waited until after the investigation to go to Hersh? Mr. Silberman: It won’t hold that long. We first give them less sensitive informa tion, so if it leaks we aren’t hurt so much. Secretary Kissinger: Suppose you say on covert operations that we support the moderate political parties? On a global basis that is okay, but how does that serve Church’s purpose? He will then just prove not only is it immoral but useless. We have to demonstrate to foreign countries we aren’t too dangerous to cooperate with because of leaks. Mr. Areeda: Is there any mileage in having the leaders of the select committee have a meeting with the President? Mr. Silberman: It’s premature. They could only discuss generalities because we couldn’t know the line yet. We should keep the President out of it until we get a crunch. Secretary Kissinger: I agree. Mr. Silberman: The FBI may be the sexiest part of this. Hoover did things which won’t stand scrutiny, especially under Johnson. We will put these out in generic terms as quickly as possible. The Bureau would like it to dribble out. This will divert attention and show relative cooperation with the committee. This relates only to illegal activities. [Kissinger relates story about Hoover and the female spy.] Secretary Kissinger: We have to be clear on what we want them to stay out of. Director Colby: I will refuse to give them the files on people—on privacy grounds. Mr. Areeda: That is a good case for a confrontation. Mr. Hoffman: But don’t we have to preserve their ability to keep security? Secretary Kissinger: Harrington is a leaker—any House member has access to the material we turn over. We can’t fight on details—only categories. We have to know the rules about the NSA, covert operations and any other areas. Mr. Areeda: There is a constitutional problem on covert operations. We can’t take the posture that we can engage in operations that were kept from the committees which Congress has designated as responsible for oversight. Secretary Kissinger: First, we must define the issues. Then we could go to court ... Mr. Silberman: I doubt it would go to court—it would take two years. Secretary Kissinger: Then we could go to the public that they are undermining the country. Director Colby: But we are doing so little in covert activities it is not too damaging. Secretary Kissinger: The disclosing them will show us to the world as a cream puff. There are dozens of places where we are letting the situation go by default. Let’s establish categories of especially sensitive activities. Then whoever testifies will follow these guidelines. Director Colby: The dangerous thing on NSA is whether they can pick up conver sations between Americans.
Secretary Kissinger: My worry is not that they will find illegalities in NSA, but that in the process of finding out about illegalities they will unravel NSA activities. In the process of giving us a clean bill of health he could destroy us. Do we have a case on executive privilege? Mr. Silberman: In the case of U.S. v. Nixon, there is something there, but you can’t analyze it on a strictly legal basis. Secretary Kissinger: I think this group should establish categories of what we say, methods for protecting what we need to keep. Then we can set down with the President to understand what the issue is. Then we would avoid the danger that to get through each week we would jeop ardize the next week’s hearings.
Colby’s approach was to be cooperative toward the investigative committees in the hope that he could elicit a more favorable attitude on their part. He explained his attitude in 1988 to the CIA’s Oral History Program.23
Sure, there is a basic difference of opinion about my role here. Various of them said that I should have stonewalled the whole thing because intelligence is too im portant, resigned and all the rest of it. I didn’t think that would do any good at all. In the context of the politics of the time, we had just had Watergate, you really weren’t going to get away with stonewalling them. It just wasn’t going to work. On the other hand, if you could go to a committee which starts out with a prose cuting mission and give them the whole view of American intelligence, which is a very good story, then these become rather small against that larger picture. And in order to do that, you’ve got to tell them quite a lot, but you don’t tell them names. And that was a basic point that we came to with the committees as soon as the chairmen were appointed. As soon as they were named, I went down and talked to them. I said, ‘‘Look, you are going to investigate us; I understand that. Not much I can do about it; you are going do it. I’d like to give you a full picture so that you’ll see whatever may have happened in proper proportion and context. Now, I’m not going to argue with you about your constitutional right to know everything in the Agency because we’ll never end that argument. You’ll take the right that you have consti tutional authority to learn everything. I’m just going to convince you that there are some things that you don’t want to know; you don’t need to know, and conse quently, that you should not know. Particularly, you don’t need to know the names of people who work for us around the world—foreigners, Americans, all the rest. To convince you that you don’t need to know them, I’ll tell you some thing: I don’t know them. I’ve made a deliberate point of not learning names of agents. Why? Because I had no reason to, I didn’t have to know them to do my job. I have to know that there is an agent there, about their reliability; but I don’t have to know the name. You don’t need to know their names. Now, let’s make a deal. We’ll be responsive to your questions as much as we can, but I’m going to ask you to let me leave the names off.’’ [...]
You didn’t think the Agency would be dismembered, dissolved?
There were days. But if you asked, thoughtfully, I would have to say that I didn’t believe they could possibly do it. I mean, that they would be so stupid. And partic ularly after I told them what the Agency really was all about. I took the right guys down to brief them every now and again. I happened to have as my personal assist ant a fellow who had been in Stanleyville and told about being there—the Simbas coming in the house. Everything was so still when he was telling us there. They got the message that there are some very special people [in the agency]. It was deliber ate. I was trying to get it out that these are serious things, serious people. Some suggest that your cooperation during the investigations saved the Agency from seri ous harm; do you agree with them? I still think I took the right choice. Now, I don’t know whether that saved the Agency a lot of trouble as a result. I can hardly say it came out scot-free. It created an awful lot of trouble abroad—people saying how can we deal with you, you guys put all your stuff in the newspapers all the time. This was a real problem. So, I wouldn’t say it saved it from any problems. It did get hurt. No question about it. It would have gotten hurt more if I had taken the totally negative [approach]. Then I think the thing wouldave just sort of disintegrated, all sorts of chaotic hullaba loos, then the names would have come out.
Far from everyone at the CIA agreed with Colby’s cooperative approach to ward testifying. Retired DCI Helms, perhaps, was chief among the dissenters, apart from the fact that Colby tried to have him charged with perjury for his lack of candor in the investigations. This excerpt is from Helms’s contribution to the Oral History Program.
What are your impressions of Mr. Colby’s cooperation with the Church and Pike Committees?
Well, I have been very careful in the years since to say nothing publicly about Colby. But I think Colby did this just wrong, and I believe that to this day. My feel ing about Bill Colby is that he should have gone to the president and said, ‘‘I don’t think we ought to do this, sending these documents about secret operations and so forth up on Capitol Hill. Will you support me?’’ And then if they insist on it, you’ll have to go to the Supreme Court, and I think that’s what should have happened. Instead of that, Colby went the last mile in cooperating with the Church and Pike Committees. He felt he was constitutionally obligated to do this, and in his book he says this, I believe. I don’t know what gave him the idea that he was a constitutional lawyer but, anyway, this is what he did. A lot of people on the inside know my feelings, which, I say, I avoided saying publicly because I think it’s unseemly for prior directors to be squabbling with each other in public about who did what to whom. A lot of people think that I’m mad at Colby because he sent those papers down to the Justice Department to try and get me convicted of perjury. I’m not mad at him about that. I’m mad at him about the way he handled the Congress and about sending all these papers down there. And ‘‘being mad at’’ is a colloquialism. I think he was wrong. As far as that perjury thing is concerned, if his lawyers and the people he appointed felt this way, fine, send the papers down to the Justice Department. I don’t think he used very good judgment because I think that in doing something like that about his predecessor he opens himself up to getting the same thing done to him. But leaving that personal element out of it, it tends to set up a precedent. I mean, he who lives in glass houses shouldn’t be throwing stones. But that was a pain in the neck for me, and it was very difficult for me to handle, and it certainly didn’t do my reputation any good. But he felt he had to do it.
After the hearings, new laws and executive orders put limits on CIA activ ities. Congress for the first time established specific committees for intelligence oversight—the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee for Intelligence—although other committees con tinued to control intelligence appropriations. Congress also established special courts equipped to authorize warrants when circumstances required domestic investigations in matters related to national security or intelligence; many refer to these as ‘‘FISA courts’’ after the law that created them, the Foreign Intelli gence Surveillance Act of 1977.24 For a time, it appeared that every president felt obliged to issue an executive order setting out the ground rules for intelli gence activities: President Gerald Ford issued Executive Order 11905 in 1976; President Jimmy Carter replaced E.O. 11905 with E.O. 12036 in 1978; and Presi dent Ronald Reagan replaced that with E.O. 12333 on 4 December 1981, which, in part, remains in effect. The basic provisions of each were quite similar, espe cially in some of the fundamental prohibitions. For example, from E.O. 12333:25
2.10 Human Experimentation. No agency within the Intelligence Community shall sponsor, contract for or conduct research on human subjects except in accordance with guidelines issued by the Department of Health and Human Services. The sub ject’s informed consent shall be documented as required by those guidelines. 2.11 Prohibition on Assassination. No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination. 2.12 Indirect Participation. No agency of the Intelligence Community shall partici pate in or request any person to undertake activities forbidden by this Order
NOTES 1. Brief tenure was common in the Watergate era. At the Department of Defense, Schlesinger was following the four-month term of Elliott Richardson, who then served six months as attorney general before he was dismissed for refusing to fire the special prosecutor investigating Watergate. 2. In his memoir, William Colby, with Peter Forbath, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978): 339, Colby cites the Hunt revelation as the trig ger for the ‘‘Family Jewels.’’ In an oral history done ten years later, ‘‘Oral History: Reflec tions of DCI Colby and Helms on the CIA’s ‘Time of Trouble,’’’ Studies in Intelligence 51:3 (2007), he says it was the discovery that James McCord had written letters to the CIA months before accusing the White House of trying to make him blame the agency for the Watergate break-in. 3. The statement is reproduced in the chapter on Watergate. 4. Richard Helms, with William Hood, A Look over My Shoulder: My Life in the Central Intelligence Agency (New York: Random House, 2003): 427. 5. ‘‘Oral History.’’ 6. Up to 500 residents of the village of My Lai 4, in South Vietnam, had been killed by U.S. troops on 16 March 1968. 7. The reference is to U.S. policy favorable to Pakistan during the India-Pakistan War of 1971. 8. Victor Marchetti, a former CIA official and public critic of the agency, coauthor of The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974). 9. Senator Edmund Muskie, Democrat of Maine. 10. Representative Lucien Nedzi, Democrat of Michigan, chairman of the House Sub committee on Intelligence Operations; Senator John C. Stennis, Democrat of Mississippi, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee (in the hospital at the time); and Sen ator Stuart Symington, Democrat of Missouri, a ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. 11. Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence, 1966–1973.
12. Edgar Snow, journalist and China specialist, author of Red Star over China (1937 and other editions); considered sympathetic to the Communist Chinese government. 13. IEC stands for Intelligence Evaluation Committee. 14. Richard Ober, former chief of the dissident project, known as MHCHAOS, had been reassigned to the National Security Council. 15. NSCID 9 stands for National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 9. 16. After retiring from the CIA and before organizing the Watergate break-in, E. Howard Hunt worked at the Robert R. Mullen Company, a public relations firm in Washington, D.C. 17. The Rockefeller Commission. 18. Fidel Castro of Cuba; Rafael Leonidas Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, assassi- nated in 1961; and General Ren e Schneider, commander of the Chilean army, who was killed during a botched kidnapping attempt that was intended to provoke a coup in 1970. See Chapter 10, ‘‘Chile.’’ 19. In December 1971, the FBI tapped the phone of National Security Council staffer Yeoman Charles Radford, suspecting him of stealing documents and giving them to col umnist Jack Anderson, but discovered that he was stealing documents and giving them to Admiral Thomas Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1970–1974). Presum ably, this was a result of the secrecy of the Nixon-Kissinger team in preparing major for eign policy initiatives. Moorer denied any knowledge of it, claiming that Radford had fabricated the story. The incident received relatively little public attention. Stanley I. Kutler, The Wars of Watergate: The Last Crisis of Richard Nixon (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990): 116–119. 20. Donald Rumsfeld was President Ford’s Chief of Staff at this time. Later that year, Rumsfeld would begin his first tour as Secretary of Defense, the youngest in U.S. history. He would again become Secretary of Defense, the oldest in history, under President George W. Bush. He was replaced as White House Chief of Staff by his assistant, Dick Cheney, who would later be a member of the House of Representatives, Secretary of Defense under George H. W. Bush, and Vice President under George W. Bush. 21. See, for example, Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Opera tions with Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate: Together with Additional, Supplemental, and Separate Views, Report No. 94-755, 6 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov ernment Printing Office, 1976); Loch K. Johnson, A Season of Inquiry: The Senate Intelligence Investigation (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1985); and Kathryn Olmsted, Challenging the Secret Government: The Post-Watergate Investigations of the CIA and FBI (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 1996). 22. The previous year, Turkey had intervened militarily in Cyprus. Even though the crisis had been initiated by Greece, this made dealings with Turkey politically controversial. 23. ‘‘Oral History.’’ 24. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act was amended in August 2007 in such a hasty manner that participants in the process argued afterward over exactly how much they had changed it. Realizing that it was acting hastily, however, Congress had set the amendment to expire at the end of six months so it could reconsider the issue. 25. One difference was that the Carter order strengthened the DCI’s influence over the budgets of other agencies, but the Reagan order diluted it again. ‘‘Historical Perspec tive,’’ in Michael Warner, ed., Central Intelligence: Origin and Evolution (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2001): 10
Chapter 13
 The List of Delicate Matters
One subset of documents within the ‘‘Family Jewels’’ file is distinguished by having its own table of contents. Oddly, the table of contents sits by itself as page 455 of the file, whereas the documents it describes commence on page 481. Many of these records are redacted. One, from the Central Cover Staff (CCS), is so heavily redacted that the table of contents is actually more revealing than the document itself. For our purposes, we shall call this subfile the ‘‘List of Delicate Matters,’’ fol lowing the subject line of a memo from the Foreign Intelligence Staff. This sub file brings together reports on various ‘‘activities with possible flap potential’’ and organizes them by division. Most of the documents are dated 7 May 1973 and therefore precede by two days DCI James Schlesinger’s general call that solicited most of the ‘‘Family Jewels’’ documents. (See ‘‘Introduction.’’) These evidently came in response to a specific request to division heads earlier that day from William Colby, then Deputy Director for Operations. The material was apparently intended to prepare Schlesi
East Asia Division Placing Agents in Leftist Milieu—Cleared with FBI
Central Cover Staff Statistics on Alias Documentation and Other Cover Support
European Division Research on Vesco Case
 Soviet Bloc Division Relations with FBI and Local Police
NARCOG Support to Law Enforcement Agencies Including Information on American Citizens
Division D International Telephone Links
Foreign Intelligence Staff Security and Exchange Commission and Vesco Case
Counterintelligence Staff Agency Funds Made Available to FBI
Vesco Case Intelligence Evaluation Committee and Staff MHCHAOS
CI/Police Group International Police Academy
Foreign Resources Locations, Recruitments, Use Alias Documents Division
The subfile begins with a brief report from the East Asia Division, describing a program that allowed the division to acclimate its assets to a leftist milieu in the United States before deploying them abroad. This was to give them creden tials and credibility when they sought to infiltrate foreign organizations by pos ing as dissidents. The report also comments on the risks of exposure inherent in the program. Note that this operation dealt with ‘‘assets,’’ not ‘‘case officers.’’ Thus, the people involved were cooperating with the CIA but were not full-time employees.

Project [—] is a Headquarters-initiated program which has as its fundamental objective the long-term manipulations of selected agent assets operating against EA Division difficult targets in the leftist and communist milieu in various parts of the world. Although targeted overseas, these agents are often exposed to and directed against American radical, leftist, and communist targets to gain a practical knowledge of the leftwing, radical, communist world. There is a possibility that an asset might become suspect and be accused of being an employee of the Agency or the Bureau; or it might happen some asset would, for some reason, become disen chanted with his role and expose his Agency relationship and his activities, with resultant embarrassment. To minimize potential problems, therefore, each case is cleared with the FBI and through CI/SO [Counterintelligence/Special Operations] the Bureau is kept informed on a regular basis.
The set of documents submitted by the CCS, according to the table of con tents, contains statistics regarding false identities (‘‘alias documentation’’) and other support to allow the officers of the Clandestine Service to operate under cover. This section runs from pages 484 to 517, but it is so heavily redacted that it is not worth transcribing. (Note that some pages are revised resubmissions of other pages in the same grouping.) Most of the perhaps two dozen or so lines of text that survived the censors consists of subject heads, such as ‘‘Alias U.S. Birth Certificates,’’ or uninformative introductory material (‘‘The following spe cific information regarding domestic cover support provided by Central Cover Staff is submitted in response to your request.’’).
The European Division offered the Vesco case. Vesco is a name that crops up at several points in the ‘‘Family Jewels’’ file, often with someone asking why his name is in the files. As a U.S. citizen, he should not have been the subject of any CIA investigation. Robert L. Vesco, the ‘‘fugitive financier,’’ fled the United States in 1973 after being accused of stealing $224 million from four mutual funds managed by his Geneva-based Investors Overseas Service, Ltd. (IOS). At the time it was said to be one of the largest securities frauds ever perpetrated. In addition, in 1972, while the Securities and Exchange Commission was investi gating those allegations, Vesco made an illegal contribution in the amount of $200,000, evidently in cash, to the Nixon reelection campaign. The intermediary for this transaction was Vesco’s administrative assistant Donald Nixon, Jr., a nephew of the president. The president’s brother Edward had also had ties to the company. Refusing to return to the United States, Vesco settled first in Costa Rica, then in the Bahamas, and finally in Cuba. He was convicted in Havana in 1996 of attempting to defraud the Cuban Health Ministry and sentenced to thir teen years in prison.1
7 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations SUBJECT: Research Project on Robert L. Vesco
1. In mid-October 1972 [—] of the Office of Economic Research [OER] asked [—just over one line deleted—] to participate in a meeting with a number of OER officers. During the meeting, [—] explained that the Director of Central Intelligence had levied a crash project on Dr. Edward Proctor, the Deputy Director for Intelligence, to produce a paper on international financier Robert L. Vesco. Since the Director had specifically requested contributions from the field, [—] asked our Division to help in procuring them. 2. We thereupon cabled various questions suggested by OER to [—about a half line deleted—] and asked for replies by 19 October. Relevant answers were turned over to OER in memorandum form. In the case of a brief reference in one of the field messages to an earlier high-level American intercession on behalf of Mr. Vesco, we asked Mr. Helms through his secretary whether this was relevant information. The response, again received through the secretary, was that it was not relevant. 3. Soon after our memoranda had been submitted, [—] advised [—] that the Director wanted everyone to forget the Vesco project. This was communi cated to all DDP Headquarters personnel who had had a hand in the project or had been made aware of it. 4. We never had any indication as to the reason for or the purpose of the project. 5. We understand that OER has recently written a memorandum on this matter for the DCI.
 [—signature deleted—]
Archibald B. Roosevelt Chief, European Division
The Soviet Bloc Division laid out its cooperation with U.S. law-enforcement agencies. Those that were not redacted, at least, did not involve an operational role in the United States. It also listed the forced detention of a Soviet KGB defec tor, Yuriy Nosenko. (See Chapter 6, ‘‘Counterintelligence: The Spies among Us.’’)
7 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations SUBJECT: Items for Possible Use in Briefing the DCI
1. This Memorandum is submitted in order to identify to you for possible brief ing of the Director activities which in certain contexts could be construed as delicate or inappropriate. 2. At the request of the Director of Security, from approximately mid-October 1972 to mid-January 1973 safesite [—] was made available to the U.S Marshal’s Service for use as a secure residence by an Assistant U.S. Attorney who reportedly was under threat of assassination by organized criminal elements. 3. [—paragraph deleted; about six lines deleted—] 4. [—paragraph deleted; about seven lines deleted—] 5. Since late 1972 CIA has taken part in seven FBI training courses at Quantico, Virginia, in response to requests from the FBI. We have shared with them through lectures and discussions lessons we have learned which are relevant to their counterespionage responsibilities. 6. As a means of sharing more fully our operational experience we have invited three FBI officers to be students in our [—] Course from 14 to 25 may 1973. 7. The Soviet defector Yuriy NOSENKO was confined at a CIA facility from April 1964 to September 1967 while efforts were being made to establish whether he was a bona fide defector. Although his present attitude toward the agency is quite satisfactory, the possibility exists that the press could cause undesirable publicity if it were to uncover the story.2
 [—signature deleted—]
 David H. Blee
Chief Soviet Bloc Division
The Narcotics Coordination Group (NARCOG) in the Directorate of Opera tions also reported cooperative activities with law-enforcement agencies. In this case, the first page was blank and others were heavily redacted.
7 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations SUBJECT: CIA Narcotics Activities Having Domestic Implications
1. This memorandum is in response to your request for a review of activities and relationships that might have domestic implications. 2. We occasionally report on the activities of American citizens involved in nar cotics trafficking abroad. This information is normally disseminated to U.S. law-enforcement agencies and other recipients of our reports. We also occa sionally request U.S. law-enforcement agencies for name traces on U.S. citizens who are known or suspected to be involved in narcotics trafficking abroad. [—equivalent of about fifteen lines deleted—] 5. We have occasionally received requests for alias documentation for U.S. nar cotics law-enforcement officials working abroad on foreign narcotics investi gations. The present method of handling such requests is for us to request the approval of the Deputy Director for Operations prior to asking the Tech nical Services Division to comply. We insist on knowing the true identity of the persons to use such documentation and limit them to staff officers of the U.S. law-enforcement agencies. We also require that we know the purpose and intended use of the documents. Finally, we require receipts from the headquarters of the agency involved and the individual, and also require these documents to be returned to us for destruction after they have fulfilled their use. We have turned down requests from BNDD [Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs] for alias documentation for domestic use. There are some indications in the files that there have been requests from BNDD for domestic documentation in connection with their domestic investigations.
These predate NARCOG, and we are unable to determine how these requests were handled. 6. We periodically receive requests for technical assistance in the form of photo graphic and audio devices or guidance for use of such items by U.S. law enforcement agencies in connection with their foreign investigations of illicit narcotics activities. We require these agencies to adhere to the same proce dures we require in our own operations. From time-to-time we have honored these requests and have provided sterile equipment when the requests have been properly presented and approved. Our records show evidence that sev eral such requests were made prior to the existence of NARCOG in connec tion with narcotics law-enforcement investigations in the United States. We are unable to determine whether the requests were fulfilled.
 [—signature and name deleted—]
The entity mysteriously designated Division D contributed several documents to the subfile. The first four pages are completely blank except for their address (the Inspector General) and the date (29 May 1973). The next document, how ever, proves very timely in the political environment of the early 2000s, when it has again become an issue. It concerns the interception of communications between the United States and foreign countries. Notable is the General Coun sel’s determination that the CIA, at least, should terminate such activity despite finding a potential loophole in the United States Code as it existed at that time.
7 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations FROM: Chief, Division D SUBJECT: Potentially Embarrassing Activities Conducted by Division D REFERENCE: Your staff meeting,
7 May 1973
1. There is one instance of an activity by Division D, with which you are al ready familiar, which the Agency General Counsel has ruled to be barred to this Agency by statute: the collection [—about one-third of a line deleted—] of international commercial radio telephone conversations between Latin American cities and New York, aimed at the interception of drug-related communications. The background on this is briefly as follows: [—about five lines deleted—] Therefore, on 29 September 1972, NSA [the National Security Agency] asked if Division D would take over the coverage, and on 12 October 1972 we agreed to do so. On 14 October, a team of intercept operators from the [—about two-thirds of a line deleted—] began the coverage experimentally. On 15 [or 13?] January 1973, NSA wrote to say that the test results were good, and that it was hoped this coverage would continue. Because a question had arisen within Division D as to the legality of this ac tivity, a query was addressed to the General Counsel on this score (Attachment A hereto). With the receipt of his reply (Attachment B), the intercept was im mediately terminated. There has been a subsequent series of exchanges between Division D and the General Counsel as to the legality of radio inter cepts made outside the U.S., but with one terminal being in the U.S., and the General Counsel has ruled that such intercept is also in violation of CIA’s stat utory responsibilities.
2. We are carrying out at present one intercept activity which falls within this technical limitation—i.e., of having one terminal in the U.S. [—four to five lines deleted—] Since the [—] link being monitored carries a large number of totally unrelated conversations, the operators do intercept other traffic, fre quently involving U.S. citizens—for example, BNDD staffers talking to their agents. I have described this situation to the General Counsel, and his infor mal judgment was that, as long as the primary purpose of the coverage is a foreign target, this is acceptable. He suggests, however, that it might be desir able to inform the Attorney General of the occasional incidental intercept of the conversations of U.S. citizens, and thus legalize this activity. We will pur sue this with Mr. Houston [the General Counsel]. [—paragraph deleted; about six lines—] 3. An incident which was entirely innocent but is certainly subject to misinterpreta tion has to do with an equipment test run by CIA [—] technicians in Miami in August 1971. At that time we were working jointly to develop short-range agent DF equipment to use against a Soviet agent in South Vietnam. [—about two thirds of a line deleted—] and a field test was agreed upon. The Miami area was chosen, and a team consisting of Division D, Commo, [—] personnel went to Miami during the second week of August. Contact was made with a Detective Sergeant [—] of the Miami Beach Police Department, and tests were made from four different hotels, one a block away from the Miami Beach Auditorium and Convention Hall. A desk clerk in this hotel volunteered the comment that the team was part of the official security checking process of all hotels prior to the convention. (The Secret Service had already been checking for possible sniper sites.) As the team’s report notes, ‘‘The cover use of the hotel is a natural.’’ 4. Another subject worthy of mention is the following: In February 1972, [—just under one line deleted—] contacts in U.S. telecom munications companies [—just over one line deleted—] for copies of the tele phone call slips pertaining to U.S.-China calls. These were then obtained regularly by Domestic Contact Service in New York, pouched to DCS/Wash ington, and turned over to Division D for passage to FE/China Operations. The DDP was appraised of this activity by Division D in March 1972, and on 28 April 1972 Division D told DCS to forward the call slips to CI Staff, Mr. Richard Ober. Soon thereafter, the source of these slips dried up, and they have ceased to come to Mr. Ober. In an advisory opinion, the Office of General Counsel stated its belief that the collection of these slips did not violate the Communica tions Act, inasmuch as they are a part of a normal record-keeping function of the telephone company, which does not in any way involve eavesdropping.3
 [—paragraph deleted—]
 [—name, signature, title deleted—]
Atts: A. DivD to OGC 26 Jan 73 B. OGC to DivD 29 Jan 73 26 January 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel SUBJECT: Intercept of Communications in the U.S.
1. CIA is intercepting at our communications site [—] high frequency, interna tional radio telephone calls originating [—] in New York and being broadcast to South America or being directed to New York from South America.  Some calls are relay calls through New York but not originating or terminating there. The calls involve both U.S. citizens and foreign nationals. 2. [—about one line deleted—] the intercept team screens the telephone calls for drug-related matters. NSA receives the traffic from CIA in the form of magnetic tape. [—about two and a half lines deleted—] 3. I would appreciate your very early views as to where this intercept activity falls with respect to U.S. law. Even if it is legal or we can secure the necessary authorization, it seems to me there is extra flap potential associated with reports going into the BNDD mechanism, particularly since they may well become the basis for executive action. [—signature and name deleted—] Acting Chief, [—office deleted—]
29 January 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chief, Division D SUBJECT: Intercept of Communications in the U.S. REFERENCE: 26 Jan 73 Memo for GC fr AC/Division D, Same Subject
1. In referent you request our views as to the legal aspects of a radio telephone intercept activity carried on at our communications site [—]. 2. The basic law is contained in section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 605, which prohibits interception of any radio communication without the authorization of the sender and also prohibits divulging the substance thereof to any person. Chapter 119 of Title 18, U.S.C., makes the interception of any wire or oral communication a crime punishable by $10,000 or five years’ imprisonment, or both. There are two exceptions to these prohibitions: a. The first provides for application through the Department of Justice to a Federal court for a court order authorizing such interception for specific purposes in connection with law-enforcement duties. Since this agency is prohibited by statute from any police or law-enforcement activities, obviously we cannot operate under this exception. b. The other exception is contained in section 2511 of Title 18, U.S.C., at subsection (3). This provides that the prohibition cited above on interception shall not limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect against attack, to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States or to protect such information, and to protect the United States against overthrow by force or other unlawful means or against any other clear and present danger to the structure or existence of the Government. 3. The type of information you describe in your memorandum does not appear to fall within any of these categories and since its ultimate destination is BNDD, it appears to be collection for law-enforcement purposes, which as noted above is barred to this Agency by statute. 4. For your information, in most cases where there is a criminal prosecution for violation of the narcotics laws, the Department of Justice queries us as to whether we have engaged in any interception in connection with the defendants. If a case should involve the interception being made [—several words deleted—] it would be deemed to be unauthorized and in all probability the prosecution would have to be dropped by the Government. It is our view, therefore, that such interception should be carried on by the appropriate law-enforcement agencies in accordance with the authority of chapter 119 of Title 18, U.S.C.
General Counsel
The Foreign Intelligence Staff also contributed a brief note on the Vesco case. The official mentioned, David Young, a former National Security Council staffer, was one of the leaders of the White House ‘‘plumbers.’’ (See Chapter 11, ‘‘Watergate.’’)
 7 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations SUBJECT: Item for the List of Delicate Matters
The Securities and Exchange Commission has asked CIA to provide information on any foreign connections with organized crime in the United States. The record indicates that Mr. David Young, of the White House staff, asked Mr. Colby to set up a contact for Mr. T. C. Barreaux, of SEC. Mr. Barreaux discussed the matter with Mr. Paul V. Walsh of DDI [the Directorate of Intelligence], and on 4 April 1973, Mr. Barreaux and Mr. Timmeny came to a meeting at CIA with Mr. Lawrence Houston (General Counsel) [—several words deleted—] (Chief, FI Staff, DDO). Since that meeting, we have received no specific requirements from Mr. Barreaux, but have provided him with one piece of information involving a banking transaction of a [—] associate of Robert Vesco.
[—signature and name deleted—]
 Chief Foreign Intelligence Staff
Following the Foreign Intelligence Staff, the Counterintelligence (CI) Staff offered a brief note on funds lent to the FBI and then its own lengthier report on Robert L. Vesco. Here emerge the reasons for the agency’s—or more properly, the White House’s—interest in Vesco and his company, IOS.
7 May 1973
You will recall that in Fiscal Years 1971 and 1972, I believe, Agency funds were made available to the FBI. These funds may still be possibly held in a special account for that use. This is one of the areas where TSD [Technical Services Division] has been much involved. Chuck Briggs would have the details as this was handled through the Executive Director’s office and of course [Counterintelligence Chief James] Angleton would have additional information.
Edward L. Sherman
Chief Missions and Programs Staff
8 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations SUBJECT: Areas of Possible Embarrassment to the Agency 1. Some time in the spring or early summer of 1971, [White House Counsel] Mr. John Dean levied the requirement on the Agency for information relating to the Investors Overseas Service (IOS). The original request was non-specific but it gradually emerged that Dean was concerned with the possible adverse publicity that might develop regarding the President’s nephew, who was employed by IOS. 2. There were multiple channels from the White House to the Agency on this subject: a. Presumably Haldeman and/or Ehrlichman to Director Helms. b. Someone (unnamed) in the White House to the DDCI [Deputy Director of Central Intelligence], General [Robert] Cushman (see attached telephone conversation). Note that Ehrlichman is mentioned, and c. John Dean to the CI Staff. These various channels were sorted out in time and six reports were passed by the CI Staff to Mr. Fred Fielding for Mr. John Dean. 3. The telephone call of General Cushman’s is of interest since it gives the flavor of White House concern. It took several days to uncover the fact that the White House interest centered on the involvement of the President’s nephew with IOS and possible adverse publicity. The reports submitted to Dean’s office were routine in nature and were coordinated with the DCI. After a few months, interest in this subject died down and we did not pursue it further. 4. Please return the attachments when they have served your purpose. 5. I also include a short note on the Intelligence Evaluation Committee and Staff prepared by Richard Ober. The original meetings were held in the office of John Dean at the White House and the principal sparkplug for this group activity was the then-Assistant Attorney General for Internal Security, Robert Mardian and then later his assistant, William Olsen. It is noted that Mr. Mardian is now appearing before the Grand Jury and it is always possible that he might draw in the Agency.4 6. Before appointing Ober to the IES Staff as the Agency representative, I had attended various inter-agency meetings presided over by Mardian. I expressed the view to Director Helms that Mardian would require very careful handling due to his inexperience. Furthermore, Mardian was deeply involved in the split between [FBI Assistant Director] Bill Sullivan and [FBI Director] Mr. [J. Edgar] Hoover. On a confidential basis one or two senior FBI officials stated that Sullivan was secretly passing files to Mardian without Mr. Hoover’s permission. This was one of the important reasons why Sullivan was dismissed from the Bureau. [—signature deleted—]
James Angleton
 Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff
 Attachments (5)
Among the attachments included with the Angleton memorandum were several newspaper clippings regarding Investors Overseas Service and the connections between it and the president’s nephew Donald and brother Edward. Also included was the following transcript between Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Robert Cushman and ‘‘someone’’ in the White House (Richard Nixon?):
Telephone conversation of General Cushman and someone in White House, 23/7/71 Bob, how are you?
—————————— DDCI: Just fine; I just talked to Jack Sherwood and he suggested I give you a buzz. ——————————
I deeply appreciate it. I asked Jack to call you. I spoke to Rose5 yesterday, and told her, ‘‘I had a little project here for John Ehrlichman and I need very discreet assistance from the Company, and I should like to touch base with Bob. I met him at Jack Sherwood’s.’’ —————————— DDCI: That’s right. —————————— That’s right and beyond that I would like to just establish a relationship because from time to time we have a few needs in your area. Let me tell you what we need to know here. Your Agency would be the only one to help. I have checked with the Bureau, Bob, and they have nothing on this fellow. Just a mere name check but it apparently has some significance, of course. Ray Finkelstein; born in Belgium about 1940; moved to Brazil about age 12 with his family. This might be helpful. He now is working with one Gilbert Straub, apparently Straub is hooked up with that Kornfeld6 outfit: IOS. We have a need to know what Finkelstein is all about. —————————— DDCI: We will do our best, of course; we have some counterintelligence files which sometimes turn up people, but ordinarily, of course, we don’t surveil any Americans but this fellow might have come to our notice. —————————— He may not be an American, just a European Jew; that is the problem, the Bureau has come up with zero. —————————— DDCI: Do you know where he is physically located? —————————— He may be in Geneva; Straub is apparently in Geneva. —————————— DDCI: Well, let me get on this and I will get back to you. The memoranda submitted by Angleton regarding the Intelligence Evaluation Committee and MHCHAOS can be found in a separate chapter. (See Chapter 7, ‘‘The Search for Foreign Instigators: Operation Chaos and the Intelligence Evaluation Committee.’’) In addition to the submission by the Counterintelligence Staff, there is a separate submission from the Counterintelligence Staff, Police Group. The packet begins with a description of the group, although significant portions failed to survive the censors.
 [No date]
 Deputy Director for Operations SUBJECT: Counterintelligence Staff, Police Group Activities 1. Counterintelligence Staff, Police Group (CI/PG) is responsible for Staff coordination within the Office of the Deputy Director for Operations for activities and programs involving assistance to foreign police/security forces for the purpose of exploiting such activities and programs for intelligence purposes 2. CI/PG maintains liaison with the Office of Public Safety, Agency for International Development (OPS/AID) and its training facility, the International Police Academy (IPA). CI/PG also administers and supervises Project [—one line deleted—] In addition, CI/PG coordinates a joint [—two-thirds of a line deleted—] Central Intelligence Agency [—] Technical Investigations Course. CI/PG provides guidance and counsel to the Area Divisions in matters pertaining to police/security functions and activities. Specific details of these functions are as follows: LIAISON WITH OPS/AID CI/PG liaison with OPS/AID and IPA is conducted on a daily basis and consists principally of: A. exchange of information on IPA participants, some of whom later attend [—] courses [—one line deleted—], B. arranging for inclusion of Agency sponsored participants in IPA/OPS/ AID training programs, C. arranging for IPA/OPS/AID briefings and tours for foreign police/security representatives sponsored by CIA Area Divisions, D. [—paragraph deleted; about three lines—] E. providing general information pertaining to police/security organizations, activities, equipment, and personalities requested by Agency operating components, F. coordinating the Agency’s participation in the Technical Investigations Course designed to familiarize the trainees with the technique required to properly investigate terrorist activities wherein explosives have been utilized, G. [—paragraph deleted; about five lines—] H. [—paragraph deleted; about two lines—] PROJECT [—one line deleted—] [—about four lines deleted—] It is engaged principally in training foreign police/security personnel under [—about half a line deleted—] and selling police/security equipment to foreign police/security personnel and organizations. [—] also provides special training programs and briefings to foreign police/security personnel of interest to Agency operating divisions. [—one and one-quarter lines deleted—] Recently [—] has acquired the capability of providing training to foreign police/security personnel in VIP protective security for Chiefs of State. [—footnote deleted; about three lines—] COMMENT [—] does not maintain direct contact or liaison with any law-enforcement organization, local or federal, at home or abroad. When the need arises, such contact is sometimes made on our behalf by [—just over one line deleted—] has such contacts at home and abroad because of the nature of its activities (training of foreign police/security personnel at home and abroad), and its Public Safety programs around the world. [—] has such contacts at home— local and federal level—because its personnel are personally acquainted with law-enforcement officers throughout the United States. Members of the [— about half a line deleted—] have appeared as guest lecturers at such federal institutions as the U.S. Park Police, IPA, the U.S. Secret Service, and the U.S. Treasury Enforcement Division. 3. In addition to the liaison mentioned in the previous paragraph, the Agency maintains liaison in varying degrees with foreign police/security organizations through its field stations. The existence and extent thereof, however, is a decision to be made by the Area Division, and is not the responsibility of [—]. 4. [—about one and two-thirds lines deleted—] with Dan Mitrione, who was murdered by the Tupamaros. Dan Mitrione, an experienced and respected law-enforcement officer, was a bona fide OPS/AID officer assigned to the AID mission in Uruguay, and was never a CIA employee or agent.7 [—signature deleted—]
 James Angleton
Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff
In the following memorandum, we discover that the Counterintelligence Staff, Police Group teaches its foreign police and security trainees how to deal with terrorist, bomb, and sabotage incidents by teaching them terrorist, bomb, and sabotage techniques, using both manufactured and improvised devices.
07 MAR 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT: Joint CIA/USAID Terrorist (Technical) Investigations Course #7 (English language) CI Staff’s Project [—]
1. This effort is a joint CIA/USAID training program for foreign police/security personnel. The initial phase of the training will be conducted at the International Police Academy (IPA), Washington, D.C. during the period 2–27 April 1973. The following subject matter is covered in this phase of the training: investigative techniques, collection and preservation of evidence, records, files, and reporting, gathering of information on terrorist groups and their activities, a student seminar devoted to discussions on terrorist and other hostile activities currently existing in their respective countries, etc. This phase of the training is concluded by a two-day orientation by the Bomb Squad of the Dade County Police Department in Florida. 2. The second phase of this training will be conducted by Agency [—about one and one-third lines deleted—] during 30 April–25 May 1973. The [—] technicians utilize [—about a half line deleted—] cover. The objective of this phase of the training is to develop individual student technical capability to realistically conduct investigations into known or suspected incidents of sabotage/ terrorist bombings by: a. Providing trainees with basic knowledge in the uses of commercial and military demolitions and incendiaries as they may be applied in terrorism and industrial sabotage operations. b. Introducing the trainees to commercially available materials and home laboratory techniques likely to be used in the manufacture of explosives and incendiaries by terrorists and saboteurs. c. Familiarizing the trainees with the concept of target analysis and operational planning that a saboteur or terrorist must employ. d. Introducing the trainees to booby-trapping devices and techniques giving practical experience with both manufactured and improvised devices through actual fabrication. Emphasize the necessity of alertness for detecting and countering booby traps placed by saboteurs or terrorists. e. Conducting several field exercises to give each trainee the opportunity for detecting and neutralizing various explosives and incendiary devices likely to be used by terrorists or saboteurs, including letter bombs, packages, attache cases, etc. f. Conducting several investigative field exercises of explosive incidents to alert the trainee to the need for and manner in which to collect, identify, and preserve legally admissable evidence for prosecutive action. 3. The program provides the trainees with ample opportunity to develop basic familiarity and use proficiently through handling, preparing and applying the various explosive charges, incendiary agents, terrorist devices and sabotage techniques. USAID, International Police Academy (IPA) has received reports from former foreign police/security personnel who participated in the program indicating that they were called upon to utilize the skills they acquired through this training in the handling of explosive devices in their respective country. Attached is a letter from a participant in TIC #6 [—] stating that he deactivated a letter-bomb device that was sent to the [—] Embassy in [—]. 4. Subject course will have 26 participants from ten (10) foreign countries. Nine (9) are financed by AID, eight (8) by CIA and nine (9) by their own governments. [—paragraph deleted; about four lines—] 5. Separate end of course reports will be prepared by USAID and CIA, TSD personnel. [—two or three lines deleted—]
 [—signature deleted—]
James Angleton Chief, Counterintelligence Staff
Attached to the memorandum above is a list of comments on facts and statistics related to the program at the International Police Academy. Some of it survived redaction.
AID/OPS TRAINING AID/OPS, International Police Academy sponsors some seven hundred (700) foreign police officers for training in the United States each year. These officers are selected from underdeveloped countries. [—just over two lines deleted—] [—] TRAINING [—about one and a third lines deleted—] trains some 350–400 of these officers in specialized areas of law enforcement. [—about four lines deleted—] During FY 1973 [—] supported two of our field stations by providing training in VIP protective security for [—about a half line deleted—] personnel. AID/OPS–CIA TRAINING During FY 1973 two joint USAID/OPS/CIA Technical Investigations training programs were conducted for [—] foreign police/security personnel representing [—] countries. The purpose of the training is to develop individual student technical capability to realistically conduct investigations into known or suspected incidents of sabotage/terrorist bombing or other activities. Also accompanying the above memorandum was an excerpt from an article with ‘‘comments on AID,’’ which the sender believed ‘‘Mr. Colby might find of interest.’’ The article was ‘‘Strategic Leverage from Aid and Trade,’’ written by the new Director of Central Intelligence, James Schlesinger, ten years earlier. In the article, Schlesinger argued that trade and aid decisions should be based neither on humanitarian and idealistic grounds nor on ideological considerations, as in automatically severing ties to dictatorial or leftist regimes. Rather, trade and aid relationships should be nurtured for the long-term political influence and leverage that can be derived from them. By maintaining trade over the longer term, we make countries, especially developing countries, vulnerable to the threat of curtailing Western markets at a later time. Foreign aid programs should not be manipulated to elicit direct support for specific foreign policy goals or to ‘‘export the trappings of American democracy,’’ but used to encourage economic development and stability, thereby strengthening the legitimacy of the existing social order. Goals such as responsive government and an equitable distribution of income conflict with the primary goals of growth and stability. A brief passage highlighted by the sender reads as follows: The statement of objectives by AID is a very ambitious one. The purposes of the assistance program include stimulation of self-help, encouragement of progressive forces, and achievement of governments based on consent, which recognize the dignity and worth of individuals who are expected to participate in determining the nation’s goals
The final submissions in the List of Delicate Matters came from the Foreign Resources Division, which was clearly a focus of concern for Colby. Until the previous year, the Foreign Resources Division had been known as the Domestic Operations Division. Operating inside the United States, its function was to identify and recruit visiting foreigners who would be willing to serve as agents of the CIA when they returned abroad. The fact that it operated within the United States, however, made it particularly sensitive and evidently brought it under close scrutiny. These documents, however, are heavily redacted.
 7 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT: Foreign Resources Division Operational Activities with Possible Flap Potential
1. At the risk of stating the obvious, almost all of the operational activities carried on by FR Division [—several words deleted—] run the risk that unauthorized disclosure could create embarrassment to the Agency. We have accepted this as a condition precedent and have proceeded with our operational activities in the most professional manner possible under the circumstances. There are certain rather unusual activities in which FR Division has participated and/or is participating that contain somewhat greater possibility for embarrassment if discovered. I have listed these below, not necessarily in order of embarrassment potential: a. [—several words deleted—] provides a fairly considerable amount of support to Dr. Kissinger in his contacts with the Chinese. This support was authorized by [Deputy Director for Plans] Mr. Karamessines and Mr. Helms. Thus far there has been no problem other than the inordinate amount of time spent by [—several words deleted—] personnel, not to mention the fairly sizeable amount of money that has been expended in support of these efforts. b
. [—paragraph deleted; about eight lines—]
 [—signature, name, and title deleted—]
Whatever it was that the previous memo said, apparently it was not specific enough. In any event, Colby did not find it satisfactory. He returned it to the Foreign Resources Division with four handwritten questions across its cover sheet, the last of which has been mostly deleted. This elicited a follow-up memo the next day.
8 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT: Foreign Resources Division Operational Activities with Possible Flap Potential
REFERENCE: FR Memorandum, [—] dated 7 May 1973, same subject
1. The answers to your questions are as follows: a. Question: Do we recruit Americans? Answer: Yes, we recruit Americans to be used as [—] support assets and access agents. These Americans are used for spotting and assessment purposes only and do not perform any recruitments. b. Question: Do we use alias documents on Americans in the course of operations? Answer: Yes, we do use alias documents when recruiting American support assets. The great majority of these recruitments are done in alias. All recruitments of foreign targets are done in alias. c. Question: What disciplinary controls do we have over alias documents? Answer: We maintain a current list in FR Division Headquarters of the alias documents issued to each Base. More importantly, each Base Chief is responsible for supervising and maintaining control over the alias documents used by the case officers on his Base. d. Question: [—just over one line deleted—] Any clearances or prohibitions? Answer: [—paragraph deleted; about sixteen lines—] 2. If you have further questions, please let me know. [—signature and name deleted—] Acting Chief Foreign Resources Division
The Acting Chief of the Foreign Resources Division provided either an annex or a further memo. The degree of redaction makes it difficult to determine which it is. The first page is simply missing. On the second page, a single paragraph survives:
c. Alias Documentation: Clearly, FR Division does the great majority of its operational work by having it case officers utilize alias documents. All recruitments are done in alias. Thus, the alias documentation is a prerequisite for effective operations [—several words deleted—] Furthermore, our case officers have utilized fully backstopped alias credit cards for renting automobiles, motel rooms, hotel rooms for operational meetings, etc. These credit cards are backstopped by accounts in alias which are promptly paid at the appropriate time. I see no problem in the continued use of alias documentation and moreover, I feel it is absolutely essential to continue using alias documentation wherever and whenever possible.
The third page offers the following: 2. Summarizing the above, I believe that all of the activities outlined are clearly within the acceptable risk frame. [—just over one line deleted—] the other activities, although clearly involving some degree of risk are necessary and valuable and in my opinion should be continued.
[—signature and name deleted—]
Acting Chief Foreign Resources Division
Following this is an outline for a briefing, also from the Foreign Resources Division. It covers such topics as organization and functions, location of field units, covers, targets, budgets, and statistics (for recruitments, general support assets, and positive intelligence reporting). The briefing itself was presumably once contained in the sixteen pages that follow. Of the sixteen-page briefing, all that survived the censors was this:
1. 1. Statement of Organization and Function
NOTES 1. New York Times (2, 4, 27 August 1996); Time (11 December 1972); and Arthur Herzog, Vesco: From Wall Street to Castro’s Cuba (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1987). 2. On Nosenko, see Chapter 6, ‘‘Counterintelligence: The Spies among Us.’’ 3. The distinction being made here is that these were records of calls made (By whom? When? To whom? For how long?) rather than transcripts of conversations. In this the program resembles the National Security Agency’s unacknowledged ‘‘data mining’’ program of the early twenty-first century, but differs from actual wiretaps. 4. For this document, see Chapter 7, ‘‘The Search for Foreign Instigators: Operation Chaos and the Intelligence Evaluation Committee.’’ 5. Presumably Rose Mary Woods, who had been Richard Nixon’s personal secretary since 1951. 6. Bernard Cornfeld was Vesco’s predecessor at IOS. 7. The death of Dan Mitrione in 1970 inspired a number of works, including the film Etat de Si  ege (State of Siege) by Constantin Costa-Gavras. In the film, Mitrione (given a different name) is depicted as someone who trains torturers. When the leader of the Tupamaro guerrillas saw the film, after a long prison sentence, he said it in no way reflected their understanding of Mitrione or his role in Uruguay. 8. James R. Schlesinger, ‘‘Strategic Leverage from Aid and Trade,’’ in David M. Abshire and Richard V. Allen, eds., National Security: Political, Military, and Economic Strategies in the Decade Ahead (New York: Praeger, 1963). The excerpt includes pages 687– 688, 696–698. The quote is from page 697
Chapter 14
Nicaragua, with a Side Trip to Iran
The Iran-Contra affair was the signature political scandal of the Reagan era. It was a complex matter that involved the CIA—at times centrally and at other times more peripherally—but was eventually focused on the National Security Council (NSC). The main elements of the affair were the clandestine solicitation of funds for a (widely publicized but nominally covert) war in Central America after Congress had ordered its funding terminated; the secret sale of arms to the Islamic Republic of Iran, even as the administration denounced it as a supporter of international terrorism; the connection of those arms sales to negotiations for the release of hostages; and the diversion of some of the Iranian arms revenues to finance the Central American war. When the affair came to light, the administration sought to place the preponderance of the blame on Lt. Col. Oliver L. North, the Deputy Director of Political-Military Affairs on the National Security Council staff, who was, to be sure, deeply involved in carrying out these policies. Note that in the minds of the participants at the time, the ‘‘Iran’’ and the ‘‘Contra’’ parts of the affair were two completely separate operations. What eventually brought them together in the mind of the public was that: (1) both operations were conducted in such secrecy that the oversight committees of the Congress and even prominent people within the administration, much less the public, were not informed; (2) as part of the endeavor to conceal the programs from the rest of the government, the NSC staff (generally the same few staff members) was made responsible for both programs, even though it normally had no operational responsibilities whatsoever; and most directly, (3) funds illicitly gained from the sale of arms to Iran (funds that the NSC could not even admit to having) were used to finance the Contras.
In July 1979, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional, FSLN) overthrew the Nicaraguan government of President  Anastasio Somoza Debayle after a long guerrilla campaign. Somoza Debayle had been the third member of the Somoza family to run Nicaragua (either officially or from behind the scenes) since his father, Anastasio Somoza Garcıa, forced the resignation of another president in 1936. As leader of the Nicaraguan army, the Guardia Nacional, in 1934 Somoza Garcıa also had ordered the assassination of Cesar Augusto Sandino, who had conducted a guerrilla war against U.S. troops in Nicaragua (1927–1933) and for whom the Sandinista front was later named. The Somoza family used its control of the government to accumulate vast holdings of land and commercial enterprises, making itself the center of economic as well as political power in the country.1 Upon the fall of the Somoza regime, a politically diverse junta was installed, but it did not have final say on decisions, and its more moderate members eventually left. The true center of power was the nine-member Joint National Directorate (Direccion Nacional Conjunta, DNC) of the FSLN, on which the three  Sandinista factions had equal representation. Both the junta and the DNC were chaired by Daniel Ortega Saavedra, the Sandinista faction leader who had devised the successful ‘‘final offensive’’ that had overthrown Somoza. The FSLN also established party-run mass organizations for workers, peasants, and women. In neighborhoods throughout the country, it organized Sandinista Defense Committees (Comites de Defensa Sandinista, CDS), which were modeled on Cuba’s Committees for the Defense of the Revolution and enabled the Sandinistas to disseminate government views, organize rationing, and keep an eye on dissidents. At least initially, the new government enjoyed the support of broad and diverse segments of the population that had opposed the Somoza dictatorship. The new regime confiscated the land holdings of the Somoza family and their associates, about 2,000 farms comprising at least 20 percent of the country’s cultivable land, and converted them into state enterprises. Other large-scale agribusinesses remained in private hands. Also nationalized were the financial institutions, all of which were in bankruptcy. This was sufficient to give the government considerable influence over the economy. Nicaragua maintained a mixed economy, although some Sandinista leaders spoke of further extending the state sector in the future, which proved counterproductive in terms of its relations with the private sector. The government became more institutionalized in 1984, when elections were held for the presidency and the National Assembly under a new constitution. By then, however, the country was well into a guerrilla war with a U.S.-backed foe. Although some opposition candidates participated and won seats in the National Assembly, the most prominent figures boycotted the election. International observers declared the elections free and fair, but the opposition decried a climate of intimidation. Daniel Ortega was elected president. Although divided into factions with different ideological and operational shadings, the Sandinistas were generally Marxists. They had long-established contacts with Fidel Castro’s government in Cuba, and the Cubans evidently advocated on their behalf in Moscow with some success. The Sandinistas’ ideology, ties to countries of the Soviet bloc, and support for revolutionaries abroad made them an immediate concern to the U.S. government, although the United States had withdrawn its support from the increasingly unpopular Somoza regime in its final months. The administration of President Jimmy Carter sought a modus vivendi with Nicaragua as an incentive to encourage political diversity and Sandinista self-restraint. Concern grew into hostility with the January 1981 inauguration of President Ronald Reagan, a conservative Republican with a tendency to view the world in terms of Soviet expansionism. A few brief entries from Reagan’s diaries sum up his attitude toward Nicaragua and the situation in Central America:
We have definite evidence Nicaragua transferring hundreds of tons of arms from Cuba to El Salvador. ... An NSC meeting that has left me with the most profound decision I’ve ever had to make. Central America is really the world’s next hotspot. Nicaragua is an armed camp supplied by Cuba and threatening a communist takeover of all of Central America. ... It’s possible the Soviets will ship ‘‘Mig’’ fighter planes into Nicaragua. George S[hultz] Monday will let [Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei] Gromyko know we’ll take very seriously any overt moves by them or their stooge Cuba toward any part of Latin Am. We have contingency plans leading all the way up to troop involvement if Cuba should send troops to stir the pot in Central Am.2  In addition to their links to the established Soviet bloc, the Sandinistas also had ties to the Farabundo Martı National Liberation Front (FMLN), which was in the early stages of a revolutionary guerrilla war in nearby El Salvador. The FMLN had previously provided the Sandinistas with financial assistance, raised principally through the kidnapping of Salvadoran notables, and now called upon the Sandinistas to reciprocate. The Sandinistas were reluctant to provide more than token assistance at first. They were concerned about the potential reaction from the United States, especially as long as the Carter administration was offering the possibility of a modus vivendi. At the same time, at least some of the Sandinista leaders believed that the revolution could survive only if it triumphed on a regional scale—not in a small, weak, and isolated state surrounded by reactionary governments backed by the United States and ‘‘world imperialism.’’ In part, revolutionary activity in other countries was expected to create allies or at least distract the revolution’s enemies from Nicaragua, and in this sense it became a strategic necessity. Ironically, this parallels one of the CIA’s arguments for ‘‘taking the war to Nicaragua,’’ to distract Nicaragua and make it harder to export the revolution abroad.3 Thus, even before there were facts on the ground, the Sandinistas assumed the United States would seek to crush them just as the Reagan administration assumed the Sandinistas would seek to foment revolution. Events did not really prove either of them wrong. The FMLN planned to launch a ‘‘final offensive’’ before the inauguration of the new president in January 1981, although the decision may well have been made before the election. The CIA reported a heightened flow of arms from Nicaragua to El Salvador in November and December 1980. At this point, the Carter administration authorized the CIA to provide funding to Nicaraguan opposition groups, including non-Sandinista parties, church groups, farmers’ cooperatives, and labor unions. It did not, however, initiate any paramilitary operations. The guerrilla offensive in El Salvador failed; the Sandinistas felt betrayed (having exposed themselves to U.S. hostility on the basis of exaggerated FMLN claims regarding the imminence of success); and the incoming Reagan administration had the evidence it needed for a hostile stance toward Nicaragua. The flow of arms to El Salvador fell off dramatically for a time in early 1981, but the pattern of hostility was already established and the incentives for further selfrestraint vanished.4 Many career officers at the CIA were skeptical of the Reagan administration’s approach to Central America. In their view, they had just been burned by politics in the 1970s. They were especially wary of conducting covert operations without informing Congress, which they would eventually be asked to do. In such situations, the CIA was generally expected to take the blame when things went bad. By the summer of 1983, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence John McMahon was proposing that the Nicaraguan project be made overt and transferred to the Department of Defense.5 Reagan chose William J. Casey to be Director of Central Intelligence. A veteran of the Office of Strategic Services in World War II, Casey had been away from intelligence work for some thirty-five years. Nevertheless, he had long wanted to be Director of Central Intelligence and had sought the position in the Nixon administration, but was named Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission instead. Among Directors of Central Intelligence, Casey stood out for his uncooperative attitude toward Congress. Within the CIA, it was said that he would not inform a Congressman if the latter’s coat had caught fire. As DCI, Casey took a special interest in the administration’s Central American policy, which he viewed as countering Soviet expansionism. According to Robert Gates, who was then a rising star in the agency:
His greatest concern was with Soviet subversion and aggression in the Third World generally, ... But no individual covert action aroused his passion or significantly occupied his thoughts or even his time, save one. For reasons I never fully comprehended, Bill Casey became obsessed with Central America.6
Sensing the agency’s skepticism toward the Central American policy that was emerging, Casey established a special task force, with its own analysts, within the Directorate of Operations to isolate the program from the rest of the agency as much as possible. To head the Latin American Division in the Directorate of Operations he chose Duane ‘‘Dewey’’ Clarridge, who knew next to nothing about the region. Clarridge devoted his time to Central America, leaving the rest of Latin America to his deputy, who was a regional specialist.7 Casey would deal directly with Clarridge, bypassing the normal chain of command, and the two would initiate actions that went beyond written authorizations (such as arming Eden Pastora’s forces in Costa Rica, south of Nicaragua, purportedly to stop the flow of arms going north from Nicaragua). Bobby Inman, a respected intelligence professional, resigned as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence because of Casey’s handling of Central America.8 Inman’s successor, John McMahon, later complained about Clarridge’s tendency to act without informing anyone. On 17 January 1983, for instance, he issued a memo of complaint to Deputy Director for Operations John Stein.
The DCI and I were distressed to learn that Dewey Clarridge was in Panama talking about the Panamanians developing a 250 man paramilitary force without the DCI or I knowing about it. ... I want to be aware of all major activities within Nicaragua by forces under our sponsorship and give prior approval before any conversation with foreign nationals on any proposed covert action.9
In March 1981, Reagan authorized further nonlethal covert operations against Nicaragua plus the interdiction of arms from Nicaragua to El Salvador. Secre tary of State Alexander Haig disdained covert action and proposed a military buildup against Cuba as a way to dissuade revolutionary activity in Central America. Casey, however, saw covert action as politically more feasible, and he won the day.10 In the summer of 1981, Casey asked Clarridge for options regarding Nicaragua. In his memoirs, Clarridge recalled his response:1
My plan was simple:
1. Take the war to Nicaragua.
2. Start killing Cubans.
The first point, taking the war to Nicaragua, Clarridge argued, was necessary to distract the Sandinistas from El Salvador. The second point was to raise the cost to Cuba of involvement in Central America, although he insisted he never intended to go out of his way to find Cubans to kill. On 1 December 1981, Presi dent Reagan signed a one-paragraph ‘‘finding,’’ authorizing the CIA to initiate a paramilitary operation against Nicaragua
Finding Pursuant to Section 662 of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 As Amended, Concerning Operations Undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency in Foreign Countries, Other than Those Intended Solely for the Purpose of Intelligence Collection.
I hereby find that the following operation in a foreign country (including all support necessary to such operation) is important to the national security of the United States, and direct the Director of Central Intelligence, or his designee, to report this Finding to the intelligence committees of the Congress pursuant to Sec tion 501 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and to provide such briefings as necessary.
Central America Support and conduct [—] Paramilitary operations against [—about one line deleted—] Nicaragua [—about two lines deleted—]
This was followed on 4 January 1982 by National Security Decision Directive Number 17, putting the policy into a somewhat broader, regional context. This document has been declassified in part
U.S. policy toward the Americas is characterized by strong support for those nations which embrace the principles of democracy and freedom for their people in a stable and peaceful environment. U.S. policy is therefore to assist in defeating the insurgency in El Salvador, and to oppose actions by Cuba, Nicaragua, or others to introduce into Central America heavy weapons, troops from outside the region, trained subversives, or arms and military supplies for insurgents. To adequately support U.S. policy, the following decisions have been made by the President based on discussion at the November 16, 1981 meeting of the National Security Council:
1. Create a public information task force to inform the public and Congress of the critical situation in the area.
2. Economic support for a number of Central American and Caribbean coun tries (estimate $250 to $300 million FY 1982 supplemental).
3. Agreement to use most of the $50 million Section 506 authority to increase military assistance to El Salvador and Honduras. Reprogram additional funds as necessary.
4. Provide military training for indigenous units and leaders in and out of country.
5. [—paragraph deleted—]
6. Maintain trade and credit to Nicaragua as long as the government permits the private sector to operate effectively.
 7. [—paragraph deleted—]
8. Encourage cooperative efforts to defeat externally supported insurgency by pursuing a multilateral step-by-step approach.
9. Support democratic forces in Nicaragua. 10
. [—paragraph deleted—] 11. [—paragraph deleted—]
 /signed Ronald Reagan/
The White House Washington, D.C. /signed Ronald Reagan/ December 1, 1981
The CIA took over tutelage of a fledgling anti-Sandinista guerrilla movement based (at this time) on personnel from Somoza’s Guardia Nacional and located in neighboring Honduras. Argentina actually had begun the process and Argen tines continued to provide training, allowing the CIA to maintain a lower pro file. Officially, the anti-Sandinistas called themselves the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (Fuerza Democr atica Nicaraguense, FDN), but to the Sandinistas they were € the Counterrevolutionaries (Contrarrevolucionarios). From this, the force became widely known on both sides as the Contras. Why were the Argentines involved? Apart from the Argentine junta’s messi anic anticommunism, the commanders of Somoza’s Guardia Nacional and Hon duran police commander Gustavo Alvarez were all graduates of an Argentine military staff college. In addition, Nicaragua had given refuge to Argentine guerrillas. The CIA inherited the entire operation after the fall of the military junta in Buenos Aires 1983, following Argentina’s unsuccessful war with Britain over the Falkland Islands. The U.S. Congress was divided from 1981 through 1986, with Republicans tak ing control of the Senate as part of the ‘‘Reagan landslide’’ in the 1980 elections but the Democrats retaining the House of Representatives. Many in Congress, but especially liberal Democrats, considered the administration’s notion of a worldwide Soviet threat to be exaggerated and its view that Central American revolutions were primarily rooted in foreign subversion to be off the mark. Rather, they saw the Central American rebellions as a reaction to the repressive policies and structures of their own governments and to past U.S. military inter ventions and support for dictatorial regimes. The Soviets and especially  the Cubans took advantage of opportunities as they arose and often at the invitation of disgruntled locals. In this view, supporting armed elements of the former Somoza regime (the so-called Somocistas)12 against an indigenous revolutionary regime was exactly the wrong thing to do. Democrats saw it as an illegitimate and ultimately counterproductive attempt to overthrow a sovereign government. Moreover, Congressional resistance was stiffened by the legacy of Vietnam and concern that the United States could be drawn into direct involvement in another prolonged civil conflict. The hasty evacuation of the U.S. embassy in Saigon had occurred just six years earlier, in 1975, and the memories were quite fresh. (To be sure, some in the administration saw the undermining of the timidity left by the Vietnam legacy as a potential side benefit of their policy.) At the same time, members of Congress—fraught as usual with internal divisions and doubts— were reluctant to cut off the operation completely, lest they be proved wrong and blamed for failure. In any event, DCI Casey made sure that no one in Congress, or in the White House for that matter, learned of the skepticism of the CIA’s own analysts regarding the likelihood of a victory by the unpopular Somocistas.13 The covert war against Nicaragua was destined to become one of the most public secrets in history. By March 1982, major newspapers and magazines were running stories exposing it before it was fully in operation. In Congress, opposi tion mounted to both the paramilitary campaign against Nicaragua and to mili tary support for the armed forces of El Salvador. Edward Boland, the Democratic Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelli gence—himself under attack from his colleagues as a tacit accomplice in the operation—attached an amendment to a supplementary appropriations bill pro hibiting the use of government funds for the purpose of overthrowing the gov ernment of Nicaragua or provoking a war between Nicaragua and Honduras.
None of the funds provided in this act may be used by the Central Intelligence Agency or the Department of Defense to furnish military equipment, military train ing or advice, or other support for military activities, to any group or individual, not part of the country’s armed forces, for the purpose of overthrowing the govern ment of Nicaragua or provoking a military exchange between Nicaragua and Honduras.
The Boland Amendment, soon to become known as the First Boland Amend ment, passed in the House in October 1982 by a vote of 411 to 0. The lopsided majority was possible, however, because the precise wording of the amendment made it virtually meaningless. The administration merely had to assert a differ ent purpose for what it was doing. Indeed, it already claimed that its intention was merely to disrupt the flow of arms from Nicaragua to rebels in El Salvador. In response to the Congressional opposition, the administration sponsored a new civilian directorate for the Contra forces and initiated a public relations campaign depicting them as fighting for freedom and democracy. Reagan issued a new finding in 1983 that continued the operation much as before but defined its aims as the interdiction of arms supplies to Salvadoran rebels and the application of pressure to force negotiations for a democratic regime in Nicaragua and for a peaceful settlement in Central America. The authorization was kept broad and vague. To accompany the finding, a supporting ‘‘scope note’’ was issued at the same time.
Finding Pursuant to Section 662 of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 As Amended, Concerning Operations Undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency in Foreign Countries, Other than Those Intended Solely for the Purpose of Intelligence Collection
I hereby find that the following activities are important to the national security of the United States, and direct the Director of Central Intelligence, or his designee, to report this Finding to the Intelligence Committees of the Congress pursuant to Section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and to provide such briefings as necessary
 [—] in cooperation with other governments, provide support, equipment, and training assistance to Nicaraguan paramilitary resistance groups as a means to induce the Sandinistas and Cubans and their allies to cease their support for insurgencies in the region; to hamper Cuban/Nicaraguan arms trafficking; to divert Nicaragua’s resources and energies from support to Central American guerrilla movements; and to bring the Sandinistas into meaningful negotiations and constructive, verifiable agreement with their neighbors on peace in the region. [—] in cooperation with other governments, provide support to opposition leaders and organizations [—] Provide training, support and guidance to Nicaraguan resistance leaders [—]. Seek support of and work with other foreign governments and organizations as appropriate to carry out this program and en courage regional cooperation and coordination in pursuit of program objectives. CIA may support [—] in order to hamper arms trafficking through Nicaragua, support indigenous resist ance efforts, and pressure the Sandinistas. U.S. support to paramilitary activities in Nicaragua will be ter minated at such time as it is verified that: (a) the Soviets, Cubans, and Sandinistas have ceased providing through Nicaragua arms, training, command and control facilities, and other logistical support to military or paramilitary operations in or against any other country in Central America, and (b) the Government of Nicaragua is demonstrating a commitment to provide amnesty and nondiscriminatory participation in the Nicaraguan political process by all Nicaraguans. The Director of Central Intelligence is directed to ensure that this program is continuously reviewed to assure that its objectives are being met and its restrictions adhered to
. /signed Ronald Reagan/
The White House Washington, D.C.
 Date: September 19, 1983
The Finding replaces the 1 December 1981 Finding which authorized certain co vert action programs in Nicaragua and Central America. This program remains a critical element of U.S. policy in the region which recognizes that Nicaragua’s San dinista regime, with Soviet and Cuban active support, is implementing a strategy of full support for insurgent elements whose aim is the overthrow of democratic gov ernments in the region. The political and paramilitary pressures created by this pro gram are linked and are essential (1) to enable friendly Central American nations to strengthen democratic political institutions and achieve economic and social devel opment, free from Soviet, Cuban, and Sandinista interference and (2) to induce a negotiated political resolution of international tensions in Central America. This Finding authorizes the provision of material support and guidance to Nica raguan resistance groups; its goal is to induce the Sandinista government to enter into meaningful negotiations with its neighboring nations; and to induce the Sandi nistas and the Cubans and their allies to cease their provision of arms, training, command and control facilities and sanctuary to regional insurgencies. This support is to be provided [—] in cooperation with others, as appropriate. The provision of political support and funding to opposition leaders and organizations [—]—in order to maintain their viability—is also authorized. POLITICAL ACTION: Financial and material support will be provided to Nica raguan opposition leaders and organizations to enable them to deal with the Sandi nistas from a position of political strength and to continue to exert political pressure on the Sandinistas to return to the original promises of the revolution— free elections, political pluralism, basic human rights, and a free press. PARAMILITARY ACTION: Arms and other support will be provided to Nicara guan paramilitary forces operating inside Nicaragua for the purpose of pressuring the Sandinista government and its Cuban supporters to cease their support for re gional insurgencies. [—] instructors will train these forces to attack targets in Nicaragua in order to deny facilities, interrupt support networks, and to raise the price the Cubans and Nicaraguans and their allies must pay for continued support of insurgent groups elsewhere in Central America. [—about one and one-third lines deleted—] U.S. support for paramilitary forces inside Nicaragua will be terminated when it is verified that: (a) the Soviets, Cubans, and Sandinistas have ceased providing arms, training, command and control facilities, and logistical support for military or paramilitary operations in or against any country in Central America, and (b) Nicaragua has committed itself to providing amnesty and non-discriminatory par ticipation in the Nicaraguan political process by all Nicaraguans. PROPAGANDA AND CIVIC ACTION: Guidance and media assistance will be provided to Nicaraguan opposition elements and paramilitary forces [—just under one line deleted—] Propaganda will be used to promote pluralism, human rights, freedom of the press, free elections, and democratic processes inside Nicaragua and throughout the region. Paramilitary units will be trained in field medicine, ba sic agriculture, and political/psychological action in order to assist local popula tions and to gain and maintain popular support. FUNDING REQUIRED: $19,000,000 is included in the Fiscal Year 1984 CIA budget for this program. Additional funding requirements, to be determined by developments in the area, could be as much as $14,000,000. Any such additional funding will have to come from the Agency’s Reserve for Contingencies or other authorized sources. RISKS: This proposal carries with it the risks that the Cubans may increase their military presence in Nicaragua to defend their installations and to control rising internal opposition to the Sandinistas, and that the Nicaraguans may increase their covert activities or take direct military action against Honduras. The USSR is not likely to take an active direct military role in Central America. The Sandinista regime may heighten repression in Nicaragua but this would only continue the course of action in which the Sandinistas have been engaged since 1979 to eliminate democratic pluralism
The Nicaragua project continued to grow in size. In large part it was fed by disillusionment with the Sandinista government, especially among peasants in northern Nicaragua who crossed the border to join the FDN Contra army. (Guardia Nacional veterans, however, still dominated the command echelon of the FDN.) The Indian and Creole populations along the Atlantic coast had their own grievances against the government’s centralizing tendencies and needed little prompting to rebel. In addition, Ed en Pastora Gomez (‘‘Comandante Cero’’), a former Sandinista field commander, switched sides in April 1982. He founded the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (Alianza Revolucionaria Democr atica, ARDE) and established a smaller anti-Sandinista southern front based in Costa Rica
With the growing size of the Contra army, members of Congress openly questioned the Regan administration’s sincerity in foreswearing the goal of overthrowing the government. That skepticism was bolstered by statements from DCI Casey, who swore that the CIA did not intend to overthrow the San dinistas ... even if the Contras did
By 1984, the CIA was concerned that opposition in Congress could result in the cutoff of all funding for Contra operations. This prospect encouraged the managers of the war to try to bring matters to a head while they still had the resources. In the early months of 1984, the CIA sought to increase economic pres sure on the Nicaraguan regime by secretly mining the country’s harbors. This was done not directly through the Contras but through separate contractors des ignated ‘‘unilaterally controlled Latino assets’’ (UCLAs). The mines were neither large nor sophisticated (in keeping with their supposed rebel origins), but it was assumed that even the rumor of mining would inhibit shipping. In the following memorandum, two members of the NSC staff report on this aspect of the Contra war to Robert C. McFarlane, the third of Reagan’s six National Security Advisers. They also outline a plan, mostly redacted, for destroying a tanker in a Nicaraguan port
 March 2, 1984
SUBJECT: Special Activities in Nicaragua
On the night of February 29, [—] emplaced four magnetic mines in the harbor at Corinto, Nicaragua. No attempt was made by the Sandinistas to engage the [—] during the mission. In accord with prior arrangements, ARDE’s ‘‘Barracuda Com mandos’’ took credit for the operation. ARDE also declared that the entire Nicaraguan littoral is now a ‘‘war zone’’ and that all shipping within the Nicara guan claimed 12nm territorial sea is subject to attack. [—about four lines deleted— ] Our intention is to severely disrupt the flow of shipping essential to Nicaraguan trade during the peak export period. [—about three lines deleted—] In this case, our objective is to further impair the already critical fuel capacity in Nicaragua. This will substantially reduce EPS mobility and hamper their ability to support the ERP/FMLN guerrillas in El Salvador.14 [—about seven lines deleted—] While we could probably find a way to overtly stop the tanker from loading/departing, it is our judgment that destroying the ves sel and its cargo will be far more effective in accomplishing our overall goal of applying stringent economic pressure. It is entirely likely that once a ship has been sunk no insurers will cover ships calling in Nicaraguan ports. This will effectively limit their seaborne trade to that which can be carried on Cuban, Soviet bloc, or their own bottoms. The following plan has been developed: No legal or financial action will be taken to deter [—about one line deleted—] [—four bullet points deleted; about twenty lines—] Given past performances by Sandinista military seamen under fire (surrender or jumping overboard), there is little reason to expect that the Nicaraguan civilian crews of a gasoline laden will attempt to ‘‘run for it.’’ It is anticipated that the operation ban be safely executed without injury or loss of life. No American citi zens will be directly involved in the operational event. RECOMMENDATION That you approve this operation and brief the President using the points above.
McFarlane wrote his initials in the ‘‘Approve’’ space, but the proposal to destroy the tanker (which is believed to have been Mexican)15 was never carried out. By the end of March, word of the mining was in the press.16 The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, not having been fully briefed on the mining operation, was caught off guard. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the ranking Democrat, submitted his resignation from the committee, withdrawing it only after Casey issued a per sonnel apology and promised to draw up improved notification procedures. Barry Goldwater, the Republican who chaired the committee and was normally supportive of the administration, sent the following angry letter to Casey.17
April 9, 1984 Hon. William J. Casey Director of Central Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C.
Dear Bill:
All this past weekend, I’ve been trying to figure out how I can most easily tell you my feelings about the discovery of the President having approved mining some of the harbors of Central America. It gets down to one, little, simple phrase: I am pissed off! I understand you had briefed the House on this matter. I’ve heard that. Now, dur ing the important debate we had all last week and the week before, on whether we would increase funds for the Nicaragua program, we were doing all right, until a Member of the Committee charged that the President had approved the mining. I strongly denied that because I had never heard of it. I found out the next day that the CIA had, with the written approval of the President, engaged in such mining, and the approval came in February! Bill, this is no way to run a railroad and I find myself in a hell of a quandary. I am forced to apologize to the Members of the Intelligence Committee because I did not know the facts on this. At the same time, my counterpart in the House did know. The President has asked us to back his foreign policy. Bill, how can we back his foreign policy when we don’t know what the hell he is doing? Lebanon, yes, we all knew that he sent troops over there. But mine the harbors in Nicaragua? This is an act violating international law. It is an act of war. For the life of me, I don’t see how we are going to explain it. My simple guess is that the House is going to defeat this supplemental and we will not be in any position to put up much of an argument after we were not given the information we were entitled to receive; particularly, if my memory serves me cor rectly, when you briefed us on Central America just a couple of weeks ago. And the order was signed before that. I don’t like this. I don’t like it one bit from the President or from you. I don’t think we need a lot of lengthy explanations. The deed has been done and, in the future, if anything like this happens, I’m going to raise one hell of a lot of fuss about it in public.
Barry Goldwater Chairman
As Senator Goldwater noted, Congressional support for continued funding of the Contra war fell precipitously. The CIA also faced condemnation from the pub lic and criticism from major allies. Clarridge was reassigned out of the Latin American Division (and made Chief of the European Division). Clair George replaced John Stein as Deputy Director for Operations. The Contras faced the prospect of having to curtail operations in Nicaragua and return to their bases in Honduras. Thus, the administration began considering ways to fund the opera tion without going through Congress, a constitutionally questionable proposition. Casey and McFarlane apparently were the first to act in anticipation of the funds being terminated. Unbeknownst to Congress, or to most members of the administration, they were already considering raising money from the govern ments of other countries. (Note that some of the words in the following memo are obscured by the large, black letters ‘‘CIA’’ stamped across the page, although some can be easily guessed.)
27 March 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
SUBJECT: Supplemental Assistance to Nicaragua Program
1. In view of possible difficulties in obtaining supplemental appropriations to carry out the Nicaraguan covert action project through the remainder of this year, I am in full agreement that you should explore funding alternatives with the Israelis and perhaps others. I believe your thought of putting one of your staff in touch with the appropriate Israeli official should promptly be pursued. You will recall that the Nicaraguan project runs out of funds in mid-May. Although additional moneys are indeed required to continue the project in the [current] fiscal year, equipment and materiel made available from other sources [might] in part substitute for some funding. We are there fore currently exploring two such alternatives. Please note, however, that we are unlikely to [receive] materiel assistance from these sources by mid-May. 2. The first of these alternatives [is] acquiring from the Israelis additional ord nance captured by them [from the] PLO. A joint CIA/DoD survey team will make a second trip to Israel [—word obscured—] April to inspect captured PLO ordnance. The first trip in 1983 resulted [in] the acquisition of some $10 million worth [—a half line deleted—] machine guns and ammunition. The purpose of the upcoming survey is to determine current Israeli inventories and to negotiate thereafter to receive appropriate weapons free or at a low cost. Of course the cost of packing and delivery will have to be factored in. 3. The second alternative we are exploring is the procurement of assistance from [—another country—] [—A senior military official of that country—] has indicated that he may be able to make some equipment and training available to the [Contras?] through the Hondurans. 4. Finally, after examining legalities, you might consider urging an appropriate private US citizen to establish a foundation that could be the recipient of non governmental funds which could be disbursed to ARDE and the FDN
. /initialed/
William J. Casey
The United States did not have a large number of troops stationed in Central America, but it did move troops in and out of Honduras for military exercises as a way to show support for Honduras and to exert pressure on Nicaragua. At the same time, there had been some limited direct negotiations between the United States and Nicaragua, and the foreign ministers of Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama had initiated negotiations in the hope of finding a com prehensive, regional settlement before the various Central American conflicts combined into a full-blown regional war. This latter effort was called the Conta dora process after the Panamanian island where the initiative was launched in January 1983. (The sponsoring countries were called the Contadora Group or the Core Four.)
 On 25 June 1984, a key meeting of an NSC subcommittee was held to survey the situation and consider ways to move forward.
Most of the participants of this meeting were unaware of the proposal to fund the Contras with donations from other countries, much less that funds and equipment from Israel and Saudi Arabia were already arriving. The meeting otherwise highlighted the divisions within the administration over what exactly it was that they had al ready authorized (including the possibility of third-party support for the Con tras) as well as differences over how they should approach negotiations with Nicaragua. Each paragraph of the minutes, including Reagan’s closing joke, was designated at the time as secret (S) except for the subject line and the time of adjournment, which were unclassified (U).
 NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING June 25, 1984; 2:00–3:00 P.M.; Situation Room
SUBJECT: Central America (U) PARTICIPANTS: The President The Vice President The Vice President’s Office: Admiral Daniel J. Murphy State: Secretary George P. Shultz Mr. Michael Armacost Mr. Langhorne Motley Defense: Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger Dr. Fred Ikle OMB: Dr. Alton Keel CIA: Mr. William J. Casey Mr. Duane Clarridge USUN: Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick JCS: General John W. Vessey, Jr. Admiral Arthur S. Moreau White House: Mr. Edwin Meese, III Mr. Robert C. McFarlane Admiral John M. Poindexter NSC: Dr. Constantine Menges
Mr. McFarlane: The purpose of this meeting is to focus on the political, economic, and military situation in Central America; to offer a status report, and to discuss next steps needed to keep our friends together while continuing to make progress toward our overall political goals. There is good news and bad news from Central America, as is always the case. The good news includes the fact that Congress will provide $62M in additional military assistance for El Salvador—$30M of which has already been spent. At the same time, we continue to need the additional $116M in aid for El Salvador which we have requested in the FY 84 supplemental, and we need to continue pressing for that. (S) The bad news includes the fact that there seems to be no prospect that the Dem ocratic leadership will provide for any vote on the Nicaraguan program. During the last vote in the House of Representatives, we lost by 64 votes, and that means that we need to change 32 votes in order to continue funding the anti-Sandinista program. On June 1, Secretary of State Shultz and Mr. Ortega of the Nicaraguan Directorate met in Nicaragua. The key question we need to consider now is what we believe about the prospects for further talks with Nicaragua; do we believe that Nicaragua wants to come to a reasonable agreement? Based on the answer to that question—how do we keep the friendly Central American governments together and focused on a multilateral, comprehensive, and verifiable treaty: What can we do to reinforce the confidence of the Central American and regional countries in the US in the light of questions about continuing congressional support for the anti-Sandinista program? For example, is there a need for any additional military exercises to disrupt or deter the communist guerrilla offensive which we expect will be coming in El Salvador in late summer or autumn? (S) What can we do to increase public understanding of the situation in Central America and of our Central American policy not only here in the United States but also in Western Europe and Latin America and among other western countries? (U) We will begin with Secretary Shultz addressing the diplomatic situation fol lowed by Bill Casey reporting on the freedom fighters in Nicaragua, and Cap Weinberger and General Vessey commenting on the military situation. (S) Secretary Shultz: Mr. President, we would not have gotten the deployment of Per shing missiles in Europe if people had not seen that we had credible, vigorous negotiation going on.18 Similarly, you have moved to get yourself in a position with the USSR where we have made credible proposals and they have walked out. This is useful because it shows who is at fault for the lack of progress. (S) Similarly, in Central America, our basic thrust has to be to generate positive ele ments of the political and economic situation, and to provide security help so that our efforts to disrupt the Nicaraguan export of subversion are as strong as we can get. An essential ingredient in that strategy is that we can say, if Nicaragua is half way reasonable, there could be a regional negotiated solution—one which we sup port as much as we can. It is essential to have something like that going on or else our support on the Hill goes down. So it is not a question of making a prediction about the outcome of negotiations, rather it is important that we don’t get sucked into something bad as it is essential to our strategy to key everything we do to sup port for the Contadora regional processes as I shall call it. (S) So on our efforts to engage Nicaragua, there is one piece of very bad news. We don’t have the votes in the House of Representatives to obtain additional funds for the anti-Sandinistas. The Congress will now be out for three weeks, and, therefore, anything credible going on the negotiating track can only help us. There is a sense of unease in Honduras about what is taking place for a great many reasons. The situation in El Salvador is a great big plus, assuming we get additional US military assistance; and taking what we got after the nun’s case was solved,19 we have a good crack at the omnibus supplemental; and if not, we can use 21(d) again. Nicar agua is in trouble though not badly so, especially if the anti-Sandinista funds run out. There is some shift in attitude of the Mexicans. For example, [Foreign Minister Bernardo] Sepulveda went to El Salvador, and there is some Mexican impatience with Nicaragua about their posture on the negotiations. This morning I spent some time with the US Ambassador to Honduras. There are things we can do to ease the concern of the Government of Honduras. They are very concerned about the US bilateral conversations with Nicaragua, but these concerns can be assuaged. Their main problems are internal—economic, and the military change. President [Rob erto] Suazo is upset. The most serious problem is what Honduras can do with the Nicaraguan freedom fighters who return. President Suazo is also bothered by the sharp decline in the US military presence. (S)
In the meantime, we have a negotiation going on both in the Contadora process and in this little effort with Nicaragua. Our approach is: (1) to consult closely with our friends; (2) keep our friends posted so they see we are trying to help. By and large, they see this as helpful, as contributing to the Contadora process, and us as supporting them. Today is the first US-Nicaragua meeting since June 1. We said we would not meet with the Mexicans present. Nicaragua said we have to keep the Mexicans informed. The United States said, O.K., we will inform all our friends in he Conta dora countries. The first meeting was at 10:00 A.M. Mexican time or noon our time. Ambassador Schlaudeman was instructed, in the first session, only to talk about modalities and procedure—not to table anything. But to continue these negotia tions, we must have content. We thing the best way for this to go on is to have a home-to-home approach (meaning alternating between the US and Nicaragua). We cannot say much about frequency. Nicaragua has lived up to its agreement about this negotiation. There was no press notification before this meeting. (S) Our negotiating strategy is to table an Aide Memoire saying here is our approach, which we have written out and which is what we told the Core Four we would do so they would not be surprised. We have not given the Core Four the Aide Memoire, which changed recently, as a result of lengthly [sic] discussion which Fred Ikle and Admiral Moreau. We have to follow the Aide Memoire with an approach to negotiations which I discussed with almost everyone before June 1, except for Jeane Kirkpatrick, who was out of the country. Instead of a vertical approach to the negotiations taking some of the four topics on one at a time, we suggest taking some of each of the four in a horizontal approach. Ambassador Schlaudeman had a tableau of these four steps with blanks where any numbers are involved. From the standpoint of negotiations, we need to get the word to go ahead, or we need to decide on some other approach. Then, we will subvert the whole thing and it will have to abort. I have to get word to Shlaudeman. (S)
Mr. McFarlane: Now we’ll receive an overview of the anti-Sandinista program from Bill Casey. (S)
Mr. Casey: The FDN in the North remains strong. ARDE in the South is on the run under pressure. In the North, we see continued support for the FDN. For example, 117 persons walked out of Nicaragua and Honduras to join up just last week, and in the central part of Nicaragua, 900 people are waiting for weapons in order to join up with the FDN. At the moment CIA has $250,000 left; about half of this is being kept in order to hold [—] US personnel in Honduras and Costa Rica until the end of September, 1984 so that we can help immediately in the event that a continuing resolution makes more money available. Our warehouses have arms and ammunition which can hold till August. Many of the anti-Sandinistas will stay in place within the country in order to feed themselves, and they would need about $3 million to get by for the next three months. We estimate that about half will retreat into Honduras and Costa Rica in some disarray, and we have to pro vide humanitarian assistance to help these individuals and those they bring out with them when they come into Honduras and Costa Rica. (S) The legal position is that CIA is authorized to cooperate and seek support from third countries. In fact, the finding encourages third country participation and sup port in this entire effort, and we are considering Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and [a South American country.] If we notify the oversight committees, we can provide direct assistance to help the FDN get the money they need from third countries. There will be some criticism, but senior members of the oversight com mittees recognize that we need to do this. We need a decision to authorize our per mitting the FDN to obtain third country support. Meanwhile, the FDN, Misura,20 and ARDE are acting on their own to try to get financial support from third party sources. There is a psychological gap coming up, and we should provide Hondu ras and Costa Rica with some type of humanitarian relief so they can assist the anti-Sandinistas. The anti-Sandinistas have something stashed away but they will be needing help. (S) I shall offer a few words now on the Cuban-Nicaraguan military buildup. We see Cuban preparations for another military offensive in El Salvador, while at the same time the Cubans are building up their own military forces in Nicaragua. We now estimate, [—about two lines deleted—] there are actually 7–8 thousand Cuban troops [—about a half line deleted—] in Nicaragua. Castro is telling people such as the Nicaraguan leader Ortega that our willingness to negotiate is intended to permit the United States to buy time until we take military action against Nicaragua. (S) Cuba and Nicaragua are moving more quickly to complete the construction of the new 3100 meter airport in Punta Huetea. [—about two and a half lines deleted—] could support Nicaraguan and Soviet cargo jets. Two other runways at two other airports are nearing the point where they could take jet fighter planes and also Soviet cargo planes. Further, we see that 45 Nicaraguan pilots trained in the Soviet bloc have returned to Nicaragua. (S) Secretary Weinberger: The Department of Defense objected strongly to the content of the State Department negotiating proposals with respect to the numerical restric tions that would have been placed on US forces in Central America. The content of that first step negotiating proposal and the Aide Memoire is not a negotiating posi tion that the United States should be presenting. We don’t want to appear in old paternalistic North American fashion to be taking over the negotiations. We don’t think it seemly to dignify Nicaragua by having the home-to-home meeting approach in which US and Nicaraguan negotiating teams alternate meetings from one capital to the other. Rather, what we should be doing is helping the Central American countries take the lead in the Contadora process in order to get a good Contadora treaty. This is the third choice between no negotiations and the separate bilateral negotiations proposed by State. We favor the third choice of helping the Contadora countries, who are our friends, obtain a comprehensive and verifiable Contadora treaty. (S) On military issues we have reduced our troop levels, trying to keep to about 700. But let me emphasize, this is a self-imposed limit, and we can increase that number now. If we went along with the first step of the State negotiating proposal to Nicaragua as originally planned, we would have given up all of our flexibility. We would have given up the ability of the Defense Department to increase its physical presence in Central America above a certain low limit that was specified. On the anti-Sandinista issue, I think we need to take the offensive against the Dem ocrats in Congress. We need to hold them accountable for not providing the resources needed to defend democracy. We need to hold the Democrats accounta ble. We should ask the Democrats whether they want a second Cuba. They see Ortega going after the visit of Secretary Shultz to Havana and then to Moscow. Do the American people want this? We should emphasize this to the Democrats in Congress rather than taking the bilateral negotiating tack where we would be giv ing Nicaragua economic aid, helping them economically. Whatever else, we need to assure that we can keep a US troop presence in Honduras of whatever size is needed to help defend our friends. (S) General Vessey: I’m going to go over some of the material that Bill Casey covered in a general overview. In Nicaragua, we see an economy in bad shape. We see the government losing popular support, and we see the airfields being readied for jet fighters. (Admiral Moreau, would you please bring the photos to the President.)
The Contras have achieved considerable success in Nicaragua in disrupting Nica raguan military operations and preparations. In Honduras, the economy is in diffi cult condition, but the civilian government is functioning well, although there is a great concern in Honduras about the Contras returning into Honduras. The re gional training center has been functioning well, and we have trained about 3,000 Salvadoran troops this year. (S) Looking in overview at what we are doing to provide support, I want to men tion the following things we are doing now: two spring deployment exercises are finished and no additional exercises are scheduled between now and December. The naval presence will remain continuous at about the current level. Congress approved the construction of two temporary military bases; and we are doing a number of things in the area of intelligence collection, such as the following: [—about nine lines deleted—] The current policy we are following is producing results. We need to help Hon duras. They have economic and military problems and they probably need an emergency package of assistance. In El Salvador we need the additional $116 mil lion in military assistance and we need to continue reassuring our friends in Cen tral America through firm commitments. Our policy is working now but if we don’t watch it, we’ll snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. (S) President Reagan: It all hangs on support for the anti-Sandinistas. How can we get that support in the Congress? We have to be more active. With respect to your dif ferences on negotiating, our participation is important from that standpoint, to get support from Congress. (S) Secretary Weinberger: If the core four Central American countries agree on our negotiating proposal, that’s fine; but they have not even seen the original Aide Memoire that was to be given to the Nicaraguans today, nor have they seen the new one that was just completed this past Saturday afternoon. Besides, we can’t end up with a negotiation that gets us into a separate bilateral deal with Nicaragua. (S) Secretary Shultz: I think Cap’s characterization of what we are trying to do is inac curate and unfair. As of late Saturday afternoon, the Aide Memoire was okay with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. (S) Secretary Weinberger: None of our friends in Central America have seen the new Aide Memoire that, as you point out, was revised Saturday and finished late Satur day afternoon. (S) President Reagan: If we are just talking about negotiations with Nicaragua, that is so far-fetched to imagine that a communist government like that would make any reasonable deal with us, but if it is to get Congress to support the anti-Sandinistas, then that can be helpful. (S) Amb. Kirkpatrick: Mr. President, at the United Nations we negotiate on everything with all the countries in the world, and I believe in diplomacy and negotiations. But it is very important to avoid getting into the situation of assuming responsibil ity for something that cannot be achieved. As you know, we often find it useful to support other countries which are trying to achieve political settlements when we, ourselves, remain in the background. For example, in Afghanistan, in the Persian Gulf where we are helping those countries trying to settle the war without our selves moving into the forefront, and, in Lebanon, where we found that we were not able to bring about a negotiated solution and where we are now working in the background to facilitate a solution by working with our friends and through our friends. In my judgment, the analogy of Central America is much closer to the Persian Gulf situation than it is to the issue of the deployment of Pershing missiles in Europe. Let us remember that the Contadora process began in early 1983 as an initiative of the Latin American countries, and that when you sent me to the region in February 1983, they told me that they wanted to try to negotiate a political set tlement among themselves. The reason the United States got out of the process directly was because the other countries wanted us out. They wanted to establish their own negotiating process, and they have made some progress. Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama have become more responsible as a result of trying to achieve a negotiated settlement. They are now much less critical of us than they were. Now they realize how difficult Nicaragua is, and now they have come to the hard part of the negotiation. (S) As we now undertake separate bilateral negotiations with Nicaragua, rather than continuing to support the 21 Contadora objectives, these Latin American countries may well take this as an excuse to stand aside. They will get off the hook, and they will put us on the spot. If we give Mexico any special role, it will further undermine the Contadora process, and in fact, the Contadora process would then probably fall apart because any US preference shown toward Mexico, which has been supporting the Nicaraguans and communist guerrillas, will undermine pres sure for a genuine negotiated solution. We would then be under lots of pressure from Congress, if the United States were negotiating bilaterally with Nicaragua, to make additional concessions. These bilateral negotiations with Nicaragua will scare our friends in the region and they will neither help us in the region nor in the US Congress. In fact, the coincidence of our undertaking this bilateral negotiating effort at the same time as the Congress fails to support funding for the Contras is enough to totally unravel our entire position in the region. (S) If we don’t find the money to support the Contras, it will be perceived in the region and the world as our having abandoned them, and this will lead to an increase in refugees in the region and it will permit Nicaragua to infiltrate thou sands of Nicaraguan trained forces into El Salvador. And this will be an infiltration we could not stop. The Democrats don’t want to vote because they don’t want to accept the responsibility for their votes against this program. I believe we need to make their responsibility in the Congress clear to the US public. We must require the Democrats to stand up and be counted. If you showed your commitment and the Administration’s commitment with more activity, it would be a positive factor in Congress. If we can’t get the money for the anti-Sandinistas, then we should make the maximum effort to find the money elsewhere; even if we couldn’t find money elsewhere immediately, we should consider using the anti-Sandinistas else where for the time being, for example, in El Salvador to help defend against the coming guerrilla offensive. (S) Secretary Shultz: Several points: (1) everyone agrees with the Contra program but there is no way to get a vote this week. If we leave it attached to the bill, we will lose the money we need for El Salvador. (2) We have had a vote on the anti Sandinista program and the Democrats voted it down. It already is on the record and the Democrats are on the record. (3) I would like to get money for the Contras also, but another lawyer, Jim Baker,21 said that if we go out and try to get money from third countries, it is an impeachable offense. (S) Mr. Casey: I am entitled to complete the record. Jim Baker said that if we tried to get money from third countries without notifying the oversight committees, it could be a problem and he was informed that the finding does provide for the par ticipation and cooperation of third countries. Once he learned that the funding [sic; finding] does encourage cooperation from third countries, Jim Baker immediately dropped his view that this could be an ‘‘impeachable offense,’’ and you heard him say that, George. (S)
Secretary Shultz: Jim Baker’s argument is that the US Government may raise and spend funds only through an appropriation of the Congress. (S) Secretary Weinberger: I am another lawyer who isn’t practicing law, but Jim Baker should realize that the United States would not be spending the money for the anti-Sandinista program; it is merely helping the anti-Sandinistas obtain the money from other sources. Therefore, the United States is not, as a government, spending money obtained from other sources. (S) Secretary Shultz: I think we need to get an opinion from the Attorney General on whether we can help the Contras obtain money from third sources. It would be the prudent thing to do. On the negotiations, all the other countries support this. The question is, can the US conduct the negotiations so that it is perceived as support ing the Contadora process? If people here are so reluctant, then we can go back and try to abort this whole thing. I am very conscious of all the negative points that have been raised. I give the chances of a positive negotiation outcome with Nicaragua as two-in-ten, but if it doesn’t succeed, it needs to be clear where the responsibility is, and that we have tried to help our Contadora friends obtain a positive outcome. (S) Mr. McFarlane: Mr. President, perhaps I might define the issues as they stand now: (1) a negotiating process in order to get a good Contadora treaty is worth while; (2) Marxist-Leninist regimes historically do not negotiate in order to make reasonable concessions, as we saw over many years in North Korea and Vietnam. For them, negotiations are tactical exercises to split up their opponents and to obtain their goals. (3) How can there be a multilateral effort rather than one with Nicaragua in which the US is in the lead? On the military front, we had 2,200 troops and now we have about 700 there. (S) Secretary Weinberger: We brought the numbers down to 700 on our own in order to deal with the critical perception that we were in some way militarizing the sit uation down there. We can always move to increase the exercises, and we can move exercises in and out so that we support our friends without creating the appearance that we are increasing the number of troops. (S) President Reagan: Even the appearance of movement of US troops into Hond uras for exercises, the movement of small units, would likely help the morale of Honduras. (S) General Vessey: Yes, and US troop movements helped El Salvador very much dur ing the communist offensive against the elections this year. The guerrillas in El Sal vador had to turn and face the direction of US troop movements because they were afraid that our forces might have attacked or might have backed up a Hon duran attack against them. So we played a positive role in blunting the Salvadoran guerrilla actions. (S) President Reagan: I think there is merit to continuing the current negotiating ses sion with the Nicaraguans, which has already begun because the press is eager to paint us as having failed again, and we don’t want to let Nicaragua get off the hook. However, we should see these talks as only an adjunct to the Contadora. What we are doing with the Nicaraguans is that our special ambassador is there to help the Contadora process along. (S) Secretary Shultz: Our Aide Memoire place heavy emphasis on the Contadora proc ess. We have no intention of getting a separate bilateral agreement or treaty. If there is any glory to be obtained, then we are hoping to have the Contadora coun tries get this if they can get a good treaty. I am of the same mind as you, Mr. Presi dent, that we must get the funds for the Contras. (S
President Reagan: The Contra funding is like the MX spending.22 It is what will keep the pressure on Nicaragua, and the only way we are going to get a good Con tadora treaty is if we keep the pressure on. (S) Amb. Kirkpatrick: Mr. President I am no expert on legislative relations, but in the last week I have spoken with many congressmen, and, from what I have heard, they feel that the Administration has not attached the same priority to getting funds for the Contras as we have for the MX program and NATO issues. We have not made the impression that if the Congress cuts off the Contra funding this is of major importance to the Administration. On the question of who negotiates with whom we should remember that the Mexicans have always wanted the US and Cuba in the negotiation process. If we would go along with this path of bilateral negotia tions with Nicaragua as the Mexicans want, we will sooner (and I mean before No vember) face the issue of the Cubans being included. I can tell you, Mr. President, that Venezuela, Colombia, and other countries in the region do not want Cuba involved directly and they do not want the United States involved in direct talks. They have approached the United Nations Secretary General in order to invite him to help the Contadora process along. But if we start direct bilateral negotiations with Nicaragua, then Colombia, Panama, and maybe even Venezuela will blame us for their failure. The Foreign Ministers in those countries, in my judgment, lack ex perience, and they definitely do not want us involved right now. (S) Secretary Shultz: Mexico, Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela say they are delighted with our initiative. Concerning our efforts in Congress to obtain the anti-Sandinista funding, Senator Kasten and others say we have really worked on this issue. In the House of Representatives General Vessey and I went up to the Congress and offered to brief the full House of Representatives on Central America—about 150 Members came. We had a good discussion. I have also spent an hour-and-a quarter on with [House Speaker] Tip O’Neill on this issue—this may be the first time he has listened to anyone from the Administration talk to him about this. (S) Mr. Casey: It is essential that we tell he Congress what will happen if they fail to provide the funding for the anti-Sandinistas. At the same time, we can go ahead in trying to help obtain funding for the anti-Sandinistas from other sources; the find ing does say explicitly ‘‘the United States should cooperate with other govern ments and seek support of other governments.’’ The limitation we have in the Congress is the cap on US spending: we want to get that lifted. We have met no re sistance from senior members of the intelligence committees to the idea of getting help with third country funding. (S) Mr. Meese: As another non-practicing lawyer I want to emphasize that it’s impor tant to tell the Department of Justice that we want them to find the proper and legal basis which will permit the United States to assist in obtaining third party resources for the anti-Sandinistas. You have to give lawyers guidance when asking them a question. (S) Secretary Weinberger: I agree that we should be giving greater emphasis to obtain ing funding for the anti-Sandinistas. We should make it a major issue with the Congress, Mr. President. I also agree that we should facilitate third party support for the anti-Sandinista groups. Third, I want to emphasize my concerns about the US trying to conduct separate bilateral negotiations with Nicaragua in order to get a regional settlement. We should be supporting the Contadora countries in order to help them get a good treaty; we should not be taking the lead in doing this our selves. And, I believe we would have much better success with Congress if we are seen as helping others to obtain a good Contadora treaty and that there would be negative effects if Mexico and Cuba are seen as coming into the whole negotiating process. Honduras is not eager to have the United States undertake separate bilat eral negotiations with Nicaragua. In fact, they are very alarmed about this and that is why they are starting to pull away from security cooperation with us. (S) Mr. McFarlane: With regard to diplomacy, Secretary Shultz should recommend specific measures so that the negotiating process will, in fact, be perceived as sup portive of these friendly Central American countries in order to obtain a good Con tadora treaty. The Secretary of Defense can propose such additional activities as may help our friends meet the coming guerrilla offensive in El Salvador and improve the morale of our friends in the region; Jim Baker and Ed Meese might examine the best way of getting additional money to expand our public affairs efforts and to have a greater impact in the Congress and to obtain an opinion from the Attorney General. (S) Mr. Casey: We need the legal opinion which makes clear that the US has the authority to facilitate third country funding for the anti-Sandinistas; and at the same time, we need to find a way to provide humanitarian assistance to any anti Sandinista and their families who might be going into Costa Rica or Honduras to escape the Nicaraguan military actions against them. We need this humanitarian assistance to be available right away. (S) President Reagan: There are persons now meeting with the Nicaraguans; and with out aborting anything, we do want to keep getting a good Contadora treaty as the focus of our negotiating process. On the anti-Sandinistas, I am behind an all-out push in Congress. We must obtain funds to help these freedom fighters. On the Contadora negotiations, there is a risk right now that our separate talks with the Nicaraguans might be misunderstood, and we need to make sure that does not happen and that our friends know they can rely on us. (S) Secretary Weinberger: We don’t need to shut off or abort any negotiations. As I have said, there is a third way between no negotiations and a separate US/Nicara gua bilateral deal. That third way, Mr. President, is that we continue actively to support our Central American friends in order to get a good Contadora treaty that provides a real solution. (S) Secretary Shultz: Right now Shlaudeman is instructed to talk only about the US Aide Memoire, and we can keep to the Contadora process as the basis of our talks with the Nicaraguans, but then the US negotiating initiative with Nicaragua is no more. (S) President Reagan: I don’t think we should quit on it. (S) Secretary Weinberger: We don’t need to quit—just use the US talks with Nicaragua in order to support our Central American friends and get a good Contadora treaty. (S) President Reagan: I just think, now, to back away from talks will also look like a defeat, but I can’t imagine that Nicaragua will offer anything reasonable in a bilat eral treaty. (S) Mr. McFarlane: The four friendly Central American countries developed a treaty proposal in late April. Secretary Shultz and the four Contadora countries have the text of a draft Contadora treaty that needs a lot of work to become reasonable. One possible agenda item for the US-Nicaragua talks is that the US could talk about the draft Contadora treaty and use the late April document of the Central American four countries to provide criteria for how this treaty needs to be improved. Then, the US can go back to these four Central American countries with Nicaraguan comments on the draft treaty and suggestions for improving it. (S) Mr. Meese: Is there any chance to pass the funds for the anti-Sandinistas before the Congress goes on recess? (S)
Mr. Casey: We estimate that of about 8,000 FDN fighters, 4,000 might decide to get out of Nicaragua once their ammunition runs out in August; and each of these may have about four family members with him. Therefore, these 16,000 possible new refugees need to have humanitarian assistance available by August. (S) Vice President Bush: How can anyone object to the US encouraging third parties to provide help to the anti-Sandinistas under the finding? The only problem that might come up is if the United States were to promise to give these third parties something in return so that some people could interpret this as some kind of an exchange. (S) Mr. Casey: Jim Baker changed his mind as soon as he saw the finding and saw the language. (S) Mr. McFarlane: I propose that there be no authority for anyone to seek third party support for the anti-Sandinistas until we have the information we need, and I cer tainly hope none of this discussion will be made public in any way. (S) President Reagan: If such a story gets out, we’ll all be hanging by our thumbs in front of the White House until we find out who did it. (S) The meeting adjourned at 3:50 P.M. (U)
The next day, Casey and the CIA General Counsel went to Attorney General William French Smith to get an opinion on third-party funding. ‘‘Smith expressed the view that discussions with third countries for such assistance would be permissible as long as it was made clear that the countries must spend their own funds and would not be reimbursed by the United States.’’23 In autumn 1984, another scandal broke out when the press came across Psy chological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare, a CIA manual written for the Contras that included advice on subjects such as how to target local officials so as to maximize the political and propaganda effects.24 Several investigations were launched. The White House renewed its commitment not to permit assassina tion. The CIA concluded that it had been written and distributed by a contract agent without official authorization or review, and that the press exaggerated the nature of the manual. In any event, the agency suffered from the episode. Not only did Congress refuse to appropriate further funds for the Contras in the wake of the mining scandal, in October 1984 it passed the second Boland Amendment. This one did away with the ambiguous language of the first. Indeed, it appeared to make every effort to close off any possible loophole.
SEC. 8066. (a) During the fiscal year 1985, no funds available to the Central Intelli gence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organiza tion, movement, or individual.
Of course, there are always loopholes. In this case, the line that stood out was ‘‘involved in intelligence activities.’’ In late 1984, responsibility for the Con tra operation was transferred from the CIA to the staff of the NSC, which nor mally had no operational responsibilities whatsoever, let alone involvement in intelligence activities. The focal point on the staff would be Lt. Col. Oliver L. North. As for funding, the administration set out on a three-track course: (1) to pursue funding from other countries, (2) to encourage donations by private citi zens, and (3) to lobby Congress to renew direct aid. In the meantime, Deputy Director for Intelligence Gates decided to ‘‘talk absolutely straight about Nicaragua,’’ laying out his view of the situation for Casey. Gates was disturbed by what he saw as a disconnect between the admin istration’s apocalyptic rhetoric regarding a threat in Central America and its failure to promote an open and consistent policy. To be sure, his vision of what needed to be done (‘‘ridding the Continent of this regime’’) was a far cry from that which prevailed in Congress. Striking are the assertions that Nicaragua was armed ‘‘far beyond its defensive needs’’ (which did not seem to take into account that it was under attack by the United States, even if only indirectly) and that the United States had been trying to reach ‘‘some sort of an accommo dation,’’ which the Nicaraguans were not reciprocating. Note that, in his mem oir, Gates says that he knew little about the private funding of the Contras and nothing about the NSC’s operational role until he became Deputy Director of Central Intelligence in April 1986.25
 14 December 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT: Nicaragua
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Deputy Director for Intelligence SUBJECT: Nicaragua
1. It is time to talk absolutely straight about Nicaragua. To recap where we are: s Based on all the assessments we have done, the Contras, even with Amer ican support, cannot overthrow the Sandinista regime. Whatever small chance they had to do that has been further diminished by the new weap onry being provided by the Soviets and Cubans. s The Soviets and Cubans are turning Nicaragua into an armed camp with military forces far beyond its defensive needs and in a position to intimi date and coerce its neighbors. s The Nicaraguan regime is steadily moving toward consolidation of a Marxist-Leninist government and the establishment of a permanent and well-armed ally of the Soviet Union and Cuba on the mainland of the Western Hemisphere. Its avowed aim is to spread further revolution in the Americas. s The FDN has been denied American assistance. Without further assis tance by February, all the information we have suggests the Contras are going to begin heading into Honduras. The Hondurans will then be faced with some 12,500 armed fighters (whom the Honduras see as closely aligned with Alvarez, thereby potentially unsettling Honduras itself).26 s Flight of the Contras into Honduras will be followed not only by their families but presumably by a second wave of refugees and others who, seeing abandonment of American efforts to force the Sandinistas to alter their regime, will see the handwriting on the wall, determine that their personal futures are in peril and leave the country. It is altogether con ceivable that we could be looking at an initial refugee wave from Nicara gua over the first year of 150,000 to 200,000 people (the families of the Contras alone could account for 50,000). s Failure of the United States to provide further assistance to the resistance and collapse of the Contra movement would force Honduras to accom modate to the Nicaraguan regime. One result of this would be  the complete reopening of the channels of arms support to the Salvadoran in surgency, thereby reversing the progress made in recent months. s These unsettled political and military circumstances in Central America would undoubtedly result in renewed capital flight from Honduras and Guatemala and result in both new hardship and political instability throughout the region. 2. These are strong assertions but our research as well as the reports of our people on the spot (for example our COS [Chief of Station] in Honduras) make it possible to substantiate each of the above points. 3. What is happening in Central America in many ways vividly calls to mind the old saw that those who forget the past are condemned to repeat it. s In 1958–60 we thought that we could reach some sort of an accommoda tion with Castro that would encourage him to build a pluralistic govern ment in Cuba. We have been trying to do the same thing with the Nicaraguans, with the same success. s In Vietnam, our strategy consisted of a series of measures applied very gradually and over a long period of time. With each step of new US involvement the gradual approach enabled the enemy to adjust to each new turn of the screw so that by the end of the war, even in the face of the most severe bombing, the Vietnamese had developed enormous toler ance. Half measures, half-heartedly applied, will have the same result in Nicaragua. s In 1975, The United States President announced that American assistance to UNITA in Angola was in the national interest of the United States and strongly urged the Congress to support military assistance to that group. The Congress turned it down, thereby not only proving that the United States would not involve itself in any significant way in the Third World to combat Soviet subversion and activity but, moreover, that the Congress could effectively block any moves the President did wish to make. The Boland Amendment and the cutoff of aid to the Contras is having the same effect again, showing the Soviets and our Third World friends how little has changed in nine years, even with a President like Ronald Reagan. s In a variety of places, including Vietnam, negotiations in effect became a cover for the consolidation and further expansion of Communist control. While they might observe whatever agreements were reached for the first weeks or as long as American attention (particularly media attention) was focused on the situation, they knew they could outlast our attention span. Usually within a relatively short period of time they were openly violating whatever agreements had been achieved. 4. The truth of the matter is that our policy has been to muddle along in Nicar agua with an essentially half-hearted policy substantially because there is no agreement within the Administration or with the Congress on our real objectives. We started out justifying the program on the basis of curtailing the flow of weapons to El Salvador. Laudable though that objective might have been, it was attacking a symptom of a larger problem in Central Amer ica and not the problem itself. 5. It seems to me that the only way that we can prevent disaster in Central America is to acknowledge openly what some have argued privately: that the existence of a Marxist-Leninist regime in Nicaragua closely allied with the Soviet Union and Cuba is unacceptable to the United States and that the United States will do everything in its power short of invasion to put that regime out. Hopes of causing the regime to reform itself for a more pluralistic government are essentially silly and hopeless. Moreover, few believe that all those weapons and the more to come are only for defense purposes. Only when we acknowledge what the objective is in Central America, can we begin to have any kind of rational discussion on how to achieve it. As long as one maintains the fig leaf of curtailing the flow of arms to El Salvador, all other efforts an easily be politically dismissed. 6. Once you accept that ridding the Continent of this regime is important to our national interest and must be our primary objective, the issue then becomes a stark one. You either acknowledge that you are willing to take all necessary measures (short of military invasion) to bring down that regime or you admit that you do not have the will to do anything about the problem and you make the best deal you can. Casting aside all fictions, it is the latter course we are on. Even new funding for the Contras, particularly in light of the new Soviet weaponry, is an inadequate answer to this problem. The Contras will be able to sustain an insurgency for a time but the cost and the pain will become very high and the resistance eventually will wither. Any negotiated agreement sim ply will offer a cover for the consolidation of the regime and two or three years from now we will be in considerably worse shape than we are now.
What to Do
7. The alternative to our present policy—which I predict ultimately and inevita bly is leading to the consolidation of the Nicaraguan regime and our facing a second Cuba in Central America—is overtly to try to bring down the regime. This involves a mustering of political force and will, first of all within the Administration, and second with the Congress, that we have not seen on any foreign policy issue (apart from our defense rearmament) in many years. It seems to me that this effort would draw upon the following measures: s Withdrawal of diplomatic recognition of the regime in Managua and the recognition of a government in exile. s Overt provision to the government in exile of military assistance, funds, propaganda support and so forth including major efforts to gain addi tional support in international community, including real pressure. s Economic sanctions against Nicaragua, perhaps even including a quaran tine. These sanctions would affect both exports and imports and would be combined with internal measures by the resistance to maximize the economic dislocation to the regime. s Politically most difficult of all, the use of air strikes to destroy a consider able portion of Nicaragua’s military buildup (focusing particularly on the tanks and helicopters). This would be accompanied by an announcement that the United States did not intend to invade Nicaragua but that no more arms deliveries of such weapons would be permitted. 8. These are hard measures. They probably are politically unacceptable. But it is time to stop fooling ourselves about what is going to happen in Central America. Putting our heads in the sand will not prevent the events that I out lined at the beginning of this note. Can the United States stand a second Cuba in the Western Hemisphere? One need only look at the difficulty that Cuba has caused this country over the past 25 years to answer that question. 9. The fact is that the Western Hemisphere is the sphere of influence of the United States. If we have decided totally to abandon the Monroe Doctrine, if in the 1980s taking strong actions to protect our interests despite the hail of criticism is too difficult, then we ought to save political capital in Washing ton, acknowledge our helplessness, and stop wasting everybody’s time. 232 The Central Intelligence Agency 10. Without a comprehensive campaign openly aimed at bringing down the re gime, at best we somewhat delay the inevitable. Without US funding for the Contras, the resistance essentially will collapse over the next year or two. While seeking funding from other countries to the Contras could help for a time, it is essential to recognize that almost as important as the money is the fact of the United States support both from an economic and political stand point. Somehow, knowing that Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore are behind you does not carry the same weight. Economic sanctions surely would have a significant impact in the initial months, but unless accompa nied by a broad range of other actions this impact will diminish over time and we will find ourselves with a Nicaragua even more closely attached to the Soviet Union and Cuba than we have now. 11. All this may be politically out of the question. Probably. But all the cards ought to be on the table and people should understand the consequences of what we do and do not do in Nicaragua. Half measures will not even pro duce half successes. The course we have been on (even before the funding cut-off—as the last two years suggest—will result in further strengthening of the regime and a Communist Nicaragua which, allied with its Soviet and Cuban friends, will serve as the engine for the destabilization of Central America. Even a well funded Contra movement cannot prevent this; indeed, relying on and supporting the Contras as our only action may actually has ten the ultimate, unfortunate outcome. /initialed/ Robert M. Gates
Gates was right about one thing. His proposals were politically out of the question at the time, even within the administration. (Nonetheless, he would be justly hailed as a moderate in the George W. Bush administration in 2006.) Gates complained that neither the administration nor Congress was willing to elaborate clear goals or take an unambiguous stand, either granting full public support for the Contras or cutting them off completely and ending the situa tion.27 In the meantime, however, the administration was quietly seeking for eign sources of funding to continue a low-scale Contra war in defiance of Congress. A 107-paragraph summary provided by the government in 1989 as evidence in the case of United States of America v. Oliver L. North provides some details on those efforts. Here are a few excerpts from that document:
You are instructed that the United States has admitted for purposes of this trial the following facts to be true
1. In 1983, DCI Casey asked Secretary of Defense Weinberger if the Department of Defense (DoD) could obtain infantry weapons that Israel had confiscated from PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] forces. Following discussions between Major General Meron of Israel and Retired Major General Richard Secord of the United States government (‘‘USG’’), Israel secretly provided several hundred tons of weapons to the DoD on a grant basis in May 1983. This was known as Operation TIPPED KETTLE. In February 1984, the CIA asked DoD if it could obtain additional PLO weapons from Israel at little or no cost for CIA operation use. After negotiations between March 1984 and July 1984, Israel secretly provided the additional weapons to DoD in Opera tion TIPPED KETTLE II. The DoD then transferred the weapons to the CIA. Although the CIA advised Congress that the weapons would be used for various purposes, in fact many of them were provided to the Nicaraguan Re sistance as appropriated funds ran out. (The effort to funnel materiel to the Contras at a time when there were limits on the amount of funds the USG could spend to support the Resistance also found expression in 1984 in Pro ject ELEPHANT HERD, under which the CIA was to stockpile weapons and materiel provided by DoD at the lowest possible cost under the Economy Act.) DoD assured Israel that, in exchange for the weapons, the U.S. Govern ment would be as flexible as possible in its approach to Israeli military and economic needs, and that it would find a way to compensate Israel for its as sistance within the restraints of the law and U.S. policy. 2. In late March 1984, National Security Advisor Robert C. McFarlane sug gested that he pursue funding alternatives for the Resistance for use after Congressional funding ran out. McFarlane proposed putting a member of the NSC staff in touch with an Israeli official to pursue funding alternatives with the Israelis. In an ‘‘Eyes Only’’ Secret memo, DCI Casey informed McFarlane that the CIA was exploring two alternative means of acquiring equipment and materiel from Israel for use by the Resistance after the fund ing ran out. First, the CIA was considering the acquisition from Israel of ordnance captured from the PLO. Casey advised McFarlane that in 1983 the USG had acquired some $10 million worth of weapons and ammunition in this manner from the Israelis (in Operation TIPPED KETTLE). Second, the CIA was considering procuring additional assistance from another country. Casey informed McFarlane that a foreign government official had indicated that he might be able to make some equipment and training available to the Resistance through Honduras. [...] 4. In early 1984, in a discussion with the Ambassador from Saudi Arabia, McFarlane encouraged that country to support the Resistance. A short time later, the Ambassador informed McFarlane that his government would con tribute $1 million per month. The money became available during the early summer of 1984. [...] 6. In late summer and early fall 1984, CIA stations reported to CIA Headquar ters concerning apparent offers by the People’s Republic of China (‘‘PRC’’) to provide assistance to the Resistance. 7. At a meeting in mid-July 1984 between DCI Casey, Deputy DCI John McMa hon, and Deputy Secretary of State Dam, Casey indicated that those present ought to get moving on non-USG funding for the Resistance since Attorney General [William French] Smith had recently concluded that raising the funds in this manner would not be an impeachable offense, as had been suggested at the NSPG meeting on June 25, 1984. [...] 11. General John Vessey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (‘‘CJCS’’), followed up on LtCol North’s approach to the PRC military officer. The PRC agreed to provide anti-aircraft missiles to the Resistance, and Retired General Richard Secord consummated the transaction and arranged shipment through Guate mala. The CIA reported the details of this transaction to McFarlane. [...] 16. In early 1985, President Reagan urged the Head of State of Saudi Arabia to continue its support for the Resistance. Saudi Arabia subsequently made a contribution of more than $25 million. 17. In early February 1985, LtCol North advised McFarlane that, as a conse quence of Singlaub’s28 recent trip, both the Taiwanese and the South Kore ans had indicated to U.S. officials that they would help the Resistance. Claire George, CIA Deputy Director of Operations (‘‘DDO’’), withheld dis semination of the offers and contacted LtCol North privately to ensure that they would not become common knowledge. LtCol North sought and received McFarlane’s permission to have Singlaub approach officials of the Embassies of Taiwan and South Korea to urge them to proceed with their offers, Singlaub would then put [Resistance leader Adolfo] Calero in direct contact with the officials As secret, foreign sources of funding were being sought, Oliver North was arranging for the collection of donations from private citizens, while concealing the administration’s orchestration of the effort. These would help cover costs for nonmilitary supplies, such as food, while third-country donations covered expenses for arms. It also would serve as part of a public explanation of how the Contras were still getting funds when Congress had cut them off.
March 16, 198
 SUBJECT: Fallback Plan for the Nicaraguan Resistance
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Deputy Director for Intelligence SUBJECT: Nicaragua